Viewing cable 09RIODEJANEIRO329, COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE COMES TO RIO'S FAVELAS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
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09RIODEJANEIRO329 | 2009-09-30 18:06 | 2010-12-07 09:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Rio De Janeiro |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RIO DE JANEIRO 000329 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019 TAGS: PINS SOCI SNAR ECON PBTS PREL BR SUBJECT: COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE COMES TO RIO'S FAVELAS Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne. Reasons (1.4 b,d) SUMMARY ¶1. (SBU) Beginning in December 2008, Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio
Cabral, with support from Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes, launched a
comprehensive program to "pacify" Rio de Janeiro's violent favelas
(i.e., vast shantytowns that are spread around the city's core)
by establishing and maintaining a sustained police and state
presence. The key component of the Favela Pacification Program is
the Pacification Police (UPP), whose ranks number approximately 500
officers. From a security perspective, the Favela Pacification
Program has thus far been successful in the four Rio favelas under
UPP control, but the subsequent delivery of basic services and social
assistance programs has reportedly been uneven. In addition to the
obvious security factors involved with the pacification program, there
are also significant economic interests at stake, with some analysts
estimating Rio de Janeiro's economy would grow by 38 billion Brazilian
Reals (21 billion USD) should favelas be reincorporated into mainstream
society and markets. The Favela Pacification Program shares some
characteristics with U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy
in Afghanistan and Iraq. The program's success will ultimately depend
not only on effective and sustained coordination between the police and
state/municipal governments, but also favela residents' perception
of the legitimacy of the state. End Summary. FAVELA PACIFICATION PROGRAM ¶2. (U) Beginning in December 2008, Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio
Cabral, with support from Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes, launched a
comprehensive program to "pacify" Rio de Janeiro's violent favelas
by establishing and maintaining a sustained police and state presence.
To date, police units have entered four such favelas - City of God,
Jardim do Batan, Santa Marta, and Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia - and
continue to maintain a presence within them. While Rio's favelas have
often been a target of police operations with a goal of disrupting
narco-trafficking activities, the Favela Pacification Program marks
the first time that state, municipal, or federal authorities are
attempting a "clear and hold" approach, the success of which is
predicated upon pushing criminal elements out of the community,
establishing a permanent police and government presence, then
providing basic services and civic privileges to favela residents.
This approach closely resembles U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and highlights the extent to which favelas
have been outside state authority. Favelas, which first emerged in the
late 19th century and grew extensively in Rio de Janeiro over the past
three decades, are urban communities of varying size whose residents
generally do not hold title to their homes. Due to the inherently
marginalized nature of favelas, various criminal elements have
historically flourished within them, using the communities as platforms
from which to conduct drug trafficking activities, pirate services for
its residents, and launch other criminal activities throughout the city.
There are approximately 1,000 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, with an
estimated 1 million inhabitants. RIO SECURITY CHIEF: "WE ARE AT WAR" ¶3. (C) In a September 22 meeting with Principal Officer, State Secretary
for Public Security Jose Beltrame explained the Favela Pacification
Program and its importance to Rio de Janeiro's overall security.
"You cannot imagine what government neglect of the favelas have done
to this city. It is a failure of public service," he said. Stating
the Rio government was now "at war," Beltrame explained, "We have a few
hundred criminals causing terror in a few million." Stating the state
needed to act, he emphasized the goal of the program is not to
eliminate all violence and drug trafficking in the favelas, but
rather to establish a state presence that can allow for the delivery
of basic services, such as trash collection, and social programs,
such as health attention and education. Under the program, state
police special operations units (BOPE) enter a favela by force.
Once criminal elements that control a favela are purged,
state-administered pacification police units (UPP) then replace
traditional police forces, in order to maintain order, foster
long-term ties between the state and the community, and assist
with the delivery of basic services to the favela. RIO DE JAN
00000329 002 OF 004 PACIFICATION POLICE CHIEF: "WE DO NOT NEED A RAMBO" ¶4. (C) The key component of the Favela Pacification Program is the
Pacification Police (UPP). There are currently 500 pacification
police (UPP) officers in the four "pacified" favelas, with the
number of officers assigned to each favela depending on levels of
existing criminal activity. For example, only 55 UPP officers are
required to maintain order in the favela of Jardim do Batan which
has approximately 40,000 residents, while 160 UPP officers are
required in the favela Santa Marta, which has only 3,000 residents.
