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TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD MENDELSOHN STATE FOR S/SRAP
RICHARD HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 TAGS: ECON PREL EFIN KTFN SA
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury Department Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard
Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior
Saudi Mabahith officials to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial
activity in Saudi Arabia. Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO officials
shared with Mabahith detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and
other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Mabahith pointed to the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), Saudi Arabia’s
overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead on Taliban matters for the
Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). Mabahith pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related
financial activity in the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban
leaders participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith asked GRPO and
Treasury to provide additional detailed and actionable information to assist
in its investigations.
¶2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence exchange session,
GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared intelligence,
which suggested that Taliban-related finance officials have visited Saudi
Arabia in order to raise funds. Mabahith pledged to follow up on the
information provided, to work through intelligence channels to share
information and results, and submit additional requests for information.
END SUMMARY.
(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network
¶3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi
government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and highlighted
the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated
that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking
and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives
significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia
and the UAE.
¶4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious threat and stated
that Saudi authorities can more easily target al-Qaida financing since the
group’s members are frequently Saudi nationals, often with Saudi addresses
and phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani network fundraisers, however, usually
enter the Kingdom from Afghanistan or Pakistan, and may use fabricated
travel documents, according to Mabahith. Mabahith also acknowledged
that the Hajj represents an opportunity for terrorist fundraisers.
The same officials further acknowledged the historical ties that
existed between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering
sympathies may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.
¶5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials travel to
Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but said they also
conduct fundraising activities while in the Kingdom. Mabahith
initially responded that Taliban reconciliation issues were handled
by the GIP and stated that the Mabahith has very little insight or
coordination with the GIP in this area. After further discussion,
Issa said that even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia
under the auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest
anyone who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.
¶6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX
three senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising
visits to Saudi Arabia, according to U.S. intelligence.
(NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange
included telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and passport information
for crosschecking against Saudi customs databases. END NOTE.)
Mabahith was not familiar with the individuals and pledged to
follow up on the identifying information provided by GRPO and
Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and
phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known
either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.
¶7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names of
suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith recognized
XXXXXXXXXXXX, a prominent Saudi who reportedly gave XXXXXXXXXXXX
$30,000 in September 2008. Mabahith had no information regarding
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s financial contributions to the Taliban, but speculated
that the money could have come from a trust or a charity that was
associated with XXXXXXXXXXXX, rather than from XXXXXXXXXXXX himself.
Mabahith pledged to investigate XXXXXXXXXXXX and stated that it would
not hesitate to “press him” regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn
emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize Taliban
fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked hard to delegitimize
al-Qaida and deter donors from giving money to the group.
¶8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG’s new fingerprinting system.
Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be more effective
against Taliban fundraisers, who travel through official points of
entry, than it will be against al-Qaida-affiliated foreign fighters,
who enter the country illegally. Mabahith also stated that this
system should reduce the effectiveness of forged travel documents
used at official points of entry. They pointed out the country’s
large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they expect
to encounter.
(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna
¶9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about Pakistan-based
extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ) and its
involvement in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan.
GRPO and Treasury passed names and other identifying information
of suspected Saudi Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates. Mabahith
pledged to investigate the names and follow up through intelligence
channels.
(U) Al-Haramain Foundation
¶10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful
operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support activities
of the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation (AHF), and pledged USG
support for their investigation. Mabahith confirmed that more than
40 AHF-affiliated individuals had been arrested as a result and that
Mabahith had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil al-Aqil.
Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were embarrassed about
the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil, since they had previously
arrested and released him based on an earlier lack of evidence.
SMITH
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