Viewing cable 10DAMASCUS168, V/FM MIQDAD DENIES SUPPLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
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VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #0168/01 0561343
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251343Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7419
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7727
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5921
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5240
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0012
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0889
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0888
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0842
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2497
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0807
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000168
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
LONDON FOR LORD
PARIS FOR NOBLES
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS PTER, PREF, PREL, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: V/FM MIQDAD DENIES SUPPLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
HIZBALLAH, DIRECTS U.S. DEMARCHE TO ISRAEL
REF: A. STATE 17307 B. TEL AVIV 404
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, for reasons 1.4 b,d.
¶1. (S) Summary: Responding to Ref A demarche, Syrian Vice Foreign
Minister (V/FM) Miqdad expressed surprise the U.S. was sharing such a
strong message in the wake of Under Secretary (U/S) William Burns’
positive February 17 visit. He argued Israel represented the major
threat to stability in the region and that the U.S. should be
directing its message toward Israeli officials. Syria, he claimed,
wanted peace and was working with Turkey and the U.S. toward that end.
Flatly denying any Syrian role in the supply of weapons to Hizballah,
The most sophisticated weapons Damascus supported Lebanese
independence while Israel violated Lebanese sovereignty on a daily
basis. Miqdad argued Syria wanted to preserve the positive results
of U/S Burns’ recent visit and promised to convey the message.
He also pledged to review our request for assisting the Center
for Victims of Torture and agreed to follow up Charge’s request
for official written notification of the government’s decision to
allow the Damascus Community School (DCS) to reopen. End Summary
--------------------------------------
Miqdad: Direct Your Message to Israel
--------------------------------------
¶2. (S) Charge and Pol/Econ Chief delivered Ref A demarche to Syrian
Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Faisal al-Miqdad on February 25. A
clearly surprised Miqdad listened attentively and took detailed notes,
interrupting twice to confirm whether the demarche concerned the
transfer of ballistic missiles and to clarify whether the message
represented a U.S. or an Israeli “warning.” Charge explained the
message reflected Washington concerns that SEMEP Mitchell and U/S
Burns had shared previously with President Asad. Addressing the
substance of the demarche, Miqdad argued that Israel itself could
not have sent a stronger warning. The message, he continued, “shows
the U.S. has not come to a mature position (that would enable it)
to differentiate between its own interests and Israel’s.” Syria
was “of course” not in the mood to increase tensions or escalate,
“because we believe in peace.” Toward that end, Syria was doing
its best with Turkey and the U.S. to achieve peace. Syria was not
taking steps to escalate. Unless Israel had plans to escalate
against Syria or Lebanon, “there’s no need to worry,” said Miqdad.
¶3. (S) Referring to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s
February 16 speech, Miqdad emphasized that Hizballah was responding
to Israeli threats and clearly conveyed Hizballah’s intent to
respond only if Israel attacked first. Syria believed in and
supported the role of UNIFIL, and was using its contacts with
the Lebanese Government to “insist” on Lebanon’s full cooperation
with UNIFIL. Miqdad insisted Israel, not Syria or Lebanon, was
issuing provocative threats and using Hizballah as a pretext.
The Syrian government had been pleased to hear Lebanese PM
Hariri’s remarks expressing concerns about Israeli provocation,
including the violation of Lebanese airspace and assassinations.
The U.S. message, summed up Miqdad, “should be directed to Israel
not to escalate.”
----------------------------------------
Denial of Supply of Weapons to Hizballah
----------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Charge replied that the U.S. message had come in the context
of improving bilateral relations, which depended on a frank and
candid exchange of assessments of regional developments. The U.S.
was issuing neither threats nor
ultimatums, but rather it sought to convey what it believed to be
a shared interest in avoiding conflict. Miqdad commented that it
was “strange” the U.S. had chosen to deliver “harsh words while
we’re trying to build better relations.” He promised to convey the
message to his superiors but reiterated Syria’s desire to avoid
escalation. “You may hear about weapons going to Hizballah,” he
claimed, “but they are absolutely not coming through Syria.” The
real threat to stability was coming from Israeli officials who had
threatened recently to attack Damascus and to change the Syrian regime.
“Please convey to Washington, while we take note of your demarche,
this message should be directed at Israel,” he said.
¶5. (S) Charge replied that, as U/S Burns had conveyed to President
Asad, the U.S. was urging all parties in the region, including
Israel, to exercise restraint and support Lebanese independence.
“This is our commitment,” Miqdad responded, “we shall not interfere
(in Lebanon).” The Lebanese should be allowed to decide for
themselves on how to resolve their own issues; those who would
interfere want to disturb the peace after Lebanon successfully
conducted national elections and formed a consensus government.
