Viewing cable 09BRASILIA725, BRAZIL - WARMING UP TO A COMPROMISE ON AMENDING NSG
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|09BRASILIA725||2009-06-08 17:05||2011-01-16 00:12||CONFIDENTIAL||Embassy Brasilia|
VZCZCXRO3463 RR RUEHRG DE RUEHBR #0725 1591752 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 081752Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4452 INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4178 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7833 RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9627 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6251 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0156 RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000725 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY NSG AR BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL - WARMING UP TO A COMPROMISE ON AMENDING NSG GUIDELINES FOR ENR TRANSFERS REF: A) STATE 49930, B) 2008 BRASILIA 1529, C) 2008 BUENOS AIRES 1661, D) 2008 STATE 120335 Classified by: A/DCM Marie Damour. Reason 1.4a and b ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: There is positive movement in Brazil's position regarding the proposed non-proliferation initiative at the Nuclear Suppliers Group concerning transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology, according to the Ministry of Exterior Relations' Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technology Santiago Mourao. He thought that acceptable language could be reached on Paragraph 6 of the proposal, which included a requirement of an Additional Protocol for an ENR transfer, so long as an exception for Brazil and Argentina were included. He also noted that others were concerned about the use of a "black box" approach for transfers of installations in Paragraph 7, but - even though Brazil would prefer something else - this would be acceptable. Paragraph 7 is "not Brazil's fight," he stated. END SUMMARY. COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON PARAGRAPH 6 AND ENR TRANSFERS ¶2. (C) Brazil's Ministry of Exterior Relations' (MRE) Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technology (DDT) Santiago Mourao outlined the movement in Brazil's thinking about the proposal for a criteria-based approach to strengthening controls over transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment and technology being considered by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). At a meeting on June 2 with Environment, Science & Technology, and Health (ESTH) Counselor and ESTH Officer he said that he sees more flexibility with his government's position. He commented that now he sees a willingness to reach a compromise from the Ministry of Defense, as well as unspecified others, which have been wary of the proposed language in Paragraph 6 of the proposal including a criterion about an Additional Protocol for ENR transfers. ¶3. (C) Mourao said for Brazil an acceptable compromise would be an agreement on Paragraph 6 that had simple language, requiring an Additional Protocol and then creating a clear exception for Brazil and Argentina. He added that something along the lines of the Netherlands proposal would be acceptable. QUESTIONS ABOUT PARAGRAPH 7, BUT "NOT BRAZIL'S FIGHT" ¶4. (C) Just as a solution seems in reach for Paragraph 6 and ENR transfers, Mourao commented that he was seeing concerns raised by others about Paragraph 7 and transfers of installations by means of a "black box" process. He noted that with all the focus on Paragraph 6, the NSG members had not given that much attention to Paragraph 7. He opined that while he would have preferred to have something other than the "black box" approach, in the end Brazil could live with it, provided that Paragraph 6 is acceptable. For Brazil, he added that it was essential that the NSG abide by the decision taken in Oslo to consider Paragraphs 6 and 7 jointly, as a package. ¶5. (C) In the end, Mourao concluded that Paragraph 7 was "not Brazil's fight". Brazil didn't expect to be involved in transfers of installations. Thus, they could live with the language of Paragraph 7 as long as the Additional Protocol language in Paragraph 6 was acceptable. ¶6. (C) COMMENT. Mourao was the most optimistic the ESTH Counselor has seen about reaching a solution within the Brazilian government. It appears that Brazil can accept language in an international agreement requiring the use of an Additional Protocol, at least for ENR transfers, so long as Brazil's - and Argentina's - particular concerns are addressed. This represents a positive development in Brazil's approach to non-proliferation measures. Mourao also seemed upbeat about the NSG reaching agreement on the proposal. END COMMENT. SOBEL .