Viewing cable 09STATE131801, TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR

Viewing cable 09STATE131801, TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR

 

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE131801	2009-12-30 13:01	2010-12-05 12:12	SECRET//NOFORN	Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0071
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1801 3641337
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301328Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 131801 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
FOR TFCO 

EO 12958 DECL: 12/28/2019 
TAGS EFIN, KTFN, PTER, PINR, PREL, PK, KU, AE, QA, SA 
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR 
LEVEL ENGAGEMENT ON TERRORISM FINANCE

REF: A. (A) STATE 112368  B. (B) RIYADH 1499  C. (C) KUWAIT 1061

D. (D) KUWAIT 1021  E. (E) ABU DHABI 1057  F. (F) DOHA 650 

G. (G) ISLAMABAD 2799
Classified By: EEB/ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary Douglas C. 

Hengel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
------- 
Summary
------- 
¶1. (U) This is an action request cable. Please see para 3.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary: In August 2009, Special Representative to the

President for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) Ambassador Richard

Holbrooke in coordination with the Department of Treasury established

the interagency Illicit Finance Task Force (IFTF). The IFTF is 

chaired by Treasury A/S David Cohen. It focuses on disrupting 

illicit finance activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the

external financial/logistical support networks of terrorist 

groups that operate there, such as al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and 

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT). The IFTF’s activities are a vital 

component of the USG’s Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak) strategy

dedicated to disrupting illicit finance flows between the Gulf

countries and Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IFTF has created a

diplomatic engagement strategy to assist in the accomplishment 

of this objective. The strategy focuses on senior-level USG 

engagement with Gulf countries and Pakistan to communicate USG

counterterrorism priorities and to generate the political will

necessary to address the problem. The IFTF has drafted talking

points for use by all USG officials in their interactions with

Gulf and Pakistani interlocutors. These points focus on funding

for terrorist groups threatening stability in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan and targeting coalition soldiers. These points have been

cleared through the relevant Washington agencies.

¶3. (SBU) Action request: Drawing on the background materials

for respective countries, and in preparation for the upcoming

visits by Ambassador Holbrooke and Treasury U/S Levey in January,

the Department requests all action posts deliver the general 

talking points in paras 5-6 and country specific talking points

contained in the following paras: (1) Saudi Arabia ) para 8, 

(2) Kuwait ) para 10, (3) UAE ) para 12, and (4) Pakistan ) para 13.

The talking points should be delivered by Ambassadors/Charge D’Affaires.

¶4. (C) In response to State 112368, the Department has received

responses from Embassies Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and

Islamabad regarding the resource capabilities devoted towards 

these efforts. The Department also received each Mission’s evaluation

of the effectiveness of host country institutions working on 

combating terrorism financing along with post’s recommendations 

on ways forward.
---------------------------------------- 
General talking points for all Embassies
---------------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Threat financing:
Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and 

achieving stability in Af/Pak are top U.S. priorities.
These objectives require effective actions against terrorist 

fundraising in the Gulf by al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT, and 

other Af/Pak-based violent extremist groups, all of which undermine

the security of the entire international community. We will not

succeed without your cooperation.
Long term success in combating terrorist financing requires a 

comprehensive, strategic approach that includes the following 

elements:
(1) aggressive action to identify, disrupt and deter terrorist 

donors, fundraisers and facilitators;
 (2) appropriate legal measures, including effective prosecution,

to hold terrorist financiers and facilitators publicly accountable

and to send a strong message of deterrence to current and would-be

donors that their actions face significant legal and social 

repercussions.
 (3) strong oversight of charities, including their overseas branches,

to ensure that these organizations are not supporting terrorist and

extremist elements;
 (4) strict enforcement of UN 1267 sanctions; and
 (5) full compliance with international anti-money laundering and

combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, including

vigorous enforcement.

