Viewing cable 09BRASILIA454, BRAZILIAN REPLY TO REQUEST FOR CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN REF: A. SECSTATE 31102 B. 08 BRASILIA 1312
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|09BRASILIA454||2009-04-14 20:08||2011-01-13 00:12||CONFIDENTIAL||Embassy Brasilia|
VZCZCXRO0289 RR RUEHRG DE RUEHBR #0454 1042035 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 142035Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4043 INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9367 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7562 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3865 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000454 C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDING ADDRESSES AND CAPTION SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/A - TOM REOTT AND EUR/RPM - AARON COPE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR BR AF SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN REPLY TO REQUEST FOR CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN REF: A. SECSTATE 31102 B. 08 BRASILIA 1312 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION LISA KUBISKE, REASONS 1.4 B, D ¶1. (C) Charge delivered assistance request (ref A) on April 8 to Ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who had recently returned from the Hague Conference on Afghanistan. In response to the specific requests, he noted that the Brazilian congress recently reduced the foreign technical assistance budget, although that did not rule out seeking funding, but he estimated Brazil's capacity to make a cash contribution as "very low." On food contributions, Jaguaribe said it might be possible and he would get back to us. There are three main obstacles to overcome with regard to the assistance requests: a) Brazil's budget, b) political receptivity, and c) Brazil's difficulty in "buying into something it did not formulate." "Brazil is not a relevant actor" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. (SBU) Jaguaribe shared with Charge a few observations about Afghanistan and Brazil, in part based on his participation at the Hague Conference. Noting that Afghanistan is "remote and distant" for Brazil, Jaguaribe said Brazil follows developments in Afghanistan but is not "a relevant actor," although were Afghanistan to open an embassy in Brasilia, Brazil would give consideration to opening one in Kabul. He said the new U.S. policy has many positive elements, and the USG was correct to identify a need for a very broad regional stategy. He said it is very important to incorporate Afghanistan's neighbors into the strategy, above all Pakistan and Iran. It was a positive development that Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke spoke with Iranian representatives recently, and this should be continued. Iran could turn out to be the most important player in the process, he added. Security for whom? - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Afghanistan needs internal political support to succeed since a military solution will never be definitive, and military action must complement the goal of greater internal political strength, Jaguaribe commented. Military actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan erode rather than fortify internal political strength, he added, although he conceded that the U.S. has better information than Brazil about the situation on the ground. He recommended looking for ways to expand President Karzai's political base; "Security for whom?" he asked, suggesting that security for the goverment and the capital are insufficient conditions to build the broad support that success in Afghanistan requires. ¶4. (C) As with earlier requests (ref B), Mission does not expect any further response from the GOB on this matter. SOBEL