“We’re confident the Lebanese can deal with their own situation,
” he said. Charge rejoined that the military capabilities of a
non-state actor like Hizballah represented a major concern because
Hizballah responded only to its own leadership and not to
government authorities.
¶6. (S) Miqdad said this issue should be discussed in the overall
framework of the situation. He then contended the provision of
U.S. weapons to the region represented a destabilizing factor.
“The most sophisticated weapons are coming to Israel, to be used
against whom?” he asked. When the U.S. pressed Israel to stop
threatening its neighbors, the situation would stabilize. “We want
peace. It’s the only solution. We are the ones who are threatened,”
he declared. Charge replied the whole region was threatened. Miqdad
said the U.S. and Syria needed to worked toward peace. “You should
address your message to the people who don’t want peace,” he added
, noting the results of U/S Burns’ visit should be preserved and
continued to improve relations. Syria had responded positively to
U/S Burns’ message because it felt more confident of Washington’s
desire to move forward.
---------------------
CVT and DCS Follow-Up
---------------------
¶7. (C) Charge affirmed the U.S. shared this intent and wanted to
maximize the opportunity by staying in close contact. In that
context, he raised PRM’s pending request to Miqdad to assist the
Center for the Victims of Torture to receive approval to begin
a proposed project in Syria; Miqdad agreed to look at the matter
and requested Embassy follow-up. Likewise, on the issue of
visas for the next group of DHS circuit riders, Miqdad asked
that the circuit riders not apply for visas until he had had
a chance to intervene. (Note: Embassy will provide Miqdad with
a list of the circuit riders.)
¶8. (C) Charge also asked Miqdad for advice on how to proceed
regarding Damascus Community School (DCS). FM Muallim had instructed
the Embassy to “start hiring teachers,” but the MFA had not yet
provided any written notification of President Asad’s decision to
allow the school to re-open. There also remained the issue of
whether Syrian students would be allowed to enroll. Miqdad agreed
that this matter required a response and advised the Charge to follow
up with him in the coming week. (Note: Miqdad reported he would be
traveling to Libya for two days to discuss bilateral
relations.)
-------
Comment
-------
¶9. (S) In the midst of hosting a quick-notice visit by Iranian
President Ahmedinejad (who openly criticized the Secretary’s
Congressional testimony expressing concern about Syria and Hizballah),
the SARG might interpret our demarche as an attempt to divert the
spotlight from the show of mutual support between Tehran and
Damascus. Miqdad’s surprise that we would raise this issue so
forcefully on the heels of U/S Burns’ visit may have been genuine,
but the abject denial of any Syrian role in supplying arms to
Hizballah and the verbal counter-attack against Israeli provocation
were standard (if disingenuous) responses. Yet even a seasoned
diplomat like Miqdad could not restrain a raised eyebrow at our
mention of the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah. We expect
the specificity of this concern could well prompt further discussions
among Syrian officials, Hizballah, and the visiting Iranian delegation.
¶10. (S) Miqdad notably did not respond to our concern about a
possible Hizballah revenge operation for the assassination of
Imad Mughniyeh. While Miqdad and Syrian officials might take
some comfort in UNIFIL’s role in preventing the spillover of
recent tensions in south Lebanon, a Hizballah operation against
Israeli targets could easily result in a situation in which
UNIFIL found itself unable to contain rising escalation. One point
we might stress in the future: Syria’s desire for a deterrent
against Israeli military action -- presumably a motivation for
the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah -- will not increase
stability because there are no mechanisms or rules of the road
to prevent and/or manage unanticipated escalation. Not having
control over Hizballah’s missiles or influence over Hizballah’s
military plans to avenge Mughniyeh increases this danger. Our
demarche might resonate more fully here if we can persuade other
key countries, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, France,
and others, to underscore their concerns about regional instability,
to which Syria’s supply of ballistic missiles to Hizballah is
directly contributing.
¶11. (S) Leaving aside the substance of Miqdad’s response to the
demarche, his agreement to meet us on two hours’ notice on a
Syrian holiday (the Prophet’s birthday) and during the Ahmedinejad
visit is worth noting. Miqdad’s Chief of Staff is typically the
recipient of Embassy demarches; CDA’s only other meeting with
Miqdad apart from appointments involving Washington visitors was
to discuss the Vice Minister’s trip to the U.S. last September.
His future willingness to meet directly with us -- which FM
Muallim instructed him to do to follow up on DCS issues -- will
serve as one more barometer of the SARG commitment to engagement
in the weeks and months ahead. HUNTER
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