¶6. (SBU) Charities:
The United States strongly supports legitimate charitable activities

and is a strong proponent of private charitable giving.
We recognize and admire the emphasis placed on charity within Islam

and we seek to work cooperatively with governments and organizations

in the Islamic world to ensure that legitimate charitable activities

thrive.
At the same time, we want to increase our cooperative efforts to ensure

that extremists and terrorists do not exploit charitable giving.
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Country-specific background material and talking points
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶7. (U) Saudi Arabia background
(S/NF) While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes seriously 

the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has been an ongoing

challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing

emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority. Due in part 

to intense focus by the USG over the last several years, Saudi Arabia

has begun to make important progress on this front and has responded

to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States through

proactively investigating and detaining financial facilitators of

concern. Still, donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant

source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide. Continued 

senior-level USG engagement is needed to build on initial efforts 

and encourage the Saudi government to take more steps to stem the 

flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists and 

extremists worldwide.
 (S/NF) The USG engages regularly with the Saudi Government on 

terrorist financing. The establishment in 2008 of a Treasury attache

office presence in Riyadh contributes to robust interaction and 

information sharing on the issue. Despite this presence, however,

more needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial

support base for al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist

groups, including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars

annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan. In contrast

to its increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qa’ida’s access

to funding from Saudi sources, Riyadh has taken only limited action

to disrupt fundraising for the UN 1267-listed Taliban and LeT-groups

that are also aligned with al-Qa’ida and focused on undermining 

stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Saudi Arabia has enacted important reforms to criminalize 

terrorist financing and restrict the overseas flow of funds from 

Saudi-based charities. However, these restrictions fail to include 

&multilateral organizations8 such as   XXXXXXXXXXXX Intelligence 

suggests that these groups continue to send money overseas and, at 

times, fund extremism overseas. In 2002, the Saudi government promised

to set up a &Charities Committee8 that would address this issue, but

has yet to do so. The establishment of such a mechanism, however, is

secondary to the primary U.S. goal of obtaining Saudi acknowledgement

of the scope of this problem and a commitment to take decisive action.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department received post’s comments regarding

embassy staffing at Riyadh and recommendations for enhancing bilateral

cooperation (ref B). The Department agrees with post’s recommendation 

that the U.S. must reinforce, on a political level, the Saudi Arabia

Government’s recent acknowledgement that terrorist groups other than

al-Qa’ida are a threat both to it and to regional stability. The 

Department also supports post’s assessment that consistent engagement,

including the exchange of actionable intelligence, by senior USG 

officials is paramount. We plan to discuss these issues with the SAG

during upcoming senior-level USG visits.

¶8. (U) Saudi Arabia talking points
(S/REL USA, SAU) We recognize your government’s efforts to disrupt

al-Qa’ida networks in the Kingdom and we reaffirm our commitment 

to support the Saudi government in its actions on terror finance. We

encourage your government to continue efforts against al-Qa’ida and

stress the importance of sharing and acting on information related 

to terrorist financing.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We note your concerns with fundraising in the Kingdom

by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups and urge decisive action to

enforce the UN 1267-mandated asset freeze against Taliban and LeT 

fundraising similar to Saudi efforts to enforce UN 1267 sanctions and

take other appropriate action to target al-Qa’ida.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned

with al-Qa’ida and that your government’s support for disrupting the

financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan,

Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize

the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation

talks to raise funds.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We urge your government to assume responsibility for

the overseas operations of charities and NGOs headquartered in the 

Kingdom. We encourage you to prevent terrorists and their supporters

from exploiting religious events (Hajj, Umrah, Ramadan) to raise funds.

We acknowledge the recent adoption of stricter financial controls on

charities, but urge greater regulation and oversight of the Saudi 

charitable sector.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We would like to stress our interest in broadening 

and deepening this dialogue and information exchange as we still lack

detailed information on the ultimate sources of terrorist financing

emanating from the Kingdom. We commend your government for recent 

efforts to put terrorists and terrorist financiers on trial, and we

encourage you to publicize details of prosecutions to maximize the

deterrent effects.
(S/REL USA, SAU) You have had success in detaining and deterring 

financial facilitators. However, we encourage your government also

to focus on the long-term and more fundamental goal of dissuading

donors from funding violent extremism.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We commend your government’s effort over the past

several years to use the media, internet, and other forms of public

outreach to discourage extremism. We emphasize that a critical 

component in this campaign is cutting off the flow of funds from 

Saudi Arabia to foreign religious, charitable, and educational 

organizations that propagate violent extremist ideologies to 

vulnerable populations.

