Viewing cable 07BRASILIA64, FRANCE MAKES BRAZIL NUMBER ONE IN LATIN AMERICA

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07BRASILIA64	2007-01-12 17:05	2011-01-18 00:12	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Brasilia

VZCZCXRO7151
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0064 0121707
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121707Z JAN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7820
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5869
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4058
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4503
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3560
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0318
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 5081
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3307
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 2037
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6677
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1006
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0297
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0163
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2087
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 6010
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 6087
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 3680
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 8986
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: FRANCE MAKES BRAZIL NUMBER ONE IN LATIN AMERICA 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 

¶1. (C) French Ambassador to Brazil Antoine Pouillieute met with Ambassador Sobel on January 9, 2007 for a surprisingly frank and substantive conversation. Key themes from the meeting are reported below. 

BRAZIL -- THE NEW FRENCH PRIORITY 

¶2. (C) Pouillieute noted that his government has a complicated relationship with Brazil and had recently decided to make Brazil France's largest and most important embassy in Latin America. His government has upgraded its presence in Brazil to 110 French nationals, thereby surpassing the French contingent in Mexico. Some of France's most successful and promising recent endeavors with Brazil have been in the area of military sales, where Pouillieute said the potential for sale of additional future French military equipment (NFI) is quite good. 

¶3. (C) Pouillieute commented that the EU's efforts in Brazil are not united and that each EU Country is pursuing its own aims in Brazil separately. He commented that he had little faith in the EU-Mercosul free trade negotiations, confirming that they basically boiled down to what will likely be a biofuels deal. In addition he speculated that even though Venezuela is not yet disruptive to Mercosul, it probably will be in the future and that it is critical to Brazil for Venezuela to become a full member. 

FOREIGN POLICY 

¶4. (C) Regarding broader Brazilian foreign policy issues, France has actually found a way to work within Brazil's stated south-south policy focus, using common interests in Africa as a key foundation. That said, Pouillieute admitted that the French were often frustrated with Brazil: the Brazilians had often been duplicitous, pointing out to African countries that they were natural allies given their common colonial past and reminding these countries that France had once exploited them. The French Ambassador was incredulous that the Brazilians could think that such comments would not eventually get back to the French. Another source of frustration for the French Ambassador is that the Brazilian foreign ministry (MRE) will often sideline some long-planned official French VIP visit to instead focus on some competing visit by a minor African visitor. This baffled Pouillietute. 

¶5. (C) Changing topics, Pouillieute said that Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim apparently has planned extensively for transition in Cuba, and knew exactly what Brazil's role would be in post-Castro scenarios on the island (NFI). Pouillieute also offered that there might be room for tripartite cooperation on law enforcement issues. (Note: US LEA's do not currently engage French counterparts on local efforts.) Finally, he expressed his amazement at the lengths Brazil was going to try to cultivate China. 

Sobel.