tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13095795487504069922024-03-13T22:14:09.577-07:00WikiLeaks: CablegateCablegate: 250,000 US Embassy Diplomatic Cables
2010-11-28
On Sunday 28th Novembre 2010, Wikileaks began publishing 251,287 leaked United States embassy cables, the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain.
Meanwhile I started to deposit only the telegrams classified as: CONFIDENTIAL; CONFIDENTIAL/NOFOR; SECRET; SECRET/NOFOR.
Conducts research on the rectangle located in the upper left.amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.comBlogger2551125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-83971911412413447902011-02-01T14:49:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:49:31.924-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 08MEXICO1487, SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT TO MEXICO OF FBI DEPUTY</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#08MEXICO1487</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html">08MEXICO1487</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2008-05_0.html">2008-05-16 14:02</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-23_0.html">2011-01-23 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/3_0.html" title="confidential">SECRET</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/68_0.html">Embassy Mexico</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO6479
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #1487/01 1371454
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 161454Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1886
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 001487
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2027
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PTER_0.html">PTER</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KCRM_0.html">KCRM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SNAR_0.html">SNAR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/MX_0.html">MX</a>
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT TO MEXICO OF FBI DEPUTY
DIRECTOR JOHN S. PISTOLE, MAY 21-23, 2008
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (U) Welcome to Mexico City. Mexico is key to USG
success in combating a wide array of transnational security
threats which undermine our ability to confront global
terrorism. A stew of widespread criminality, drug
trafficking, corruption and impunity has created an enabling
environment for a variety of ill-intended elements here.
There is much good news, however: the U.S. - Mexico
relationship on security issues, including counter-terrorism
and counter-narcotics, is excellent and we have no evidence
that foreign terrorist organizations have gained a foothold
here. Equally important, a resolute president is taking
aggressive actions to combat organized crime that will make
Mexico an even more valued partner in years to come. Your
visit here will provide an excellent overview of Mexico's
challenging security environment. While your interlocutors
will have well-defined opinions on the nature of the security
challenges facing Mexico -- that do not always reflect our
own thinking -- engaging them will advance our dialogue
greatly.
Mexico's Security Environment and Commitment
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (U) Mexico remains relatively inhospitable to local and
international terrorist groups intending to operate within
the country. In July and September of 2007, the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR), a domestic guerrilla group,
attacked oil and gas pipelines, causing significant economic
damage. Several months ago, this group issue a communiquQ
threatening CISEN, Mexico's civilian intelligence
organization. Attacks, however, are sporadic and it is
doubtful domestic groups have the wherewithal to make an
impact with sustained armed operations. More recently, EPR
and the GOM have been floating possible scenarios under which
they would entertain a dialogue but have yet to reach
agreement.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (S) Mexican authorities are receptive to concerns raised
by foreign governments regarding potential infiltration by
foreign groups, stepping up security and surveillance when
circumstances warrant, investigating special interest aliens
and taking action against human trafficking and smuggling
operations that might be exploited by terrorists. (A March
2007 procedural change, however, has complicated this
picture. Instead of holding SIAs in one central facility
near the capital, migration authorities now detain and
release such individuals where they are originally found,
complicating our ability to investigate and track them. CBP
has been working with senior migration officials, who are
sympathetic to our concerns. On a positive note, CISEN,
which is our primary interlocutor on counterterrorism, has
allowed USG officers to interview foreign nationals detained
at Mexican immigration detention centers dispersed around the
country for potential CT information of interest.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (U) Mexico strengthened its anti-terrorism regime last
year with passage of legislation outlawing terrorist
financing and associated money laundering, significantly
toughening penalties for a variety of terror-related
activities in the process. While the legislation lacked some
important provisions, such as assets forfeiture measures, it
represented a significant step forward in suppressing those
who plan, facilitate, finance or commit terrorist acts. It
is also worth noting, that the judicial reform bill passed in
February includes provisions for asset forfeiture. Money
laundering remains a serious problem and Mexico needs to
dedicate more resources to combat this problem.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (S) The GOM coordinates well with the USG in a variety of
counter-terror areas. Mexico has begun exploring programs
designed to deter terrorists from using Mexico's seaports as
staging areas for introducing terror-related materials.
Mexico cooperates with USG elements in countering money
laundering activity and its military is actively looking to
gain greater control over its vast maritime zone through
equipment upgrades and counter drug initiatives. CISEN and
DNI's Open Source Center recently negotiated a formal
information sharing arrangement which will permit
subscription to each other's open source products.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (U) In July 2007, the Mexican Government created the
Specialized High-Level Committee on International
Disarmament, Terrorism, and Security -- otherwise known as
the National Authority -- to "unify, coordinate, design, and
articulate the government of Mexico's public policies to
comply with international obligations on disarmament,
nonproliferation and terrorism." CISEN is the titular head
of the National Authority which is to serve as a coordination
MEXICO 00001487 002 OF 003
entity. The other permanent members include the Foreign
Ministry (SRE), the Finance Ministry, the Defense Ministry
(SEDENA), the Navy (SEMAR), the Attorney General's Office
(PGR), the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), and the
Transportation and Public Communications Ministry. The
National Authority consists of six permanent working groups
including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons,
conventional weapons, terrorism, administrative and legal
harmonization and international security. Tasks undertaken
by the working groups include legislative and administrative
harmonization; export controls consultation; development of a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
(CBRNE) national controls list; the national industry
registrar; industry outreach and awareness; enforcement;
inspection, verification and control; capacity building; and
intelligence sharing.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (U) Areas of concern remain. Mexico's large territory
and traditionally weak enforcement of the movement of peoples
and goods both at its borders and within Mexico make it a
potential transit point for terrorists intending to launch
attacks against the U.S. Moreover, in recent years,
criminality has taken on a growing presence in Mexico and
engendered concern that the government had lost significant
ground in many locales to narco-cartels. Rampant
lawlessness, widespread corruption and the government's
long-standing inability to confront either had been seen as
troubling threat indicators to those watching our southern
border for signs of potential terrorist infiltration.
Aggressive New Posture on Law Enforcement and Security
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (U) In the past year and a half, however, the GOM has
taken aggressive steps to turn the situation around. Since
taking office, Calderon has launched anti-drug operations in
ten states, raised pay for the military, and replaced
numerous high-ranking federal police officers. He launched
improvements to inter-agency communications and oversaw a
successful effort to pass legislation unifying federal police
forces and reform the judicial system. These enhancements, if
fully implemented, should strengthen the GOM's security
capabilities across the board and make it better able to
confront potential challenges from all manner of ill-intended
non-state actors. For the time being, the government's
aggressive posture has provoked violent struggles within and
among cartels as well as attacks on security personnel
producing record numbers of drug related homicides including
the killing of police and military officials
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (U) Calderon has also placed a high premium on
strengthened law enforcement cooperation with the U.S. which
extends on cases run out of the Attorney General's Office
ranging from child pornography and fugitives to kidnapping
and money laundering. He has significantly expanded the
number of criminal extraditions, instructed key members of
his security team to engage their USG counterparts fully and
worked closely with us to develop a joint approach to
counter-narcotics through such efforts as the Merida
Initiative, a program to provide Mexico with $1.4 billion in
assistance to help it combat organized crime. Post's Office
of the Legal AttachQ has provided Mexico's Public Security
Secretariat (SSP) with training in a variety of fields
including counterterrorism, interview techniques, and
fingerprinting; we also sponsored approximately 60 officials
at FBI Training Academy last year for the LEEDS Course. The
emerging pattern of bilateral cooperation across the board is
highly positive and likely to take on momentum in years to
come.
Old Attitudes Complicate Dialogue on Security Issues
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (U) Despite Mexico's commitment to broaden bilateral
cooperation, there are differences between the U.S. and
Mexican approaches to global affairs to be considered when
seeking dialogue with Mexican interlocutors on security and
foreign policy issues. Mexico is still developing an
"over-the-horizon" view of the world and the potential
security threats it throws up. It does not share our
position on the need for robust, forward-based defense of our
security interests in the Near East or South Asia. It places
less emphasis on the potential threat to the region emanating
from groups such as Al-Qaida. It is less nervous about
Iranian diplomatic, economic and political outreach in the
region than we are.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) Closer to home, Mexico has traditionally sought to
play a regional role that is independent of the U.S. With
the exception of the Fox administration, Mexican governments
-- including Calderon's -- have generally sought to maintain
warm ties with Cuba. Similarly, until recently, the GOM had
MEXICO 00001487 003 OF 003
sought to avoid conflict with the current Venezuelan
government. Mexican officials and citizens alike have viewed
the activities of populist governments, and even certain
armed groups, in the region as relatively benign. One senior
official in Mexico's Foreign Relations Secretariat recently
told us that even the FARC had its "historical context" which
conveyed a certain amount of legitimacy to the organization.
You should remember that Mexicans still view global and
regional security issues through a different prism than we do
when discussing such issues.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/05/08MEXICO1487.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) Comment: The Calderon administration has committed
to significantly strengthening the security relationship with
the United States, but remains keen to balance this effort
against its desire to be seen in the region as an influential
-- and independent -- actor. Security cooperation,
particularly in the area of counter terrorism initiatives,
will necessarily be low key for some time to come. That
said, security cooperation in combating organized crime has
never been better. We expect your visit will only reinforce
burgeoning cooperation we are observing across the board when
it comes to law enforcement activities. End Comment.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
and the North AmericanPartnership Blog at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-76161471675296873172011-02-01T14:48:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:48:28.870-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1994, NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: MINISTER TIMMERMANS REGRETS</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#07THEHAGUE1994</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html">07THEHAGUE1994</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2007-11_0.html">2007-11-15 12:12</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 17:05</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1994/01 3191207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151207Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0693
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0701
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0331
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1756
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2193
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0628
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0583</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001994
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EU_0.html">EU</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/RU_0.html">RU</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KV_0.html">KV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/YI_0.html">YI</a>
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: MINISTER TIMMERMANS REGRETS
RUSSIA DEALS
REF: THE HAGUE 1979
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall for reasons 1.5(b) and (d)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 9, Ambassador met with Dutch MFA
Minister for European Affairs Timmermans to discuss Russia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, French President Sarkozy, Timmermans,
upcoming trips to the United States, and plans to commemorate
400 years of American-Dutch relations. Although Timmermans
officially defended the reasons for recent Dutch-Russian
energy deals, he privately confessed disappointment. He also
expressed strong doubt the EU could ever reach consensus on
Kosovo. Timmermans is visiting New York November 16-18, and
will also visit Washington DC November 26-28; he is seeking
high level meetings at State, DOE, NSC, and Capitol Hill (see
para 8). END SUMMARY.
Dutch - Russian Relations
-------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Timmermans stated he was not without concerns about
the latest Dutch-Russian business agreements. However, he
must defend the government's policy. (Note: Timmermans
served previously as a diplomat in Moscow and is known to
advocate a stronger human rights policy toward Russia. On
November 8, Timmermans' fellow MP and Labor Party member
Martijn van Dam criticized PM Balkenende's purported failure
to publicly discuss human rights during the PM's recent visit
to Russia.) Timmermans noted that the positive news is that
engaging Russia is the only way to influence it. There isn't
a level playing field for energy deals, and the Dutch energy
sector needs the deals with Russia. If the Russians don't
make deals and follow through to develop their energy sector,
they will default on their contracts, and the fallout will
hit Germany and then the Netherlands. Timmermans concluded
that he has great concerns...but Russia is not going away.
Kosovo
------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) Timmermans noted that Russia was creating havoc in
the Balkans, and Kosovo will be a messy affair. The
Russians will react strongly (to a Kosovar declaration of
independence), and the European reaction will be all over
the place, I'm afraid. Timmermans was concerned about the
future implications of the EU's outreach to Kosovo: Kosovo
is run by people who live off crime...(they have) no other
means to support themselves.
Afghanistan
-----------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Timmermans had just returned from the Dutch cabinet
meeting, where Afghanistan was discussed only on the
margins. In principle, the first round of cabinet
discussions will take place November 16, and everyone wants
to avoid delay that could mean a January, rather than
December, parliamentary decision (reftel). For Timmermans,
setting an 18-24 month time limit on the Uruzgan deployment
is key -- the deadline should be firm to avoid repeating the
Dutch debate in two years. (Note: Timmermans' statement
reflects the view of the Labor Party. Timmermans added that
his brother will soon go to Afghanistan as a battalion
commander, and that he thinks about the parents of the dead
soldiers in Afghanistan.) The Dutch will not disengage from
Afghanistan any time soon, but will disengage from Uruzgan.
The French decision to deploy in Uruzgan is very good news,
though there was an explicit deal between PM Balkenende and
President Sarkozy -- that the Dutch would deploy to Chad in
exchange for the French deployment to Afghanistan.
Sarkozy
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) President Sarkozy is creating a wonderful opportunity
for the EU and the United States. However, the risk is that
he may overpromise and underdeliver in France and within the
EU. Sarkozy's steps toward NATO are extraordinary.
Timmermans' Trip to the United States, Dutch-U.S. Relations
--------------------------------------------- --------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C/NF) Timmermans wants to make the 2009 celebration of
American-Dutch relations a success. He is working to
focus organizers during his meetings in New York November
16-18. He spoke earlier to New York Governor Spitzer about
the events, and the governor was committed to the issue.
Queen Beatrix has expressed interest in participating (Note:
Please protect. Timmermans asked that the information about
the Queen not be shared.).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Timmermans also commented on Dutch-U.S. relations
after the 2008 elections -- he does not expect much change.
There are few differences among the campaigns on foreign
policy. If the Democrats win the White House, they won't
disengage from Iraq. If the Republicans win, they won't put
any less effort into building relations with Europe.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (SBU) Timmermans thanked the ambassador for agreeing to
help set up meetings for Timmermans' November 26-28 trip to
Washington. He would like to meet with Energy Secretary
Bodman, Under Secretaries Burns and Jeffrey, as well as
senior National Security Council contacts and members of
Congress.
COMMENT:
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1994.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Although his official portfolio covers European and
Cultural Affairs, Timmermans is a major behind-the-scenes
player within the Labor Party (PvdA) on foreign and defense
policy issues generally, including the Uruzgan extension.
Timmermans' support, while still in opposition, for sending
Dutch troops to Uruzgan was one of the key factors convincing
PvdA leader Wouter Bos to support the original deployment
decision in 2005. Now that the issue of a new referendum on
the EU reform treaty has been settled in the Balkenende
government's favor, Timmermans appears to be focusing on
European Energy policy as his next big project. His views on
this subject will carry weight not only within the
Netherlands, but also in EU circles where he is widely
respected. End Comment.
Arnall</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-26565495047824454872011-02-01T14:47:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:47:42.335-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1992, NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: BALKENENDE MIXES BUSINESS</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#07THEHAGUE1992</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html">07THEHAGUE1992</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2007-11_0.html">2007-11-15 12:12</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 17:05</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1992/01 3191206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151206Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0689
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1754
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001992
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2027
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/IR_0.html">IR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/RU_0.html">RU</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KO_0.html">KO</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NL_0.html">NL</a>
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: BALKENENDE MIXES BUSINESS
WITH PRESSURE
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1985
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. POL/ECON IN THE NL 11/09/07 AND 11/14/07
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND E. ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B/D).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: During his November 5-8 visit to Moscow,
Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende engaged Russian President
Putin on tough issues such as Kosovo, Iran, and human
rights in addition to announcing a major multi-billion dollar
gas pipeline deal (reported septels). Balkenende believes
that strong economic ties with Russia and demonstrating
respect for Russian pride are the keys to influencing Putin.
Although Balkenende claimed to have delivered a strong and
clear message on the need to respect democratic norms, he was
later criticized in Parliament for appearing to place Dutch
economic interests ahead of human rights concerns. END
SUMMARY.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) In a November 13 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Dutch
Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende expressed satisfaction
regarding his November 5-8 visit to Moscow. Without directly
referring to the substantial new energy cooperation
agreements announced during the visit -- for which Balkenende
has been criticized in Parliament (refs) -- Balkenende argued
that the Netherlands' growing economic ties to Russia make it
possible to engage Russian President Putin directly on the
most difficult issues. Balkenende stressed that he did not
shy away from discussing sensitive issues, such as human
rights, both in public and in his private conversations with
Putin.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) Balkenende proudly noted that he and Putin were able
to conduct nearly all of their conversations in German,
which, he said, allowed for a more open and direct
conversation than working through translators. Putin, he
added, was obviously a clever guy who was well briefed on
every issue discussed. According to Balkenende, Putin
readily acknowledges that there are serious problems in
Russia, such as corruption, and was willing to listen to
constructive criticism. At the same time, however, Putin
remains sensitive to perceived slights to Russia's status as
a great power, and is motivated -- in Balkenende's view -- as
much by national pride as by geopolitical or economic
considerations. Treating Putin, and Russia, with respect,
therefore, is a necessary first step before engaging on tough
issues.
KOSOVO:
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) According to Balkenende, Putin showed little concern
over the lack of progress on Kosovo. Asked what would happen
if no agreement satisfactory to both sides can be reached by
December 10, Putin told Balkenende: then we go to December
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. Putin also reportedly tried to downplay the potential
for regional instability by noting that other countries in
Europe -- such as Belgium or Ireland -- are also divided
along ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences.
Balkenende dismissed these arguments and stressed that there
is no point in talking and talking without ever reaching a
solution. On the other hand, Balkenende made clear to
Ambassador Arnall that he is deeply worried about divisions
within the EU should Kosovo unilaterally declare
independence, a development that would post the most serious
challenge to the EU in fifteen years.
IRAN/MISSILE DEFENSE:
---------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) On Iran, Balkenende said he had impressed on Putin the
importance of maintaining a united front to ensure Iran does
not succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. He also
underscored the key roles of the IAEA and the UNSC, and the
potential damage to their credibility should Iran continue to
ignore its obligations. Balkenende said Putin had
demonstrated a deep understanding of the situation and
appeared genuinely concerned. He added that the Russians
believed they had detected a new, more positive tone in their
recent dealings with Iran (and with Supreme Leader Khameini
in particular), but did not elaborate. (Note: Per ref A,
MFA Political Director Pieter de Gooijer is in Tehran this
week.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) On the related issue of missile defense, Balkenende
was pleased that recent talks between senior U.S. and Russian
officials appeared to have taken some of the heat out of
Russian opposition to a U.S.-proposed missile shield in
Eastern Europe. That said, the sides clearly remained far
apart and it will be difficult to find a compromise. Putin,
he added, continued to push for increased dialogue between
Russia and NATO on this issue.
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
---------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Balkenende was adamant that he was not afraid to raise
human rights concerns during his visit. He noted that he met
with NGO's working on civil society and rule of law projects
receiving assistance from the Netherlands. In his private
meetings with Putin, and in his press interviews, he had also
stressed the Dutch commitment to democracy and the rule of
law. (Note: Per ref B, Putin apparently later criticized
Balkenende for some of his public remarks.) Balkenende
stressed, however, that such comments would fall on deaf ears
if not accompanied by appropriate gestures of respect and
understanding for Russia's unique situation. Unlike the U.S.
or the Netherlands, Russia has had at most sixteen years of
democracy. Putin, he added, is admired internally for his
strong leadership -- to the point that most Western leaders
should and do envy his popularity ratings.
COMMENT:
--------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/11/07THEHAGUE1992.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) Balkenende was obviously impressed by Putin and feels
that he is someone he can do business with -- literally, in
fact. The announcement of a multi-billion dollar accord
between Gazprom and the Dutch gas company GasUnie during the
visit opened the Prime Minister to criticism -- including
from some members of his own party -- for appearing to place
Dutch economic interests ahead of human rights' concerns.
The fact that the deal was announced the same week the
Foreign Minister publicly presented the Cabinet's new, more
aggressive international Human Rights Policy to Parliament
only heightened the contrast and further motivated
Balkenende's opponents to attack him; at one point, Foreign
Minister Verhagen found himself calling the Prime Minister in
Moscow directly from Parliament for guidance. Several
contacts have since acknowledged that holding the two events
so close together was a serious miscalculation.
Arnall</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-40762627436964010952011-02-01T14:46:00.003-08:002011-02-01T14:46:57.937-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 09ALGIERS370, BOUTEFLIKA REELECTED IN HEAVILY MANAGED CONTEST</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#09ALGIERS370</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html">09ALGIERS370</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2009-04_0.html">2009-04-13 19:07</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/136_0.html">Embassy Algiers</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO5599
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAS #0370/01 1031912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131912Z APR 09 ZDK CTG RUEHNM#3308
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7347
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6738
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1918
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0956
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0544
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000370
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2024
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a>
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA REELECTED IN HEAVILY MANAGED CONTEST
REF: A. ALGIERS 337
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. ALGIERS 331
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#parC" id="parC">¶</a>C. ALGIERS 147
Algiers 00000370 001.14 of 004
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: To the surprise of noone, Algerian President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected to a third term on April 9
in a carefully choreographed and heavily controlled election
with official results the main opposition leader called
"Brezhnevian." Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni
announced in a press conference on April 10 that a record
74.54 percent of over 20 million eligible voters participated
in the election, with Bouteflika receiving 90.24 percent of
the votes. Opposition parties and defeated candidates have
placed actual turnout figures at between 18 and 55 percent,
while informal Embassy observations indicated that the vast
majority of polling stations were empty across the capital,
with actual turnout at 25-30 percent at most. A joint
statement by observer teams from the African Union, Arab
League and Organization of the Islamic Conference was quick
to proclaim the election "fair and transparent," but UN
monitors declined to participate in the statement despite
Algerian government pressure to do so. Their concerns, to be
presented in a private report to UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon, illustrate a system in which opposition parties and
civil society have their backs against the wall and citizens
have little to do with a political process increasingly
detached from society. With Bouteflika's hold on power
secure, Algeria now faces an urgent need for dialogue between
the population and the state, a situation that left the UN
monitors deeply worried about what comes next. END SUMMARY.
Bouteflika's "crushing majority"
--------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Interior Minister Zerhouni officially pronounced
President Bouteflika the victor in the April 9 election
during a press conference at an Algiers hotel on April 10,
closing the final chapter on the President's bid for a third
term made possible by the November 12 revision of the
constitution that removed presidential term limits. Zerhouni
proclaimed that 74.54 percent of Algeria's 20 million
registered voters had gone to the polls the preceding day,
delivering a landslide victory for the incumbent. After the
final vote tally, Zerhouni said Bouteflika landed 90.24
percent of the vote, followed by Worker's Party (PT)
candidate Louisa Hanoune with a distant 4.22 percent, the
Algerian National Front's (FNA) Moussa Touati with 2.31
percent, El Islah's Djahid Younsi with 1.37 percent, Ali
Fouzi Rebaine of Ahd 54 with 0.93 percent, and Mohamed Said
of the unregistered Party for Liberty and Justice (PLJ) in
last place with 0.92 percent.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) As many observers here predicted before the election
(ref A), the official turnout figure has stirred more
controversy than the election result itself. Two hours after
the polls closed on election day, Zerhouni put turnout at
74.11 percent, revising the number slightly upward the next
day. State-run television (ENTV) and the pages of the regime
newspaper El Moudjahid ran images depicting crowds of voters
queuing outside Algiers polling stations. But anecdotal
reports of voter activity suggested Zerhouni's figure to be
greatly exaggerated. Some of our local staff noted that the
crowds of voters on state media appeared dressed for cold
weather, while April 9 was generally warm and sunny,
suggesting that officials used archive footage from previous
elections. The opposition Rally for Culture and Democracy
(RCD) charged that at several polling stations, the Interior
Ministry bussed in loyal voters such as plainclothes police
to create an optic that matched the desired turnout result.
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us the polling stations
he visited with a French journalist were almost empty. In
one case, he met an unemployed man who said he was voting
because he was told to present his voter card in order to
obtain a passport. A woman at another polling station told
xxxxxxxxxxxx she was there to visit her daughter, who was a polling
official, but she did not intend to vote.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Opposition parties boycotting the election and the
defeated candidates gave turnout estimates ranging between 18
and 55 percent. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us his
party's observers believed 25 percent was a more accurate
turnout figure for the capital, compared to the Interior
Ministry's claim of 64.76 percent. The foreign ministry had
declined to authorize Embassy officers to observe the voting
process, but Embassy personnel informally observed voting at
Algiers 00000370 002 of 004
more than 30 polling stations throughout the capital and saw
only a handful of voters trickling in and out during peak
voting hours. Some employees were able to get informal
statistics from friends or relatives working in polling
stations. At a voting bureau in the CEM Pasteur neighborhood
of central Algiers, 74 of 214 voters cast ballots, a
participation rate of 34 percent. The vote tally counted 48
votes for Bouteflika, 8 for Lousia Hanoune, 5 for Said and
one each for Rebaine, Touati and Younsi. Voters spoiled 10
of the ballots cast, generally considered a "vote blanche" or
protest vote. At another polling station in the same
neighborhood, 85 out of 281 voted with 21 ballots spoiled.
These anecdotal percentages mirrored what the UN monitoring
team told us on April 11 that they had observed. At a vote
count UN monitors attended, 120 of 345 registered voters
participated (34 percent); 75 percent of the votes, they
said, went to Bouteflika and 20 percent of the ballots were
spoiled.
Resigned objections
-------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Each of the losing candidates expressed public doubts
over official turnout figures, while resigning themselves to
the outcome. Fouzi Rebaine accused the government of
inflating vote figures and said he could easily accept defeat
if the numbers were "real." Rebaine threatened to file a
complaint with the UN instead of Algeria's national election
commission, claiming Algerian institutions connected to the
election lacked credibility. Djahid Younsi described the
election results as nothing short of "miraculous," and
estimated voter turnout was closer to 25 percent. PT
candidate Louisa Hanoune believed she actually won at least
30 percent of the vote, and added that the official turnout
figure made Algeria look like "a banana republic." The
leader of the three-person UN monitoring mission, M.I. Abdool
Rahman, told us April 11 that his mission was "quite certain"
something was not right after receiving many vague
allegations of fraud from opposition parties, but the lack of
detail made it impossible to describe with certainty the type
of fraud and how it occurred. The most detailed example of
vote tampering we received came from an Embassy employee who
observed a phone call in which a polling station worker was
told by an Interior Ministry official to use an inflated
figure for the number of ballots cast during the day. When
the polling station closed, Interior Ministry police
presented the polling station worker with a vote protocol to
sign, featuring a grossly inflated figure and names he simply
had not seen during the day.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) There were other signs of government efforts to manage
the optics of the process and keep voices of dissent out of
public view. An Embassy officer watched as a soldier in
uniform made a young Algerian scrape boycott posters off the
exterior wall of the FFS party headquarters in Algiers on the
morning of April 10 even before the official announcement of
the results. Taking aim at the RCD's campaign to make April
9 "a day of national mourning," Zerhouni said during his
April 10 press conference that RCD activists would face
justice, particularly for replacing the Algerian flag over
their headquarters with a black flag of mourning. His
statement apparently cleared the path for a commando raid on
RCD headquarters in El Biar, organized by Algiers Mayor Tayeb
Zitouni, who led a small group of young men in throwing rocks
and attempting to scale the RCD walls to seize the black
flag. RCD leader Said Sadi told us on April 11 that the
election result was "Brezhnevian" and that RCD members
succeeded in thwarting the April 10 attack.