¶9. (U) Kuwait background
(S/NF) The USG has consistently engaged the Government of Kuwait

(GOK) about the specific activities of terrorist financiers in

country, Kuwaiti charities financing terrorism abroad, and Kuwait’s

lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist

financing regime. While the GOK has demonstrated a willingness to 

take action when attacks target Kuwait, it has been less inclined 

to take action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators 

plotting attacks outside of Kuwait. Al-Qa’ida and other groups 

continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds and as a 

key transit point.
(S/NF) The GOK has undertaken a number of initiatives to curb 

terrorist financing in the charitable sector (ending direct cash

donations, increasing monitoring and supervising mosques and 

charitable organizations, and enhancing enforcement of regulations

by a Ministry of Social Affairs task force). It also recently 

arrested some Kuwait-based al-Qa’ida facilitators, but it is too

early to assess whether this marks a change in Kuwaiti policy of

co-opting terrorists as a means of deflecting potential attacks

against Kuwaiti interests.
(S/NF) Kuwait’s law prohibits efforts to undermine or attack Arab

neighbors, a basis for the prosecution of al-Qa’ida facilitators,

Kuwait remains the sole Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country that

has not criminalized terrorist financing. The GOK faces an uphill

battle to implement comprehensive terror finance legislation due

to a lack of parliamentary support. However the government is also

not currently prepared to push hard on this issue. The GOK at times

has obstructed or been slow to enforce UN-mandated asset freezes of

Kuwait-based entities.
(S/NF) A particular point of difference between the U.S. and Kuwait

concerns Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). In June 2008 

the USG domestically designated all RIHS offices  RIHS under Executive

Order 13224 for providing financial and material support to al-Qa’ida

and UN 1267-listed al-Qa’ida affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba,

Jemaah Islamiyah, and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The United States 

nominated RIHS for listing under UNSCR 1267 but Indonesia placed a

technical hold on the RIHS listing due concerns regarding RIHS’s

presence in Indonesia. Libya also placed a hold - probably at 

Kuwait’s behest - citing insufficient information on RIHS’s activities.

Indonesia has rotated off the United Nation’s Security Council so

only Libya’s hold on RIHS remains. (Department note: Libya’s hold

will drop in 2010 unless one of the newly elected UNSC Members 

places a hold on our request to list RIHS.) In Kuwait, RIHS enjoys

broad public support as a charitable entity. The GOK to date has 

not taken significant action to address or shut down RIHS’s headquarters

or its branches, which is consistent with GOK tolerance of similar

behavior by Kuwaiti citizens and organizations as long as the behavior

occurs or is directed outside of Kuwait.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department appreciates postVs thorough 

description of the staffing situation at Mission Kuwait (ref B).

The Department commends U.S. Embassy Kuwait for taking an active

approach in proposing a strategy to build GOK capacity in combating 

financial crimes through training and seminars focused on legislation

and law enforcement (ref C). The opportunity to engage the GOK on 

improving its capabilities to deal with financial crimes is

enthusiastically welcomed by agencies in Washington. Washington

agencies appreciate post’s assessment and identification of several

focal areas that deal with financial crimes. These goals closely 

track the work of the IFTF Capacity Building Working Group. The 

Department commends Embassy Kuwait’s recent support of Kuwait’s 

National Anti Money Laundering Committee’s AML conference in early

December 2009. In response to post’s request, the Department will

work with relevant members of the Washington inter-agency to provide

comments and feedback to the draft of Kuwait’s amended AML law.

¶10. (U) Kuwait talking points
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our strong

bilateral relationship. We would like to see our cooperation on 

counter-terrorist financing improve to a level that matches our 

excellent cooperation in many other areas. In this respect, the 

recent Kuwait anti-money laundering conference held in Kuwait is

a positive step forward.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti donors serve

as an important source of funds and other support for al-Qa’ida and

other terrorist groups. The arrest in August of six Kuwaiti men who

were plotting terrorist attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks 

an important step in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage 

you to keep up the positive momentum.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned 

with al-Qaida and that your government’s support for disrupting the 

financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan,

Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize

the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation 

talks to raise funds.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government’s generosity for a wide

range of important causes and for the positive contributions made by

Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait for some of the initiatives taken

