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O 071310Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHDC 0096
INFO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVES E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07 TAGS: ECON PTER KTFN AE AF EFIN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S.
Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
(S//NF) Summary
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met
with senior officials from the UAE’s State Security Department (SSD)
and Dubai’s General Department of State Security (GDSS) to discuss
suspected Taliban-related financial activity in the UAE. Prior to these
meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD and GDSS detailed information on
the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups
based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its
contribution to building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked
the SSD and GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related financial
activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE services pledged full
cooperation toward the shared goal and asked for additional detailed and
actionable lead information. In particular, they asked for additional
passport information, telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and
travel itineraries for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence exchange
sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared
information suggesting that Taliban-related finance officials have visited
the UAE in order to raise or move funds. The UAE security officials believe
that the Taliban may draw support from the sizeable Pashtun population
resident in the UAE. They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather
with names of individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting
the Taliban.
¶3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their respective
organizations would follow up on the information provided, and work through
intelligence channels to share information and results and submit additional
requests for information.
Taliban/Haqqani Network
¶4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has
taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops
to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating
Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money
from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes
that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly
from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban
and Haqqani Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business interests.
Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that the Taliban and Haqqani
Network are serious threats. Officials from SSD added that Iran supports the
Taliban with money and weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates
the movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated that Iran’s
IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS officials noted Iran’s
support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that GDSS believes that India also has
supported Pakistani Taliban and Pashtun separatists.
¶5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX two
senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to
the UAE, according to U.S. intelligence. The UAE security services were
not familiar with either individual and asked for additional identifying
information, including current passport information used by the
individuals to enter the UAE in order to track down their movements.
(NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange
included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport
information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases
on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE immigration
systems based on the passport information provided and found no matching
records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers
of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in
or travel to the UAE. SSD officials stated that Taliban fundraisers
may use fabricated travel documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often
carry multiple passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan
and Afghanistan who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan.
The officials said this system should help prevent a single individual
from using different aliases or passports. The services pledged to
continue their investigations and share further results.
¶6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large
Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they commented
that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan businessmen.
The same officials said the Taliban is also involved in kidnapping for
ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based family members of
the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for Taliban profit. Some
Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted to purchasing tickets on
the day of travel to limit the chance of being kidnapped themselves
upon arrival in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
¶7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually
unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban.
They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to
transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize suspicion.
¶8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani Network’s
suspected use of front companies to raise and move money. They were
familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani Network financial
facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not able to provide
any details on him.
¶9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with XXXXXXXXXXXX who
reportedly provides funding to the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according
to U.S. intelligence. The GDSS officials stated that they do not
believe XXXXXXXXXXXX is loyal to the Taliban, and noted that he has
cooperated with Pakistani authorities, as well as with Afghan President
Karzai. They pointed out XXXXXXXXXXXX’s past visits from former
Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Zaif, but noted that such visits-which
may have resulted in financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues
to monitor XXXXXXXXXXXX although at present they do not believe that
he is a Taliban financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may
be a pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities,
but the USG has current information that suggests he is still involved
with the Taliban.
¶10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis. They
specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani’s success in exploiting images
of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for fundraising purposes.
(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna
¶11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based
extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security services
were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT members
shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on the information.
Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as an organization
suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with the organization
and pledged to investigate the matter.
OLSON
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