Security incidents
------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) There were no major security incidents in the capital
(where an exceptionally heavy security presence was visible)
but there were reports of isolated violence in other regions
across the country. The most serious was a report that a
suicide bomber in the town of Boumerdes (30 miles east of
Algiers) detonated a bomb in a polling station, killing two
police officers. Notably, no voters were harmed in the
attack. In Tamait, in the eastern region of Bejaia, two
opposing political groups created a scuffle near a polling
station that caused an interruption in voting. In Tizi
Ouzou, a group of young Algerians boycotting the election
rushed into a polling station and destroyed three ballot
boxes. When police intervened, one officer was injured by a
Molotov cocktail used by one of the youths during the
confrontation. In Bouira, a group of young men set fire to a
Algiers 00000370 003 of 004
polling station. The local press also reported explosions of
small bombs in Skikda, Tipaza, Tebessa, Tizi Ouzou and Larbaa
Nath Irrathen in the Kabylie region.
A heavily managed affair
------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) The government's management of pre-election and
election-day activities demonstrated a carefully orchestrated
strategy to control the process by using complicated
procedural rules to maintain the outward appearance of
transparency (ref A). The UN's Abdool Rahman told us on
April 11 that Algeria's legal framework itself provided room
for fraud: "For every concern we raised, the government could
point to a rule in the elecTnQ;g1fEQUxwQ[action,"
he said, adding, "We didn't have many good conversations."
Abdool Rahman and his colleagues said the primary weakness of
the process was the government's credibility as an impartial
actor. He noted there was no role for civil society, or
consultation with stakeholders outside the government or
Bouteflika's administration. Even the institution charged
with hearing complaints from candidates and voters, the
National Commission for the Surveillance of the Presidential
Election (CNES), was formed by the government and its
chairman was appointed by President Bouteflika. "Civil
society should have been in the lead." Abdool Rahman said he
raised these concerns in a conversation with the vice
president of the Constitutional Council, who agreed that
opposition parties should have had more representation in
electoral institutions. Another concern the UN team raised
was that candidates, with the exception of Bouteflika, only
had access to the media during the official campaign period
of March 19 - April 7. Abdool Rahman added that throughout
the election boycotting parties were prohibited from speaking
up. AU observer Calixte Mbari shared the UN concern with
media access: "It's too bad we couldn't be here to see the
pre-campaign media environment," he told us, "that would have
been interesting."
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Abdool Rahman said his mission was hindered by the
government's effort to control its meetings and use the
mission's presence to convey the official election story. He
noted that outside of his election-related meetings, he met
only with the U.S. and European Union foreign missions during
his visits to Algiers, something he said the government
actively tried to prevent. Abdool Rahman said Algerian
officials forced schedule changes to prevent a meeting at the
Embassy during the team's mid-March visit. He remarked that
an MFA official even attempted to attend an internal UNDP
country team meeting, as well as a private meeting at the
French embassy. "We had to politely tell him no," he said.
At meetings arranged by the government, team member
Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte said, it was hard to talk to "real"
people. He complained that the team was forced to sit
through a staged civil society meeting in Tizi Ouzou and
listen to canned statements on the election's fairness. We
experienced a similar situation when the Ambassador attempted
to sat meet on April 10 with AU Observer Mission leader
Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique. After
originally agreeing to a 9:15 meeting, the AU team informed
us the meeting was moved to 10:00, the same time Zerhouni was
expected to deliver the election results. We waited for 15
minutes to see Chissano, only to have an MFA official
interrupt the meeting after roughly five minutes to inform
Chissano that he was being summoned to attend Zerhouni's
press event, which ultimately took place at 1130.
Recommendations for the future
------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) Abdool Rahman said that his mission would not comment
publicly on the election. He noted that the Department's
April 10 statement expressing "concern" over the election was
"very strong" but added that his team agreed with it. He
said that the UN mission's decision to say nothing clearly
annoyed the MFA. "They put a lot of pressure on us to make a
joint statement with the AU, AL and OIC." Abdool Rahman told
us his team would draft a report for UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon that
would highlight the problems he discussed as well as positive
aspects of the election. Abdool Rahman believed no decision
had been made as to how much of the report might be made
public, or in what form its recommendations would be
transmitted to the Algerians. We advised the UN team that
public criticism was generally counterproductive; however, we
believed that the government would seriously consider
critical comments made in private, even if the criticism was
not welcome. Abdool Rahman suggested that USUN New York
Algiers 00000370 004.2 of 004
might obtain a copy of the mission's report by contacting the
SYG's office directly at some point in the coming weeks.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) Abdool Rahman predicted their recommendations would
underscore the need to make progress on freedom of expression
and create a more inclusive dialogue between citizens, civil
society and the government. "There has to be some separation
between the government and the administration," he stressed.
He added that a larger domestic observer presence could have
improved the process. Drawing from his experience elsewhere
in Africa, UNDP resrep Mamadou Mbaye commented, "If leaders
can be elected without this essential element, then we would
be worried about the future here." Ali-Diabacte reiterated
his colleagues' remarks, saying "Five years is not a lot of
time; there is a need for dialogue now. I don't see any
alternative."
Procedural bright spots
-----------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) There were good practices to highlight, according to
the UN monitors. Algeria's computerized voter registry was
user-friendly and easily accessible in polling stations. If
they had not done so before the election, Algerians could
present a valid form of identification and obtain a voter
card on the spot. Ali-Diabacte added that polling station
officials were well trained and quick to address voters'
questions. The balloting method itself was simple,
inexpensive and effective. Another important election
dynamic, Abdool Rahman underscored, was the sense of security
and general absence of violence.
Comment
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/04/09ALGIERS370.html#par13" id="par13">¶</a>13. (C) The disparity between the official turnout figures
and what the average person saw on April 9 has caused many
people here to scratch their heads at how the government
expected to legitimize such an exaggerated turnout figure.
In an April 12 editorial, the French-language daily Liberte
question whether the inflated turnout wouldn't ultimately
delegitimize the electoral process the government worked so
hard to craft. Rather than showing that Algeria is on a path
toward greater democracy, the commentator feared that April 9
was more reminiscent of a return to Algeria's one-party
system. Meanwhile, while Bouteflika based his third-term
platform on continuity, we have heard hints that he is
unhappy with the status quo and acknowledges a political
system sagging under its own weight (ref C). With civil
society and opposition now on the ropes, Bouteflika's control
over the system appears secure, albeit with no discernible
vision for a progressive political future. Without unveiling
such a vision through dialogue between citizens, civil
society, opposition parties and government, the fate of the
disillusioned 72 percent of Algeria's population under the
age of 30 remains in doubt, and with it, the long-term
stability of the country. As the UN's Mbaye put it, Algeria
is "sitting on a volcano." We will continue to sift for
opportunities to support reform, and should be prepared to
offer our frank but private opinion of Algeria's progress
along the way.
Pearce</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-8697998851083186222011-02-01T14:46:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:46:17.963-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 09ABUJA259, C) NIGERIA: SHELL BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON OIL GAS ISSUES,</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#09ABUJA259</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html">09ABUJA259</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2009-02_0.html">2009-02-10 16:04</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/4_0.html" title="secret//noforn">SECRET//NOFORN</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/139_0.html">Embassy Abuja</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO7442
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0259/01 0411610
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101610Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5253
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0802
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000259
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR FOR AGAMA
USDOE FOR GEORGE PERSON AND CHAYLOCK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2028
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EPET_0.html">EPET</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ENRG_0.html">ENRG</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ELAB_0.html">ELAB</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SENV_0.html">SENV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NI_0.html">NI</a>
SUBJECT: (C) NIGERIA: SHELL BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON OIL GAS ISSUES,
COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION
REF: ABUJA 203
Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Shell's regional executive vice president for
Africa Ann Pickard and government relations representative Peter
Francis met with the Ambassador on January 27 in Abuja and provided
an update on problems in the oil and gas sector. Pickard said that
things were going from bad to worse, especially the security
situation. She said that Nigeria now had one of the highest negative
ratings for maritime operations, creating problems for Shell in
hiring oil tankers to load, as tanker operators will work only under
highly selective conditions. Last year there were about 80 piracy
attacks on land and water combined. This year already 15 have been
tallied, which includes 3 for Shell and 3 for Exxon. On corruption,
Pickard said that Nigerian entities control the lifting of many oil
cargoes and there are some "very interesting" people lifting oil.
Oil buyers would pay NNPC GMD Yar'Adua, Chief Economic Advisor Yakubu
and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua large bribes to lift oil. Pickard
also reported an instance of the Attorney General Aondoakaa allegedly
soliciting a $20 million bribe to sign a document. The International
Oil Companies (IOC) are quite concerned about the "very flawed" new
petroleum sector energy bill. The IOCs will be asking U.S., Dutch,
and U.K. COMs to convey points on the bill to GON policymakers.
Pickard agreed that the President's health is a guessing game. She
said that in her recent meetings with Yar'Auda he seems alert, though
very drawn in the face, thin, and frail. Her information is that the
President was not in danger of dying soon, but also was unlikely to
ever fully recover from his ailments. (Note: see septel on oil/energy
sector issues for the Ambassador's meeting with the new Minister of
Petroleum Resources. End Note). END SUMMARY.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Shell's regional executive vice president for Africa Ann
Pickard and government relations representative Peter Francis met
with the Ambassador on January 27, 2009 in Abuja and provided an
update on problems in the oil and gas sector. Pickard reported that
Shell's meeting with Minister of Petroleum Resources Dr. Rilwanu
Lukman scheduled for earlier that day had been cancelled; the third
week in a row where key appointments had fallen through, with the
excuse of being summoned to the Presidential Villa. (Note: Emboffs
have observed that meetings with ministers and senior staff are
indeed often cancelled with the explanation that they have been
summoned to the Presidential Villa, even when the President is out of
town. End note). Econ Counselor and Econoff (notetaker) also
attended the discussion.
- - - - - - - - -
from bad to worse
- - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to share with Pickard that
the Mission was in the midst of completing its Strategic Plan and
asked Pickard where she thought Nigeria was headed. Pickard said that
things were going from bad to worse, especially in terms of security.
She said that Nigeria now had the highest negative rating for
maritime security, creating problems for Shell in hiring oil tankers
to load; tankers will work only under highly selective conditions.
She also noted that late on the evening of Saturday January 17,
Nigerian militants attacked and boarded two vessels at a Shell crude
oil loading platform in Bonny and took eight crew members hostage.
Standard procedure on the tanker was followed: the ship went into
immediate lock down; there were no injuries or fatalities from the
boarding. The eight Nigerian crew members who were taken hostage were
later released. The pirates who went through the sections of the
boat to which they were able to gain access, smashing and stealing
computers, electronics, and personal items of the crew members. The
second vessel was a tug boat towing a supply vessel from Bonny to
Calabar. Last year there were about 80 incidents of piracy; this
year already 15 had been tallied, which includes 3 for Shell and 3
for Exxon. GON officials have told Shell to "hire more security."
The price of doing business in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria
continues to climb she concluded. [Note: The International Maritime
Bureau (IMB), a division of the International Chamber of Commerce -
www icc-ccs org - reports that the waters off the Gulf of Guinea
(Nigeria) remain the second worst, with 40 incidents in 2008 to the
Horn of Africa (Somalia) with 42 recorded incidents. The IMB notes
that in 2009 the Horn of Africa will be more intense as Spring comes
due to the large number of foreign warships in the region on active
patrol to ensure the safety and security of vessels. The same
increased security is not expected for Nigeria in 2009. End Note]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
shell believes coup unlikely; corruption worsening
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Abuja 00000259 002 of 003
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked what Shell's thoughts were on any
potential for a coup. Pickard answered that there is little
intellectual capital to plan and execute a coup and Shell sees little
potential for one. Pickard then went on to say that corruption in
the oil sector was worsening by the day. The Ambassador asked for a
few examples. Pickard said that Nigerian entities control the
lifting of many oil cargoes and there are some "very interesting"
people lifting oil (People, she said that were not even in the
industry). As an example she said that oil buyers would pay Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) General Managing Director
Yar'Adua, (Note: not related to President Yar'Adua. End Note) Chief
Economic Advisor Yakubu, and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua large
bribes, millions of dollars per tanker, to lift oil. The IOCs
control the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cargos, so GON actors do
not have the same opportunity for illicit gain. Pickard also said xxxxxxxxxxxx
Attorney General Aondoakaa had told a visitor that he would sign
a document only if the visitor paid $2 million immediately and
another $18 million the next day.
- - - - - - -
very bad bill
- - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Pickard reported that Shell, Exxon-Mobil and Chevron all have
big license review disputes with the GON. Shell has taken its
dispute to court and the court is supporting Shell's position.
According to her, Shell is stepping back for the moment, however, to
see how the other two majors negotiation fair, but is not taking its
case out of court yet. The IOCs are quite concerned about the "very
flawed" new petroleum sector energy bill. The bill is silent on what
fiscal regimes would be applied. Shell says that the bill could
reduce the corporation's overall value in Nigeria. GON discussions
around the bill have mentioned the possibility of moving to five-year
licenses and prohibiting exploring both oil and gas from the same
source, which would contradict how oil and gas extraction works in
practice. The bill is silent on joint ventures; it just states that
NNPC will be incorporated. Pickard said the bill was "likely to sail
through." The IOCs will be asking U.S., Dutch and U.K. COMs to
convey points on the bill to GON policymakers. (Note: Pickard
mentioned that the IOCs will not share company information directly;
they will hire consultants, like McKinsey, to produce common themes
so the messages from the IOCs to be shared with the relevant
Ambassadors are clear and consistent. End note). Pickard lamented
that the expected cycle of petroleum is at least five years for the
first oil to flow, another 10 years of production to begin to break
even. These numbers change when oil is $40 per barrel instead of $100
per barrel. Hence, a five year license would not be an incentive for
investment and development.
- - - - - -
gas issues
- - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) The Ambassador said that the Mission was looking at
performance measures for the economy, i.e. the linkage between the
country's electricity output and gross domestic product (GDP). The
Ambassador shared that the Mission feels strongly that gas for
feedstock is the key to Nigeria's power production, which is only
about 2,800 average megawatts for a country of 140 million people.
Pickard agreed and added that the U.S. got it wrong on its domestic
natural gas policies, which it took over 20 years to sort out. So it
is not surprising that Nigeria has it wrong at this point. She said
there is not adequate infrastructure for gas. Gathering plants and
pipelines to carry the product to the power plants still have to be
financed and built. The Nigeria Independent Power Projects (NIPP)
were located where there is no gas and no infrastructure. In
addition, the international oil companies were coerced into building
a power plant each, something they have no expertise in, and they are
scrambling to deliver gas to these plants.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
yar'auda vacation is perhaps something else
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (S/NF) Pickard agreed that the President's health is a guessing
game. She said that in her recent meetings with Yar'Auda he seems
alert but drawn in the face and frail. She reported that a xxxxxxxxxxxx
contact says that the President was not in danger of
dying soon but has serious ailments from which he will never fully
recover. Pickard shared that Berger provides transportation
including planes for the President and has reportedly flown in
doctors and technicians to attend the President (reftel). She said,
for instance, that xxxxxxxxxxxx confided that they flew the
President from Germany to Saudi in September 2008. Additionally, the
Berger contact thought the President would not return to the Villa
Abuja 00000259 003 of 003
offices, as they were moving the President's personal things out of
the Villa. (Note: What we think this means is that Yar'Adua is
spending most of his time in the presidential residence and not in
the Villa offices. End Note).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
hopes that oil nationalism can be tempered
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) The Ambassador asked how comfortable Shell was with the new
appointment of Dr. Rilwanu Lukman as Minister of Petroleum Resources,
and the appointment of Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo as the new NNPC GMD.
Pickard sees the nationalism card cooling with the removal of former
NNPC GMD Yar'Adua, given that new Minister of Petroleum Lukman is
more "pragmatic" and will hold sway over deputy Minister Ajumogobia.
(Note: Ajumogobia's technical assistant told EconOff in a meeting on
January 14, 2009 that the State Minister was focusing on Gas, since
before the mass cabinet change he was State Minster of Petroleum,
with a separate State Minster for Gas.) End Note. She said she was
also okay with NNPC chief Barkindo. She has worked with Barkindo
several times over the past few decades, especially when they were
both working climate change. She said Barkindo led Nigeria's
technical delegation to climate change negotiations that produced the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)and the
Kyoto protocol to UNFCCC during while he served on its Bureau at
various times. She indicated that although his undergraduate studies
were in political science, he obtained his MBA from Southeastern
University in Washington DC and did postgraduate work in petroleum
economics and management at Oxford University. Although she also said
terms like nationalistic and Chavez she however said that she thought
he could be steered in the right direction on the petroleum sector.
- - - -
comment
- - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Although Pickard clearly seems frustrated with the way things
are going in the maritime security, oil sector legislation, and
corruption which affects Shell's bottom line, it was useful to hear
that she has hopes for the new Petroleum Minister and NNPC chief.
Septel on the Ambassador's meeting with new Petroleum Minister Lukman
will address many of these same issues.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
Sanders</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-2261268492766022702011-02-01T14:45:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:45:38.298-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 09ABUJA203, NIGERIA: UPDATED HEALTH INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#09ABUJA203</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html">09ABUJA203</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2009-02_0.html">2009-02-04 16:04</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/4_0.html" title="secret//noforn">SECRET//NOFORN</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/139_0.html">Embassy Abuja</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO2938
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0203/01 0351633
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041633Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5177
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1640
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 0614
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0750
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 000203
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2034
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NI_0.html">NI</a>
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UPDATED HEALTH INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT
YAR'ADUA (C-AL8-02520)
REF: A. STATE 6401
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. 08 ABUJA 2525
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parC" id="parC">¶</a>C. 08 ABUJA 2517
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parD" id="parD">¶</a>D. 08 ABUJA 2222
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parE" id="parE">¶</a>E. 08 ABUJA 2165
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parF" id="parF">¶</a>F. 08 ABUJA 2147
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parG" id="parG">¶</a>G. 08 ABUJA 2141
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parH" id="parH">¶</a>H. 08 ABUJA 2123
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parI" id="parI">¶</a>I. 08 ABUJA 2104
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parJ" id="parJ">¶</a>J. 08 ABUJA 2065
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parK" id="parK">¶</a>K. 08 ABUJA 1822
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parL" id="parL">¶</a>L. 08 ABUJA 1016
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parM" id="parM">¶</a>M. 08 ABUJA 962
Classified By: Ambassador Robin Renee Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b & d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (S/NF) INTRODUCTION. Ref A requested updated information
about the health of Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.
We note that our GON and private contacts continue to state
that President Yar'Adua is managing his known health issues
-- chronic kidney problems -- and is not suffering from
something more serious. The Villa also continues to keep a
tight hold on any information concerning his health and has
been cautious about any indications on travel outside of
Nigeria, to avoid additional concerns. As a result, attempts
to gain specific and/or verifiable information on his
condition, prognoses, medication, treatment options are
limited. The Ambassador's last personal dialogue with him
(Ref. C), in which she observed him up close, noted that he
was extremely frail, more soft spoken than usual, his skin
was extremely drawn, teeth were extremely tarred and his
involuntary cough had increased. He was, however alert and
could carry on a sophisticated conversation. We have also
reported, ref. B, recent extensive critical comments by a
Villa staff member on the impact of the President's health on
the country's governance. What is clear is that the
President's health is a matter of growing concern,
particularly on the minds of the northern Nigerian elite. We
have noted a considerable up-tick in what appears to be
behind-the-scenes machinations and backroom dealing, most
notably the recent reconciliation meeting between former
President Obasanjo and former VP Atiku and Atiku's pending
official return in March to the ruling PDP, former President
Babangida's sudden return to the political scene with a
string of public pronouncements, and Kwara Governor Saraki's
machinations to possibly be a PDP candidate in 2011.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (S/NF) If Yar'Adua were closer to "death's door," we would
expect more of a political power struggle publicly to break
out drawing in these traditional "Godfathers" of Nigerian
politics, as well as newer groupings including Kwara State
Governor Saraki (and Governors' Forum chairman), some of the
other Governors (e.g. Niger and Kaduna), and some members of
the "Katsina clique" who have gathered around Yar'Adua. All
these groups have a shared interest either in maneuvering VP
Goodluck Jonathan out of assuming the presidency, or in
assuring that his power as President was strictly
circumscribed and that he appointed a strong Northerner as
his VP. (We note there has been a speculation of a Yar'Adua
demise in February 2009. Thus, this has not happened and he
may either not be suffering from a terminal disease or could
-- as other leaders have done in the past -- hang on longer
than we anticipate.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (S/NF) Yar'Adua began a two-week vacation on January 26
(to date he still remains in Abuja and his vacation is
scheduled to end on Monday, February 9). However, official
statements from the Presidential Spokesman indicated that he
would pass the two weeks in Lagos, Cross River State (at the
Obudu Cattle Ranch) and at his home state of Katsina. There
is widespread speculation, however, that the Villa may be
using the guise of a "vacation" to hide medical treatment.
On January 27, Kwara State Governor Saraki insisted to
Ambassador that Yar'Adua will not/not leave Nigeria during
his vacation; however, we believe that he is most likely
receiving clandestine medical treatment in Nigeria during
this period. Ambassador was told by two key contacts, Shell
Abuja 00000203 002 of 006
VP for Africa on January 27 and Information Minister Akunyili
on February 2, that experts from Germany have been brought in
to oversee the President's treatment. END INTRODUCTION.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (S/NF) Information below on the health of President
Yar'Adua is keyed to Ref. A questions:
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parA" id="parA">¶</a>A. (c) overall health
A 1. (S/NF) DIAGNOSES: Despite continued statements by the
Villa spokesperson that the President is not in poor health,
several individuals xxxxxxxxxxxx and First Lady Turai Yar'Adua) have
admitted privately to the Ambassador that he suffers from
acute kidney disease (Refs. C, G, H and others). We continue
to hear press and blog reports that Yar'Adua suffers from
lung cancer, although this is generally from sources further
removed from the Presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx is the only credible source who confirmed
that he heard reports of lung cancer. xxxxxxxxxxxx is
not close to the President and has access to tertiary
information at best.) On October 27, First Lady Turai
Yar'Adua told Ambassador that Yar'Adua did not have lung
cancer, but admitted that he suffered from long-term kidney
disease and from asthma (Ref. G). On January 27, Kwara State
Governor Saraki, a medical doctor by training, told
Ambassador that Yar'Adua is "not at death's door" and that he
is learning to cope and manage his energy levels better,
leading to an improvement in his energy and breathing since
the September 2008 timeframe. xxxxxxxxxxxx a contact xxxxxxxxxxxx at
the German Julius Berger company said that Yar'Adua is
steadily weakening and going downhill, noting that although
he is "not in danger of dying soon," his ailments were
serious and chronic. Other media outlets, such as the online
news site "Sahara Reporters" have reported several
conditions: Churg Strauss Syndrome and/or lung cancer along
with kidney disease.
In a follow-up meeting with Information Minister Akunyili on
February 2, xxxxxxxxxxxx told the Ambassador that Yar'Adua remained
extremely weak. xxxxxxxxxxxxx noted that when xxxxxxxxxxxx last met with him it
was at the residence and not the office as he has
substantially reduced his office hours to conserve his
energy. xxxxxxxxxxxx said Yar'Adua told xxxxxxxxxxxx that he really
wanted to go out of Nigeria for "a rest" but given the uproar
over his September 2008 trip to Saudi, he was compelled to
stay in Nigeria to avoid more speculation on his health. xxxxxxxxxxxx
added that Yar'Adua's current strategy is to have meetings
planned well in advance so he can rest up in order to be able
to have enough energy to complete the session.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
A 2. (C) PAIN: Most of Post's information concerns his lack
of energy and fatigue; however, information exists in other
channels regarding pain management.
A 3. (s/nf) health improved/worsened, changes in appearance:
We believe that Yar'Adua still remains weak and as physically
fragile as he was in November-December 2008. Ref. C contains
Ambassador's observations during her meeting with Yar'Adua on
the margins of the December 19, 2008 ECOWAS meetings.
Ambassador noted: he coughed more extensively as he delivered
his speech on becoming ECOWAS Chair, he appeared to weigh no
more than 130-140 pounds, his skin was very taunt, his
handshake was weak, voice was fainter than on previous
Abuja 00000203 003 of 006
meetings, his eyes were deep set with dark circles
underneath, and his teeth were also very badly tarred. Over
the past several weeks, Yar'Adua has made few public
appearances. Despite this, he was able to carry on a
sophisticated conversation. His most recent appearance was
at his daughter's marriage on January 25, 2008, to Bauchi
State Governor Yuguda. Although we believe these appearances
were meant to calm public anxiety, they actually tended to
renew suspicions about his health. Based on pictures and TV
coverage of these events he appears pale and weak. He
continues to lose weight and he coughs and appears at times
to have difficulty breathing when he talks. U.K. diplomats
told us January 28 that they have seen reports that Yar'Adua
wears make-up for public appearances and padding to hide his
weight loss.
A 4. (S/NF) RESTRICTIONS TO ACTIVITY/SCHEDULE: Yar'Adua's
schedule, since assuming office in May 2007, has never
included long days or late night appointments (Ref. M);
however, it has clearly been severely restricted since late
Summer and appears to be more so since late December 2008.
President Yar'Adua has made few international trips since
assuming office, including missing the September 2008 UN
General Assembly meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx
contact of the Mission shared his risk-analysis paper with us
in late 2008 (Ref. B, q.v.), in which he complained that
Yar'Adua's restricted office hours are "taking a heavy toll
on governance." He also noted then that the President "works
for limited hours, often can't keep scheduled appointments,
and cannot undertake rigorous national tours." On xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolCouns that Yar'Adua's
health has improved "a bit" since last fall; however, there
has been no positive impact on his ability to meet the
demands of the presidency. (This comment dove tails with
Saraki's, who also indicated that Yar'Adua has had a slight
improvement.)
