Viewing cable 09REYKJAVIK225, REYKJAVIK CIWG ANNUAL MEETING

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09REYKJAVIK225	2009-12-24 11:11	2011-01-13 05:05	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Reykjavik

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRK #0225 3581135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241135Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4245

S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 000225 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/CI, DS/TIA/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2019 
TAGS: ASEC IC
SUBJECT: REYKJAVIK CIWG ANNUAL MEETING 
 
REF: A) STATE 133533 B) 08 STATE 111936 C) 08 
     REYKJAVIK 298 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Kathleen Eagen for Reasons 1.4 (a) and (c) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) On December 17, 2009, American Embassy Reykjavik 
convened a Counter Intelligence Working Group (CIWG) meeting. 
 CDA Sam Watson chaired the meeting.  In attendance were 
A/DCM, POL, PAO, CONS, ECON, IPC, MILREP, MGT and RSO. Ref A 
discusses Post's previous CIWG.  Ref C discusses Post's 
previous CIWG meeting. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) RSO began the meeting by discussing Post's current 
ratings on the Security Environment Threat List (SETL).  Per 
Ref A., Post's HUMINT rating remains LOW, and Post's 
Technical rating is considered to be MEDIUM.  RSO advised 
that the current CRITICAL threat countries represented in 
Iceland are Russia and China and the HIGH threat country is 
France.  In addition to the countries noted above, accredited 
diplomatic missions in Iceland include Germany, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, India, Poland, Japan, Finland, Canada and 
the United Kingdom. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) It is believed that the Chinese are continuing to 
utilize their TECHNICAL and HUMINT capabilities to conduct 
industrial espionage.  It is also believed that the Russians 
are monitoring the Chinese actions.  The current Russian DCM 
in Iceland is considered to be a China expert.  The current 
Chinese AMB to Iceland is a known U.S. expert.  It is unknown 
if there is any targeting of the mission or any of its 
employees by the Russians or Chinese.  There is no current 
GRPO presence at Post and visits are infrequent. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) RSO reminded the CIWG that Post's classified 
information processing level goes only to SECRET.  The C-LAN, 
STE, classified FAX, conversations, storage, etc., should 
remain at the SECRET level or below. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) RSO apprised the CIWG that there are NO/NO 
technical security exceptions at Post and that NO/NO 
electronic items (unless securely procured and shipped to 
post via classified pouch) are permitted in the controlled 
access area (CAA) at any time.  RSO also counseled the CIWG 
that all personal items brought into a CAA must be screened 
and logged by the RSO.  The CIWG approved the secure 
procurement of a television to Post to be placed in the CAA, 
to be procured through secure means and shipped via 
classified pouch per regulations. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) IMO recommended that the proposed sound masking 
equipment to be procured for the IPC was not necessary.  Due 
to high costs of equipment and lengthy wait times, coupled 
with the low overall threat in Iceland, IMO recommended that 
the  current situation did not merit the procurement of the 
equipment.  CIWG voted against the procurement of the 
equipment, but agreed to reassess the necessity of such 
equipment again in the future. 
WATSON