to enhance oversight of charitable donations, but we need you to do 

more to prevent the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your government

to separate and protect legitimate charitable activity from those that

fund terror. We have particular concerns about their foreign activities.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued absence of 

counterterrorism legislation criminalizing terrorist financing will

continue to prevent effective counterterrorist efforts.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the passage

of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and comprehensive 

anti-money laundering and counterterror financing laws will enhance

your government’s ability to prosecute those seeking to undermine 

Kuwait’s security, but will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait’s

financial sector as a whole.
(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our concerns

with your government regarding RIHS on numerous occasions. We designated

the organization in the United States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their countries.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work more closely

with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities cannot be used to 

support terrorists.

¶11. (U) United Arab Emirates background
(S/NF) UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a variety

of terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT and other

terrorist groups, including Hamas. Washington agencies note, however,

that they have limited information on the identity of Taliban and LeT

donors and facilitators in the UAE. Hence there is limited information

to be shared with local interlocutors. Nonetheless, the point can be

emphasized that the UAE’s role as a growing global financial center,

coupled with weak regulatory oversight, makes it vulnerable to abuse

by terrorist financiers and facilitation networks.
(S/NF) Department Note: The Department has received post’s comments

regarding personnel staffing at Mission UAE and the challenges post

faces. The Department is supportive of the action plan laid out on 

engaging with the UAE on Taliban finance issues (ref E). The Department

assesses that a bilateral commitment by the United States and the UAE

to focus on weaknesses within its financial regulatory measures is an

important step in making progress on strengthening UAE efforts to 

disrupt potential terrorist financing.

¶12. (U) United Arab Emirates talking points
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate the depth and breadth of our bilateral

relationship. Since 2001, we have developed a strong partnership 

with your government in countering financial support for al-Qa’ida,

and more recently, in constricting Iran’s ability to use UAE 

financial institutions to support its nuclear program.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We would like to extend our cooperation and partnership

to efforts to deal with the threat represented by Taliban and LeT 

fundraising in the UAE. We believe that the United States and UAE, 

which both have troops in the field in Afghanistan, share a common 

interest in curtailing any Taliban or LeT fundraising activities and

fully implementing UN 1267 sanctions on such activities on behalf 

of these groups in the UAE.
(S/REL USA, ARE) However, we are pleased that concerns have been

raised in the UAE regarding the Taliban and LeT fundraising. We 

also commend the calls for increased vigilance, information sharing,

and enforcement actions to disrupt and deter this activity.
(S/REL USA, ARE) In our view, the alignment of the Taliban and LeT

with al-Qa’ida means that our mutual efforts to disrupt the financing

of these groups also is critical to the stability of Afghanistan 

and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from

using the cover of reconciliation talks to travel and raise funds.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate your government’s willingness to work

with the USG on cash courier interdiction and note that such efforts

are crucial to undermine al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and other groups’ 

ability to exploit the UAE as a fundraising and facilitation hub. We

urge your government to strengthen its regulatory and enforcement 

regime to interdict cash couriers transiting major airports.

¶13. (U) Pakistan background
(S/NF) Pakistan’s intermittent support to terrorist groups and 

militant organizations threatens to undermine regional security 

and endanger U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan and

Pakistan. Although Pakistani senior officials have publicly 

disavowed support for these groups, some officials from the 

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) continue

to maintain ties with a wide array of extremist organizations, 

in particular the Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations.

These extremist organizations continue to find refuge in Pakistan

and exploit Pakistan’s extensive network of charities, NGOs, and

madrassas. This network of social service institutions readily 

provides extremist organizations with recruits, funding and 

infrastructure for planning new attacks. On the international 

stage, Pakistan has sought to block the UNSCR 1267 listings of

Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists by requesting that China

place holds on the nominations. China recently placed a technical

hold on the designation of three Pakistan-based or affiliated 

terrorists nominated by India, although China did not prevent 

the most recent Pakistan-related U.S. designation nomination in

June.
(S/NF) The Department has received post’s comments regarding personnel

staffing and the detailed description of the challenges faced by 

Embassy Islamabad in the area of terrorism finance (ref D). Department

leaves it to post discretion to determine which departments within 

the host government should receive the points provided in para 16 so

that Pakistan fully understands the priority the USG places on this

issue.