A 5. (s/nf) yar'adua aware of his diagnoses/prognoses:
Although the spokesman for the Villa continues to maintain
that Yar'Adua has no serious health problems that hinder his
ability to carry out his executive functions, the President's
wife admitted his serious kidney ailment to the Ambassador.
We do believe that those around him may be jeopardizing his
well-being for their own political gain. We note that, in
conversations with other foreign diplomats, the First Lady
has indicated she is looking forward to Yar'Adua running for
a second term in 2011.
A 6. (C) NAMES AND SPECIALTIES OF PHYSICIANS: Adamu Banye
Barau serves as Chief Physician to the President. Barau
applied for a U.S. visa in April 2008. xxxxxxxxxxxx Barau planned to travel to the U.S. to
purchase medical equipment. In addition, we know Hussaini
Yakasai Munir serves as a Villa medical officer. (NOTE:
Munir applied for a visa in mid-January to attend medical
training in North Carolina from February 2-14. Specifically,
he will attend Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Cardiac Stress
Testing, Overview of Cardiac Catheterization, Non-Invasive
Management of Myocardial Infarction, and Advances of
Echocardiography at Ladan Medical Center, North Carolina
under Dr. Mohammad Lawal Garba.) We also know from several
sources that German specialists do come in and out of Nigeria
as they are, xxxxxxxxxxxx, transported by the
German Julius Berger company.
A 7-8. (c) who provides yar'adua with reports on health and
IS HE FOLLOWING DOCTOR'S ADVICE: We have no specific
information, but we believe that his wife and other members
of the "Katsina clique," such as Agriculture Minister Ruma,
and possibly Kwara Governor Saraki (who is a medical doctor),
are managing Yar'Adua's health strictly for political
reasons, which seems to overshadow any advice he may be
receiving from medical experts.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. Procedures and treatments
B 1. (C) MEDICATIONS AND CHANGES IN MEDICATION: Information
Abuja 00000203 004 of 006
exists in other channels that provides suggestions on what
Yar'Adua may be taking.
B 2. (s/nf) medical procedures/surgeries in the past year:
Yar'Adua had a range of medical tests in Saudi Arabia in late
August 2008, about which there is reporting in other
channels. According to Leadership newspaper, between August
20 and August 31, 2008 he was at the King Abdulaziz Hospital
in Jeddah. We understand that, in 2001 or 2002, while he was
Governor of Katsina State, Yar'Adua had a kidney transplant.
The Ambassador was told on November 1, 2008 that Minister of
Agriculture Ruma was the donor for Yar'Adua's transplant, but
that the kidney now appeared to be failing. The individuals
(lunch attendees at a Central Bank luncheon) maintained that
Ruma's brother had traveled to Germany to determine if he was
a potential match for a second transplant (Ref. E).
B 3. (C) ADVISED TO SEEK TREATMENT IN LAST MONTH: We
understand that travel to Germany was being heavily
considered by the Villa in December 2008, but given that it
sparked renewed public concern about Yar'Adua's ability to
govern, the President remained in Nigeria. This has been
confirmed by xxxxxxxxxxxx
B 4. (S/NF) CANCELED OR POSTPONED ANY PLANNED TREATMENT:xxxxxxxxxxxx told Ambassador on
December 22 that First Lady Turai Yar'Adua confided xxxxxxxxxxxx
that Yar'Adua would travel to Germany for a second renal
transplant between December 16 and January 1 (Ref. C).
Yar'Adua did not take this planned trip given public reaction
to rumors about travel and concerns about his ability to
govern. We have no information on whether this trip may be
rescheduled.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parC" id="parC">¶</a>C. Medical equipment
C 1. (C) EQUIPMENT ACCESSIBLE IN ABUJA: We understand that
the Villa maintains a dialysis machine for the President's
use in Abuja and from a credible source at Shell Oil Company
that some additional medical equipment for the President
arrived in December-January 2009. xxxxxxxxxxxx
was more specific in a xxxxxxxxxxxx meeting with
Ambassador, saying that Yar'Adua is on dialysis three times a
week in the afternoons.
C 2. (s/nf) access to equipment to treat lung cancer: u.s.
medical personnel operating in Nigeria believe it may be
possible to bring chemotherapy drugs into Nigeria to receive
chemotherapy; however, the only hospital which may/may have
radiation equipment is Lagos Teaching Hospital. In all,
however, the American physician with whom we spoke on January
29 noted that both chemo and radiation therapy require a
large cadre of trained specialists (from oncologists, to
nurses and equipment technicians). However, Nigeria has
little to no specialists in these areas. Due to the lack of
local specialists, our medical source believed it would not
be possible to receive reasonably adequate treatment in
Nigeria.
C 3. (s/nf) access to equipment for surgery related to renal
FAILURE OR LUNG CANCER: St. Nicholas Hospital in Lagos
recently began performing minimally invasive transplants
(including both removal -- important as all donors in Nigeria
are "living donors" -- and transplantation) using equipment
from South Africa.
C 4. (S/NF) NEW MEDICAL EQUIPMENT BROUGHT TO ABUJA: Press
reports have circulated periodically that new equipment was
being purchased (dialysis machines mainly) and online news
site Sahara Reporters reported on January 22 that a contract
had been awarded previously to one of Yar'Adua's brothers to
build a 10 billion Naira ($64 million) "State House Clinic"
at the Villa (advertised in the SUN newspaper on July 5,
2008). Sahara Reporters maintained that the clinic was never
completed, but that dialysis equipment and equipment for a
complete Intensive Care Unit (ICU) was purchased. As noted
in A6 above, Chief Physician to the President Amadu Barau is
Abuja 00000203 005 of 006
believed to have traveled to the U.S. in May 2008 to purchase
medical equipment. The specific type of equipment is unknown.
C 5. (s/nf) surgical equipment and specialists in nigeria to
PERFORM KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS: The St. Nicholas Hospital in
Lagos has a full transplant team. St. Nicholas has been
performing renal transplants for approximately ten years,
performing more than 80 of the 100 or so transplants that
have been done in Nigeria. To date, there remains no
capacity in Nigeria to do HLA (human leukocyte antigen)
tissue matching, although samples can be taken in Nigeria and
sent abroad for testing.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parD" id="parD">¶</a>D. Mental health
D 1. (s/nf) does yar'adua seem sad, detached, distracted,
IRRITABLE OR CONFUSED: xxxxxxxxxxxx both reported to
Ambassador in December that the President was exhausted, but
still very intellectually competent, and that the political
haggling and pressure of putting together a new cabinet drove
him to push for a vacation outside of Nigeria. The political
pressures of the cabinet reshuffle reportedly took a further
toll on his physical wellness. At Ambassador's last meeting
with him, he did not seem sad, detached, irritable or
confused.
D 2. (s/nf) does yar'adua conduct meetings/ is he alert and
FOCUSED: Yar'Adua has delivered remarks recently at the
January 12 Armed Forces Remembrance Day and the January 16
presentation of the 2006 Census to the National Assembly, as
well as attended the highly visible wedding of his daughter
to Bauchi Governor Yuguda on January 24. In these public
appearances, he appeared physically fragile. Ambassador
noted in her December 19 discussions with Yar'Adua and
observations of him at ECOWAS that he "remained focused and
still showed intelligence, understanding and awareness in his
dialogue." Others, from the Foreign, Petroleum and
Information Ministers to the Central Bank Governor, have
confirmed the same.
D 3. (s/nf) does yar'adua use prepared notes/ do aides prompt
HIM OR ANSWER FOR HIM: Yar'Adua spoke at the January 12
Remembrance Day events in Abuja without notes. In his
December 19 interactions with Ambassador, he spoke without
notes and without prompting from aides. We believe that he
is still intellectually fit, even if we don't agree with his
style of governance. However, his physical weakness adds to
the inability of his administration to do more on top of his
slow leadership style. We judge that even if his health were
not an issue, his governance and leadership style would
likely remain slow and largely ineffective as a result of his
personality, his lack of a political network of his own, and
the fact that he chooses not to dictate decisions to his
Ministers, even when necessary and/or expected. Although he
may not be up for days beforehand, he still chairs his weekly
Cabinet meetings, which we still understand can run 3-4
hours.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA203.html#parE" id="parE">¶</a>E. Spread of health information
E 1. (s/nf) why are yar'adua/family/advisors reluctant to
DISCLOSE HEALTH INFORMATION: While we have heard the
argument that Yar'Adua's quiet personality and his northern
Nigerian culture are the reasons for his unwillingness to
discuss health information, we believe that those close to
him are motivated more by a desire to retain power. His wife
and several special advisors, such as Economic Advisor Tanimu
Yakubu, we would put high on this list as they only have
influence so long as he is President.
E 2.xxxxxxxxxxxx
Abuja 00000203 006 of 006
stage is missed. (This is a point the Mission raises
regularly with GON interlocutors.)
E 3. (c) reasons or motivations for those close to yar'adua
TO LIE ABOUT HIS HEALTH: We would characterize the behavior
of those close to Yar'Adua more as avoidance, secrecy and
disregard for what is ultimately medically best for the
Nigerian President. We would add that the closed-mouth
nature of both Yar'Adua and his wife, plus the influence of
their religion are also factors. In Yar'Adua's May 15, 2008
interview with the Financial Times, he admitted he is "a
normal human being, who can fall sick," hinting at his
medical condition. His wife admitted his kidney and asthma
ailments to the Ambassador on October 27, 2008 without
hesitation. So, his handlers do not directly lie, but just
go to great lengths to avoid talking about it.
#. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
SANDERS</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-75900649889314840962011-02-01T14:44:00.003-08:002011-02-01T14:44:50.884-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 09ABUJA202, NIGERIA: SARAKI ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, NEED FOR</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
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<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#09ABUJA202</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html">09ABUJA202</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2009-02_0.html">2009-02-04 14:02</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/139_0.html">Embassy Abuja</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO2813
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0202/01 0351455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041455Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5175
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1638
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 0612
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0748
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000202
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EFIN_0.html">EFIN</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KCOR_0.html">KCOR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/TBIO_0.html">TBIO</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NI_0.html">NI</a>
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SARAKI ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, NEED FOR
ACTION ON PRIORITIES IN 2009, APPOINTMENT OF FORMER NFIU CHIEF TO GOVERNOR'S FORUM
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador met with Kwara State Governor and
President of the Governor's Forum (GF) Bukola Saraki on
January 28. Saraki was his usual self, discussing President
Yar'Adua's health situation and his own attempt to resolve
some of the EFCC's issues by appointing the former NFIU Chief
as Director General of the GF. He also noted that he had
followed through on the framework for stemming polio
outbreaks tha tthe Ambassador had given to him in December
2008 to share with the 36 governors. (NOTE: The Ambassador
had provided the interagency points on what states needed to
do better to address polio in Nigeria.) Saraki continues to
maintain that Yar'Adua does not have lung cancer and noted
that he is less fatigued and breathing better than in
September 2008. Saraki told me Yar'Adua recognizes the need
to take visible action on his seven point agenda in 2009, as
January 2010 will see the beginning of political maneuvering
for the 2011 elections. Saraki put the recent reconciliation
between former President Obasanjo and former VP Atiku in the
context of preparations for the 2011 elections. He again
thanked Ambassador for a presentation on polio sent by the
Mission and noted that the governors agreed to work to
eradicate polio in their respective states under the umbrella
of the "Make Your State Polio Free" campaign. END SUMMARY.
Saraki comments on yar'adua's health
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) On the President, Saraki began by saying Yar'Adua will
remain in Abuja the week of January 26 and plans to travel to
Katsina and other areas of Nigeria the next week. He holds
to his view (as a medical doctor) that Yar'Adua is
chronically ill, suffering from kidney disease, but maintains
that he knows of no plans to go to Germany for treatment and
does not believe he has lung cancer or is in need of a kidney
transplant at this time. Saraki said Yar'Adua wanted to go
out of Nigeria with his family for vacation, but was
concerned that international travel would be perceived as
another medical trip, so decided to stay in Nigeria to allay
any fears. Regarding Yar'Adua's health in general, Saraki
said that Yar'Adua suffers from less fatigue and shortness of
breath than he had in September 2008, and has not had a major
episode since returning to Nigeria from his September trip to
Saudi Arabia, implying that his medical regime has given him
some relief.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) NOTE: In a January 27 meeting, Shell Petroleum Vice
President for Africa Anne Pickard noted to Ambassador that xxxxxxxxxxxx
the German construction and transport company
Julius Berger xxxxxxxxxxxx provide transportation to and
from Germany for doctors looking after Yar'Adua, as well as
helps ship medical equipment to Abuja.
Yar'adua realizes need to act in 2009
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Saraki asked the Ambassador (given her recent trip
back) how Nigeria is being viewed in the U.S. these days.
Ambassador noted that there was still concern that there was
not more movement on Yar'Adua's 7-point agenda, nor concrete
steps to improve the Niger Delta situation and the lack of
movement on the anti-corruption fight remains at the top of
the list. Saraki said he discussed this with Yar'Adua and
that Yar'Adua realized he needs to move faster and no longer
has the liberty to be as deliberative as his nature might
dictate. Saraki said that he and Yar'Adua are of like minds
in seeing 2009 as a "make or break" year. In January 2010,
political camps within the PDP will already be formulating
their positions on candidates for the 2011 election and it
would be harder for Ministers and others to take any bold
actions as they seek their godfathers for 2011. Ambassador
asked Saraki if he thought the PDP would support Yar'Adua for
another term, if he so desired. Saraki said he did not know,
noting there are already others interested (i.e., Atiku) who
will also be working the party members. Saraki said he did
not know and has not received any signal from Yar'Adua
regarding his plans for 2011.
Abuja 00000202 002 of 002
Saraki on obasanjo-atiku meeting
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Saraki maintained that former President Obasanjo and
former VP Atiku were having a "lovefest" in order to prepare
for the 2011 elections. Asked about internal machinations
within the PDP lately, which clearly have the governors on
one side and politicos like Obasanjo and Atiku on the other,
Saraki said this was the case and he expected things to
continue in this vein as people begin to decide who they are
going to back for the 2011 election. Saraki said Atiku would
officially be coming back into the PDP in March 2009.
Gov's forum to put efcc back on track
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) Saraki said he is trying to work behind the scenes
getting the issues surrounding the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission "back on track." He maintained this was
the motivation behind hiring former Nigerian Financial
Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Director Ashishano Bayo Okauru as
Director General of the Governor's Forum (announced publicly
on January 27). Saraki said Okauru is not/not being pursued
on corruption nor national security grounds and neither is
there an arrest pending on him. According to Saraki, Okauru
has worked out his "resignation issues." (COMMENT: Given
previous EFCC focus on the Saraki family, we are skeptical of
the Governor's comments as he has a vested in terest in the
EFCC taking its spotlight off his family. END COMMENT.)
State-level polio eradication campaigns
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Saraki said the governors were appreciative of the
polio presentation the Ambassador sent to the Governors'
Forum in December, noting the attendance of Ministry of
Health officials at the forum. The governors agreed to a
campaign to make their states polio-free and report on polio
issues at each GF meeting. Further developments will be
reported septel.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) COMMENT: Although Saraki is very plugged in with
President Yar'Adua and holds a lot of political sway with
many governors, particuarly in the north, we always need to
weigh his motives with the information he provides in
one-on-one meetings. He certainly sees himself as a
potential political candidate at sometime and sees Yar'Adua
as one of his best vehicles to get there. On the other hand,
he clearly has fears about the Obasanjo-Atiku reunion as they
would be a more difficult faction of the PDP to control.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA202.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
SANDERS</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-20303545649329043992011-02-01T14:44:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:44:10.078-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 08ALGIERS787, THE HARRAGA: GIVE ME DIGNITY OR GIVE ME DEATH</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#08ALGIERS787</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html">08ALGIERS787</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2008-07_0.html">2008-07-13 07:07</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/136_0.html">Embassy Algiers</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO5652
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0787/01 1950711
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130711Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6104
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2804
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8993
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2434
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7289
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6454
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1672
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0632
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3487
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000787
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2018
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SOCI_0.html">SOCI</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a>
SUBJECT: THE HARRAGA: GIVE ME DIGNITY OR GIVE ME DEATH
REF: 07 ALGIERS 1704
Classified By: CDA, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (U) SUMMARY: On the desolate beach of Sidi Salem, in the
eastern suburbs of Annaba, a dozen young Algerian males
alternate between kicking a soccer ball and working on
several small, unmarked wooden boats. Each week, several
boats leave from this beach, filled with a cross-section of
frustrated young Algeria -- doctors, lawyers, dropouts, the
unemployed. They set out across the open sea, usually 10 or
12 to a boat, armed with water, food, blankets, a small motor
and GPS tracking device, headed for the Italian islands of
Lampedusa, Sicily or Sardinia. They are the harraga --
literally, "one who burns" identity papers and vital
documents before departure -- and over 90 percent of them
will either die at sea, be arrested and detained indefinitely
in Tunisia or Libya, or be returned by the Algerian, French,
Spanish or Italian coast guards. Across the street from Sidi
Salem beach is a police precinct, whose officers idly watch
departure preparations knowing that they may be asked to
arrest these same harraga upon their return. The issue has
paralyzed the Algerian government, which vacillates between
criminalizing the activity by arresting returning harraga and
a more conciliatory approach by offering token financial
incentives tied to political support for President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika. Anything to make a highly unpopular and
emotional issue go away. But the problem is growing, and
hundreds of departures from Algeria's eastern and western
beaches each month no longer carry exclusively the poor,
under-educated, young male stereotype. The harraga have
become a fixture in the Algerian media, popular music and
daily conversation, a symptom of a society in which
entertainment is limited, the education system does not link
to the job market, and the doors of opportunity are closed
but to the well connected. END SUMMARY.
Should i stay or should i go
----------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (U) Now that universities are out of session and the
summer season has arrived, newspaper reports throughout the
month of June were rife with stories about scores of dead or
arrested harraga. The June 15 edition of the French-language
daily Tout Sur l'Algerie featured 24 harraga who departed
from Oran and were promptly arrested by Algerian authorities
upon their return. The front page of the June 18 edition of
the French-language daily Le Jeune Independant told of a
larger boatload of some 150 clandestine immigrants en route
from Libya to Italy that was wrecked at sea, with over 40
dead. Of these, according to quoted survivors, at least 17
were Algerian. Although statistics are hard to verify, the
article cited Spanish and Italian authorities who stated that
roughly 16,500 clandestines attempted to arrive in Italy from
Algeria and Libya in 2007, with another 31,000 departures
from western Algeria bound for the Spanish coast. Last
November 11 the French-language daily El Watan corroborated
those figures, counting 12,753 migrants arriving in Sicily
during the first nine months of 2007, a 20-percent increase
over the previous year.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (U) During our April visit to the beach at Sidi Salem,
police officers standing in front of their precinct watched
harraga prepare for departure. "We are not the border
police," they told us, saying they would not interfere. A
look around revealed a soccer field littered with trash, a
trash heap and a mosque alongside public low- to
middle-income housing projects. xxxxxxxxxxxx pointed down the street from
the police station at two small, dingy cafes. Those cafes,
he told us, are where harraga gather to exchange information,
meet with departure organizers, and pay their way. xxxxxxxxxxxx
said that would-be harraga from all over Algeria know by word
of mouth to come to the cafes, where an "oral bulletin board"
exists of young men pooling resources, organizing departures
and coordinating basic supplies. He said that as much as USD
500 is generally required to start the process. xxxxxxxxxxxxis
all too familiar with these details: on the night of April
17, 2007, his son xxxxxxxxxxxx left and was never heard from
again. The next morning, a friend of xxxxxxxxxxxx visited and
dropped off his car keys, telling xxxxxxxxxxxx that his son had
left in a boat with nine other passengers, ranging in age
from 21 to 39. xxxxxxxxxxxx, the manager of the
Algiers 00000787 002 of 004
xxxxxxxxxxxx, and a university graduate with
computer skills.
Caught between hogra and harga
------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (U) On the western outskirts of Annaba lies the smaller
and more secluded beach of La Caroube. xxxxxxxxxxxx
sat idly with three friends on a concrete stoop, while
several old wooden fishing boats lay overturned on the sand
nearby. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us that last summer he set out in a boat
of 10 people, leaving Algerian territorial waters, which he
was quick to point out already represented a victory for him.
He and his shipmates followed the coastline to Tunisia and
prepared to cross to Sicily. The sea turned rough and they
were forced to turn back, at which point they were stopped by
the Algerian coast guard inside Algerian waters and sent
back.xxxxxxxxxxxx boat contained a mixed profile of passengers
old and young, including five university graduates and two
doctors. xxxxxxxxxxxx said most of his fellow harraga bring GPS
devices and do extensive research on weather conditions and
mapping the best routes. All of xxxxxxxxxxxx three friends said
they had also tried at least once to leave their country by
sea, a crossing they say can take anywhere from 12-48 hours
depending on the weather.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (U) Kamel Daoud, a retired attorney, is the president of
the Human Rights Information and Documentation Center (CCDH)
in Annaba, a legally recognized NGO that serves as an
informal gathering place for local groups that have been
unable to obtain legal status. He is also a member of the
Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights. One of the
unrecognized groups that meets at Daoud's center is the
Parents of Disappeared Harraga, an association of parents
from eastern Algeria who have been seeking assistance and
information from the government since the beginning of 2007.
Alongside xxxxxxxxxxxx, the organization is run by Boubakr
Sabouni, whose son Faycel, age 25, disappeared on May 24,
2007, when he left with six others in a small boat for Italy.
One survivor, 30-year-old Riad Haddef, was found alive by
the Tunisian coast guard on May 29 but died the following
day. His body was repatriated to Algeria, and according to
Sabouni, Tunisian authorities also found a small outboard
motor and three cell phones. According to Daoud, most
harraga bring GPS tracking devices, but believe the crossing
is deceptively easy because many of their parents and
parents' friends were a part of the region's once-vibrant
fishing industry. Sabouni and Belabed asserted that harraga
"always call home" upon arrival, without exception, meaning
no news is never good news -- either arrest or death.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (U) Loitering xxxxxxxxxxxx quickly listed the three reasons
Algerian youth want to burn (harga) their documents and
leave: hogra (humiliation), poverty and corruption. He and
his friends told us of police brutality and "profiling,"
whereby police harass and often brutalize groups of idle
young men who are simply minding their own business. "We
have no space to just hang out," xxxxxxxxxxxx said, "since
everywhere we go the doors are closed, even on the street or
in the park." Daoud explained that because Algeria still
lives under the 1992 state of emergency, the government
remains paranoid about freedom of association and the spectre
of criminal or terrorist activity carried out by young males.
xxxxxxxxxxxx could not remember a single case of a female
harraga, although xxxxxxxxxxxx on the beach said he had heard of
such a case "once." In a conversation with xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, all three told us that Algerian parents who
fought to liberate the country from the French were now
"disillusioned" as a police force they helped build "to
protect the future of the country" was now antagonizing the
next generation.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (U) xxxxxxxxxxxx, a young attorney working with xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the visa process to Europe and
specifically France was another source of hogra for young
Algerians. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he had applied several times for a
visa, xxxxxxxxxxxxx only to be
"systematically refused" by the French embassy in Algiers.
xxxxxxxxxxxx described the visa process as "cold," one in which
applicants often spend hours waiting only to see an
adjudication official very briefly. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he found an
open door through the U.S. International Visitor Program,
through which he gained international contacts, additional
Algiers 00000787 003 of 004
perspective and hope, all of which he was now trying to share
with xxxxxxxxxxxx and young legal students in Annaba. Meanwhile,
not even the most successful families are immune to the
harraga phenomenon: the grandson of former President Chadli
Bendjedid, 29 year-old Mourad Bendjedid, left on February 8,
2007 along with six other young men and has not been heard
from since.
A government out of touch
-------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) Political xxxxxxxxxxxx told us on July 8
that the government simply does not know what to do about the
harraga, as evidenced by its wildly varied responses.
xxxxxxxxxxxx echoed this sentiment to us on June
30, saying the government was "well aware" of the public
passions that have been aroused by the harraga, and that the
issue had completely stymied the regime. Minister of
National Solidarity Djamel Ould Abbes, in a highly publicized
April visit to the coastal towns of Ain Temouchent and Tiaret
in western Algeria, gathered returned harraga in front of the
press and offered 400,000 dinar (approx USD 615) to each,
along with an offer to provide work. Ould Abbes' visit came
within a week after ten harraga died at sea, with bodies
washing up on the beaches nearby. Abbassa said that event
further inflamed public emotion and the government became
nervous, realizing it had to do something, but "had no idea
what that something was."
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx on the beach of La Caroube, told us that Ould
Abbes' offer was "an insult," since at the end of the meeting
he asked all those assembled to sign a statement of support
for President Bouteflika. Daoud confirmed this and said that
the harraga did not sign. Instead, he said, they rallied and
encircled the house Ould Abbes was staying in, intending
perhaps to take him hostage. Daoud said that when the
minister got wind of this, he left Tiaret before dawn,
earlier than expected, and rushed back to Algiers. "We do
not want someone to throw money at us," xxxxxxxxxxxx said, "we want
opportunity." xxxxxxxxxxxx then said he would "sweep this beach"
if someone gave him a broom and a modest salary. Instead, he
and his friends agreed that the best thing to do with Ould
Abbes' 400,000 dinar was "to buy a better boat."
Too little information
----------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) The parents of the disappeared harraga spend their
days lobbying the government to take greater action in
obtaining and sharing information. Between April and
December 2007, they sent full dossiers on the disappeared and
requests for meetings and information to over 37 Algerian
government officials, ministries, ambassadors,
parliamentarians and judges. They did not obtain a single
response. Consultants xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx were not surprised
by this, saying the government would not respond because,
although it realizes the emotional urgency of the problem, it
had "no clue" how to solve the problem and therefore did not
want to touch it. Daoud said that when harraga do not phone
home upon arrival, they are most often either dead or in a
Tunisian jail. xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx have sought government
assistance in getting information from Tunisia, but xxxxxxxxxxxx
said, "nobody is asking on our behalf." Meanwhile, Daoud
said that very little effort is made to identify the bodies
of harraga that wash up on the beaches of Algeria, and that
to his knowledge no DNA testing is done by the Algerian
authorities.
