Viewing cable 09RIODEJANEIRO353, A VISIT TO A PACIFIED FAVELA

Viewing cable 09RIODEJANEIRO353, A VISIT TO A PACIFIED FAVELA

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09RIODEJANEIRO353	2009-10-27 17:05	2010-12-07 09:09	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Consulate Rio De Janeiro

VZCZCXRO2531
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHRI #0353/01 3001734
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271734Z OCT 09 ZDS
FM AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5146
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1428
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3551
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0002

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIO DE JANEIRO 000353 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA.2 AND PARA.6) 

SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV BR
SUBJECT: A VISIT TO A PACIFIED FAVELA 

REF: a) RIO 346, b) RIO 329 

RIO DE JAN 00000353 001.2 OF 003 

¶1. (SBU) Summary: On 16 October 2009 Principal Officer and consulate 

officers joined Rio State Secretary of Security Beltrame and police 

officials for a visit to Dona Marta, the first favela formally

considered "pacified" under the state government's Favela Pacification

Program (ref b). Along with Dona Marta, four other favelas are

considered pacified at present. Rio police entered the Dona Marta

favela in December 2008, pushing out drug gang members who had

dominated the area, establishing community policing and introducing

public utilities and other services into the community. Dona Marta

now appears generally calm and secure, with a permanent Pacification

Police Unit (UPP) presence in place, but Beltrame said additional

services and assistance to the favela's population needed to consolidate

gains are lagging. The experience with Dona Marta seems encouraging

thus far, but also points up, per comment below, some lessons going

forward: i.e., that favelas will have distinctive characteristics that

must be taken into account, that there is a pressing need for additional

civilian agency and NGO support for the FPP, and that the momentum 

crucial for the FPP's success over time will require, in Beltrame's own

assessment, successful pacification of 30-40 favelas (out of more than

1,000 in Rio) where gang dominance and violence are most severe.

End summary. 

¶2. (SBU) On 16 October, one day before an outbreak of widespread drug

gang violence in Rio's northern zone (ref a), Principal Officer, 

accompanied by Rio State Security Secretary Jose Mariano Beltrame and

by state police and consulate officers, visited Dona Marta 

(aka Santa Marta), the first Rio favela to be formally considered

"pacified" under the state government's Favela Pacification Program 

(ref b). Four other favelas are currently considered pacified, i.e.,

mostly free of gang activity and with the population accessible for

city services and social assistance. Home to an estimated 15,000 

persons, the Dona Marta favela climbs a steep hill directly above the

Botafogo area of the city's affluent South Zone. It is a maze of 

improvised brick and plywood dwellings, spread along twisting, narrow

paths (recently improved with concrete surfaces). The favela fits within

a relatively compact space bordered by two walls that separate the 

favela from an ecological preserve. A funicular-type street car on a 

track runs along one side of the favela. The Dona Marta favela was 

occupied by authorities under the FPP plan in December 2008, and Beltrame

explained that state authorities had followed closely the FPP model in

entering Dona Marta. (Comment. This approach is reminiscent of "clear,

hold and build" in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, as discused in ref

b. End comment.) After Beltrame personally visited the favela to 

advise residents that the police "were coming in and coming to stay,"

state military police, spearheaded by the Special Operations Battalion

(BOPE), entered Dona Marta in late 2008, resulting in some confrontations

(accounts of the level of violence vary) with local elements of the 

major Rio drug gang Commando Vermelho (Red Command) which controlled the

area. Most gang members ultimately fled, and the gang leader who had 

ruled the favela for many years was arrested and transferred to a 

maximum security prison. His house - situated on commanding high ground 

in the favela - has been turned into a police observation post. 

¶3. (SBU) Within a month from the initial police invasion, Dona Marta 

was free of gang dominance, Beltrame said. State authorities established

a Police Pacification Unit (UPP) station in an abandoned crhche 

building at the summit of the favela, with 120 UPP police officers 

full time (2x 12-hour shifts) in the favela. The UPP policemen are 

specially trained in the community policing techniques that, under

the plan's doctrine, are intended to win the trust of the local 

population and increase their access to civil services and governance

(ref b). Utilities companies brought regular electrical power and 

sanitary plumbing to the favela for the first time, and Dona Marta 

residents willingly paid the new utilities bills, since a documented

history of paid city services can enable favela residents to claim 

legal title to the property on which their makeshift dwellings are built,

Beltrame explained. Beltrame lamented, however, that other services and

projects that needed to come into the favela quickly to consolidate 

hope for a better future within the population were not materializing 

rapidly enough. He stressed both civilian agencies in the state government

and civil society groups needed to be more directly and broadly engaged

in the FPP; "the police cannot do it all," he added. 

¶4. (SBU) Walking through Dona Marta with Beltrame and the UPP station

commander, a female military police captain who appeared to be a beloved

figure to many of the favela's children, PO noted a general sense of

calm (many favela residents were away at jobs during the weekday morning,

and mainly children, young mothers and elderly persons were in evidence).

Starting at the UPP station, PO saw police volunteers giving classes in

karate to several children and adolescents from the community, and also

coaching soccer on a field built by the police next to the station.