¶14. (U) Pakistan talking points
(S/REL USA, PAK) Emphasize that Pakistan’s support for disrupting

financing to the Taliban and LeT obligatory pursuant to their 

obligations under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions, and is 

critical to achieving stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We are deeply concerned that Pakistan has failed

to enact an AML/CTF law that meets APG/FATF standards.  As you 

may realize the FATF is currently engaged in a &International 

Co-Operation Review Group8 exercise, that is likely to have very 

negative multilateral repercussions if the Parliament does not pass

an adequate AML/CTF law.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress your government’s obligation, under UNSCR

1267, and successor resolutions to strictly enforce existing sanctions

against the 142 Taliban, LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, LeT/JUD, al Rashid 

Trust, al Akhtar Trust and other individuals and entities on the UN 

1267 Consolidated List.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to support the international

community’s efforts to combat terrorist financing. Your government’s

views of UNSCR 1267 listing requests for LeT and other Pakistan-based

terrorist groups should be made on the merits of the requests and 

not linked to politics, including what country made the nomination

or which countries are referenced in the public statements of the

cases.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to comply with UN and 

domestic legal obligations to enforce sanctions on the Pakistan-based,

UN-proscribed NGOs al Rashid Trust and al Akhtar Trust, and all 

successor organizations that continue to funnel money and provide

other forms of support to the Taliban and LeT.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We emphasize that social services provided by NGO

extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) challenge the

legitimacy of your government to provide for its people. This 

includes relief efforts in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) 

camps of the Northwest Frontier Provinces by the new LeT/JUD charity

Falah-e Insaniyat Foundation.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress that our governments must work together 

to ensure that there are moderate alternatives to terrorist-controlled

social welfare networks upon which IDPs and other vulnerable

populations currently rely. We must work together to develop

and support NGOs not affiliated with terrorist groups, and establish

a comprehensive oversight and enforcement mechanism for NGOs that

is consistent with the Financial Action Task Force’s international

standard.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government in the strongest possible

terms to take action against the Haqqani network, which is funneling

weapons and fighters across the border to fight U.S. and Coalition

Forces in Afghanistan. This network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who

was listed by the UN under UNSCR 1267, funds its activities through

illicit activities, including kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery,

narcotics, smuggling, and fraud.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government to replace the anti-money

laundering decree recently promulgated by your Executive Branch with

legislation fully consistent with the Financial Action Task Force 

(FATF) Recommendations and to ensure that the current decree can

stand in court. The FATF Forty Plus Nine Recommendations are 

international standards, which Pakistan, by virtue of its membership

in the Asia-Pacific Group, committed to.

¶15. (U) Qatar background
(S//NF) Department Note: Qatar is one of the four Gulf countries

included in the IFTF, and accordingly, the IFTF developed the 

background information included in para 16 for inclusion in the

diplomatic engagement strategy. However, given the current focus

of U.S. engagement with the GOQ on terror finance related to Hamas,

it would be counter-productive for Embassy Doha to engage the GOQ at

this time on disrupting financial support of terrorist groups 

operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Qatar has adopted a largely passive approach to cooperating

with the U.S. against terrorist financing. Qatar’s overall level

of CT cooperation with the U.S. is considered the worst in the

region. Al-Qaida, the Taliban, UN-1267 listed LeT, and other

terrorist groups exploit Qatar as a fundraising locale. Although

Qatar’s security services have the capability to deal with direct

threats and occasionally have put that capability to use, they 

have been hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern

for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.
(S//NF) Department Note: The Department has received post’s comments

regarding personnel staffing and the thorough description of the

coordination process on terrorist finance issues at Embassy Doha

(ref F). Department appreciates post’s assessment that GOQ 

definitions of what constitutes terrorism differs occasionally

from those of the USG. Department agrees with post’s suggested

approach on this issue of engaging with direct discussions with

host government officials.
---------------------------------------- 
Points of contact and reporting deadline
---------------------------------------- 
¶16. (U) Please direct any questions or comments on this 

request to EEB/ESC/TFS (Jay J. Jallorina or Linda Recht).

Posts are requested to report back on responses from other

governments by January 19, 2010. CLINTON