Relief and surrender at the mosque
----------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) According to Daoud, xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx local
parents are "relieved" when their naturally aggressive,
entrepreneurial children surrender and begin hanging out at
the mosque. "As long as their behavior stays positive and
the government controls extremist messaging," Daoud
explained, this is a far less worrisome outcome than the
risks of the harraga experience. The problem, xxxxxxxxxxxx
explained, is that this "spirit of surrender and passivity"
found among young men who find comfort in the mosque, "is not
at all a natural Algerian quality." xxxxxxxxxxxx said the parents
do worry about the temptations of extremist thought leading
their children astray, but both were emphatic that "Algerians
Algiers 00000787 004 of 004
are not natural suicide bombers." Daoud, also a sociologist,
said that Algerian society is still suffering from "cultural
post traumatic stress syndrome" after the violence of the
1990s. This, when added to current pressures of terrorism
and socioeconomic stagnation, leaves many "dazed and
paralyzed, with their eyes glazed over. Most people simply
don't understand what has hit them over the past 15 years."
Searching for ellis island in the mediterranean
--------------------------------------------- --
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/07/08ALGIERS787.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) COMMENT: The harraga phenomenon has grown steadily
over the past year, not only in numbers but in the emotional
resonance the issue generates among the population. Crowds
packed local cinemas early in 2008 to see a new, locally
produced film highlighting the crisis, and the tragedy has
become the subject of popular songs by Cheb Mami and other
singers. The government appears worried but uncertain of how
to solve the problem, trying everything from criminalization
of those who leave to highly publicized efforts to win over
the disenchanted harraga with money and political promises.
Kamel Daoud urged us not to confuse the harraga with suicide
bombers, as "it is an entirely different mentality." The
act of harraga, Daoud explained, "is a cry for liberty
exactly like the immigrants who came to Ellis Island." The
harraga are a product of a society whose fear of terror and
instability has caused it to shut off virtually all outlets
for opportunity, dignity and free association, and not just
to the stereotypical poor unemployed male. Back on the beach
of La Caroube, xxxxxxxxxxxx listed at least six jobs he had applied
for over the last year, all of which he said ultimately went
to "people with connections." When asked where we could
contact him and his friends if we needed to, he smiled and
shook his head. "You can come back in ten years," he said,
"and we'll be sitting right here."
Daughton</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-29608707471628069402011-02-01T14:28:00.003-08:002011-02-01T14:28:59.413-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 08ABUJA1016, S/NF) NIGERIA: xxxxxxxxxxxx</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#08ABUJA1016</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html">08ABUJA1016</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2008-06_0.html">2008-06-02 15:03</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/4_0.html" title="secret//noforn">SECRET//NOFORN</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/139_0.html">Embassy Abuja</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO8985
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #1016/01 1541511
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021511Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2993
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 9340
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001016
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA, INR/B
DOE FOR GPERSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2033
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KISL_0.html">KISL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SOCI_0.html">SOCI</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NI_0.html">NI</a>
SUBJECT: (S/NF) NIGERIA: xxxxxxxxxxxx
Ref: a. ABUJA 320
b. ABUJA 799
c. ABUJA 972
Classified By: A/Pol/C Heather Merritt, reasons 1.4 (b, c & d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: xxxxxxxxxxxx contended that Yar'Adua began
experiencing symptoms of acute renal failure in late 1999,
and traveled at that time to Mainz, Germany, to consult with
kidney specialists. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed, that in 1999, German
doctors told Yar'Adua to undergo dialysis treatment, and that
a dialysis unit was subsequently installed in his private
Katsina residence in 2000. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx when
Yar'Adua's condition worsened in 2002, he traveled to Saudi
Arabia to receive a kidney transplant. To ensure his body
would accept the transplant, Yar'Adua took steroids and other
medications which in due course reportedly caused the
discoloration that we see today on the President's face.
Moreover, xxxxxxxxxxxx averred that Yar'Adua's poor health reduced
his capacity to govern and, correspondingly, his political
influence in the North. xxxxxxxxxxxx also alleged that during
Yar'Adua's tenure as Katsina governor his wife, Hajiya Turai
Yar'Adua, persuaded Yar'Adua to divert millions of dollars of
public funds from the Katsina state treasury into private
accounts. (Note: We have heard of similar illicit enrichment
attempts by Mrs. Yar'Adua now that she is in the Villa as
well as scarce allegations that President Yar'Adua had
engaged in corruption while Katsina governor. End Note.) On
the political front, amidst current rumors of President
Yar'Adua's failing health, the northern political elite
appears increasingly concerned that in the event of
Yar'Adua's untimely demise, the presidency may return to the
South. END SUMMARY.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (S//NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx spoke with
PolOff May 26. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that Yar'Adua began experiencing
symptoms of acute renal failure in late 1999, after traveling
to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia for the lesser pilgrimage in Mecca.
Upon returning from Saudi Arabia, xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed, Yar'Adua
traveled to Mainz, Germany to consult with kidney experts.
According to xxxxxxxxxxxx the German specialists instructed
Yar'Adua to promptly go on dialysis treatment. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated
that the German-based Julius Berger construction company,
which had significant financial ties to the Yar'Adua family
(through the President's elder brother Shehu Yar'Adua), was
contracted to set up a dialysis unit in Yar'Adua's home in
Katsina. Doctors from Germany were brought to Katsina to
train local physicians in dialysis operations, though, xxxxxxxxxxxx
asserted, Yar'Adua also retained the services of German
kidney specialists in Wiesbaden, making frequent trips there
between 2000 and 2002.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (S//NF) Following a 2001 visit to Saudi Arabia, xxxxxxxxxxxx
said, Yar'Adua's condition worsened, and he was diagnosed
with chronic renal failure. Upon returning from Saudi
Arabia, Yar'Adua's dialysis treatments become more rigorous,
xxxxxxxxxxxx confided, and his dialysis machine was moved into his
private bedroom. xxxxxxxxxxxx maintained that Yar'Adua likely
received a kidney transplant in Saudi Arabia in either late
2001 or early 2002. xxxxxxxxxxxx also claimed that Yar'Adua's
dialysis machine was removed from his Katsina residence in
2002 and that discoloration was evident on his face at that
time, which he assessed was the result of Yar'Adua taking
steroids and other medications to enable his body to accept a
transplant. xxxxxxxxxxxx rejected notions Yar'Adua suffered from
Churgg-Strauss syndrome. Additionally, xxxxxxxxxxxx explained that
the raised patch of skin often noted by observers on
President Yar'Adua's right hand is not connected to his
kidney ailments, but instead the result of a serious car
accident Yar'Adua sustained in 1999. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx
after Yar'Adua's car accident, his physicians removed some
tissue from his buttock area to graft to his injured, and
badly disfigured hand.
Abuja 00001016 002 of 003
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (S//NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx contended that Yar'Adua "always" craved
power, dating back to the days when Yar'Adua first contested
and lost the governorship of Katsina state in 1991. Indeed,
xxxxxxxxxxxx remarked, Yar'Adua's politically prominent family
"bred" him to assume office in the future. However, xxxxxxxxxxxx
asserted that throughout Yar'Adua's administration in
Katsina, his performance suffered due to his poor health,
which contributed to his constant fatigue, and to "an
inability to govern." Whereas Katsina state commissioners
and permanent secretaries routinely worked twelve-hour days,
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that governor Yar'Adua himself entered the office
at 10:00am and returned home around 3:00pm each day.
According to xxxxxxxxxxxx Yar'Adua seemed disinterested in
engaging in the requisite politicking that is the hallmark of
political relations between elected leaders and power brokers
in the North, and Nigeria generally. Yar'Adua's
disinclination to travel while governor, even to neighboring
states to meet with the northern political elite, also
perpetuated his political isolation.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (S//NF) During his tenure as governor of Katsina, xxxxxxxxxxxx
maintained, Yar'Adua appeared deliberative and ruthless in
managing the affairs of his state. While intelligent,
Yar'Adua, according to xxxxxxxxxxxx neither tolerated disagreement
nor insubordination. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that Yar'Adua ultimately
relied on a handful of confidants, whom xxxxxxxxxxxx considered
sycophants more than dispassionate consultants. xxxxxxxxxxxx said
that Yar'Adua, paradoxically, routinely ignored the counsel
of even his purportedly trusted advisers, preferring instead,
to make his own decisions. In so doing, xxxxxxxxxxxx said,
Yar'Adua had been assessed by some other northern elders as
both an unimpressive leader, and an irresponsible one.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (S//NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx suggested that while Yar'Adua served as
governor of Katsina, Yar'Adua's wife Hajiya Turai Yar'Adua,
manipulated him into diverting millions of dollars of funds
from the state treasury into private Yar'Adua family
accounts. xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged that Yar'Adua used these stolen
funds to construct a lavish private residence in Katsina and
to finance family vacations to the Middle East and the UK
(Ref A). Though xxxxxxxxxxxx acknowledged that Yar'Adua as former
governor had built primary and secondary schools in Katsina,
xxxxxxxxxxxx criticized Yar'Adua for failing to properly fund the
training of teachers for those schools. As a result, xxxxxxxxxxxxx
said, unlike in the past, under Yar'Adua's two terms as
governor, Katsina students consistently failed to meet
national standards in math and reading assessments. xxxxxxxxxxxx
said that for Yar'Adua, "it was all about the spectacle of
governing." Even the roadways in Katsina, xxxxxxxxxxxx said, may
have been impressive, particularly when compared to the
deplorable road network in other parts of the North, however,
xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged that while the roads had been built, the
contract costs were egregiously inflated and the excess funds
were siphoned. xxxxxxxxxxxx said some Katsina road contracts had
been given to non-existent, "ghost" companies, which were
secretly "owned" by Turai Yar'Adua.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (S//NF) COMMENT:xxxxxxxxxxxx allegations of Turai Yar'Adua's contract-related
corruption in Katsina also seem credible in light of similar
claims previously reported by the Mission since she became
the First Lady (see Ref A, for example).xxxxxxxxxxxx perspective may help shed light on
President Yar'Adua. As reported (Ref C), we believe the
President has two sides: one, for international consumption;
and the other, which turns a blind eye to certain rule of law
issues, particularly as it pertains to his wife.
Then-governor Yar'Adua's unwillingness to engage in the
necessary politicking to build a broad base of support in
Katsina may have been relatively insignificant against the
backdrop of insular Katsina state, or even northern regional,
politics. However, as president of a diverse nation, with
competing regional interests and powerful patronage networks,
Yar'Adua's continued political isolation (even within the
Abuja 00001016 003 of 003
North) may illustrate, to an extent, why even today Yar'Adua
has not fully succeeded in truly stamping his authority on
the PDP or the Presidency.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (S//NF) COMMENT CONT'D: Certainly, Yar'Adua's health
remains a cause of concern for northern power brokers,
especially in light of the possibility that Vice President
Goodluck Jonathan would constitutionally be next in line for
the presidency in the event of Yar'Adua's demise, although we
doubt the northern elite would allow this to transpire.
Opposition presidential aspirant Muhammadu Buhari (All
Nigeria People's Party) told PolOff May 13 at his Kaduna home
that given the North's trepidation of power returning to the
South (if, for instance, Yar'Adua cannot complete his term),
Buhari feels vindicated in his insistence on challenging the
President's election. Buhari intimated that members of the
northern political elite have begun visiting him to affirm
their allegiance to him, and to support him as he continues
to contest Yar'Adua's election at the Supreme Court (see Ref
B). Buhari noted that, in light of news of Yar'Adua's
troubling health, some northern power brokers now believe
fresh polls (wherein Buhari emerges the victor) might be the
best way of ensuring that the North retains the presidency.
End comment.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08ABUJA1016.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (S//NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx END NOTE.
Sanders</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-35229005151806120792011-02-01T14:28:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:28:18.992-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 07ALGIERS1806, AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO</h3><div> <br />
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<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html">07ALGIERS1806</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2007-12_0.html">2007-12-19 12:12</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/3_0.html" title="confidential">SECRET</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/136_0.html">Embassy Algiers</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO5580
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #1806/01 3531206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191206Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5022
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2467
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8733
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2078
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6935
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6149
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1403
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0353
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3182
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 001806
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2027
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINS_0.html">PINS</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/AG_0.html">AG</a>
SUBJECT: AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO
2008
REF: A. ALGIERS 1704
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. ALGIERS 1618
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#parC" id="parC">¶</a>C. ALGIERS 1237
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#parD" id="parD">¶</a>D. ALGIERS 1658
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with former government
officials, long-term opposition leaders and journalists paint
a picture of an Algerian regime that is fragile in ways it
has not been before, plagued by a lack of vision,
unprecedented levels of corruption and rumblings of division
within the military rank and file. Our Algerian contacts are
often a grumpy lot, but we now hear more than the ordinary
amount of concern about the GOA's inability or unwillingness
to address political, economic and security problems. The
December 11 suicide bombings in Algiers, carried out by two
men amnestied under the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation, have ignited heated debate about the ability
of President Bouteflika's reconciliation program to protect
the country. The debate pits proponents of an urgent and
aggressive approach to the terrorist threat against those
aligned with Bouteflika who still believe that amnesty has a
role to play. The picture of an isolated president, a
stagnant reform process and an uncertain approach towards
terror comes at a time when efforts within the government to
engineer a third term for Bouteflika are gathering steam. We
do not sense an explosion coming right away. Instead, we see
a government drifting and groping for a way forward. END
SUMMARY.
SHIP OF STATE ADRIFT
--------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) On December 3, opposition Rally for Culture and
Democracy (RCD) leader Said Sadi presented a somber overview
of the Algerian regime, saying it insisted on continued
control but lacked vision and capacity. Sadi warned that in
the context of current stagnation in economic and political
reform, Algeria's institutions were corroding from within,
losing many of their best cadres of workers and civil
servants. The former leader of the Islamist al-Islah party,
Abdallah Djaballah, who was ousted from the party's
leadership with active help from the Interior Ministry,
pointed out to us on December 17 that the harraga phenomenon
(ref A), in which youth flee on makeshift crafts to Europe,
was no longer limited only to poor, unemployed youth.
Djaballah viewed Algerian youth as having a choice "between
death at sea and a slow, gradual death at home" given the
profound lack of opportunities in the country's stagnant
economy. Sadi told us he was shocked to find so many
educated, middle-class Algerians in Quebec and parts of the
U.S. on a recent visit. "Those people are the future of
Algeria," Sadi said.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told us
December 17 that when it came to national reconciliation, the
December 11 bombings had polarized the debate within the
Algerian security services, with an increasing number of
voices favoring a tougher approach. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the
regime had no single, clear approach to fighting terror, a
fact proven by its indecisiveness on how to handle
high-profile amnesty cases such as that of Hassan Hattab (ref
B). According to Sadi and XXXXXXXXXXXX ordinary Algerians, who
have already lost confidence in the economic and political
reform agenda, are now losing faith in the ability of the
regime to protect them. Laila Aslaoui, a former minister,
women's rights activist and writer, told Ambassador at dinner
December 18 that much of Algerian society was demobilizing
against the terror threat. It was scandalous that the
Interior Ministry knew the Supreme Court was a target and did
nothing to improve the building's security or warn the
public, she claimed. She was caustic about the Interior
Minister's comment that it was impossible to provide complete
protection against bomb attacks, wondering why the GOA does
not more vigorously pursue terrorist suspects. The GOA had
asked Ms. Aslaoui on December 17 to help organize a march
condemning terrorism. In the 1990s, she said she would not
have hesitated. Now, she remarked bitterly, she would do
nothing that helps the Algerian government justify its
approach to security. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX, told Ambassador XXXXXXXXXXXX
that there is a growing gap between what ordinary Algerians
see as their key needs and what they perceive the government
is offering in terms of wages and quality of life. As a
result, he said, fewer Algerians are willing to help the
government. The word on the street, he said, is that if you
have to do business in a government office, go but then leave
promptly and stay out of the way.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) On the other hand, Djaballah told us that widespread
disenchantment about the government's willingness to share
power with Islamists ultimately prompted Algerian Islamists
to heed calls by his and other Islamist parties to boycott
the November 29 local elections. They understand, he said,
that the new electoral law (ref C) was designed to
marginalize them and perpetuate the ruling coalition's grip
on power. Closing out political space will merely spur more
extremism, he warned. The Ambassador told Djaballah that the
U.S. favors political liberalization in Algeria but we also
understand that this may have to be done gradually. The U.S.
does not want to see a return to the violence of the 1990s
and is working with the GOA against those who actively seek
it. He welcomed Djaballah's effort to play in the legal
political system. The important point, the Ambassador
underlined, is that while political evolution might be slow
it needs to be in a steady direction of liberalization.
Djaballah accepted the point and appreciated our having
raised election process problems with the GOA.
A RULING "GANG FROM TIKRIT"
---------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Commenting on the stability of the country, XXXXXXXXXXXX
stressed that Algerians "have been through far worse than
this," and that internal divisions should not be mistaken for
instability. The regime, XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out, values
stability above all else, and is consequently both fragile
and stable at the same time. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with an analogy
made by Sadi both to us and publicly in the press, comparing
the Bouteflika government to "a gang from Tikrit" in which a
disproportionate number of cabinet ministers and generals
came from the same region in the western province of Tlemcen
as President Bouteflika. (Indeed, many in the inner circle
come from the small town of Nedrumah.) The loyalty of this
"gang," according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Sadi, is key to maintaining
stability, just as it did in Saddamn Hussein's Iraq.
SADI: "STAND UP FOR OUR YOUTH"
------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) Sadi warned of the long-term dangers of the U.S.
remaining silent on what he perceived as the deterioration of
Algerian democracy, as evidenced by the local elections. In
Sadi's view, outside support is critical to the survival of
democracy and the productive engagement of Algerian youth --
70 percent of the population -- in political and economic
life. If the U.S. is seen to be complicit in meaningless
elections and the process of amending the constitution to
allow Bouteflika to run for a third term, he warned, it risks
losing the youth demographic for the future.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) The Ambassador reminded Sadi of our fruitless efforts
to maintain a National Democratic Institute program in
Algeria that the Interior Ministry consciously shut down; few
political parties had pushed hard to save it. Ambassador
told Sadi we had raised on multiple occasions problems with
the election process and its credibility. He noted to Sadi
that we had heard other parties ask for more public U.S.
support, and urged the RCD and other Algerian parties to make
their voices heard. The U.S. would be credible in raising
obstacles to liberalization only if the Algerian political
parties themselves spoke out loudly. Given the absence of an
international election monitoring commissions in the 2008
legislative and local elections, the Ambassador advised Sadi
to consider sooner rather than later generating public
requests for international observers for the 2009
presidential elections.
STABILITY IN THE HANDS OF A DIVIDED MILITARY...
--------------------------------------------- --
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (S) Sadi, who maintains contacts with elements of the
ALGIERS 00001806 003 OF 004
Algerian military and security services, told us that the
army was no longer as unified as it had been even a few years
ago. Two splits were emerging, he said. The first is among
younger officers who know Algeria is not well and blame the
old guard for neglect and mismanagement. These officers,
Sadi said, want change and feel an increasing sense of
urgency that the country is adrift. The second split
identified by Sadi lies within the senior ranks of the
military, between officers who favor a tougher approach to
security and counter-terrorism (the "eradicateurs") and those
still aligned with Bouteflika's national reconciliation
policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX, whose brother
is an army officer, said on December 17 that there are
colonels in the Algerian military who think the current drift
cannot continue. The question, XXXXXXXXXXXX whispered, is whether
they can organize themselves.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (S) Sadi told us of at least one conversation he has had
recently with General Toufik Mediene, the head of Algeria's
DRS (military intelligence apparatus) who is widely viewed as
the key figure in ensuring regime control and survival. He
said Mediene acknowledged that all was not well with the
health of Bouteflika and Algeria writ large. However,
according to Sadi, Mediene said that he needed some kind of
reassurance that any political alternative "would be viable"
and, by implication, would not destabilize the country. Sadi
said that many senior officers were beginning to wonder if
they could get the army out of politics altogether, without
fear of public retribution for past abuses during the civil
war.
...WHILE CORRUPTION AND OIL PRICES REACH NEW HEIGHTS
--------------------------------------------- -------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (S) Sadi, Djaballah, XXXXXXXXXXXX and numerous other
contacts have told us that corruption has reached
unprecedented levels in the current regime. As we reported
in ref D, the ruling FLN party, intent on laying the
groundwork for a Bouteflika third term, has sought to install
local officials through electoral wrangling based on loyalty
even at the expense of competence. With oil prices at record
highs, former Finance and Prime Minister Benbitour told
Ambassador in November, there was less incentive for the
regime to carry out much-needed reforms. High oil prices are
bringing incredible wealth into the country, Benbitour told
us, but ordinary people are not seeing any impact on their
daily lives. (Indeed, Benbitour publicly coined a term we
see often in the media now: Algeria is rich, but the people
are poor. Islamist leader Djaballah used it with us often on
December 17.) Corruption, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has reached epic
proportions, even within the military. He cited Lieutenant
General Ahmad Gaid Salah, commander of Algerian military
forces, as perhaps the most corrupt official in the military
apparatus, something other contacts have told us as well.
When Sadi mentioned the corruption problem to General
Mediene, Sadi said, Mediene acknowledged the problem.
Motioning silently to the portrait of Bouteflika that hung
over their heads, he indicated to Sadi that the extent of the
problem went all the way to the top. (Comment: many embassy
contacts think President Bouteflika himself is not
particularly corrupt, but they readily finger the President's
brothers, Said and Abdallah, as being particularly rapacious.
The Algerian military, meanwhile, has launched an
anti-corruption program that is ambitious by Algerian
standards but has left the senior leadership relatively
untouched. End Comment.)
COMMENT: AN AILING REGIME, AN AILING PRESIDENT
--------------------------------------------- -
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07ALGIERS1806.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (S) Our Algerian contacts are often a grumpy lot, but we
now hear more than the ordinary amount of concern about the
GOA's inability or unwillingness to address political,
economic and security problems. The bombings and the debate
about how to handle Islamist extremism also are starting to
remind of the ferocious arguments within Algerian society
during the worst of 1990s violence. These contacts agree
that while the 1990s showed most Algerians can withstand lots
of pain, the December 11 bombings laid bare the regime's lack
of vision and inability to manage the pressures. We are
starting to hear echoes of a debate within some circles of
the military establishment of an increasingly polarized
ALGIERS 00001806 004 OF 004
debate over national reconciliation has become a discussion
about the viability of Bouteflika's government itself.
According to our contacts, stability remains the top priority
even among officials on opposite sides of the debate,
although they see stability as flowing not from Bouteflika's
leadership but from a military apparatus that appears to
realize that the buck stops with them. The new element is
the push from Prime Minister Belkhadem and the FLN apparatus,
probably with impetus from Bouteflika's brothers if not
President Bouteflika himself, to arrange a constitutional
amendment and a third term. Sadi, a medical doctor, said
that both Bouteflika and Algeria itself were in critical
condition and fading. According to Sadi (who may or may not
know), Bouteflika suffers from terminal stomach cancer, and
the regime lies on the operating table, slipping towards a
point of no return as "untrained surgeons" stand by.
Meanwhile, the government's seeming inability to jump-start
the stagnant economy has Algerians, especially youth, feeling
gloomy and grim about the fate of their country as it drifts
into the new year.
FORD</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-71499733838087868392011-02-01T14:27:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:27:37.954-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE2282, NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER: FOREIGN MINISTER BOT'S</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#06THEHAGUE2282</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html">06THEHAGUE2282</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2006-10_0.html">2006-10-20 11:11</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO5629
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #2282/01 2931153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201153Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7172
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002282
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR SECRETARY RICE FROM AMBASSADOR ARNALL; PLEASE ALSO PASS
TO EUR, L, AND P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/MARR_0.html">MARR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NL_0.html">NL</a>
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER: FOREIGN MINISTER BOT'S
10/23 WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
MADAM SECRETARY:
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot's upcoming visit to
Washington DC comes just one month before national elections.
It therefore provides an excellent opportunity to move some
difficult issues forward in a way that helps ensure that the
next Dutch government, whatever its configuration, comes into
office on a positive note with regard to the bilateral
relationship. Although we have had, and will continue to
have, differences with the Dutch on a variety of issues, they
remain one of our staunchest allies in continental Europe,
willing to put their credibility, resources, and even troops
on the line again and again to support transatlantic
objectives. Bot's support was critical in the Dutch
decisions to deploy troops to Afghanistan, to participate in
UNIFIL, and to provide significant assistance to Darfur. He
has also been an outspoken advocate of tougher measures to
restrain North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, and is a
strong supporter of our goals for the 2006 NATO summit.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) The current government's close ties to the U.S. have
not been without cost to the coalition government or to Bot
personally. Parliamentary and public concerns about
Guantanamo/Detainee issues, in particular, have put Bot in
the uncomfortable position of having to defend the bilateral
relationship in Parliament while carrying out explicit
parliamentary instructions to criticize U.S. policies at
every opportunity. John Bellinger's successful visit here
October 10-11 helped shift our bilateral discussions in a
more positive direction, and Bot has expressed strong
interest in continuing the dialogue; we need to move quickly
to exploit this opening to support our broader efforts to
influence Dutch and European opinion.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) In addition to his meeting with you, Bot has meetings
with Sen. Chuck Hagel, Deputy NSA Crouch, and Deputy
Secretary of Defense England on Oct. 23. He will also give a
SIPDIS
press conference and attend a dinner hosted by the American
Enterprise Institute on transatlantic relations. On Oct. 24,
Bot will meet with Deputy NSA Eliott Abrams, deliver a speech
at Georgetown University on Saving Democracy in a World of
Change, and attend a lunch at the Dutch ambassador's
residence on Afghanistan. While Afghanistan,
Guantanamo/Detainee issues, and the upcoming Riga summit will
be the main items on his agenda, Bot will also be interested
in hearing about your recent visit to the Middle East. This
cable contains brief summaries of the current state of play
of these and several other issues -- North Korea/Iran,
Venezuela, Sudan, the Human Rights Council, Joint Strike
Fighter, and Law Enforcement cooperation -- as viewed from
The Hague.
