Viewing cable 09RIODEJANEIRO357, C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"

Viewing cable 09RIODEJANEIRO357, C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09RIODEJANEIRO357	2009-11-03 14:02	2010-12-07 09:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Consulate Rio De Janeiro

VZCZCXRO7589
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHRI #0357/01 3071411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031411Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5151
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1433
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3554
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0005

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT" 

REF: A. (A) RIO 329 
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for 

reasons 1.4 (b, d ) 

¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23

October with XXXX (strictly protect),  XXX for the International 

Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience

in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many

Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal

armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX 

recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de

jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed

conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes 

a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working

in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting

to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the

wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies

to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet 

granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of 

extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed

megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more

than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect

of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and 

state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary. 

¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought

by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument

that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all

practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said

he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian 

sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every 

detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under 

International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in

Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in

its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly 

on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions

or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians

trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for

ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian 

spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations

worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international

organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with

conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, 

including in Haiti, in Uganda  and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the

course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations:

--Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas,

Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and 

Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s 

senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the 

state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he 

noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice

Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian

spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first 

using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In 

concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions 

to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe 

areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate 

release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water)

to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence

inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working

with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment

and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF

closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when

it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded

citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict

in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building

up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with

leaders of gangs and militias,  as well as with police. Contact with 

gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in

contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and 

mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses 

clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance

to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC

also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX 

allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts 

to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned 

primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by

gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned

gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not

political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there

is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by 

family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional

violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang

may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they 

attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds

the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based 

Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending 

government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but

does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change 

the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC

must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out

his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters

building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian

Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in

the favelas. 

¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX 

assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional

makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas

as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply 

urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival

criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political

or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic

areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated

favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command

and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the

horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble

combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal

distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized

throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring

within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill 

outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed

megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one 

of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy

may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders 

can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 

Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government.

There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague

of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen 

whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level

public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security

will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal 

armed conflict. HEARNE