Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1540, BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1540, BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09BRASILIA1540	2009-12-31 13:01	2010-12-05 12:12	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Brasilia

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0233
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

UNCLAS BRASILIA 001540 

SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 

¶1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to cooperate in countering

terrorism and related activities that could contribute to the 

facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere-to include 

investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery 

networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, elements of

the Brazilian government responsible for combating terrorism,

such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian 

Intelligence Agency, work effectively with their U.S. counterparts

most of the time and pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. 

and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial 

agencies regarding terrorist suspects. 

¶2. (SBU)There are two separate discourses in the government of

Brazil on counterterrorism; politically, Brazil continues to deny 

the presence and potential threat of terrorists and terrorism in Brazil,

while law enforcement and intelligence monitor and cooperate to counter

the threat. The head of the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) intelligence 

division in July went on record during a Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

hearing on terrorism and admitted that an individual arrested in April

was in fact linked to al Qaeda (AQ). Despite the statement, most GOB

officials continue to toe the party line and deny any evidence that

terrorists have, or would be, interested in establishing a presence

in Brazil. 

¶3. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are 

concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support

and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and

have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, the tri-borders areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil, Peru, and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Other branches of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of External Relations, do not believe Brazil is vulnerable to terrorism-related activities and instead focus more heavily on threats from transnational crimes. In October 2009, the MRE did admit, for the first time, that terrorists could become interested in Brazil because of the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian law enforcement's recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that could raise the profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department level. 

¶4. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work with

regional and international partners. Brazil participates in regional

counterterrorism fora, but is less committed to regional groups in 

which the Unites States is involved. Brazil is actively involved 

Mercosul's working group on terrorism and the sub-working group on

financial issues, the latter of which discusses terrorism financing 

and money laundering among the Mercosul countries, but has proven 

difficult to engage in 3+1 mechanism on security in the Tri-Border 

Area (TBA), where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay share a border. 

¶5. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses 

throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering,

detection of travel document fraud, container security, and 

international organized crime. In 2009 the USG again hosted a Major

Crimes Conference that successfully brought together Brazil and 

neighboring countries' federal and state law enforcement communities

and judges and prosecutors to share best practices and receive 

practical training. 

¶6. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups 

and does not recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula

da Silva has been critical of the FARC's use of violence and has

publicly called on the group to desist in the armed struggle against

the Colombian government. 

¶7. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations

and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the 

Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), to identify possible

funding sources for terrorist groups. Through COAF, Brazil has 

carried out name checks for persons and entities on the UNSCR 1267

and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not found any assets,

accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN

terror-finance lists. 

¶8. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its 

capabilities to combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen 

specialized money laundering courts have been established, including

two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who receives 

specialized training in national money laundering legislation. In addition,

in 2008, the United States and Brazil established a working group with

money laundering judges to share best practices and training needs. 

¶9. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was formed

aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by creating 

complementary specialized federal police financial crimes units in the

same jurisdictions. In 2008, the federal police established such units

in the Federal District (Brasilia) and the states of Rio de Janeiro and

Sao Paulo. In addition, the Ministry of Justice funded the creation of

technology center to combat money laundering in the federal district

and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of which received two such centers, 

one embedded with the Public Ministry and one with the State Civil Police.

In 2008, the Ministry signed accords to establish additional centers

in Bahia, Goiais, and Rio Grande do Sul. 

¶10. (SBU) The government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy 

consists of deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory

to facilitate attacks or raise funds, along with monitoring and 

suppressing transnational criminal activities that could support 

terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through actions between 

its law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United

States and other partners in the region. For example, in 2009 

Brazilian authorities began in earnest to work with other concerned

nations (particularly the U.S.) in combating the significant and

largely unchecked document fraud problem in the country. During

the year, multiple regional and international joint operations

with U.S. authorities successfully disrupted a number of document

vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking 

infrastructures. This included one of the largest visa fraud cases 

of its type in U.S. law enforcement history. 

¶11. (SBU) In 2009, the work on the U.S.-Brazil container security 

initiative in Santos, Brazil was stalled after U.S. officials 

traveling to Brazil for the program had difficulties getting 

Brazilian visas. The container security initiative was created

to promote secure containerized cargo to the United States 

through the establishment of a trade transparency unit to detect

money laundering through trade transactions. The Brazilian

Ministry of External Relations (MRE) was uncomfortable with 

the counter-terrorism focus of the program, but has recently

agreed to issuing visas in support of the initiative. 

¶12. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results

from recent investment in border and law enforcement infrastructure

that were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of 

goods-legal and illegal-through the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil,

Argentina, and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be diverted 

to support terror groups. The inspection station at the Friendship

Bridge in the TBA that was completed by the Brazilian customs agency

(Receita Federal) in 2007 continued to take effective action to 

reduce the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and contraband goods along

the border with Paraguay. According to Receita Federal, from 

January to July 2009 the agency seized more than USD 400 million

in contraband goods, including drugs, weapons, and munitions,

an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result of the 

effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling 

operations now take place through the Parana River and Lago 

Itaipu and some have migrated to other sections of the border,

such as the towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal Police 

has special maritime police units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira

that patrol the maritime border areas, but because of the scale

and complexity of the endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking

activities through the waterways, Brazil is considering using an 

unmanned aerial vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the

border, a development that could further improve border security. 

¶13. (SBU) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and

illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism 

is undermined by the GOB's failure to strengthen its legal 

counterterrorism framework significantly. Although terrorist 

financing is an established predicate offense for money laundering,

Brazil lacks legislation criminalizing terrorism or its financing 

as autonomous offenses. The 2005 National Strategy against Money 

Laundering (ENCLA) created a working group (composed of representatives

of ministries involved in CFT, the judiciary, and the federal 

prosecutor's office) charged with drafting legislation to criminalize

terrorism and its financing. The draft legislation was never forwarded 

from the executive branch to the Brazilian Congress. A long-delayed 

anti-money laundering bill is still pending before the Brazilian 

Congress. The bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access 

to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize 

illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and 

facilitate prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the 

legal definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous 

offense. KUBISKE 2009-12-31