Overview
--------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Bot's visit to Washington comes against the backdrop
of the November 22 national elections, in which Bot's
governing Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) has recently
pulled from behind to run neck-in-neck with the opposition
Labor Party (PvdA). Regardless of which party gains the most
seats in the next parliament, the next Dutch government --
like all previous Dutch governments -- will be a coalition,
probably containing at least one of the current government's
two center-right parties (CDA and VVD), either governing
together or individually in partnership with the PvdA. For
that reason alone, it is clear that many of the current
government's policies will continue. In the heat of a hotly
contested campaign, however, opposition candidates will
continue to exploit perceived weaknesses in the
Bot/Balkenende foreign policy for political gain, and Bot
will feel compelled to respond -- sometimes in ways that
appear unnecessarily critical of the U.S. While we enjoy
excellent working relations with the Dutch on a wide range of
issues around the world -- including, most obviously, in
Afghanistan -- we should not underestimate the level of
public frustration with U.S. policies or the current
government's hyper-sensitivity to criticism from a volatile
and divided electorate.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Bot could retain the Foreign Minister portfolio in any
future coalition government in which CDA is a partner.
Although Bot wants the job, however, he faces stiff
competition, including from within his own party, as Maxim
THE HAGUE 00002282 002 OF 004
Verhagen, the CDA's leader in parliament, is also a prime
contender. Bot is actively using visits such as this one to
demonstrate his value to his party and the general
electorate. By choosing not to stand for parliament
personally, he may also hope to remain somewhat above
politics in order to make himself more attractive to
potential coalition partners. Even if it turns out to be a
last hurrah, a successful visit to the U.S. at this moment
is important to Bot personally, to the Balkenende government,
and for the bilateral relationship in general.
Afghanistan
-----------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) Despite a contentious parliamentary debate last winter
and low public support, the Dutch deployment to Uruzgan as
part of NATO's ISAF III mission has not emerged as a
difficult election issue for the current government -- at
least not yet. In retrospect, the lengthy debate, in which
the PvdA ultimately voted in favor of the deployment despite
serious reservations, effectively neutralized most serious
critics of the mission early and locked all the major parties
into supportive positions. In an effort to destroy this
consensus, opposition parties to the left of Labor, notably
GreenLeft and the Socialist Party, have argued noisily that
the GONL has failed in its promise to maintain a clear line
between ISAF and OEF operations, and that the focus of the
mission has shifted from reconstruction -- which the public
largely supports -- to a far more controversial combat
mission. So far, however, PvdA politicians have not taken
the bait, and the GONL has effectively countered these
charges by stressing that a secure environment is necessary
for any effective reconstruction effort, and that Dutch
military forces are fully prepared to deal with the
challenges they face.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Meanwhile, the Dutch have performed well in the field,
engaging and killing the enemy. That said, the Dutch
continue to place a higher emphasis on hearts and minds
reconstruction efforts than on the hunt for terrorists --
combat missions have been largely reactive instead of
proactive. They are set to take over regional command in the
south in November. The Dutch have not suffered any
casualties as a result of enemy fire -- an F-16 crash and
apparent suicide are the only casualties thus far. Some
speculate a high casualty count might put Afghanistan back in
play for the elections. FM Bot should be congratulated and
encouraged for the Dutch deployment and performance in
Uruzgan as they continue to punch above their weight. Bot
most likely will raise increased security along the Pakistani
border.
Detainees/Guantanamo
--------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) This is perhaps the most difficult issue in our
bilateral relationship right now. All major parties,
including the CDA, condemned the recent revelations of secret
prisons and continue to demand that Guantanamo Bay be closed
-- without offering credible alternatives. Bot has been at
the center of this particular storm, repeatedly called to
testify before Parliament to defend the bilateral
relationship in the face of the widely-shared perception that
the U.S. is not abiding by international law -- an especially
sensitive issue for the Dutch, who are proud of The Hague's
traditional role as the preeminent center of international
law -- and ignoring the concerns of allies. Bot has received
explicit instructions from Parliament to raise detainee
issues bilaterally and in international fora including the EU
GAERC and NATO NAC; he has done so with a vigor bordering on
obsession. That said, a recent visit to The Hague by John
Bellinger and other senior officials appears to have made
modest inroads into Bot's thinking. and he now supports
continuing a serious dialogue to find legally viable, long
term solutions to the detainee issue, including revisiting
portions of the Geneva Conventions. Since Bot expects to
speak publicly about the issue during his visit, it would be
useful to re-emphasize in your meeting with him that the
Military Commissions Act provides every detainee in
Guantanamo some means of judicial review and that the secret
prisons remain subject to Congressional oversight and U.S.
law.
NATO/Riga Summit
----------------
THE HAGUE 00002282 003 OF 004
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) The GONL for the most part agrees with our Riga Summit
goals, including especially the need to demonstrate progress
in Afghanistan. The Dutch have been supporters of our global
partnership initiative, although they have previously
expressed concern that building stronger ties with security
providers might create first- and second-class partnerships
at the expense of security consumers. The Dutch strongly
support a single tool box from which all interested parties
might seek to enhance ties with NATO. They are conscious of
other Allied concerns -- notably France -- regarding the use
of global terminology. They advise at Riga an understated
and fact-oriented approach to NATO's role as a global player
to garner French support for initiative.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) The Dutch also are with us when it comes to the nuts
and bolts for Riga -- it's the whither NATO question that
causes consternation. They support various military
capability enhancement initiatives, including the C-17
consortium, the special operations center, and the Middle
East training center, and eventually supported Intensified
Dialogue (ID) for Georgia. That said, the Dutch are
concerned about the direction of NATO and remain leery of
enlargement plans. While the MFA working level has been
supportive of Croatia's membership aspirations, Bot and
Political Director Pieter de Gooijer believe the EU and NATO
are expanding too quickly. They have called for an Allied
existential discussion to determine NATO's path, both at Riga
and at subsequent summits in 2008 and 2009. Following the
President's recent announcement, Bot's visit provides an
excellent opportunity to make a pitch for Croatian NATO
membership at the 2008 summit.
Lebanon/Middle East Peace Process
---------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) The Dutch are contributing a 150-person frigate as
part of the maritime component of UNIFIL. But MFA Head of
Middle Eastern Affairs Henriette van Lynden-Leijten told
Ambassador Arnall October 17 the Dutch are taking a
step-by-step approach to the Middle East, especially
regarding Syria and Lebanon, to determine where the Dutch
might have value added. This involves a review of possible
options, including better cooperation with the Middle East
Quartet, more meetings with moderate Arab states, and better
definitions of end goals. She added, however, that Dutch
influence over Syria has been clouded by a contentious
custody case involving two Dutch-Syrian children currently
encamped at the Dutch embassy in Damascus. Otherwise, van
Lynden-Leijten said Bot has excellent relations in the Middle
East, and will no doubt ask for a readout on the Secretary's
recent trip to the region. Bot should be encouraged to take
a greater role, especially with regard to influencing the EU.
North Korea/Iran
----------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) The GONL -- and Bot in particular -- share our deep
concern over nuclear developments in North Korea and Iran.
Bot publicly labeled North Korea's nuclear test
irresponsibly provocative and totally senseless, and
called for Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks. He
also said the use of force would be counterproductive, given
the large population in nearby Seoul, and suggested China was
crucial in getting North Korea to return to the table. While
the Dutch continue to push for a diplomatic resolution, they
worry about the message the international community is
sending to Iran and its nuclear program. Although publicly
supportive of the EU-3's efforts to engage Iran, in private
he has frequently expressed frustration at being left out of
the process. Recently, he called publicly for the UN
Security Council to become directly involved given the
apparent lack of progress on the EU track. The Dutch have
offered on several occasions to play a more active role on
the margins of the six-party talks and in dealing with Iran,
suggesting that any and all diplomatic pressure would be
helpful in persuading these states to abandon their current
courses. Bot should be encouraged to continue to press EU
members to engage on North Korea and Iran.
Venezuela and Latin America
---------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par13" id="par13">¶</a>13. (C) As Venezuela's neighbor -- the Netherlands Antilles
and Aruba sit just off the Venezuelan coast -- the Dutch are
THE HAGUE 00002282 004 OF 004
understandably worried about Chavez' intentions, but also go
to great lengths to avoid provoking him. For example, the
Dutch were unwilling to lobby on behalf of Guatemala for the
UN Security Council or otherwise draw attention to their
intention to vote against Venezuela. They have significant
interests in Venezuela, including a new Shell exploration
concession and a major subcontract on new light frigates.
While the Dutch posture toward Venezuela is less forward
leaning than we would like - and while Bot has at times made
statements we consider unhelpful - the Dutch have been
leaders within the EU on other regional issues. Dutch
participation in Colombian paramilitary reintegration, coca
eradication efforts, Nicaraguan election monitoring, and
other regional initiatives has been superb. On Cuba and
other Latin American issues, they have been a useful
counterbalance to traditional Spanish sway within the EU.
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
--------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par14" id="par14">¶</a>14. (C) The Dutch Parliament is expected on October 24 to
approve the GONL's signing of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD)
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). A solid majority in
Parliament supports the GONL's continued participation in
JSF, while the Dutch press views MOU signature as a foregone
conclusion. The MOU signing ceremony hosted by Deputy
Secretary of Defense England is planned for November 14 in
SIPDIS
the Pentagon. Dutch State Secretary of Defense van der Knaap
and Foreign Trade Minister van Gennip are expected to
represent the GONL. The Dutch and Italian governments are
considering a joint signing ceremony, although this has not
yet been confirmed.
Sudan
-----
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par15" id="par15">¶</a>15. (C) Dutch financial contributions to Sudan relief,
development and peacekeeping, exceed all but our own, on a
per capita basis. We have worked extremely closely with the
MFA and Development Minister Ardenne (Bot's close colleague)
on Darfur and southern Sudan. The Dutch have been close
allies on several other regional initiatives, including
efforts to deal with the Lords' Resistance Army in Uganda,
promote reconciliation and intelligence cooperation in the
Great Lakes, train peacekeepers, and develop effective
HIV/AIDS programs. Van Ardenne, rather than Bot, takes the
lead on these issues.
Human Rights Council
--------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par16" id="par16">¶</a>16. (C) Bot would like the U.S. to run for the HRC in 2007.
The Dutch worked very closely with our mission in Geneva this
fall and were among our closest EU allies during the
Israel/Lebanon debates - this despite severe criticism at
home, both of Bot and Israel. He is committed to HRC reform,
and frustrated by the course of events so far, but believes
like-minded nations can best protect their interests and
effect change by remaining involved.
Law Enforcement Issues
----------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06THEHAGUE2282.html#par17" id="par17">¶</a>17. (SBU) Attorney General Gonzales will visit The Hague a
few days after your meeting with Bot. Gonzales will open a
bilateral conference on cyber crime that the Embassy is
co-sponsoring with the Dutch Justice Ministry. The
conference will spur our bilateral cooperation on high-tech
crime, which is emerging as a priority for the law
enforcement communities in both countries. Law enforcement
cooperation is good and getting better. While bureaucratic
and privacy restrictions continue to hamper some direct
police-to-police cooperation, we have made significant
advances in the last two years. In particular, Dutch efforts
to stem the flow of ecstasy to the United States have
resulted in dramatic declines in the volume of Dutch-linked
ecstasy seized in the U.S. since 2000. Cooperation with DEA
on narcotics, and the FBI on cyber crime and
counter-terrorism investigations, is excellent.
ARNALL</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-84073175899546906162011-02-01T14:26:00.003-08:002011-02-01T14:26:57.383-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE406, YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#05THEHAGUE406</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html">05THEHAGUE406</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2005-02_0.html">2005-02-11 11:11</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/3_0.html" title="confidential">SECRET</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000406
SIPDIS
TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SOBEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2025
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NL_0.html">NL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EUN_0.html">EUN</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NATO_0.html">NATO</a>
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT
REF: THE HAGUE 3350 (2004)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D).
Madame Secretary:
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Foreign Minister Bot requested this meeting to discuss
a wide range of U.S.-EU issues prior to the President's visit
to Europe. A former Dutch permrep to the EU with a
pro-European reputation, Bot's appreciation of the
transatlantic relationship appears to have deepened and
strengthened during the six months of the Dutch EU
presidency. On several key issues -- e.g. Iraq, Ukraine,
China, Turkey -- Bot leveraged his understanding of European
politics and institutions to advance a solidly transatlantic
agenda. His candid assessments of internal European
decision-making at critical moments also proved invaluable.
Bot very much wants to remain a player, and is seeking to
stake out a clear role for the Dutch (and for himself) in the
post-Presidency environment. Although we have had our recent
-- over the Dutch withdrawal from al-Muthanna, for example
-- this meeting provides an excellent opportunity to take
advantage of Bot's credibility and experience to refine our
message to Europe, while encouraging Bot to assume a more
active leadership role in key areas.
IRAQ:
----
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Bot personally made Iraq a high priority during the
Dutch EU Presidency. He should continue to press the EU from
within to assume greater responsibilities in Iraq, and to
move quickly to establish a physical presence on the ground
in particular. The decision -- which Bot fought in cabinet
-- to withdraw the Dutch bilateral military presence from
al-Muthanna next month is unfortunately irreversible. The
Dutch were among the first, however, to commit personnel to
the first phase of the NATO training mission and have
indicated a willingness to provide up to 100 in later phases
-- with the caveat that they expect other partners to provide
similar numbers. It would be useful to remind Bot that while
we appreciate Dutch efforts to press allies to be more
forthcoming, basing Dutch contributions on strict definitions
of proportionality would be counterproductive.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) The Dutch have never ruled out additional missions in
Iraq, and Bot in particular may be receptive to ideas for how
the Dutch could fill important niches For example, The
Dutch could be asked to consider expanding bilateral support
to Iraqi institutions such as the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs (the Dutch are currently training one class of junior
Iraqi diplomats in the Hague) and Justice (the Dutch last
year hosted a successful conference of Iraqi jurists in The
Hague) or to sponsor specific reconstruction and development
projects in the al-Muthanna area to take advantage of
existing links to the local community.
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO:
------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Bot started the Dutch presidency resigned to lifting
the China Arms Embargo, but ended it determined to prevent a
lift on his watch. He can continue to provide useful
insights into how the issue is being handled within EU
circles, and should be pushed to keep the EU focused on its
commitment -- which the Dutch insisted on inserting into the
December 17 Council declaration -- not to increase sales to
China in quantity or quality. The Dutch have made clear
that they will take their lead on this issue from the
British, and that they will not stand alone to prevent a
lift, but they may be able to help us find and exploit
potential cracks in the EU's consensus. Bot should also be
left with no illusions about the likely consequences of a
lift, including potential complications in U.S.-European
defense trade.
CUBA:
----
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) The Dutch continue to represent the EU Presidency in
Havana (since Luxembourg has no mission there) and have deep
concerns about the human rights situation there. The Dutch
have so far not been as active as the Czechs or Poles in
pressing the EU to maintain contacts with dissidents as it
improves relations with Havana; Bot could and should do more
in this area. For example, he could instruct the Dutch
Embassy in Havana to respond positively to our request that
US representatives be invited to the monthly coordination
meetings on human rights held by EU missions in Havana.
TURKEY/CYPRUS:
-------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) As a former Ambassador to Turkey, and the man under
whose watch the Turks finally got a date to begin accession
talks, Bot has a personal interest in facilitating Turkey's
bid to accede to the EU. The Dutch MFA plans to establish a
regular bilateral forum for discussing EU accession issues
with Turkey along the lines of their previous successful
relationship with Poland; this relationship may prove useful
in identifying and resolving problems ad October 3
approaches. The Dutch can also provide useful insights into
EU thinking regarding Cyprus, and are keenly aware that a
failure to resolve the current impasse over Berlin-plus has
serious implications for NATO.
ICC/SUDAN:
---------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) We will have little success convincing Bot to break
from EU consensus to support an AU/UN tribunal on Darfur as
long as the ICC remains an option in European eyes; as the
host of the ICC, the Dutch are uniquely committed to seeing
it succeed. We can, however, ask Bot to tone down the
rhetoric and activities of Dutch representatives in New York,
Brussels, and elsewhere opposing alternatives to the ICC. As
a pragmatist, Bot should understand that a public spat over
this issue does nothing either to promote the transatlantic
agenda or to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Dutch,
and Bot personally, have been heavily involved in Darfur (the
Dutch, for example, paid over half of the EU's contribution
to the AU mission) and do not want to jeopardize a potential
resolution over technicalities.
AFGHANISTAN:
-----------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (S) In the debate over the al-Muthanna withdrawal, the
Dutch government cited commitments in Afghanistan --
including a possible deployment of special forces to OEF and
heading up a new PRT in phase III -- as one reason for
leaving Iraq. These commitments are substantial, useful, and
appropriate, but you may want to set down a marker that they
should not be used to justify seen as substitutes for
contributions in Iraq -- both are high priorities. The Dutch
have also recently expressed public interest in deploying the
Dutch battalion of the SRF to Afghanistan to support upcoming
elections, but have balked at deploying the more substantial
Dutch NRF forces (approximately 4,000 troops.) NATO has not
yet determined which force, if either, should be deployed for
this mission, but Dutch efforts to predetermine the outcome
are not helpful.
MIDDLE EAST:
-----------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Last November, Bot was eager to transform his
successful hosting of the EUROMED conference in the Hague
into a a prominent role in the Middle East Peace Process. So
far, however, he has been unable to carve out an appropriate
role for himself or the Netherlands either within the EU or
bilaterally. Bot correctly judges that there is broad public
support (including from the main opposition parties in
parliament) for increased engagement in the Middle East, but
he will not insert himself into the process without being
asked.
AFRICA:
------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) Already heavily involved in Africa -- the Dutch are
the fourth largest donor of aid to the continent -- Bot is
under constant pressure from the Dutch parliament (and Dutch
development minister Agnes van Ardenne) to do more. The
Dutch uniquely include a major focus on peace and security in
their African development policy, and have expressed interest
in greater coordination with the U.S., especially in the Horn
and Great Lakes Regions. In fleshing out possible areas of
increased cooperation in Africa, we should remain cognizant
of the fact that African initiatives have sometimes been
portrayed as alternatives to missions in Iraq or Afghanistan;
we will need to make clear in any discussion where our top
priorities lie.
BOTTOM LINE:
-----------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) Bot's experience and credibility make him a useful
European interlocutor and an effective advocate for the
transatlantic agenda. During the Dutch presidency, he
repeatedly demonstrated a talent for translating
transatlantic objectives into the language of Europeanism,
and for discreetly managing difficult issues (such as Turkey
or China) to successful conclusions. It would be in our
interest to find creative ways to harness his skills as a
coalition builder and his newly-deepened transatlantic
orientation in the post-presidency environment as well.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/02/05THEHAGUE406.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) One final point you may want to stress in your
discussion is that the concept of proportionality creeping
into many Dutch debates (on Iraq and Afghanistan, for
example) is misguided. The value we place on our partnership
is not based on whether or not the Dutch contribute their
fair share to any given operation, but rather reflects the
trust developed over a long history in which each side
demonstrated its willingness to do whatever was needed to
achieve shared objectives.
SOBEL</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-78416805264332598482011-02-01T14:26:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:26:17.116-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"><br />
</div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 05TELAVIV45, C) PM'S ADVISOR ON RENEWED REPARATIONS CLAIMS</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
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</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
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<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html">05TELAVIV45</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2005-01_0.html">2005-01-04 14:02</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/25_0.html">Embassy Tel Aviv</a> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td colspan="5"> Appears in these articles:<br />
<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/">www.spiegel.de</a><br />
</td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000045
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2014
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/MASS_0.html">MASS</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PL_0.html">PL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/IS_0.html">IS</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/GOI_0.html">GOI</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EXTERNAL_0.html">EXTERNAL</a>
SUBJECT: (C) PM'S ADVISOR ON RENEWED REPARATIONS CLAIMS
AGAINST GERMANY, RESTITUTION CLAIMS AGAINST POLAND
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).
OutGoing Cable Acknowledgement
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Summary: A GOI working group charged with developing a
five-year plan on Holocaust-era reparations, pensions and
restitution is considering a recommendation that the GOI ask
Germany for about $500 million -- possibly in the form of new
German-made submarines -- in compensation for what the GOI
says is that portion of the 1953 German-Israeli reparations
agreement that had been attributed to East Germany, but never
paid. xxxxxxxxxxxx (strictly protect), contended that such a GOI claim would not violate any "closure" agreements about Holocaust-era
claims because it would be based on the unfulfilled portion
of a preexisting agreement. The working group also expects
to call for renewed GOI efforts to resolve Holocaust-era
pension issues within five years and to settle all unresolved
property and asset issues. End summary.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx
informally previewed elements of the GOI,s not-yet-adopted
&five-year action plan8 on Holocaust-era reparations,
pensions and restitution, in a December 8 meeting with
emboff. (Strictly protect xxxxxxxxxxxx.) He
emphasized that the action plan, which includes renewed
claims against Germany and Poland, is still in draft, and is
being vetted with major Holocaust survivor organizations. It
has not yet, therefore, gone forward to the GOI,s newly
created Ministerial Commission on Restitution for Jewish
Rights and Property, nor to the full GOI, for review and
adoption as official policy.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (U) The text of the GOI Cabinet decision that
established the Commission is at:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/government/communiq ues/2003
/cabinet communique - 28-dec-2003.htm
------------------------------
Draft GOI Approach/Action Plan
------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said that xxxxxxxxxxxx and
Nimrod Barkan, head of the MFA's World Jewish Affairs Bureau,
was tasked in late 2003 with drafting and submitting to the
Ministerial Commission a &five-year plan of action8 on
Holocaust restitution and related issues. The draft, which
is nearing completion, could be put forward to the
Ministerial Commission as early as January/February 2005, xxxxxxxxxxxx
said. The report is likely to recommend that the GOI:
-- Work to close all outstanding Holocaust-era reparations
issues within the next five years, including, in particular,
what xxxxxxxxxxxx said is a still-unpaid sum from the 1953 West
Germany)Israel agreement.
-- Work to complete all issues related to Holocaust-era
pensions within the next five years, while survivors are
still living.
-- Continue the strongest possible diplomatic action on all
fronts to secure full restitution of property and assets,
including heirless property and assets. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that no
time limit would apply to this effort, and that the GOI would
continue work on the issue until it accounts for every asset.
(Note: In previous discussions and e-mails, xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated to
Emboff and EUR/OHI that his draft paper would also include a
recommendation for the GOI to press for restitution for
Jewish property and assets in Arab lands from which Jews
fled.)
-------------------------------------------
Likely Israel Bilateral Approach to Germany
-------------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Regarding Germany, xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that, according to the
working group,s research, Israel is still due money from its
1953 Holocaust reparations agreement with West Germany. He
said that the amount is one-third of the $845 million agreed
to in the deal, and represents an amount that West Germany
reportedly said East Germany would be responsible for paying,
but that East Germany never paid. Most of the amount paid to
Israel under the 1953 agreement was in the form of goods
transferred from West Germany to Israel. In this case,
Israel is considering a request for military goods, probably
two submarines, worth about $500 million, he said. (Note:
xxxxxxxxxxxx was undoubtedly referring to Dolphin-class submarines,
three of which the GOI received in the early 1990s from
Germany. The model now sought by the Israeli Navy costs
about $350-500 million per submarine.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) &This does not constitute a new claim,xxxxxxxxxxxx took
pains to point out. Rather, he argued, it stems from
incomplete implementation of an existing agreement, and, as
such, should not come under the terms of any agreement with
the United States not to raise new reparations claims against
Germany. He noted that he reviewed his analysis with Amb.
Stuart Eizenstat, the former U.S. special envoy for
Holocaust-era property claims, when Eizenstat visited Israel
in November. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx Eizenstat concurred that
nothing in the U.S. closure agreement with Germany in 2000
would preclude Israel from independently seeking redress of
an issue stemming from a preexisting agreement. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he
hoped that the U.S. would not do anything that could be seen
as opposing or undermining Israel,s bilateral approach to
Germany. xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed to emboff's request to keep the embassy
and U.S. Special Envoy O'Donnell apprised of working group
deliberations and other matters of potential U.S. interest,
and to brief the Ambassador on the restitution plan as it
nears completion.
-----------------------------------
Future Work: Poland and Arab States
-----------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/01/05TELAVIV45.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Finally, xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that Poland would likely be the
next area of focus of the GOI restitution efforts, and that
the GOI would work in close coordination with the World
Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) and the other main
survivor and restitution bodies in Israel and abroad. All of
the above are in addition to the GOI Ministerial Committee,s
continuing research into expanding pursuit of restitution
claims for Jewish property and assets from Arab lands.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
kurtzer</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-72846897607754237722011-02-01T14:25:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:25:26.005-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE3166, NETHERLANDS/EU: FM BOT ON CHINA, TURKEY,</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
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Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#04THEHAGUE3166</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html">04THEHAGUE3166</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2004-12_0.html">2004-12-03 16:04</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003166
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/MARR_0.html">MARR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CH_0.html">CH</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/RS_0.html">RS</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NL_0.html">NL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EUN_0.html">EUN</a>
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: FM BOT ON CHINA, TURKEY,
ENLARGEMENT, RUSSIA/UKRAINE, MIDDLE EAST, AND IRAN
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1
.4 (B AND D)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: During a one and one half hour discussion
with Ambassador Sobel on December 2, Dutch Foreign Minister
Bernard Bot laid out his priorities for the last few weeks of
the Dutch EU presidency. Bot stated categorically that he
will not lift the Chinese Arms Embargo, but predicted
(again) that Luxembourg would. He claimed that getting a
yes on Turkey will be the most important legacy of the
Dutch presidency, but stressed that this will not happen
unless Turkey signs the Ankara Customs Union Agreement
protocol on Cyprus at the eleventh hour on December 17. He
faulted the Commission for the lack of progress on Romanian
and Croatian accession talks. With regard to Russia, Bot
said Putin's debating skills during the U.S.-EU summit were
impressive but worried that Russian great game thinking
will continue to thwart closer U.S.-EU cooperation in Ukraine
and other parts of the new neighborhood. The EU will
remain engaged in Ukraine despite Russian pressure, but Bot
expected a new election would likely produce the same
(fraudulent) results. Bot is proud that he was able to bring
Israelis and Palestinians together at the EUROMED conference
and intends to stay engaged in the Middle East after the
conclusion of the Dutch Presidency. Finally, Bot described
the EU-Iran agreement as flawed, but better than nothing:
half and egg is better than a shell. END SUMMARY.
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: I WILL NOT LIFT
--------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Bot stated that the Chinese have stepped up the
pressure to have the embargo lifted before the end of the
year. He said he recently told Chinese Foreign Minister Li
on the phone that I will not lift the embargo. (Note:
This is the first time Bot has stated this categorically.)