UPP commander Colonel Jose Carvalho - a former United Nations
Peacekeeping Commander - told us on August 25 that only new police
academy recruits are selected into the UPP program. "We need fresh,
strong minds, not a Rambo," Carvalho stated. "The older generation
of cops is more oriented to kicking down doors and shooting people."
Following acceptance into the UPP, officers receive additional
training in human rights and community outreach, in addition to
community profile briefings specific to the officer's assigned
favela. Carvalho said active UPP officers are also subject to
internal affairs undercover operations, to ensure UPP officers are
not abusing their power within the favelas. PROGRESS, BUT MANY CHALLENGES ¶5. (C) From a security perspective, the Favela Pacification Program
has thus far been successful in the four Rio favelas under UPP control,
but the subsequent delivery of basic services and social programs
appears to be uneven. BOPE Lieutenant Wolney Francisco de Paula told
us on August 19 that BOPE units entering the favelas encountered no
resistance from the narco-trafficking gangs that had de facto control
of the communities, while UPP Colonel Carvalho claimed there have
been no UPP-related fatalities in the favelas under pacification.
That said, the delivery of basic services and implementation of
social programs are reported to be uneven among the four favelas.
Carvalho explained, for example, that his officers had to quell a
near riot in the Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia favela, after its
residents protested that they were not receiving equal benefits as
other "pacified" favelas. Carvalho blamed the Rio de Janeiro state
government for failing to provide essential services, stating "There
are no services there, and the state is not organized enough to
provide them." Favela representatives, while generally supporting
the pacification program, universally cite the need for more social
programs and basic services. During a September 18 symposium on
favela development sponsored by the BNDES - the Brazilian development
bank - Rio favela resident association representatives recognized
efforts by the state, municipal, and federal governments to address
the plight of the favelas, but voiced concerns over how money was
being spent. For example, a community leader from pacified favela
Santa Marta, Jose Mario dos Santos, questioned why state money was
being used to construct a wall around that community. Rosino de Castro
Diniz, president of the Federation of Favela Associations in Rio de
Janeiro, told us the pacification program could not succeed without a
concerted effort to provide jobs and social services to residents. ¶6. (C) Another significant factor for the project's success will be
how receptive favela residents are to assuming civic responsibilities,
such as paying for legitimate services and taxes. BOPE Lieutenant
Francisco de Paula, who is also a resident of the Jardim de Batan
favela, told us many in his community were resistant to the idea
of having to switch from paying pirated sources of services, such
as electricity and water, to higher-priced legitimate providers.
Carvalho also said his officers encountered wide-spread confusion
among residents that, until now, have been paying for electricity
and cable TV service through pirated sources. "It is very difficult
for them to all of a sudden have to pay for services they previously
received for less or even free," he said. Carvalho also lamented the
overall mentality of favela residents who lived for decades under the
sway of narco-trafficking groups. "This generation is lost," he said.
"We need to focus on children through providing sports and education
programs." ¶7. (SBU) Security experts see a possible link between the pacification
program and an increase in crime in Rio de Janeiro's more affluent
neighborhoods, such as Ipanema, Leblon, and Copacabana, collectively
known as "Zona Sul." Rio de Janeiro's Public Security Institute (ISP)
reported a 50 percent increase in residential theft and a 52 percent
in RIO DE JAN 00000329 003 OF 004 robberies of businesses in Zona Sul
from December 2008 to July 2009, compared with the same period the
year prior. Julita Lemgruber, director for the Center for Security
and Civics (CESEC) and a former police ombudsman, said this increase
was due to drug traffickers - forced out of the drug trade in UPP-occupied
favelas - now branching out into other criminal activities outside of
the favelas. Beltrame had a similar theory, explaining the structure
of narco-trafficking networks played a role in the increase. "When we
hit these guys at the top, they lose jobs at the bottom. This results
in more street crime." ¶8. (C) Wilson Carlos Carvalho, a senior adviser to Governor Cabral on
security matters, told us on August 28 that the federal government needed
to do more to assist with the favela problem and the crime increasing in
other parts of the city, highlighting the large flow of arms and drugs
into Rio de Janeiro. "We do not have any arms factories or coca fields in
Rio de Janeiro. More needs to be done to control the borders," he said
(Note: Beltrame also expressed concern over the proliferation of
military-grade weapons in Rio de Janeiro, and said most illegal arms
were of American origin and issued to foreign armies, such as Colombia,
Bolivia, and Paraguay. End Note). EXPANDING THE PACIFICATION ¶9. (C) State Security Secretary Beltrame offered to share the strategic
plan for the favela program with Consulate officers and to take the PO
into a "pacified" favela in the near future. Beltrame stated of the 50
favelas he envisions pacified by the end of 2010, "Complexo de Alemao"
was the principal target. The Complexo de Alemao is an enormous favela
with over 200,000 residents and heavily armed criminal groups entrenched.
