Viewing cable 09REYKJAVIK225, REYKJAVIK CIWG ANNUAL MEETING
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|09REYKJAVIK225||2009-12-24 11:11||2011-01-13 05:05||SECRET//NOFORN||Embassy Reykjavik|
VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRK #0225 3581135 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 241135Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4245
S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 000225 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT. FOR DS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/CI, DS/TIA/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2019 TAGS: ASEC IC SUBJECT: REYKJAVIK CIWG ANNUAL MEETING REF: A) STATE 133533 B) 08 STATE 111936 C) 08 REYKJAVIK 298 Classified By: A/DCM Kathleen Eagen for Reasons 1.4 (a) and (c) ¶1. (S/NF) On December 17, 2009, American Embassy Reykjavik convened a Counter Intelligence Working Group (CIWG) meeting. CDA Sam Watson chaired the meeting. In attendance were A/DCM, POL, PAO, CONS, ECON, IPC, MILREP, MGT and RSO. Ref A discusses Post's previous CIWG. Ref C discusses Post's previous CIWG meeting. ¶2. (S/NF) RSO began the meeting by discussing Post's current ratings on the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). Per Ref A., Post's HUMINT rating remains LOW, and Post's Technical rating is considered to be MEDIUM. RSO advised that the current CRITICAL threat countries represented in Iceland are Russia and China and the HIGH threat country is France. In addition to the countries noted above, accredited diplomatic missions in Iceland include Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, India, Poland, Japan, Finland, Canada and the United Kingdom. ¶3. (S/NF) It is believed that the Chinese are continuing to utilize their TECHNICAL and HUMINT capabilities to conduct industrial espionage. It is also believed that the Russians are monitoring the Chinese actions. The current Russian DCM in Iceland is considered to be a China expert. The current Chinese AMB to Iceland is a known U.S. expert. It is unknown if there is any targeting of the mission or any of its employees by the Russians or Chinese. There is no current GRPO presence at Post and visits are infrequent. ¶4. (S/NF) RSO reminded the CIWG that Post's classified information processing level goes only to SECRET. The C-LAN, STE, classified FAX, conversations, storage, etc., should remain at the SECRET level or below. ¶5. (S/NF) RSO apprised the CIWG that there are NO/NO technical security exceptions at Post and that NO/NO electronic items (unless securely procured and shipped to post via classified pouch) are permitted in the controlled access area (CAA) at any time. RSO also counseled the CIWG that all personal items brought into a CAA must be screened and logged by the RSO. The CIWG approved the secure procurement of a television to Post to be placed in the CAA, to be procured through secure means and shipped via classified pouch per regulations. ¶6. (S/NF) IMO recommended that the proposed sound masking equipment to be procured for the IPC was not necessary. Due to high costs of equipment and lengthy wait times, coupled with the low overall threat in Iceland, IMO recommended that the current situation did not merit the procurement of the equipment. CIWG voted against the procurement of the equipment, but agreed to reassess the necessity of such equipment again in the future. WATSON