Julian Assange

sexta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2011


Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05BRASILIA2676 2005-10-07 14:02 2011-01-14 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071429Z Oct 05


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Philip Chicola. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Secretary Zoellick told FM Amorim October 6 that the international community needs to engage strongly in Bolivia during the elections to guarantee transparency, and must remain engaged following elections to guarantee some degree of governability. Amorim urged U.S. flexibility in dealing with Evo Morales, something the Deputy Secretary said would be difficult to do given Morales' ties SIPDIS to the drug trade. FM Amorim said he would look at using President Lula's PT Party's ties with leftists to urge the Sandinistas and others in Nicaragua to engage with Lewites and put pressure on Ortega. He urged that Valdez's replacement in Haiti be from South America. The Deputy Secretary agreed that Amorim's proposals for broadening SIPDIS U.S.-Brazilian dialogue to the areas of science, technology, education and fighting racism were worth looking into, but he also proposed deepening the bilateral dialogue on democracy and development by identifying areas where democracy and development intersect. FM Amorim pledged to take action on that proposal. End Summary 

------- BOLIVIA ------- 

¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Amorim noted that there had been much concern expressed about the situation in Bolivia during the September 29-30 Summit of the Community of South American Nations (CASA). He said that all of the leaders attending the summit agreed that postponing the Bolivian elections would be a bad idea. Amorim said he believed that Quiroga is currently in the lead, but there remained the possibility that the vote would end up in a virtual draw, leaving Bolivia in a German-like situation, but without the strong institutions that Germany has. The Foreign Minister asserted that if Morales wins a plurality, it would be almost impossible to deny him the presidency. 

¶3. (C) Regarding Morales, FM Amorim said that through Brazilian engagement with Morales, he appears to be changing a little and is tending toward moderation except when there occur instances of street mobilization or other popular unrest. Opining that Morales and his party are not as far left as radicals such as Quispe, Amorim said that when there is popular mobilization on any issue, Morales has to radicalize to prevent the more radical parties from outflanking him. The Foreign Minister added that President Lula has had a positive influence on Morales during times of crisis. 

¶4. (C) Amorim suggested that the U.S. might need to think about being more flexible with Morales, to which the Deputy Secretary replied that it would be hard to be more flexible SIPDIS with someone that has the kind of ties to "Cocaleros" that Morales maintains, and given uncertainties about Morales' commitment to democracy. Noting that much of the coca grown in Bolivia passes through Brazil, and that it has fomented a drug problem for Brazil, he said Morales' ties to the cocaleros should be of concern in Brasilia. Amorim responded that "There are cocaleros and then there are cocaleros," and added that Brazil was addressing the coca problem by looking for ways to buy more from Bolivia as part of the crop substitution process. 

¶5. (C) The Deputy Secretary told Amorim that in the short term, Bolivia needs a strong international presence during the election to guarantee a degree of transparency. In addition, the international community needs to work with Bolivia after the election to guarantee some degree of governability. He said it would be useful for the U.S. and Brazil, among others, to work with the OAS to figure out how to create a political compact to run the country. At the same time, Bolivians need to address the same kinds of issues, including, for example, what the role of a constitutional assembly should be. 

¶6. (C) FM Amorim said he believed that kind of discussion could be useful, but added that the international community had to act very carefully in Bolivia because there is growing radicalization on all sides. In addition, there is some sensitivity in Bolivia regarding the OAS because the head of the OAS is a Chilean. He noted that Brazil is moving cautiously and that he had personally worked to ensure that Petrobras' investment disputes are not pressed for the moment. 

--------- NICARAGUA --------- 

¶7. (C) Much of the Deputy Secretary's presentation on Nicaragua was new to FM Amorim, who appeared not to be aware of the extent of Ortega and the PLC's effort to undermine the legitimate government of the country. However, he did note that President Lula's Workers' Party (PT) had good relations with the Sandinistas and other leftist parties and he could ask prominent PT members to talk with the leftists in Nicaragua and thereby engage with Lewites and put additional pressure on Ortega. ----------- 

POTUS VISIT ----------- 

¶8. (C) The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make sure something valuable could be extracted from the upcoming visit of the President to Brazil. He suggested creating additional bilateral working groups on science, technology, education and fighting racism. He also suggested looking for ways to increase bilateral cooperation on Africa, adding his hope that cooperation would go beyond Guinea Bissau. He then noted the creation of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) fund that promotes cooperation on development programs in different parts of the world. Amorim said it might be useful if the U.S. could find a way to cooperate with the IBSA fund, and so diminish the South-South aspect of its work and make the effort look more like that of large multi-racial democracies cooperating on development. 

¶9. (C) The Deputy Secretary said he believed the FM's ideas were interesting and worth looking at. Noting that he had earlier planted some seeds on bilateral issues with Finance Minister Palocci and President Lula's International Affairs Advisor Garcia, the Deputy Secretary said he wanted to share them with FM Amorim. He noted that the U.S. had started strategic talks with China and India, and it struck him as odd that the U.S. strategic dialogue with Brazil lagged behind that with India and China. Given that the U.S. and Brazil are democracies that share common political values, the two countries should be able to do more. 

¶10. (C) One way to enhance dialogue is to broaden discussions as the FM had suggested. Another way, the Deputy Secretary pointed out, is to deepen dialogue around several SIPDIS specific topics centered on democracy and development in the Americas. With new leadership at the OAS and IDB, and with the Summit of the Americas approaching, this might be a good time to start deepening our dialogue. 

¶11. (C) Specifically, the Foreign and Finance Ministries of the two countries could meet to discuss how democracy and development issues intersect and use the intersections as a point of departure. FM Amorim said that was a good idea and said he would work to identify appropriate interlocutors and determine when such discussions could take place. 

HAITI ----- 12. (C) FM Amorim told the Deputy Secretary that the replacement for Juan Gabriel Valdez should be someone from South America in order to maintain the link between the political and military side of UN engagement in Haiti. 

¶13. (U) Participants: Brazil Side: Foreign Minister Celso Amorim U.S. Side: The Deputy Secretary Ambassador Danilovich NSC Senior Director Shannon D Chief of Staff Padilla 14. (U) The Deputy Secretary's party has cleared this message. 


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