Ambassador Sobel asked about the language on a positive
signal we understood would be included in the EU-China
summit statement on December 8; Bot acknowledged that the
statement would include language indicating that the EU was
working toward lifting the embargo but would not go
further. Bot denied that the statement would include any
conditions on lifting, but stressed that the EU would
appeal for action on Human Rights and make clear that the
toolbox and strengthened code of conduct must be in place
before lift. (Grinning, Bot said he told Li to blame the
French if their refusal to make concessions on the toolbox
prevented the lifting of the embargo.) According to Bot, Li
said that the Chinese would ratify the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights soon, but did not
want to do it with a gun to their heads.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) Asked about the current dynamic within the EU, Bot
said that the Baltics had recently become more active in
expressing their concerns about lifting the embargo at this
time, along with the Danes, Swedes, and Czechs. Bot
predicted, however, that the embargo would almost certainly
be lifted during the Luxembourg presidency, probably in May
or June 2005, in response to pressure from China and France.
TURKEY: I WANT A YES
----------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Bot told Ambassador Sobel that he is determined to get
a yes for Turkey at the December 17 Council meeting,
asserting that this is the most important thing he hopes to
accomplish this year. He stated categorically that the
Council decision will use the October 6 Commission report
language on open-ended negotiations: the Austrians, he
said, will not get what they want. On the other hand, Bot
argued that Turkey must eventually agree to sign the
protocol to the Ankara Agreement (effectively recognizing
Cyprus) -- which he expected them to do at the absolutely
last minute on December 17 or early December 18 (after
midnight) -- or there is no deal. Bot passed this message
to Turkish FM Gul several times over the past few weeks, he
said, but Gul so far remained adamant that Turkey would not
sign. Shrugging, Bot said that if that remained the Turkish
position there was nothing he could do as this was
non-negotiable; if Turkey did sign, he added, then Cyprus
would come under enormous pressure to drop all other
additional demands.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Bot asked for U.S. assistance in convincing Turkey to
suspend military operations in the Aegean, at least through
December 17, as they were providing a pretext for Greece to
agitate against Turkish accession. According to Bot, Turkish
PM Erdogan had told him recently that he could not stop the
flights because he did not control the military -- an
assertion Bot found disturbing. Asked by Ambassador Sobel
about a possible date for starting negotiations with Turkey,
Bot said that it would almost certainly be late 2005; he
noted that in public statements he sometimes added or early
2006 as a sop to the French, but did not believe it.
ROMANIA/CROATIA: BAD VIBES
---------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) Bot expressed frustration with the slow progress on
Romania and Croation accession. Romania was not even close
to accession, he said, largely because of its lack of
progress on competition area; while Croatia's failure to hand
over Gotovina to the ICTY was a serious problem. Bot said
that he did not want the Dutch presidency to be remembered
primarily for saying no to multiple candidates, and was
talking intensively with the Commission to find a way to move
forward.
RUSSIA/UKRAINE: PUTIN WINS ON POINTS
-------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) In response to a question from Ambassador Sobel, Bot
denied that the lunch discussion on Ukraine during the recent
EU-Russia summit had been as contentious as reported by some.
Bot stressed that Putin had been polite but tough and very
well prepared. Compared to his own Prime Minister, Bot
continued, Putin came across as a strong debater who could
win on points but still fail to convince his audience
because his premises were all wrong. Putin had argued, for
example, that the EU should stay out of Ukraine just as
Russia has, and suggested that Ukraine's ties to Russia
meant it would never be a Western European state. With
regard to next steps, Bot said that he had deliberately
chosen to let Solana take the lead for the EU (despite
pressure from the Poles to take a more active personal role)
since the Commission was inherently less threatening to
Russia than the EU presidency. Bot expected that the
Ukrainian supreme court decision would lay the basis for
either a re-run of the election or completely new elections,
and speculated that the Russian line in the sand would be
for the EU to recognize Yuschenko as a winner without one of
these steps occurring first. In either case, however, Bot
concluded glumly that the same forces that rigged the last
election would probably do so again unless the West could
come up with 25,000 monitors. While the EU had been
relatively united so far, Bot doubted that consensus could be
maintained over the long term if the cause appeared lost.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) With regard to the four common spaces, both sides
agreed at the summit to set May 2005 as the target for
concluding agreement, but Bot was skeptical that this would
be achieved, especially with regard to external relations.
Russia, he said, is still operating on the basis of 19th
century Great Game thinking, while the EU is trying to be a
good neighbor.
MIDDLE EAST: STAYING IN THE PICTURE
------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Bot confirmed that the Shaath-Shalom-Bot meeting on
the margins of the November 29 EUROMED meetings had been very
constructive. Bot had told both parties that the EU would
refrain from discussing final status issues provided they
made a real commitment to successful Palestinian elections
and related near-term steps. (In response to a question from
the Ambassador, Bot said that he had restrained Solana and
some Arab delegations from seeking to restart a discussion on
final status issues during the dinner by spelling out this
agreement.) The mood of that meeting had helped set a
positive tone for the dinner, which Bot contrasted favorably
to the previous EUROMED dinner in which soup and plates
flew. The EU is committed to providing funds, logistical
support, and observers for the Palestinian elections but is
also seeking support from countries in the region.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) Bot was eager to coordinate EU efforts with the U.S.
and expressed frustration that more information on U.S.
near-term planning was not available. He did not think he
would be able to attend the December 11 Forum for the Future
meeting in Rabat because he would be attending Prince
Bernhard's funeral, but stressed that he intended to remain
engaged on the Middle East even after the end of the Dutch EU
presidency. (Note: On December 3, Bot told the Ambassador he
would like to attend the Forum for the Future and intended to
ask the Prime Minister if he could be excused from the
funeral, but stressed that the Prime Minister was unlikely to
approve.) Both the Palestinians and Israelis, he said,
appreciated the Netherlands' balanced approach (especially
when compared to some other European governments) and had
asked him to stay involved. Bot said he had discussed this
with his Luxembourg counterpart who also supported leaving
much of this portfolio in Dutch hands.
describing his commitment to
IRAN: HALF AN EGG BETTER THAN A SHELL
--------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) Ambassador Sobel asked Bot if he thought the EU-3
agreement with Iran would hold; Bot replied in the
affirmative. He readily acknowledged that the agreement was
not perfect, but noted that China had made clear its
intention to veto any critical resolution in the Security
Council, so that route was not practical. Citing a Dutch
proverb, Bot argued that half an egg is better than a whole
shell. The agreement would at least slow down the Iranians,
he said, and could lead to a more significant IAEA monitoring
regime in the future.
COMMENT:
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3166.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) Bot was confident and decisive throughout the
meeting. Although still looking for consensus within the EU,
he also appeared comfortable choosing -- when forced to make
a choice -- a position in favor of the transatlantic agenda
over the objections of EU partners, as in the case of China.
His irritation with France was palpable; at one point, Bot
told the Ambassador in confidence that it would be a big
mistake to reward Chirac's behavior with a presidential
visit or other post-election gesture without guaranteed
deliverables.
RUSSEL</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-48652280255767960912011-02-01T14:24:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:24:29.571-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 03THEHAGUE2843, AMBASSADOR'S NOVEMBER 10 DINNER WITH DUTCH PRIME</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
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</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#03THEHAGUE2843</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html">03THEHAGUE2843</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2003-11_0.html">2003-11-13 14:02</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002843
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2013
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/IZ_0.html">IZ</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NL_0.html">NL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a>
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S NOVEMBER 10 DINNER WITH DUTCH PRIME
MINISTER BALKENENDE
Classified By: Classified By: DCM Daniel R. Russel:
reasons 1.5 (B) (D)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Sobel hosted dinner for Dutch
Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende November 10. The PM's
Diplomatic Advisor Rob Swartbol and DCM also attended.
Balkenende promised that Dutch foreign policy would remain
constant when Ben Bot became FM on Dec. 3, but cautioned that
EU Presidency preparations would consume increasing amounts
of government attention. Balkenende restated his commitment
to shoring up trans-Atlantic ties and expressed interest in
working on US-EU border security and justice issues during
the Dutch presidency. He described an agenda with a heavy
European focus, and was cautious on whether the Dutch could
play a constructive role in fostering US-EU Article 98
agreements. The PM indicated he was also thinking about an
outreach of some kind to Israel. Balkenende thanked the
Ambassador warmly for the reception by the President and
other senior USG officials in Washington in September. End
summary.
New Foreign Minister, Same Foreign Policy
------------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Balkenende said that Ben Bot, set to replace outgoing
FM de Hoop Scheffer on December 3, would maintain the
government's priorities in foreign affairs: European
integration, the trans-Atlantic relationship, and continuity
in Middle East policy. Balkenende said Bot is indeed a
Europeanist, having spent the past ten years as Dutch
Ambassador to the EU, but will be strong in maintaining
trans-Atlantic ties and will maintain the existing division
of labor with the State Secretary for European Affairs.
Balkenende cautioned that Bot would have his hands full in
the first few months of his tenure. His first order of
business is establishing himself with the Parliament and
preparing for the EU Presidency. He also needs to invest in
establishing his management of the Ministry and to travel
abroad, including to Washington. Balkenende noted that he
himself would travel to the US in March to receive an award
at Princeton and planned to make a major speech on
trans-Atlantic relations at that time.
Dutch '04 EU Presidency
------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) Sobel asked what initiatives the Dutch could take
during their presidency in support of the US-European
relationship. The Justice Minister, who had recently met
with DHS Secretary Ridge, had confirmed that Dutch would be
working on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues during their
presidency and agreed that perhaps there could be progress on
the US-EU track. Swartbol said that the GONL had not made
decisions yet about any trans-Atlantic initiatives, but a
US-EU effort on border control and justice issues would fit
the Dutch emphasis on internal and external security. He
cautioned that the arrival of a new slate of EU Commissioners
in November '04 would complicate and delay things. PM
Balkenende said that he and Irish PM Ahern had discussed the
question of whether the Dutch would begin the process of
designing a program to follow Tampere -- the JHA multiyear
plan that would be completed and reviewed during the Irish
Presidency. In order to get anything done in the second half
of '04, the Irish would have to do the preparatory work.
Balkenende said he would ask his people to look at the
possibilities.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) The Ambassador urged the PM to stay engaged in the
trans-Atlantic partnership and show leadership in Europe.
Wrapping up on the EU Presidency, Balkenende said that the
government is increasingly busy in its preparations, although
he invited the Ambassador to contact him when there are
important US issues. The cabinet now meets monthly to review
Presidency preparations, and the pace of those meetings will
accelerate.
Balkenende listed the following Dutch priorities for the
second semester of '04:
- - Enlargement - Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey;
- - The new European Commission and Parliament;
- - Lisbon 2000 (economic), Tampere, and Common Security and
Foreign Policy (CSFP);
- - Deregulation in Europe; and
- - Promoting social values in Europe.
Other issues
--------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) ICC: The Ambassador also raised the ICC, noting that
the UN arrangements will again expire in June, risking a
US-EU confrontation. The US position will not change, so
wouldn't it be better for the European Council Presidency to
deal with this? Balkenende replied that it would be very
hard to imagine the EU accepting Article 98 agreements with
the US. The American perspective on the ICC is very
different and will not change; Dutch political support for it
is strong. Swartbol added that since the Netherlands is the
host country, it is very difficult for the government to
engage on this matter. Europe does not want conflict with
the US over the ICC, but objects to pressure and publicizing
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#parA" id="parA">¶</a>A. 98 agreements by other countries. DCM responded that the
US was not seeking to undermine the ICC and that EU countries
individually wanted to find a way out of the confrontation
with the US over the ICC. The treaty itself provided the
answer in Article 98 and we would welcome quiet Dutch efforts
with its EU partners to break the stalemate.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) Economics: Sobel briefed the PM on plans for a
high-level trade mission by Dutch companies to Silicon
Valley. Balkenende confirmed that he would address the group
via video and expressed interest in meeting with the mission
when it returned. He described the government's efforts to
increase private R&D spending, eliminate barriers to foreign
scientists coming to Dutch universities, and otherwise
increase competitiveness in the short and the long term.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Iraq: Balkenende asked if the Madrid Conference had
been successful. Ambassador replied that it had been very
positive and a number of countries had risen to the challenge
at the last minute. DCM noted that there had been valuable
consultations in and on the margins of the conference. The
Iraqi Planning Minister al Hafidh, who visited the
Netherlands in October, had just been named Minister of
Development and International Cooperation - was the GoNL
planning to do more in helping to grow the Iraqi economy and
build infrastructure? Sobel said that Dutch industry has
been signaling its interest and was looking for leadership
from the government. Balkenende replied that Economic Affairs
Minister Brinkhorst was the person who should be developing
opportunities for Dutch companies and promised he would raise
the issue.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) The Ambassador probed Dutch thinking on the Middle
East in the run-up to their EU Presidency. Balkenende said
that any effort in the Middle East Peace Process would need
to be carefully prepared and depended on whether the two
parties were ready to negotiate seriously. Picking up the
point previously made to the Dutch FM in Washington last
September by White House Senior Director Elliot Abrams, Sobel
noted that anything that reduced Israel's isolation from the
EU would be beneficial. Swartbol later told the Ambassador
that the GONL, if it decided to get involved, would think in
terms of inviting PMs Sharon and Qurei (separately) to visit
Holland, probably sometime next year.
Comment
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2843.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Balkenende remains staunchly supportive of the
trans-Atlantic relationship and again demonstrated his
accessibility to the Ambassador and willingness to entertain
new ideas. The conversation revealed, however, the extent to
which he and the GONL are increasingly consumed by the vortex
of Europe, particularly in the run-up to the Dutch EU
Presidency in July '04. Dutch decision-making in the best of
times is slow and diffused - and Balkenende is a
consensus-builder in a coalition cabinet, not an assertive
leader dominating the political scene. This means that
although Balkenende's heart is in the right place, getting
him, incoming FM Bot, and other senior GoNL officials to
focus adequately and consistently on US equities will be a
labor-intensive process -- although well worth the effort.
RUSSEL</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-15189837825421535432011-02-01T14:23:00.003-08:002011-02-01T14:23:50.712-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 03THEHAGUE2480, NEW DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER DESIGNATED - BERNARD</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/09/03THEHAGUE2480.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#03THEHAGUE2480</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/09/03THEHAGUE2480.html">03THEHAGUE2480</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2003-09_0.html">2003-09-30 14:02</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/24_0.html">Embassy The Hague</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002480
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2013
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/NL_0.html">NL</a>
SUBJECT: NEW DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER DESIGNATED - BERNARD
BEN BOT
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary E. Daly reasons 1.5 (b & d)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/09/03THEHAGUE2480.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Summary: On September 30, Prime Minister Jan Peter
Balkenende asked retired career diplomat Bernard Bot to
accept the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs beginning in
early December, 2003. Bot declared himself most willing to
accept the position. The intention is for de Hoop Scheffer
to stay in office through the OSCE Ministerial December 1-2.
The primary reason for choosing Bot is the need for an
accomplished technocrat to run the Dutch EU presidency. Bot
most recently served as the Netherlands' permanent
representative at the EU between 1992 and 2002. Prior to
that, he was Dutch ambassador to Turkey and to NATO, as well
as Secretary General of the MFA. Privately, sources close to
the Prime Minister told us that the Prime Minister insisted
that foreign policy remain unchanged, especially regarding
relations with the United States and Israel. Bot's interview
with the Prime Minister this weekend was reportedly very long
and designed to assess whether he was willing to carry out
the current policy line. According to the PM's top political
advisor, Balkenende was fully satisfied that Bot was strongly
committed to the Atlantic partnership. The Prime Minister
passed over candidates from the political class. While he
would have liked CDA floor leader Maxime Verhagen in the job
(the men are extremely close personally and on policy), he
could not spare him from parliament. Bot's resume follows.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/09/03THEHAGUE2480.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Dr. Bernard Rudolf Bot
Born November 21, 1937 in Batavia, Indonesia
Widower, three children
Education: St. Aloysius College, The Hague
Law studies, University of Leyden
Academy of International Law, The Hague,
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass USA (LLM)
Doctorate in law (cum laude), University of Leyden
Career: Joined the diplomatic service of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs October 22, 1963.
Postings: 1964 - 1970 - Brussels, Permanent Representation
of the Netherlands to the European Communities
1970 - 1973 - Buenos Aires
1973 - 1976 - (East) Berlin
1976 - 1982 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
1982 - 1986 - Brussels, Deputy Permanent Representative of
the Netherlands to NATO
1986 - 1989 - Ankara, Ambassador
1989 - 1992 - Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Hague
October 1, 1992 - Brussels, Permanent Representative of the
Netherlands to the European Union
January 1, 2003 - Partner, Praaning Meines Consultancy Group
Other Positions:
Chairman, Association of the Members of the Diplomatic
Service (1978 - 1982)
Member of the Board of Governors, Fondation Journalistes en
Europe
Member of the Supervisory Board, Hotel School The Hague
Chairman of the Advisory Board, Energy Charter Secretariat
Member of the Board of Trustees of the European Centre for
Work and Society
Member of the Board of Trustees of the University of Tilburg
Publications:
Non-recognition and Treaty Relations (1968), edited by
Sijhoff and Oceana
Articles on the Common Market, European Political
co-operation, NATO and various other political matters
SOBEL</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-79577963847797258962011-02-01T14:23:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:23:12.067-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 09HAVANA492, C/NF) THE CHURCH AND TRANSITION IN CUBA</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#09HAVANA492</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html">09HAVANA492</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2009-08_0.html">2009-08-11 17:05</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/4_0.html" title="secret//noforn">SECRET//NOFORN</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUB #0492/01 2231754
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 111754Z AUG 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4664
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC</pre><code></code><pre>S E C R E T HAVANA 000492
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA AND INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2034
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SCUL_0.html">SCUL</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a>
SUBJECT: (C/NF) THE CHURCH AND TRANSITION IN CUBA
(C-AL9-01566)
REF: STATE 80209
Classified By: Chief of Mission Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (c) and
(d)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (SBU) This cable is in response to reftel. We will also keep the questions in mind as we continue to meet with relevant contacts.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C/NF) QUESTION A: ARE CHURCH OFFICIALS CULTIVATING
CUBAN PROFESSIONALS SUCH AS DOCTORS, ENGINEERS, ACCOUNTANTS, PROJECT DIRECTORS, ETC? IF SO, HOW? WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF COURTING PROFESSIONALS? WHO IS DIRECTING THIS APPROACH? ARE THESE ACTIVITIES COORDINATED FROM THE CHURCH HIERARCHY, OR
DESIGNED INDEPENDENTLY BY PARISHES?
(C/NF) POST RESPONSE: We do not see evidence of such
targeted proselytizing. The church hierarchy, from the
Cardinal on down to parish priests, complains that emigration
decimates the ranks of the laity and that they have to engage
in constant recruitment merely to replace those laity who
emigrate. We have no reason to believe that those efforts
target professionals in particular.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C/NF) QUESTION B: ARE CHURCH MEMBERS RUNNING
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING CLASSES? IF SO, WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING ARE PARISHES PROVIDING (I.E. FOREIGN LANGUAGES, CRITICAL THINKING, BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND DELEGATION, WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, PUBLIC SPEAKING, ETC.)?
(C/NF) POST RESPONSE: We have seen several examples of
parishes and at least one convent that provide training in
computers and foreign languages. (Note:
denominations have similar activities. End Note.)
XXXXXXXXXXXX also tells us he does some training at his parish in
Santiago de Cuba. Computer training is the most common. The
San Juan de Letran church in Vedado has a monthly lecture
series on theological issues that attracts 100 or more,
mainly university-age, participants. The Mission to the
Order of Malta provides equipment (projector, video camera,
etc.) for some workshops promoting spiritual cinema.
Otherwise, we are not familiar with churches that run the
type of courses mentioned in reftel.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C/NF) QUESTION C: ARE LOWER-LEVEL CUBAN CLERGY AND LAY PEOPLE PROVIDING TRAINING AND/OR CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES NOT APPROVED BY THE HIERARCHY? HOW ARE THESE PEOPLE IDENTIFIED?
THROUGH CHURCH ACTIVITIES? FROM SCHOOLS? ARE INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT PREVIOUS ENTREPRENEURIAL OR POLITICAL SKILLS BEING TRAINED? HOW LONG HAVE THESE ACTIVITIES BEEN TAKING PLACE?
(C/NF) POST RESPONSE: The classes of which we are aware are
offered to all parishioners on a first-come, first-served
basis. These are mostly modest efforts. These programs go
back at least several years. Our experience with contacts is
that these programs are known to the Church hierarchy and
that in many cases the hierarchy provides "cover" for such activities with the relevant Government of Cuba (GOC) authorities.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C/NF) QUESTION D: DOES ANY EVIDENCE EXIST TO SUGGEST THAT THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IS SEEKING TO MEDIATE A DIALOGUE IN CUBA'S CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT BETWEEN INDEPENDENT CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE-ASSOCIATED INTELLECTUALS BY "HOSTING" INTERVIEWS WITH THE LATTER GROUP IN CHURCH PUBLICATIONS--SUCH AS THE HAVANA ARCHDIOCESAN MAGAZINE ESPACIO LAICAL (E.G. THE 2009 ISSUE NUMBER ONE ARTICLES INVOLVING ECONOMIST OMAR EVERLENY PEREZ AND POLITICAL SCIENTIST CARLOS ALZUGARAY)?
(C/NF) POST RESPONSE: We've seen articles as described in reftel in both Espacio Laical and in Palabra Nueva, which recently ran a two-part series that essentially was a point/counterpoint between Orlando Marquez of Palabra Nueva and Rafael Hernandez, the editor of Temas. Post believes these articles are oriented toward creating space and legitimacy for the Catholic Church as a legitimate interlocutor in Cuban societal issues and are not aimed at fostering a broader debate between GOC-affiliated intellectuals and broader civil society. In fact, we have not seen any evidence that the Catholic Church is specifically reaching out to independent civil society in Cuba.
--------
Comments
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<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09HAVANA492.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C/NF) The Catholic Church is slowly increasing the scope of the activities it is willing and able to conduct in Cuba. The relief work of Caritas and various parishes after the 2008 hurricanes has earned the Church some additional street credibility. Some parishes also offer soup kitchens, medicines, and some form of parochial education for children, all of which are at risk since they technically compete with the Cuban Government's desire for complete control over the provision of social services. The Church goes to great lengths to keep a low profile and stay out of any public discussions that may be deemed political, or certainly counter-revolutionary. For years, the Church has worked to
distance itself from well-known opposition figures who are also devout Catholics such as Oswaldo Paya and Dagoberto Valdes. As such, any activities the Church may be carrying out to prepare for a post-Castro Cuba are not being shared either from the pulpit or in our private discussions with Church officials.
FARRAR</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-28656851043728342252011-02-01T14:22:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:22:25.465-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 08HAVANA811, PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE: THOUGHTS ON THE CATHOLIC</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
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<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html">08HAVANA811</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2008-10_0.html">2008-10-15 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO6592
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHUB #0811/01 2892125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 152125Z OCT 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3799
INFO RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0152</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000811
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/EAID_0.html">EAID</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/KDEM_0.html">KDEM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a>
SUBJECT: PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE: THOUGHTS ON THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH IN CUBA
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REA...
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) The Catholic Church seeks to work under the GOC's radar to rebuild its infrastructure and ecclesiastical ranks. From Cardinal Ortega all the way down to provincial nuns, the Church mostly avoids challenging the GOC. Fear of drawing the ire of the GOC limits church outreach programs to narrow niches, such as caring for mentally challenged children and adults. Congregations for the most part remain small, elderly, and female. Youth programs are stunted, leading one to wonder who will fill the newly-renovated churches to listen to the priests who graduate from the huge seminary now under construction.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Over the past two months, COM has had the opportunity to engage with elements of the Catholic Church on a variety of levels, including with Cardinal Ortega, the auxiliary bishop of Havana, the bishop of Santiago, missionary nuns in Matanzas province, and priests from nine Havana parishes and one in Santiago. The impression one takes away is of a church extremely unlikely to challenge the GOC beyond even minimal ways. On issues large and small, Catholic Church strategy is to capitulate to GOC positions, preemptively if possible. Cardinal Ortega's priority is to increase the ranks of priests and religious, renovate church buildings, and complete the new seminary. In this he has succeeded. The numbers of priests has risen over the past ten years from 140 up to 240, and religious have doubled from 300 to 600. Half of the priests and two-thirds of the religious are foreigners. Churches recently renovated, or undergoing renovation with assistance from overseas, are evident throughout Havana.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (SBU) You Always Have to Give Way: As a nun with 26 years experience in Cuba explained to us, one always gives way to the GOC. Cardinal Ortega told the COM much the same during their two hour meeting. These dynamics appear to hold on both the national and local levels. Whether Church real estate was taken by the GOC before 1959 or afterwards, the Church is not seeking to recover it. When the seminarian ranks began to outgrow the capacity of their location in Havana Vieja, the church maneuvered (successfully) during Pope John Paul II's visit to gain permission to build a new seminary rather than recover its former building. Churches converted into museums and concert halls will remain that way. Rather than expressing rancor toward the GOC, members of the Catholic Church hierarchy expressed gratitude that the GOC does not block funding from foreign foundations and other sources needed to build and restore Church buildings.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (SBU) On the local level, the Catholic Church pays great deference to GOC strictures. Earlier this year, three missionary nuns in Matanzas sought to add a guest room to their house for their Mother Superior to use on visits. After they acquired the building materials, local authorities refused permission to build. The materials remain stacked in the house's interior courtyard. Population shifts within Havana province have increased the need for new churches in areas such as Alamar, on the outskirts of USINT,s travel limits. Absent GOC approval for new construction, the Catholic Church makes do with makeshift services in individual houses.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) And Then Came the Hurricanes: The interaction between the Catholic Church, including its relief arm, Caritas, and the GOC over hurricane relief issues is an interesting illustration of this deference. Caritas initially accepted USD 80,000 in hurricane relief funding from OFDA. Subsequently, Caritas engaged in delicate negotiations with the GOC on the terms under which it may import and distribute relief supplies. The GOC for the first time agreed for Caritas to import relief supplies and distribute them through Caritas's own distribution system. Most other churches distribute relief through the GOC's system, using GOC transport, for which the GOC takes credit. When the GOC turned up the heat in recent weeks on all churches not to accept USG relief funds, Caritas received instructions from the Church hierarchy here to cancel its agreement with USINT for the OFDA funds. Caritas promptly did so. Elsewhere on relief efforts, at the parish level COM has seen several parishes where the parish priest and laypersons went beyond the church hierarchy's structure for hurricane relief and began direct parish-to-parish relief efforts. Such direct engagement bears watching and encouragement.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (SBU) The Lost Generation: Youth programs mostly are anemic, and church attendance by young people reflects this. The Bishop of Santiago, Juan Hernandez, highlighted the difficulty of attracting children and adolescents whose parents are not churchgoers. Both Havana and Santiago dioceses offer catechism classes for minors, but attendance
HAVANA 00000811 002 OF 002
mostly appears sparse. A nun in Matanzas looked back fondly on her time in Camaguey, where she recalled a youth group of 75 or so. She found Matanzas to be much more challenging. Both the bishops and Cardinal Ortega noted church youth programs could not be seen to compete with the GOC's own programs. XXXXXXXXXXXX runs a lunch program for his mostly poor parish in Santiago, but disperses the meals among parish houses so as to attract less attention than would a large lunch at the church itself.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Migration is Killing Us: Almost all of COM's Catholic Church interlocutors said migration was taking away many of their most educated and committed laypersons. Cardinal Ortega went further, noting that internal migration of non-Catholic Afro-Cubans into Havana had upset the "natural balance" in some of the poorer parishes in Havana. Asked about Church outreach programs for these migrants, the Cardinal did not cite any and instead gave the impression he considered such programs would be wasted efforts.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (SBU) Quiet Diplomacy: When asked about political prisoners, Cardinal Ortega said the Catholic Church prefers to intercede with GOC authorities behind the scenes. He views the Church as one of the few institutions able to intercede, albeit quietly, with the GOC on such issues. It is difficult to judge how often, or how effective, is such intercession. Both Bishop Hernandez and Havana Auxiliary Bishop Garcia Ibanez said access by priests to political prisoners is more frequent than it is to the larger population of those jailed for common crimes.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08HAVANA811.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Comment: The Catholic Church is by far the largest island-wide institution with even minimal autonomy from the GOC (the Methodists enjoy some autonomy but their reach is much less extensive). From what COM has observed thus far, however, decades of difficult Church-State relations have left their scars on the Catholic Church. Cardinal Ortega is committed to a slow rebuilding of the Catholic Church's capacity. The Catholic Church has neither the strength nor the inclination to challenge the GOC beyond the occasional criticism when GOC policies conflict with Vatican doctrine on issues such as gay rights. Nor do Catholic Church programs overall provide much material support to complement or substitute for GOC programs. The GOC means to keep it that way, and the Church thus far has gone along. We will be watching to see whether experiences in providing hurricane relief over the coming months change that dynamic.
