Viewing cable 09REYKJAVIK69, ICELAND: NO NEW AFGHANISTAN PLEDGES BEFORE ELECTIONS
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VZCZCXRO2826
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRK #0069 0981719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081719Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4042
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE 0085
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000069
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/A REOTT, EUR/RPM COPE
ALSO FOR EUR/NB
OSLO FOR DATT
OSD FOR OSD-P (FENTON)
EUCOM FOR J-5
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV MARR NATO AF IC
SUBJECT: ICELAND: NO NEW AFGHANISTAN PLEDGES BEFORE ELECTIONS
REFS: A) STATE 031102
B) STATE 028929
Classified By: Amb. Carol van Voorst for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Iceland's government is committed to supporting
NATO in Afghanistan but new pledges of assistance are unlikely before
parliamentary elections at the end of April, based on discussions
with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In separate meetings
with Ambassador, both ministers repeated the FM's pledges at
Strasbourg/Kehl to continue support for operations in Afghanistan.
For his part, FM Skarphedinsson noted that simply keeping Iceland's
small ISAF contingent in place has been a victory in view of pressure
from the other party in government to withdraw entirely. Post does
not anticipate a massive shift after the election; all we can
realistically hope for given the economic situation here is a plus-up
by a handful of billets. End summary.
¶2. (C) Ambassador delivered ref A points to Icelandic Prime Minister
Johanna Sigurdardottir, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Permanent
Secretary Benedikt Jonsson, and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ossur
Skarphedinsson in meetings April 6-8. In each case, officials took
the opportunity to reaffirm Iceland's commitment to Afghanistan, but
made no new pledges of support. PM Sigurdardottir, not previously
outspoken on NATO, Afghanistan, or foreign affairs in general, noted
the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit's strong focus on Afghanistan. Ambassador
made the case that Iceland's international reputation has taken a
beating due to the country's economic difficulties. In these times,
being seen as an active contributor to international reconstruction
and stabilization efforts may be one of the most effective means to
help displace "economic collapse" as the first association foreign
observers have when thinking about Iceland. The Prime Minister
sidestepped a direct commitment but made it clear that Ambassador's
points were taken on board.
¶3. (C) In subsequent meetings at the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador
made the same case, that the sterling reputation of its peacekeepers
was a plus point in the eyes of the international community that the
government should not let drop. Foreign Minister Skarphedinsson
called the Ambassador's argument persuasive, and agreed that efforts
within NATO or additional civilian reconstruction efforts would help
improve the way the world sees Iceland. However, Skarphedinsson,
visibly wincing at the thought of financial contributions to overseas
ventures in tough budget times, drew attention to the difficulty of
making new commitments right now. He added that the U.S. should be
happy that Iceland had fallen short of the Ambassador's worst fears,
i.e., that the Icelandic ISAF contingent would be called home
immediately when the Left-Greens came in to government in February.
The FM said his Social Democratic party is under pressure from their
Left-Green coalition partners to cut back on NATO activities, but
that he has successfully countered these efforts so far.
Skarphedinsson pledged to keep the Ambassador's arguments in mind
when looking at the budget again, but implied strongly that this
would not happen before the April 25 parliamentary elections.
¶4. (C) Comment: The ministers' responses confirm what other senior
officials have told post in recent weeks; namely, that although
ministry staff are strongly in favor of maintaining or expanding
Iceland's Afghan presence, the political leadership is not interested
in moving before the elections. Both the PM and FM stated strong
faith in opinion polls that show the current government holding power
after April 25, and we believe they may be more open to reexamining
the issue at that point. However, given the strong pressure to cut
budgets at the MFA and elsewhere, we may at best only be able to hope
for an increase by a few billets in police advising or other
"civilian-oriented" fields.
van Voorst
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