In a grim reminder of life in Dona Marta before pacification, one wall

of the former crhche-turned-UPP station was pockmarked with gun shots

- Beltrame indicated it had been an execution site used by favela 

criminals. The UPP station also had a small operations center, with

TV screens showing images from surveillance cameras posted throughout

the favela. Beltrame pointed out to PO several spots where 

traffickers had controlled access throughout the favela, and 

indicating the choke points and gang fighting positions had been 

mapped out by police in advance of the invasion. A young boy from 

the neighborhood acted as guide to lead PO and the group to a rough 

patio overlooking Rio - a location that is Dona Marta's claim to fame,

the site of the filming of a famous Michael Jackson music video from 

the 1990s. Beltrame said that persistent rumor in the favela indicated

Jackson's production group paid local traffickers to assure security

for the video's production. 

¶5. (SBU) Near the base of Dona Marta, Beltrame and PO waited for the

funicular cable car that serves three stops along the favela's steep

incline. A large group of print and media reporters interviewed PO 

and Beltrame, indicating the high degree of interest in the FPP - and 

the way it is being perceived abroad - in the Rio public. Leaving the

favela and entering the first paved street at the foot of the Dona 

Marta hill in Botafogo (favela residents call the regular neighborhoods

of the city "the asphalt"), Beltrame pointed out several snack stalls

along the street that appeared to have closed down. He said those 

small businesses had catered to Rio residents - many from the middle

class - who had driven the street at night, seeking to buy cocaine 

from Dona Marta's gang dealers. Those small-scale merchants had 

actually protested to police that the pacification of the favela had

been bad for their business, adding their complaints, Beltrame mused,

to others doubtless expressed by the drug gang's customers, who had

lost the "drive through" cocaine purchase venue afforded by Dona 

Marta's proximity to Botafogo's busy streets. As Beltrame and PO 

prepared to depart, the president of the favela residents association

approached and told Beltrame that "things are going well" and, 

despite some "specific problems" (NFI), the community is optimistic 

and will continue to cooperate with authorities. 

¶6. (SBU) Comment: Dona Marta is receiving a lot of attention as the 

test case for the FPP, and a bellwether of whether this new strategic

approach can actually create conditions for fundamentally altering 

Rio's abysmally violent environment for the better. That may be more

scrutiny than the relatively small community spreading on a hill 

above Botafogo can justify in terms of drawing clear and persuasive

conclusions, but the experience of the FPP in Dona Marta in its 

initial seems encouraging. The visit to the favela reinforced a number

of observations on favelas and the FPP approach: --Every favela will

be distinctive: Dona Marta is the FPP prototype, but its relatively

small size, terrain features and other social aspects make it a 

somewhat easier proposition than many other favelas, such as the Morro

dos Maccacos, where the police helicopter was shot down (ref a), or 

the massive Complexo de Alemao, which is a veritable fortress of the 

senior leaders of the Commando Vermelho. Successful pacification of

Complexo de Alemao will be iconic for the city's effort to reclaim 

the favelas, but also likely will be "traumatic" in terms of the scale

of violence, according to Beltrame (ref b), perhaps resembling the 

battles in Fallujah more than a conventional urban police operation.

Other favelas will be nearly as hard. Political leaders will have to

prepare Rio - and Brazil - for that reality. --Police are not enough:

The FPP strategy contemplates police pushing traffickers out, securing

favelas and winning their residents' confidence with the UPP. However,

it was never envisaged in the plan that police would also be the 

primary, long-term arbiters for provision of city services to residents,

and main providers of volunteers for social action projects. Yet that

is what is happening, according to Beltrame, as civilian government 

agencies and NGOs have yet to fall in on the FPP doctrine in any 

organized and robust fashion. In Dona Marta, with the exception of a

few tutors and computer instructors who volunteered individually,

police officers are doing everything from assisting residents with 

requests for utilities to coaching sports. There is no cadre of civilian

government and NGO personnel to handle those tasks, nor evidence of

systematic programming for additional services (beyond basic light and

water) on the horizon. If such a vacuum persists, it will wear down 

police capacity and lead to frustration among residents in pacified 

favelas, threatening the initial gains in those areas. --Momentum is 

crucial: The past week in Rio is an example of how events - especially

sudden and violent ones - can derail best-laid plans for the FPP's 

progression. Whatever next steps were planned under the FPP, the entire

machinery of Rio's security structure was suddenly deployed in dragnet

actions against favelas thought to house the leaders of the attack 

against the police helicopter, which captured national and world 

attention. The gunmen get a vote, and outlasting and besting them 

will require a combination of persistence and tactical patience - a

willingness to adjust and even delay action at times -- while 

remaining committed to the strategic plan. Beltrame seems aware of

this, and will also pick and chose his fights. Rio has an estimated 

1,000 favelas encompassing approximately 3 million people, but 

Beltrame cautiously believes he can achieve strong momentum if he

can pacify between 30-40 favelas with the largest concentrations

of criminal activity over the next two or so years. 

¶7. (SBU) While much of the current international attention on Rio 

stems from the Rio's selection to host the Olympics in 2016 and the

recent spectacular violence that closely followed the Olympics 

announcement, most Rio residents see the issue in even more profound

terms. As Rio Governor Sergio Cabral noted recently, Brazil has a

track record for successfully securing major athletic events, but

the greater challenge for Rio is to create a permanent change in 

the city, addressing the favelas and the profound social problems 

they present with a comprehensive and sustained strategy that can 

fundamentally alter the security environment, economy and quality of 

the life in the city for the long term. HEARNE