End Comment.
FARRAR</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-68004904694832051462011-02-01T14:21:00.003-08:002011-02-01T14:21:46.687-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 08HAVANA245, BERTONE VISIT GENERATES BROAD DISAPPOINTMENT</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
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<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#08HAVANA245</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html">08HAVANA245</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2008-03_0.html">2008-03-14 18:06</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO5568
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHUB #0245/01 0741808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141808Z MAR 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3030
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0149
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000245
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a>
SUBJECT: BERTONE VISIT GENERATES BROAD DISAPPOINTMENT
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PHUM_0.html">PHUM</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PINR_0.html">PINR</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a>
SUBJECT: BERTONE VISIT GENERATES BROAD DISAPPOINTMENT
REF: VATICAN 0031
HAVANA 00000245 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Buddy Williams for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY: The visit to Cuba of Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone was considered a disappointment by everyone USINT has spoken with, though presumably not by the GOC itself. In a subsequent meeting with the COM, the Nuncio seemed especially disappointed. But even normally cautious Cardinal Jaime Ortega cited several serious problems with the visit. Nevertheless, the visit probably achieved the Church's principal objective of preserving, and even expanding slightly, its space on the island. Cardinal Ortega is now focusing his attention on convincing the Vatican that a papal visit in January 2009 would be a good idea.
END SUMMARY.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) The February 20-26 visit to Cuba of Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone had been planned for months to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the visit to Cuba of Pope John Paul II. The visit included the dedication of a monument to the papal visit that was erected on the site of the papal mass celebrated during the 1998 visit in the central Cuban city of Villa Clara. By coincidence, Bertone's visit began just as the Cuban National Assembly was electing Raul Castro president of the Council of State in place of his brother Fidel, who had withdrawn from consideration for the post the week before for health reasons. Thus, Cardinal Bertone became the first official outside visitor to the new Raul Castro-led Cuba. With that role in mind, the Bertone visit was an especially inauspicious event.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) Given the care with which the Church in Cuba approaches its relations with the regime, we did not expect Bertone to go beyond very circumspect diplomatic language. Instead, at a MINREX-sponsored press event he attacked U.S. policy towards Cuba, calling the embargo "ethically unacceptable and an oppression of the Cuban people." He also lent his support to the GOC proposal to swap political prisoners for five Cuban spies held in the U.S., implicitly equating the convicted spies with prisoners of conscience. He further criticized the U.S. for the way its policies affected family reunification, but made no mention of restrictions placed on family reunification of its own citizens by the Government of Cuba itself.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Bertone's willingness to join with the GOC in bashing U.S. policy prompted one Cuban to comment to his parish priest that the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) would soon be issuing him a membership card. Many Cubans with whom we have spoken expressed similar or stronger levels of disappointment with the visit. Especially among practicing Catholic faithful, Bertone's visit had been anticipated as an opportunity to renew the spirit of hope that had come from Pope John Paul II's 1998 visit, and give a voice to the rising and unfulfilled expectations of the Cuban people to which the Cuban bishops had referred clearly in their Christmas message. Those in and around Havana complained specifically about the heavy police presence at Cardinal Bertone's mass at the Havana cathedral that seemed designed to exclude the rank and file faithful. Those excluded were relegated to viewing the mass on television (the broadcast of which was considered a success of the visit by the local church) where they could see the pews filled with foreign diplomats (though not from USINT, we were not invited), government officials, and members of the nomenklatura who normally take no part in church activities.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) COM called on the Papal Nuncio the week after the visit to raise the statements made by Cardinal Bertone. The Nuncio defended Bertone's statement on the embargo strongly as consistent with the Vatican's position, and refused to be swayed on the question of swapping Cuban political prisoners for five Cuban spies held in the U.S., saying all are prisoners who suffer and the Church must defend the rights of all. The Nuncio seemed literally to be stricken that the USG would be offended by Bertone's comments. He did allow that he thought it was unfortunate that the Cardinal had decided to speak in Spanish, a language in which he is not comfortable, at the news conference. That decision may have induced Bertone to use the Spanish phrasing he had heard most recently, that of the senior officials of the Cuban Foreign Ministry who used their customary loaded language to describe relations with the U.S. The Nuncio cited some things he saw as successes coming from the visit, including progress on
HAVANA 00000245 002.2 OF 002
allowing the Church to have regular radio broadcasts and permission for construction on churches (though not to build entirely new churches).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) In a subsequent meeting, the usually cautious and circumspect Cardinal Jaime Ortega, the archbishop of Havana, told COM and PolEcon Counselor that he was disappointed with the visit as a whole. Ortega complained about the level of Cardinal Bertone's homilies, which he described as doctoral-level essays on the theology of relativism--a worthy subject, but not what the Cuban people needed or wanted to hear about at this time. Ortega also was very unhappy about the decision to have the Cardinal visit the ELAM (Escuela Latino-American de Medicina or Latin American School of Medicine). There he met with foreign students dressed in native dress who extolled the benefits of being brought to Cuba to study medicine. The event was a blatant propaganda exercise directed at individuals who are not in any way related to the Cuban Catholic Church. Presumably, it was the price that had to be paid to allow the construction and dedication of the papal monument in Villa Clara to go forward.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) While disappointed in the visit of Cardinal Bertone, Ortega is already focused on a larger goal--another papal visit. He said that he hoped to convince the Vatican that it will be possible for the Pope to stop in Cuba upon his return from an already scheduled visit to Mexico in January 2009. Ortega expects that the Vatican will argue that the Pope will be too exhausted to do another visit, but he plans to argue that the flight to Cuba from Mexico is short; the visit would consist only of the dedication of the new seminary now under construction near Havana and a large, open-air mass; and that the Pope can then fly directly to Rome. As Ortega faces mandatory retirement for age at the end of 2009, this will be his last chance to get the Pope to Cuba. He hopes that a papal visit will help to fill the newly-opened seminary with Cuban candidates for the priesthood.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) The most positive reports regarding the Bertone visit came from outside of Havana. Santiago-based priest, Fr. XXXXXXXXXXXX, described the Catholic faithful in eastern Cuba as excited by the visit, and enthusiastic participants in the mass Bertone celebrated in the city of Guantanamo and his visit to the Basilica of the Copper Madonna near Santiago. XXXXXXXXXXXX thought the Cardinal's homilies on those occasions were appropriately directed to the interests of the local people and well-received. He agreed, however, with the overall assessment that the visit had not addressed the broader expectations of the Cuban people.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08HAVANA245.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) COMMENT: The Cuban church hierarchy has been famous (or infamous) for taking a very mild stance relative to the Castro regime. Their goal, and that of the Vatican as well, has been to preserve and nurture back to health an institution that had been battered by the revolution. To achieve that goal, their center of gravity has been the regime, since it has always represented the biggest threat to the existence of the church as an institution. Through keeping the regime friendly, the Church hopes to build on small successes, like access to the airwaves and permission to construct Church-related buildings like the seminary. In the sense of achieving the goal of keeping the regime friendly, the Bertone visit could be considered a great success, therefore. However, it is a success that could come at the cost of a loss of confidence in the Church among the Cuban faithful. If those faithful feel the Catholic Church is not sensitive enough to their expectations, they may begin to drift away, perhaps to be picked up by the burgeoning evangelical and pentecostal movements on the island. Parish-level priests we spoke with in Havana are aware of this threat and were even more vocal in their disapproval of the Bertone visit. It goes without saying that we too are extremely disappointed by the fact that the Cardinal allowed himself to be used by the regime as a propaganda tool to bash U.S. policy. If an early-2009 papal visit is a viable option, the way might still be clear to recuperate some of the ground lost through Bertone's visit. But that will only happen if the Vatican has a change of heart about how it deals with this regime.
PARMLY</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-12373467314946968282011-02-01T14:21:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:21:10.712-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 07HAVANA317, CUBAN REGIME REMOVES JUSTICE MINISTER</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07HAVANA317.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#07HAVANA317</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07HAVANA317.html">07HAVANA317</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2007-03_0.html">2007-03-30 16:04</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO0628
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHUB #0317 0891623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301623Z MAR 07
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1530
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000317
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a>
SUBJECT: CUBAN REGIME REMOVES JUSTICE MINISTER
Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07HAVANA317.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (U) Cuban official media announced March 24 that Justice Minister Roberto Diaz Sotolongo would be replaced by Vice Minister Maria Esther Reus. Additionally, Water Resources Institute Director Jorge Luis Aspiolea would be replaced by his deputy, Rene Mesa.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07HAVANA317.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (U) Although the regime's public announcement gave no reasons, an independent journalist posted a story claiming that Sotolongo was involved in corruption regarding fees for illegal internet accounts, and that one of his subordinates was caught over a year ago trying to leave the Cuba illegally with 25 thousand dollars. This same story reports that Maria Esther Reus has a background dealing with corruption cases and is a confidant of Raul Castro. Former GOC official Jesus Marzo Fernandez, on the March 29 Miami-based TV show "Polos Opuestos," said that Sotolongo was up to his ears in corruption.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07HAVANA317.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) USINT's American Citizens Services Officer learned from an American Citizen XXXXXXXXXXXX that Sotolongo and Aspiolea have been in the Villa Marista Detention Center in Havana since February. According to this source, Sotolongo's detention/removal is related to his involvement in migrant smuggling.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07HAVANA317.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Comment: Cuba's justice system is characterized by corruption and subservience to political dictates. That someone would be removed for corruption is usually an indication that the individual's misdeeds were not fully coordinated in advance, and the profits not shared enough with the Castros. The regime is, in public, "shocked" that corruption might be going on in its midst.
PARMLY</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-56254616821178296812011-02-01T14:20:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:20:13.057-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 06HAVANA11650, CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#06HAVANA11650</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html">06HAVANA11650</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2006-06_0.html">2006-06-05 19:07</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO8439
RR RUEHAG
DE RUEHUB #1650/01 1561932
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051932Z JUN 06
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8841
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 011650
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
STATE DEPT FOR WHA/CCA
EO 12958 DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS PGOV, ECON, PREL, SOCI, CU
SUBJECT: CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION
HAVANA 00011650 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: COM Michael Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (SBU) This edition of “Cartas” features the following items:
-- Paras 2-4 Medical Malpractice -- 5-8 Baseball, Music and Racism -- 9-11 China Syndrome -- 12-19 Diplomatic Corps Reflections -- 20-22
Bracing for the NAM
-------------------
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
-------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (U) NEWS: USINT is always looking for human interest stories and other news that shatters the myth of Cuban medical prowess, which has become a key feature of the regime’s foreign policy and its self-congratulatory propaganda. Two articles appeared this week in our roundup of news about Cuba that we collect and disseminate daily:
--Dateline 31 May: Jamaican Dr. Albert Lue has publicly denounced Cuban medical incompetency in handling Jamaican patients who traveled to Cuba for eye surgery. Of 60 such patients he surveyed, 3 were left permanently blind and another 14 returned to Jamaica with permanent cornea damage.
--Dateline 1 June: 14,000 Bolivian doctors are on strike to protest the 600 Cuban doctors who have been shipped into the country, with no concern as to displacement or unemployment among the Bolivian doctors, or qualifications of the Cubans.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (U) In a recent appearance on Miami Cable TV station 41’s “A Mano Limpia” interview show, Cuban doctor and former Director of Family Medicine in the Ministry of Health, Alcides Lorenzo, slammed the Cuban medical system for being overly politicized. Lorenzo had just defected to the USA via Mexico, where he missed his connecting flight from Cancun to Havana, on the way back from an international conference in Peru. According to Lorenzo, Cuban doctors spend two-thirds of their time going to political meetings, as opposed to treating patients. Lorenzo also said that Cuban medical care was grossly understaffed and underfunded at home as a result of the “medical missions” overseas, particularly to Venezuela. Unfortunately for Lorenzo, or any other Cuban doctor who considers defecting from a “mission” overseas, his family is held hostage in Cuba and will not be permitted to leave the island.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------
Baseball, Music and Racism:
---------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) COM and several USINT colleagues went to the Industriales-Santiago (World Series equivalent) baseball game at Latinoamericano stadium in Havana. It was a great, hard-fought game. (In the end, Industriales won, coming back from a 4-2 deficit to go ahead 8-4, and eventually finishing 10-7.) What was striking at the game, however, was not on the field but rather in the stands. First thing: The Industriales crowd was visibly “criollo,” i.e, of Spanish descent, with very few black faces on their side of the field. The Santiago supporters, on the other hand, were heavily black. Their music, played in the stands, was entirely of an Afro-Cuban beat. There were also ample dashes of santero flavor among the SdC followers. What really highlighted the racial split, however, was the chants among the Industriales fans. If a Santiago pitcher was working on
HAVANA 00011650 002.2 OF 004
an intentional walk, the fans would yell, “Pitch, mommy, pitch!” That then evolved into “Pitch, guajira, pitch!” Then came allusions to the pitcher lacking all of his manhood, again with clear racial overtones.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) Cubans told COM that the catcalls, chants and aggressive behavior are not new. They did say that there has been a marked increase in such racially-overtoned slurs in recent years. One devoted baseball fan remarked that the regime encourages such aggressive behavior in order to take folks’ minds off where the real problem lies.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) The following morning, COM and Mrs. Parmly strolled over to the Callejon de Hamel, a tourist trap in downtown Havana set up a few years ago by popular artists. All the artists there were black, and were very much into accentuating their race in their art, in their dress and hairstyles, and in their behavior. The alleyway hosted an impromptu concert of Afro-Cuban and even pure Afro rhythms, with both musicians and many black Cubans in the crowd singing along. The show was put on partly to address foreign tourists: The alleyway is listed in tourist guides, and there was a Havanatur bus right outside the street, which disgorged mainly Canadian tourists. Still, the artists and musicians were “into their own thing” for the most part. There was surprisingly little panhandling or otherwise pitching to the foreigners in the public.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) Comment: These two snapshots were a window into a part of Cuban life with a dynamic all its own. They underline the existence of at least two Cubas, and explain why so many regime supporters and sympathizers are obsessed with the notion of unity, precisely because they know how hard that unity will be to maintain when change becomes more openly energized.
---------------
China Syndrome:
---------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) A couple of weeks ago, there was a concert at Amadeo Roldan theater that featured a Chinese conductor as guest of the National Symphony. It was part of the normal Sunday afternoon series. The Chinese Embassy made a big deal out of the Chinese guest conductor, turning out a pretty much full house of Cubans and others (presumably a large Chinese contingent), and most importantly, the visiting Chinese Vice Minister of Culture, who was in town on an official visit.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) After the concert, several officials got up to speak. Leading the Cuban cohort was Abel Prieto, Minister of Culture, who had the usual things to say about the depth and strength of Cuban-Chinese ties. All the speakers got the usual polite applause. Then the Chinese Vice Minister got up. Rather than just respond with counter-inanities, he launched into a speech on the success of the Chinese economic model, including noting the degree to which openness to the world, encouraging private initiative and letting individual creativity have free rein were key to economic progress. The audience went cold. Not a clap, not a peep when the Minister finished speaking.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) Chinese Appliances: Cubans who visit USINT tell us frequently that new, supposedly energy-saving appliances made in China are of very poor quality. The small refrigerators have earned the nickname of “underarms,” because they break quickly and are seen on the streets carried under the arms of their unhappy owners to the repair facilities (which of course are understocked with spare parts). The new Chinese-made ovens have a blue plastic thermostat button which users say melts when the ovens are heated up to normal baking temperatures.
-----------------------------
Diplomatic Corps Reflections:
-----------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) Spanish Ambassador Alonso (May 26) described the fight within the “nomenklatura” for the soul of the future Cuban regime. Fidel, with his railings against “Forbes” magazine and his narcissistic rollout of Ignacio Ramonet,s
HAVANA 00011650 003.2 OF 004
book, is “present for now,” but not for the future. According to Alonso, there is a deep split within the government circles that can be summarized as Consumption vs. Investment. Alonso portrayed the split with anecdotes. Everyone knows the infrastructure is collapsing. Look at the transport network, Alonso said. Cuba got from China 12 shiny new locomotives, which were presented/rolled out with great fanfare by Fidel and others. That was several months ago. They have still not entered into service. Reason: The locomotives are designed to work at peak efficiency at speeds far in excess of what the rickety Cuban rail network will allow, unless the regime is willing to risk derailment, which it is not.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par13" id="par13">¶</a>13. (C) So, Alonso continued, the regime comes back to its choice: Does it put what money it has in repairing the rail (and bus) network, or in continuing to subsidize tariffs for the average consumer? For some time, the urban transport system has needed to decide on a fare hike, but there are those within the ruling circles who say such an increase would trigger a strong negative popular response. The new Chinese Yutong buses have been put into use on inter-urban lines, accompanied by steep fare hikes. (Comment: These have already been announced in “Granma” and “Juventud Rebelde;” the papers talked of hikes of 100 to 250 percent in most inter-urban fares. End Comment.) However, it is quite another thing, Alonso noted, to raise intra-urban fares.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par14" id="par14">¶</a>14. (C) The regime sounds confident in its public statements. Fidel especially sounds boisterous and bombastic. Just below him, Alonso concluded, the officials responsible for keeping the machinery running are much more uncomfortable, because they realize how narrow their margin of maneuver is. Analyzing Fidel,s reaction to Forbes, Alonso came up with two explanations: Latin America and his anti-corruption campaign. Alonso argued that Fidel,s primary target was fellow Latin leaders. Whether of left or right, most Latin political leaders are leery of Fidel, who returns the suspicion. By trying to highlight how little money he personally possesses, Fidel was telling his fellow Latin politicians to beware of forces below them. (Comment: Alonso implied, but did not state, that Fidel was threatening his fellow Latins with popular rebellion if they did not hew to the ALBA line. End Comment.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par15" id="par15">¶</a>15. (C) Corruption in Cuba is a fairly unique phenomenon, Alonso said. Fidel does not fear much the street accusing him of having stashes of cash for personal use. (Comment: Other diplomatic sources disagree, and report that the initial reaction of “the street” was precisely to ask where Castro keeps his funds. Mexican Ambassador Pina described what he heard in the following way: The average Cuban sees the Special Period having ended at least five years ago and the Venezuelan largesse having started flowing several years ago. Still, however, Cubans note no rise whatsoever in their living standards. “Where is he putting the money?” those Cubans ask. End Comment.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par16" id="par16">¶</a>16. (C) Alonso said Cuban corruption is remarkable for its universality. Corruption is needed by all to survive. Alonso said that in most Latin countries, a corruption scandal consists of a person robbing 11 million dollars. In Cuba, it is 11 million Cubans each stealing one dollar. There are exceptional cases, such as Political Bureau member Robinson, who was summarily dismissed and imprisoned recently for alleged corrupt behavior. Fidel sent an equally powerful signal in dismissing his Minister of Auditing and Control, Lina Pedraza Rodriguez. (The press reported that Pedraza would be moved to other responsibilities). However, the bulk of the corruption behavior that Fidel talks about is simply cheating on a small scale in order to get by.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par17" id="par17">¶</a>17. (C) Czech Charge Vit Korselt (May 30) said he had just come back from Prague, where he had arranged for the replacement of his DCM, who was recently expelled by the regime. The new assignee will be coming from Caracas, where he handles political and press issues. Korselt explored the documents released several weeks ago by Oswaldo Paya. He said he was surprised by Paya,s emphasis on outlawing the Communist Party. At least 50 percent of Cuban society is controlled by the Party, Korselt reasoned; he wondered how
HAVANA 00011650 004.2 OF 004
the next regime would be able to function with over half the population put outside the law. (Comment: That is not what Paya proposed. Rather, Paya,s formula is to outlaw the party but not necessarily ban all former party members from public life.) Korselt said he had engaged Paya several times on the point, but had been unable to persuade the dissident of the logic of the Czech way. Korselt allowed that the Czechs had been the exception, and that all the other East European countries had followed a path proposed by Paya in Cuba; i.e., of banning Communist Parties, even if substitute parties were subsequently accepted.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par18" id="par18">¶</a>18. (C) Korselt also commented on corruption in Cuba. He is convinced there are numerous multi-millionaires on the island. He has seen too many signs -- fast cars and generous meals at restaurants, for example -- to think that everyone is living on 20 dollars a month. He thought this would be an explosive factor in post-Castro Cuba.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par19" id="par19">¶</a>19. (C) The UK DCM said last week that the presence of lunatic fringe MP George Galloway in Havana put the British Embassy in an embarassing situation. On the one hand, they wanted to at least go through the motions of offering assistance to an MP; on the other hand, they thought it better not to be seen or photographed next to Galloway, who had just released a statement saying that it would be just fine if somebody killed Tony Blair. Galloway made two TV apearances with Castro, in the series of “Roundtables” that aimed to discredit “Forbes” magazine’s article that ranked Castro seventh on a list of the world’s richest kings, queens and dictators.
--------------------
BRACING FOR THE NAM:
--------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par20" id="par20">¶</a>20. (C) As we get closer to September, when Cuba hosts the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, we will be ever more interested in factoids that demonstrate Cuban perfidy in NAM member countries, of which recent Cuban history is replete. For example, at a recent African embassy’s national day reception, P/E Officer recommended to the Angolan Charge d’Affaires that he read (Air Force Defector, General) Rafael Del Pino,s memoirs, which included a lot about Cuba,s military involvement in Angola. Del Pino,s main point was that the fighting was largely Cuban military massacring Africans, and that it was cruel and unjustified. The Angolan replied with the party line about Cuba helping defend Angola from South African aggression, that the assistance was to a sister socialist movement, etc., etc. The Charge d’Affaires, in keeping with his African socialist principles, then said he’d be spending his summer vacation at his investment home in Lisbon.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par21" id="par21">¶</a>21. (C) It will be hard for us to witness the NAM first hand, but our protecting power, the Swiss Embassy, is applying to the current NAM Chairman, Malaysia, for observer status, which they enjoyed at the Kuala Lumpur Summit. A XXXXXXXXXXXX journalist has also applied for credentials to cover the NAM and was turned down. His offense: Referring to the GOC as “the regime” instead of “the government” in his last article about Cuba.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06HAVANA11650.html#par22" id="par22">¶</a>22. (C) We plan to feature more NAM-related items in our next installment; stay tuned.
PARMLY</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-1272230593777131222011-02-01T14:19:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:19:16.061-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 06HAVANA8986, CUBA IS) A STATE ON THE TAKE</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#06HAVANA8986</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html">06HAVANA8986</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2006-04_0.html">2006-04-26 18:06</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO5713
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUB #8986/01 1161834
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261834Z APR 06
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6107
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0076
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 008986
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SOCI_0.html">SOCI</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a>
SUBJECT: (CUBA IS) A STATE ON THE TAKE
REF: HAVANA 8769
HAVANA 00008986 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: MICHAEL E. PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.4 b/d
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Summary: Castro has spent the past five months battling corruption in a country where trickery has become a way of life. Because most Cubans work for the state, the entire system - from petty officials to Castro's closest advisors - is rife with corrupt practices. Given state control over all resources, corruption and thievery have become one and the same. Corrupt practices also include bribery, misuse of state resources and accounting shenanigans. In its post-Soviet incarnation, Cuba has become a state on the take. End Summary.
From Petty to Grande
--------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (U) In October 2005, Castro embarked on a crusade against corruption that shows no signs of letting up (ref A). The concerted campaign has disrupted the lives of many Cubans living off their abilities to "resolver" (a word that implies everything from simply finding a creative solution to outright stealing). Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, "resolver" has become a way of life in Cuba. Economic desperation combined with totalitarian control has resulted in a state system riddled by corruption from top to bottom.
