Viewing cable 10STATE8675, EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY
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|10STATE8675||2010-01-28 14:02||2010-11-28 18:06||SECRET//NOFORN||Secretary of State|
VZCZCXYZ0007 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #8675 0281433 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 281427Z JAN 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0000 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0000 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 008675 NOFORN SIPDIS EMBASSY MUSCAT FOR EXBS ADVISOR TYLER HOFFMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP PARM OTR TC SUBJECT: EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY IDENTIFICATION TRAINING, DUBAI, 10-13 JAN 2010 Classified By: Jerry Guilbert for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) The Department of Energy,s (DOE) International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), through funding provided by the Department of State,s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program, conducted Commodity Identification Training (CIT) for Dubai Customs, Jan 10 ) 13, 2010. CIT teaches customs agents to recognize WMD-related dual-use items, and this event marked the first time INECP had delivered any type of training in the Unite Arab Emirates (UAE). ¶2. (U) The INECP team consisted of Chris Walker (DOE HQ); Heidi Mahy and Kevin Whattam (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory); Basil Picologlou (Argonne National Laboratory); and Kirk Walker (Kansas City Plant). Lisa Meyers (DOS/Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives) and Tyler Hoffmann (EXBS Advisor for the Middle East) also attended. The Dubai office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided organizational support and attended the course. ¶3. (U) The course began with brief overviews of Weapons and Mass Destruction and delivery systems (missiles), which occupied most of the workshop,s first day. The remaining three days consisted of about three dozen modules covering a range of controlled goods, including machine tools, gyroscopes, (precursor) chemicals, and many others. The course also featured several practical exercises and &games8 to test the participants, grasp of the material. Unsurprisingly, the attendees were not particularly lively during the overview presentations, but they showed strong interest in the commodity presentations and especially the exercises. Dubai Customs brought an x-ray van to the course, allowing both instructors and participants to see how some controlled goods (that is, the ones INECP brought along as teaching aids) look when x-rayed, probably the part of the course that generated the most interest and excitement. This was the first time any Customs agency had provided an X-ray van at a CIT seminar. ¶4. (U) Attendance on the part of Dubai Customs varied from about 15 participants on the first day to around 20 or so for most of Days 2 through 4, plus a few individuals from the training division responsible for organizing the event. Most of the attendees work in Port Rashid, but there were also attendees from the Jebel Ali, Cargo Village, UAE-Oman border crossing, and two representatives from Dubai Customs, WMD division. Mr. Mohammed Foolad, the Dubai Custom,s Manager for Non-proliferation of WMD, was the senior-most person in attendance and had a good working knowledge about WMD related dual-use items from his work. He leads a special unit of five individuals (one of whom attended the course with him). He requested extra copies of the printed course materials and electronic versions of all the Arab-language materials, which the team provided to him. ¶5. (U) Overall, the level of interest was quite good. The audience was fairly participatory, and showed a great deal of energy in particular while x-raying the goods and during a wrap-up exercise, in which groups of participants identify pictures of goods from the course. Multiple participants stated that cooperation should continue in the future; time will tell if the sentiment was genuine. ¶6. (S) In a side conversation between Mr. Foolad and Ms. Meyers, he noted that his job is to coordinate WMD- related cases. He works closely with the Dubai General Directorate of State Security on sensitive issues. When asked about the Export Control office, he noted that he works with them, but that they are new to this issue, while Dubai Customs has been working on this issue for years. He noted that the UAE was developing a computer system that will allow Emirate- level customs offices to communicate with each other. ¶7. (S//NF) CONTD: On targeting, Mr. Foolad noted that Dubai Customs is stopping WMD related cargo on their own (without information from foreign governments) using their targeting methods. They currently use the control lists of the various regimes to target controlled goods, as well as information provided by the United States, Germany, and others to target end users. They have a handbook created by Dubai Customs to help their officers physically identify WMD related dual-use goods, but noted they have had difficulty finding pictures of certain Wassenaar military- related items. He described a case of glass fiber stopped on its way from the Netherlands to Iran, as well as some 7075 aluminum. He noted that they really need more information on who the suspect end users are, as they could use this information to help them better target WMD end users. He mentioned that they routinely find that the same phone numbers are associated with different companies. ¶8. (S//NF) CONTD: Mr. Foolad explained the serious problems they are facing at their Cargo Village facility, which is where they handle air cargo shipments. He noted that they have to look at over 9,000 shipments a month going to one country of concern (i.e., Iran). He noted how difficult this is due to the quick time frame, but how necessary given the sensitivity. NOTE: Mr. Foolad seemed to take the course, and moreover his responsibilities leading the WMD unit, very seriously. ¶9. (U) Point of Contact for DOS/EXBS program activities in UAE is Vennie Pikoulos-Psaros: ph ) 202-647-4513; email: PikoulosBA8at8state.gov. Point of Contact for DOE/INECP program activities in UAE is Chris Walker: ph - 202-586-0052; email: chris.walker8at8nnsa.doe.gov. CLINTON