Viewing cable 10STATE9939, S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED

Viewing cable 10STATE9939, S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10STATE9939.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10STATE9939	2010-02-01 16:04	2010-11-28 18:06	SECRET	Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0026
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #9939 0321611
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011605Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2747
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7036

S E C R E T STATE 009939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2035 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH
SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED 
EXPORT TO IRAN 
 
Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS DAVID B. SHEAR, 
REASON: 1.4 (C). 
 
 ¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Embassy Beijing, please 
see paragraph 3. 
 
¶2.  (S) Background/Objective: The U.S. has information 
indicating that in December 2009, the Chinese company Hong 
Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. offered to sell gyroscopes 
produced by a Russian company to Iran's Isfahan Optics 
Industries.  Our information indicates that these gyroscopes 
could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that 
Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction 
through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco).  Because 
key missile development organizations in Iran previously have 
attempted to procure similar gyroscopes, we are concerned 
this equipment potentially could be diverted to 
missile-related end-users.  We therefore want to alert 
Chinese officials to this information and ask that they 
investigate this activity with a view to preventing Hong Kong 
4 Star Electronics Ltd. from facilitating missile-related 
exports to Iran. 
 
¶3.  (S) Action Request:  Request Embassy Beijing approach 
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking 
points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. 
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. 
 
¶4.  (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: 
 
(SECRET//REL CHINA) 
 
--We would like to alert you to information of proliferation 
concern and request your government's assistance in 
investigating this activity. 
 
--The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, 
Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd., a Chinese company based in 
Futian, China, had offered to sell Iran's Isfahan Optics 
Industries gyroscopes produced by a Russian company. 
 
--Our information indicates that these gyroscopes could be 
delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that Isfahan 
Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction through 
an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). 
 
--We are bringing this matter to your attention to support 
your export control efforts as we are concerned this 
equipment potentially could be diverted to missile-related 
end-users in Iran. 
 
--We understand that the Aerospace Industries Organization 
(AIO), which is responsible for overseeing all of Iran's 
missile programs, has previously attempted to procure similar 
gyroscopes. 
 
--We hope you will use this information to investigate this 
activity and take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. is not facilitating 
unauthorized exports of missile technology to Iran. 
 
--We believe taking such action would be consistent with 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1803, 
which require countries to prevent transfers of items to and 
from Iran that could contribute to the development of nuclear 
weapons delivery systems. 
 
--We look forward to continued cooperation on missile 
nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your 
government takes in response to this information. 
 
End talking points/non-paper 
 
¶5.  (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 
202-647-3185).  Please slug any reporting on this issue for 
ISN/MTR and EAP/CM. 
 
¶6.  (U) A word version of this document will be posted at 
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON