Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1312, WHA TARGETED REQUESTS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
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|08BRASILIA1312||2008-10-03 11:11||2011-01-13 00:12||CONFIDENTIAL||Embassy Brasilia|
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBR #1312 2771104 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031104Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2580 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0011 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2128 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001312 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2018 TAGS: PREL AF BR SUBJECT: WHA TARGETED REQUESTS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY REF: SECSTATE 98082 Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (SBU) PolCouns delivered the demarche on September 24 to Minister Marcos Pinta Gama in the Foreign Ministry's General Secretariat of Foreign Relations, and Poloff delivered it on September 29 to First Secretary Marisa Kenicke, the Afghanistan desk officer. Pinta Gama noted that Brazil had attended an earlier donor conference on Afghanistan and was considering ways in which it might be helpful. Up to this point, Brazil has looked for development-related projects rather than support for the military, however. So far, the GOB has not found feasible opportunities for supporting Afghanistan. Kenicke received the demarche without substantive comment and reported October 1 that there was still no official response. ¶2. (C) Brazil's track record suggests that it would be precedent-breaking for Brazil to support a foreign military force outside of a UN system mechanism, within which the GOB strongly prefers to work. The request of five million dollars over five years is far larger than many other requests we have made which have gone unanswered. Brazil's resources for assistance in general are extremely limited, and the GOB tends to prefer technical assistance for social development projects. SOBEL