The scope of an operation into Complexo de Alemao would be vast and
the scale of violence potentially "traumatic," Beltrame said. Beltrame
seemed determined, however, noting the operation would likely take
place in early 2010. "This favela is totally outside of state authority,
and it is the epicenter of the fight," he stated. Although Wilson
Carlos Carvalho, the Cabral adviser, told us that the Intelligence
Branch of the State Secretariat for Public Security had mapped more
than 90 favelas in the city for eventual UPP operations, Beltrame
said only 10-12 favelas, including Complexo de Alemao, would be
critical to the program. "We do not need to take over 100 favelas.
The real violence is concentrated in only about a dozen," he
explained. In order to meet the manpower requirements for extending
the pacification program, Wilson Carlos Carvalho said the Military
Police would recruit 7,000 new police officers, 3,500 of whom would
join the UPP ranks by next year. Beltrame's estimate of police
recruitment was more expansive, with a projection of 30,000 new
police officers on Rio's streets by 2016. ECONOMICS OF FAVELA PACIFICATION ¶10. (SBU) In addition to the security factors involved with the
pacification program, there are also significant economic interests
at stake. Some economists have forecast an increase of 90 million
Brazilian Reals (45 million USD) in new property and service taxes
that would go towards the Rio municipal government, should all
favelas come under the authority of Rio state. The president of Rio
electricity provider "Light" estimated the economy of Rio de Janeiro
could grow by around 38 billion Brazilian Reals (21 billion USD)
through increased commerce and new jobs. According to Andre Urani,
an economist with the Institute of Labor and Social Research (IETS),
Light loses at least 200 million USD per year due to pirated
electricity in the favelas (Note: Light donated 600 low energy
consumption refrigerators to residents in Santa Marta favela, in
order to encourage their integration as utility customers. End Note).
Emphasizing the potential market in favelas, Urani stated,
"Imagine the revenue increase if Light could successfully turn the
one million illegal users of its services into customers." According
to data provided by the Rio State Secretariat for Security, operations
to fully pacify and reintegrate favelas would cost the state between
90 million to 340 million Brazilian Reals (48 million to 183 million USD). COMMENT ¶11. (SBU) The Favela Pacification Program shares some characteristics
with U.S. counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like
counter-insurgency, the RIO DE JAN 00000329 004 OF 004 population is
the true center of gravity, and the program's success will ultimately
depend not only on effective and sustained coordination between the
police and state/municipal governments, but on favela residents'
perception of the legitimacy of state. One of the principal challenges
in this project is to convince favela populations that the benefits of
submitting to state authority (security, legitimate land ownership,
access to education) outweigh the costs (taxes, utility fees, civil
obedience). As with American counter-insurgency doctrine, we should
not expect results overnight. If the program is limited to Governor
Cabral's 2010 reelection campaign or constitutes little more than an
initiative crafted to bolster Rio de Janeiro's 2016 bid for the
Olympics, as some critics have charged, it offers little chance of
success. If, however, the program wins over "hearts and minds" in
the favelas, and continues to enjoy genuine support from the governor
and the mayor, bolstered by private enterprise lured by the prospects
of reintegrating some one million favela residents into mainstream
markets, this program could remake the social and economic fabric of
Rio de Janeiro. Post will work closely with the relevant state
authorities to facilitate exchanges, seminars, and institutional
partnerships towards this end. End Comment. HEARNE
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