Bribes
------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (U) Bribes are a common means of getting around suffocating controls. For example, Cubans are only allowed to swap housing ("permutar") if both residences are of equal value. Money is not allowed to exchange hands in the transaction, but often does. If a Cuban mother swaps a small apartment for a large one in a trade that obviously involved compensation, she must also be prepared to pay a GOC housing official several hundred dollars to look the other way. An additional fee may be required to push the deal through in a timely fashion. As always, Cubans must tread carefully; accidentally propositioning a clean official - or worse, a strident revolutionary - could result in disaster.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (U) Block organizations (CDRs) have declined in prominence over the years (to the point where few Cubans have any interest in becoming CDR President), but still maintain control over the distribution of goods. On rare occasions, these goods are valuable. When televisions or refrigerators become available through the state system, CDR Officers are famous for giving preferential access to two groups: Those that maintain good revolutionary credentials... and those that can afford it.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (U) Bribes are also key to getting good jobs (good jobs being those with opportunities to "resolver"). For example, a job with access to a fuel tank (gas station or other outlet) reportedly costs thousands of dollars, while a job in tourism (with access to tips) might cost in the hundreds. An unemployed Cuban told P/E Officer that a job with elite state firm CIMEX (The Import-Export Corporation) would cost him up to 500 USD.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (U) Cuban police officers are famous for taking bribes. They pull drivers over for myriad transgressions, then describe their "sick child." An Italian tourist told P/E Officer that every time a police officer pulled him over, it was always the officer's "birthday." The police are so corrupt that the GOC regularly fills their ranks with unsullied recruits from the East. As time passes, the new crop becomes as corrupt as the old, and a fresh batch is brought in to replace them.
Misuse of State Resources
-------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (U) Cash is not abundant in Cuba, such that bribes sometimes take a back seat to bartering, exchanging favors, and "tit for tat" deals. A Cuban might not enjoy control over anything easily stolen or sold on the black market, but putting resources to other uses can be lucrative. Transportation is a prime example. As every Cuban knows, anyone behind the wheel of a state vehicle (whether truck, bus, car or train) earns two incomes: a
HAVANA 00008986 002.2 OF 003
pittance from the state, plus additional income transporting people or goods on the side. In another example, a Cuban woman told P/E officer how she finally managed to get her tooth capped successfully by paying hard currency at an underground dental clinic, staffed by health ministry dentists and outfitted with equipment stolen from the state.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (U) Certain sectors, including shipping, tourism, construction and food are notorious for generalized theft and corruption. For example, there is a thriving black market in cement, paint and wood. Or as one Cuban commented (in response to Vice President Carlos Lage's 2005 promise to build 10,000 new housing units), "the GOC can't build anything because it is simply impossible to collect enough supplies in one place." The ration system, which leaves bulk foods under the supervision of bodega employees, is also notorious for theft and corruption. As mentioned above, the housing office, or "Vivienda," is also famous for corruption.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (U) In Cuba's so-called "productive" sectors, much wheeling and dealing goes on behind the scenes as state managers swap goods, concoct inventories, fabricate receipts, and deal in imaginary resources. They are aided by an accounting system that equates the Cuban Peso (CP) with the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC) on paper, though the real exchange rate is 26 to 1. (For example, some official state purchases are made in CUCs while others are made in CPs.) To aid in the confusion, Cuban managers and accountants still track their accounts with paper and pencils. The resulting morass of numbers is so incomprehensible that even "clean" managers are forced to play accounting tricks in order to do their jobs.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (U) Some state installations are run by de facto "mafias." One Cuban told P/E officer about the manager of a bread distribution center who put his friends in key jobs. He eventually came to control an entire chain of state bakeries.
Power and Position
------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) The GOC stopped giving licenses to new paladars (home-based restaurants) several years ago, raising questions as to what the remaining operations had done to stay open. An American specialist on the topic posited that all upscale paladars were in some way "connected." For example, a USINT officer outside the XXXXXXXXXXXX paladar XXXXXXXXXXXX spotted the supposedly "self-employed" owner drive up in a car with Ministry of the Interior (MININT) plates. A one-table paladar in the Santa Fe neighborhood (known as the "fish paladar") reportedly enjoys an elite clientele - Raul Castro. In these days of heightened state control, merely bribing inspectors is not enough to stay open.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (U) The benefits of holding a position of power within the GOC can be lucrative. A Swiss businessman told P/E officer that Cuban managers take kickbacks for awarding large contracts to foreign companies and then deposit those kickbacks in banks abroad. "Just like everywhere in the world, a million dollar contract gets you 100,000 in the bank," he commented. These state managers are not so much members of the revolutionary elite, but rather pragmatists who have carved out a space for themselves within an otherwise rigid system. The former head of the Tourism Ministry might serve as an example - he was dismissed in 2004 due to "serious mistakes relating to control" and replaced with a military general.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par13" id="par13">¶</a>13. (C) Separate from this elite crowd of entrepreneurs stand Castro's cadres of regime faithfuls, some of whom are widely rumored to be corrupt (such as Castro clan insider General Julio Casas Regueiro). Last year, Battle of Ideas Head Otto Rivero (a Castro protege) almost lost his job due to a corruption scandal. Battle of Ideas personnel were rumored to be dipping into the pie at all levels, from accounting shenanigans to making off with food and television sets destined for the "Free the Five" campaign.
Comment
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8986.html#par14" id="par14">¶</a>14. (C) Because the state controls - or tries to control -
HAVANA 00008986 003.2 OF 003
all aspects of life in Cuba, theft and corruption have become one and the same. The hotel manager who appropriates foodstuffs is both corrupt (he uses his state job for personal gain) and a thief (he steals). The more corruption grows, the more Castro tightens control, and the more Cubans turn to corruption to get what they want. The GOC leadership is well aware of the problem, but Castro can't seem to make peace with it. As one local diplomat ruminated, "Castro leads a saintly life, but saints are special because they are rare." And so the Comandante continues his struggle to wipe out corruption, seemingly oblivious to its irreversibility as long as profitable activity is illegal, individual success is cause for suspicion, and old-fashioned hard work gets you nowhere.
PARMLY</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-24259643818116019312011-02-01T14:18:00.001-08:002011-02-01T14:18:40.302-08:00<div class="main"> <div class="pane small"> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/support.html"> </a></div><div class="pane big"> <h3>Viewing cable 06HAVANA8769, CASTRO'S YOUTHFUL RECRUITS WAGE WAR ON CORRUPTION</h3><div> <br />
</div><div id="help_1" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Understanding cables</b> <br />
Every cable message consists of three parts: <ul><li>The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.</li>
<li>The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.</li>
<li>The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#by_A">browse by origin</a> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.</li>
</ul>To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <a href="http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526#Part_1">WikiSource</a> article as reference. </div><div id="help_2" style="display: none;"> <br />
<b>Discussing cables</b> <br />
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags <b>#cablegate</b> and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. <b>#06HAVANA8769</b>. </div><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr> <th>Reference ID</th> <th>Created</th> <th>Released</th> <th>Classification</th> <th>Origin</th> </tr>
<tr> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html">06HAVANA8769</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/date/2006-04_0.html">2006-04-24 15:03</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/reldate/2011-01-22_0.html">2011-01-22 21:09</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td> <td> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/origin/4_0.html">US Interests Section Havana</a> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><pre>VZCZCXRO2781
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHUB #8769/01 1141533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241533Z APR 06
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5884
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0073
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL</pre><code></code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 008769
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/SOCI_0.html">SOCI</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/ECON_0.html">ECON</a> <a href="http://wikileaks.ch/tag/CU_0.html">CU</a>
SUBJECT: CASTRO'S YOUTHFUL RECRUITS WAGE WAR ON CORRUPTION
REF: A. HAVANA 8017
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. 05 HAVANA 23177
Classified By: MICHAEL E. PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.4 b/d
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Summary: One of Castro's top concerns this year is the battle against corruption. In a campaign that began five months ago, hundreds of state workers have been fired or transferred. Thousands of "social workers" (unemployed youth) were enlisted to man the gas pumps and oversee the books at hotels. The military took over the Port of Havana. GOC agents continue to carry out "hit and run" raids on markets, bakeries and restaurants. The administration of state farms has reportedly been tightened and consolidated. The anti-corruption campaign is geared to stem graft at all levels, but the wielding of social workers in the effort appears to have a corollary social goal: The inculcation of Cuba's alienated, underemployed youth with revolutionary ideals.
End Summary.
Anti-Corruption: One of Castro's Top Three Pastimes
--------------------------------------------- ------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Castro has busied himself with three major campaigns this year: The "Energy Revolution" to end blackouts (ref A); the propaganda response to U.S. policy and so-called "terrorism"; and the battle against
corruption. Of the three, the anti-corruption campaign has had the most tangible effects on the Cuban public.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) Castro enlisted 20,000 "social workers" from Havana and the provinces to implement his anti-corruption campaign, initiated five months ago following major speeches in October and November addressing the topic. The campaign first took the form of a rumored "13
measures" followed by a murky operation called "The Rich Folks of Today" (ref B). While the general public has not been informed of Castro's exact targets, the GOC has cracked down on the gas stations, ports, markets, bakeries, hotels, and state farms. Details of the operations filter through the rumor mill - some are confirmed, others are hearsay.
Gas Stations
------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) In October, hundreds of youthful "social workers" were bussed to the capital and sent to take over the city's gas stations at 4:00 a.m. (the regular gas station employees were sent home on full salary). The social workers have been there ever since, manning the pumps and handling gas receipts. Social workers were expected to man the pumps for 45 days, but five months and several rotations later they are still there.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) The fate of the regular gas station employees is unknown, though they are among hundreds of state employees dismissed or transferred during the anti-corruption campaign. One former attendant is now a cashier at an adjoining "Rapido" fast food operation, but her father is
a colonel and she has presumably benefited from his leverage. Other former attendants have probably been moved into less attractive jobs or manual labor (like cutting grass along the roadways).
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) The social workers say the four-month operation is finally coming to an end and they will be sent home May 1 "to await the next mission." The GOC is rumored to be hiring a new crop of permanent employees, but are doubtless vetting them closely. Meanwhile, locals and foreigners have commented that revenues at the pumps doubled immediately upon the dismissal of the regular employees and replacement by social workers.
Ports
-----
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par7" id="par7">¶</a>7. (C) Another major but more obscure operation has been the military takeover of the ports between October and November of 2005. A general was placed in charge of the Port of Havana to end the theft of imported goods. This operation was also supposed to be in effect for 45 days but has apparently been extended. An American visitor in Cuba told P/E officer that his friend, a container inspector, used to do so well he could afford to invite his foreign friends to dinner in hard currency restaurants
HAVANA 00008769 002 OF 003
(a rare reversal of the usual dynamic). The inspector reportedly complained, however, that the port takeover had deprived him of his usual means of support (thieving) for the past five months, imposing serious financial hardship as a result. According to the American, the port inspector was looking forward to a possible transfer to a port in Venezuela, where oversight might be more lax.
Markets, Bakeries
-----------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par8" id="par8">¶</a>8. (C) In addition to these more deliberate efforts, the GOC has increased "hit-and-run" raids on state operations. Farmer's markets have been a prime target, with GOC operatives rounding up vendors to check their licenses and verify that only farmers were selling produce (as opposed to paid middlemen). Reuters journalist Marc Frank told P/E Officer the GOC also conducted a recent raid on 40 hard currency "Sylvain" bakeries. Employees were rounded up and sent outside while GOC inspectors looked for stolen goods. According to Frank (who enjoys good contacts inside the GOC), every single bakery harbored stashes of sugar or flour for sale on the black market.
Hotels, Private Restaurants, State Farms
----------------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par9" id="par9">¶</a>9. (C) Dutch consultant Genevieve van der Vlugt told P/E Officer that social workers had replaced general managers at every hotel in Old Havana run by Habaguanex (Eusebio Leal's chain of luxury tourist accommodations). This had thrown a wrench in the daily workings of the hotels, since "now everyone has to behave like saints and hide their
cell phones." (Not only are Cubans prohibited from buying cell phones, but hotel employees living righteously off their state salary should not be able to afford one.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par10" id="par10">¶</a>10. (C) Another foreigner commented to P/E Officer that social workers had been taking over the accounting of "all major industries" (not just hotels), but this rumor has not been confirmed. Similarly, the GOC is said to be tightening up the administration of its large state farms, or Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPCs), but again, the restructuring has not been confirmed.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par11" id="par11">¶</a>11. (C) Finally, Havana paladars (private restaurants) were subject to raids by inspectors in November. Some observers predicted a general shutdown of paladars, but they are so far still in operation (if beleaguered by the steep hike in electricity bills) (refs A, B).
The Brawn Behind the Operation
------------------------------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par12" id="par12">¶</a>12. (C) Castro's social workers are not trained professionals, but rather youth who are not otherwise occupied with school or jobs (i.e., dropouts). P/E Officer's Cuban neighbor complained the social workers
earned 300 pesos a month (12 USD), exceeding her husband's military pension. (Note: the sum is a pittance, but still considered a decent salary for Cubans without access to hard currency. End note.)
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par13" id="par13">¶</a>13. (C) The social workers' youth and inexperience is painfully obvious to all who interact with them, and Castro has since buttressed his original 20,000 recruits with an additional 10,000 social workers from Carlitos Lage's Federation of University Students (FEU). These "University Brigades of Social Workers" (Brigadas Universitarias de Trabajadores Sociales) have gained prominence of late and can be seen around town, at GOC functions and in the media sporting their red "BUTS" t-shirts. USINT has not been able to clarify the division of roles between the two classes of social workers, nor are we able to confirm the total number of social workers involved in the campaign.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par14" id="par14">¶</a>14. (C) Juxtaposing youth with age, Raul Castro recently introduced "Duos" into the anti-corruption mix (two-person teams of several thousand retired military and regime faithful tasked with sniffing out illegal practices). According to secondhand descriptions of a newly-circulated video featuring Raul Castro, one pair of "Duos" uncovered 2,000 tons of missing product from a wholesale food operation; a theft that went undetected despite 14 visits by regular GOC inspectors. In the video, Raul Castro reportedly questions his GOC audience (apparently without
HAVANA 00008769 003 OF 003
irony), "How can you explain this?"
Comment
-------
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par15" id="par15">¶</a>15. (C) The anti-corruption campaign is geared to end pilferage from top to bottom, but the incorporation of Cuban youth also implies social aims. Not only will the campaign help mop up unemployment, it will supposedly encourage Cuban youth to invest in revolutionary ideals. The incorporation of university students could also be intended to smooth out class divisions by forcing the elite to mix with the popular classes.
<a href="http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/04/06HAVANA8769.html#par16" id="par16">¶</a>16. (C) Castro has given fewer public speeches of late, and has not touched on the issue of corruption for several months. But the ubiquitous social workers and release of the Raul video indicates anti-corruption is still very much in fashion with the Castro leadership. Corruption has become the modern bane of the Revolution, and unlike
his simultaneous campaign against "U.S. terrorism," in corruption Castro faces a real enemy.
PARMLY</pre></div></div>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-74602088627185559572011-02-01T09:18:00.001-08:002011-02-01T09:18:43.047-08:00<div class="main"><div class="pane big"><h3>Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1112, BRAZIL MORE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS APPROACH BUT NO AID COMMITMENTS YET</h3><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr><th>Reference ID</th><th>Created</th><th>Released</th><th>Classification</th><th>Origin</th></tr>
<tr><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/cable/2009/09/09BRASILIA1112.html">09BRASILIA1112</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/date/2009-09_0.html">2009-09-04 20:08</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/reldate/2011-01-21_0.html">2011-01-21 00:12</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/origin/114_0.html">Embassy Brasilia</a> </td></tr>
</tbody></table><code><pre>VZCZCXRO9317
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1112/01 2472038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 042038Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5015
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0404
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0090
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0180
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0031
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9888
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8149
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4499</pre></code><code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001112
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/PGOV_0.html">PGOV</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/EFIN_0.html">EFIN</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/EAID_0.html">EAID</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/KWBG_0.html">KWBG</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/OPDC_0.html">OPDC</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/IS_0.html">IS</a>
SUBJECT: BRAZIL MORE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS APPROACH BUT NO AID COMMITMENTS YET
REF: A. SECSTATE 80039
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. BRASILIA 391
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#parC" id="parC">¶</a>C. BRASILIA 322
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) Summary. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE or Itamaraty) has no immediate response to our request in ref A to provide $10 million in direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority (PA). The relevant MRE department heads were receptive to the idea of a further Brazilian contribution but noted that the Brazilian Congress still has not approved the $10 million that Itamaraty promised the PA for Gaza reconstruction in March. MRE officials who have previously criticized the U.S. approach to Arab-Israeli negotiations offered praise for our current strategy, especially increased discussions with Syria and pressure on Israel to halt construction of settlements. Brasilia wants to raise its profile on Israel-Palestine issues generally, and intends to host separate visits from Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, both in November. September 4 newspaper reports also suggested that a long-planned visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad might be scheduled for December. MRE also asked for our help in setting up a a meeting between between Special Envoy Mitchell and Brazil's top envoy on Middle East issues, Ambassador Affonso Ouro Preto. End summary.
Enthusiastic but Non-Committal ------------------------------
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) In a September 3 meeting with poloff at Itamaraty, Middle East division directors Claudio Nascimento (Israel-Palestine, Turkey, Syria) and Roberto Abdalla (Iran, Iraq, Gulf States), discussed at length Arab-Israeli relations and their desire for Brasil to have a larger role -- but could not give an immediate answer to the question in reftel A. (They said that the Minister had received reftel letter in early August, but that their section had not become aware of it until recently.) While Nascimento in particular sounded enthusiastic about the concept of providing funding for the PA in advance of peace negotiations, they acknowledged that an earlier $10 million promised for Gaza reconstruction (ref B) by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in advance of the March 31 Arab-South American summit still had not been authorized by Congress. No one in either division knew anything about the status of the $10 million in Congress. Later in the day, poloff called the Senate Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee and learned from staff that the legislation still has not been assigned a lead sponsor ("relator") -- meaning that it would take weeks at a minimum before the funding could be approved and released.
Supportive of New Direction ---------------------------
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) In contrast to previous meetings with the Embassy, in which Itamaraty has generally criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East (refs B, C), feedback for the overall U.S. approach to Israel-Palestine issues was quite positive. They specifically praised President Obama and Special Advisor Mitchell for taking a different and hands-on approach. Nascimento, who has emphasized in previous meetings the importance of better U.S. relations with Syria as part of Arab-Israeli negotiations, noted the increased level of outreach to Damascus in recent months. MRE hoped to learn more about the specifics of our policy toward Syria. (Note: Brazil's Arab community is largely of Christian Syrian and Lebanese origin. End Note.) Nascimento also cited our emphasis on asking Israel to halt construction of settlements "as a really noticeable and positive change." The directors also latched on to Hamas chief Khalad Meshal's statement last month that it could accept a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders as a hopeful sign for future talks.
Raising the Brazilian Profile -----------------------------
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) While non-committal about PA funding, Nascimento mentioned ways in which Brazil is trying to raise its profile on Arab-Israeli issues. In addition to a projected visit by Peres on November 11, MRE is also in the process of organizing a visit by Abbas two weeks later. Ambassador Ouro Preto, Brazil's top envoy to the Middle East, is attempting BRASILIA 00001112 002 OF 002 to meet with both men before the prospective visits. The original idea was to meet with Peres and Abbas at a planned Moscow conference but, since Itamaraty is not sanguine about propects for that conference happening anytime soon, Ouro Preto plans to visit them in their respective offices. There are no plans on the immediate horizon for President Lula to reschedule his trip to Israel-Palestine, which was canceled earlier this year for security reasons.
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) Nascimento also requested assistance in setting up a meeting between Ambassador Ouro Preto and Special Envoy Mitchell. He said that DAS Kelly's office had reached out to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington about setting up a meeting but that no further contact has been made recently. Such a meeting could be held on the margins of the UN General Assembly in late September, he said. No specific subject matter for the meeting was mentioned.
Comment -------
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) The guarded enthusiasm expressed by Itamaraty about the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli peace process represents a welcome change of pace, but it will be difficult to convert this into immediate deliverables from the GOB. The delay in approving the $10 million for the PA promised in March does not preclude additional Itamaraty commitments for additional budget assistance but the March commitment is already an extremely large contribution for Brazil and any new contribution will also have to be cleared by Congress. Brazil is determined to play a larger role, however, and additional contact with the GOB on this issue would be helpful both to inform and influence what is still a relatively unrefined policy toward the region and the Israel-Palestine peace process in particular. End Comment.
KUBISKE</pre></code></div></div><script src="/static/js/cables.js" type="text/javascript">
</script>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1309579548750406992.post-86230329579526708752011-02-01T09:17:00.003-08:002011-02-01T09:17:55.727-08:00<div class="main"><div class="pane big"><h3>Viewing cable 09BRASILIA796, BRAZIL'S EXPORT CONTROLS ON MILITARY SALES: HOW THEY WORK</h3><table class="cable"><tbody>
<tr><th>Reference ID</th><th>Created</th><th>Released</th><th>Classification</th><th>Origin</th></tr>
<tr><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/cable/2009/06/09BRASILIA796.html">09BRASILIA796</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/date/2009-06_0.html">2009-06-22 17:05</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/reldate/2011-01-21_0.html">2011-01-21 00:12</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/classification/1_0.html" title="unclassified">CONFIDENTIAL</a> </td><td><a href="http://www.blogger.com/origin/114_0.html">Embassy Brasilia</a> </td></tr>
</tbody></table><code></code><code><pre>C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000796
C O R R E C T E D COPY - PARA 1, 2, 6
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, PM/DDTC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/PREL_0.html">PREL</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/ETTC_0.html">ETTC</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/MASS_0.html">MASS</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/PARM_0.html">PARM</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/tag/BR_0.html">BR</a>
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S EXPORT CONTROLS ON MILITARY SALES: HOW THEY WORK
REF: A. BRASILIA 34
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#parB" id="parB">¶</a>B. STATE 11869
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#parC" id="parC">¶</a>C. BRASILIA 613
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par1" id="par1">¶</a>1. (C) SUMMARY. Brazilian policy supports increasing Brazil,s exports of military goods and technology as part of the development of Brazil,s own defense sector. Brazil currently has a system of export controls that has been effective in ensuring that Brazil,s limited military exports do not fall into the wrong hands. Brazilian controls are based on policies aimed at not contributing to conflicts and observing UN and other international standards. The GOB is preparing new regulations that set procedures into code and enhance the role of Ministry of Defense licensing authorities. Brazilian export control authorities are open to dialogue on U.S. practices, particularly electronic licensing. END SUMMARY.
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par2" id="par2">¶</a>2. (C) Brazil's December 2008 Defense Strategy (ref a) mandated efforts to revitalize Brazil's defense industry by promoting exports of Brazilian defense products. While Brazil had a niche as a supplier of armored vehicles and other low-end military products, primarily to fellow non-aligned nations, during the Cold War, defense exports have since remained relatively low, at a rate of only about a thousand per year, according to Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Director for Commerce Promotion (responsible for export controls) Norton Andrade. The largest number of these cases are for export of ammunition and small arms. Brazil's current system of export controls has effective procedures but lacks a formal set of regulations with legal force similar to the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and reflects the limited volume of exports and the relatively low level of technology involved.
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par3" id="par3">¶</a>3. (C) The Brazilian export licensing process currently begins when an exporter has an opportunity to sell a product outside of the country and consults the MRE and other relevant Ministries about the proposed sale. This process, referred to as &prenegotiation,8 is a key to the Brazilian system of control. In effect, the GOB will tell the exporter if the proposed export is likely to be approved leading to an approval rate of almost one hundred percent on the actual applications. Andrade likened the process for licensing to a &gentlemen,s agreement8 and said that most Brazilian exporters had a good idea of what exports would normally be approved and over what items the GOB will exercise greater control . Brazil,s Ministry of Industry has published a code of what items require export licensing (equivalent to the USML). Once an application is submitted, it undergoes a process of interagency consultation that normally takes about a week, then is forwarded to the MOD for approval. Cases involving higher technology, for example anti air missiles, can take up to two months for interagency review.
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par4" id="par4">¶</a>4. (C) Brazilian export control policy is based on two principles: not contributing to existing conflicts and upholding UN standards. Brazil requires end user certifications for all military exports and will block those it believes will not go to legitimate military organizations. For example, in 2008, Brazil turned down an export of small arms ammunition to Chad because of concerns it would either contribute to internal conflict or be diverted across the border to Sudan. Although Brazil,s role in Africa is expanding, it still treats exports of military items there with caution. One exception has been the training Brazil has provided to the Mozambique army for African Union peacekeeping operations. As of April 2009, however, this training did not include equipment or weaponry. Brazilian policy is to support all UN restrictions on arms transfers, although where specific UN measures do not exist, Brazil generally will approve sales. Brazil,s 2005 attempt to sell Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela, a sale blocked by USG refusal to agree to retransfer of U.S.-origin items on the aircraft provided a case where Brazilian and U.S. policies diverged. Brazil argued that such a sale would give Brazil more influence with Chavez, military that could be a moderating force and complained that the denial of the turboprop Super Tucano trainers led to Venezuela,s decision to procure advanced jet fighters from Russia. It is likely that Brazil,s desire to market the Super Tucanos was driven by the plane,s manufacturer, Embraer, putting pressure on the GOB to approve in order to protect industrial jobs in the runup to the 2006 elections rather than any Brazilian policy toward Venezuela. Recently, Brazil received protests from India for a proposed sale of anti-radiation missiles to Pakistan.
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par5" id="par5">¶</a>5. (C) COMMENT. As Brazil,s economy and technological base keep growing, so will its role as an exporter of military items. Both President Lula and Defense Minister Jobim have stated that developing strong defense industries that thrive on exports will enhance Brazil,s security. It is therefore probable that governments and non-government actors seeking access to military technology will increasingly turn to Brazil. This year,s Latin American Aerospace and Defense Exposition LAAD (ref c) was notable for the high profile given to Brazilian products. Brazil,s current system of export controls, with its emphasis on informal consultations and understanding that &all our exporters know what they should do,8 while sufficient for the present, could become inadequate. The GOB is working on elements for greater controls through a technology transfer working group and possibly adding a process for adjudicating which exports require licensing as defense products. According to Andrade, Brazil also hopes to make greater use of technology in its export licensing process.
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=1309579548750406992#par6" id="par6">¶</a>6. (C) These changes create an opportunity for the USG to offer to share our best practices with Brazil. Andrade indicated informally that he would be interested in "the American system" with particular attention to State Department experiences with e-licensing and USG interaction with the U.S. export community. Post recommends seeking an opportunity to establish contacts between Brazilian licensing authorities, both from the MRE and MOD, and PM/DDTC. In addition to the above topics, the Brazilians could benefit from information on the USG Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) process and on compliance issues. The October 2008 visit of a Blue Lantern team (ref b) gave an overview of licensing and compliance issues, but an exchange of information on trends in arms trafficking in Latin America would serve to sensitize Brazil to the need for developing a compliance program of its own.
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</script>amsfhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11008384511318042117noreply@blogger.com0