Viewing cable 10STATE9939, S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED
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|10STATE9939||2010-02-01 16:04||2010-11-28 18:06||SECRET||Secretary of State|
VZCZCXYZ0026 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #9939 0321611 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 011605Z FEB 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2747 INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7036
S E C R E T STATE 009939 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2035 TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED EXPORT TO IRAN Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS DAVID B. SHEAR, REASON: 1.4 (C). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 3. ¶2. (S) Background/Objective: The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, the Chinese company Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. offered to sell gyroscopes produced by a Russian company to Iran's Isfahan Optics Industries. Our information indicates that these gyroscopes could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). Because key missile development organizations in Iran previously have attempted to procure similar gyroscopes, we are concerned this equipment potentially could be diverted to missile-related end-users. We therefore want to alert Chinese officials to this information and ask that they investigate this activity with a view to preventing Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. from facilitating missile-related exports to Iran. ¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET//REL CHINA) --We would like to alert you to information of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity. --The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd., a Chinese company based in Futian, China, had offered to sell Iran's Isfahan Optics Industries gyroscopes produced by a Russian company. --Our information indicates that these gyroscopes could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). --We are bringing this matter to your attention to support your export control efforts as we are concerned this equipment potentially could be diverted to missile-related end-users in Iran. --We understand that the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for overseeing all of Iran's missile programs, has previously attempted to procure similar gyroscopes. --We hope you will use this information to investigate this activity and take all appropriate measures to ensure that Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. is not facilitating unauthorized exports of missile technology to Iran. --We believe taking such action would be consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1803, which require countries to prevent transfers of items to and from Iran that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. --We look forward to continued cooperation on missile nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information. End talking points/non-paper ¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/CM. ¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON