Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2555, NETHERLANDS: UAV SALES TO IRAN
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|05THEHAGUE2555||2005-09-20 16:04||2011-01-19 20:08||SECRET||Embassy The Hague|
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S E C R E T THE HAGUE 002555 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/PRA, ISN/ECNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015 TAGS: MARR NL PREL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: UAV SALES TO IRAN REF: A. STATE 172807 ¶B. STATE 164496 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer; reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Polmiloff delivered ref A points to Ceta Noland (Senior Policy Advisor, Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation Division, MFA) September 20. Noland appreciated the new information, and stated she would pass it on to the Dutch intelligence service and the Financial and Economic Investigation Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Noland explained that the Dutch intelligence services typically pass information on such cases directly to their U.S. intelligence counterparts. She added that Dutch intelligence was actively working the case; given Washington's keen interest, she said she would try to pass us any update she receives. ¶2. (C) Noland could not/not confirm whether the shipment (ref A) had been sent to Iran, although she suspected it had, or she would have heard about a seizure at Schiphol Airport. She noted that she would follow up with the Financial and Economic Investigation Agency for a definite answer. ¶3. (C) Noland further explained that the Dutch intelligence service is somewhat limited in investigations of companies. For example, company cooperation is voluntary should the Dutch intelligence agency request additional information during an investigation. The Dutch government is considering an audit of the company involved (ref B) by the Financial and Economic Investigation Agency in which company cooperation would become obligatory. BLAKEMAN