Viewing cable 10STATE8675, EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY

Viewing cable 10STATE8675, EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10STATE8675	2010-01-28 14:02	2010-11-28 18:06	SECRET//NOFORN	Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8675 0281433
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281427Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0000
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 008675 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
EMBASSY MUSCAT FOR EXBS ADVISOR TYLER HOFFMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 
TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP PARM OTR TC
SUBJECT: EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY 
IDENTIFICATION TRAINING, DUBAI, 10-13 JAN 2010 
 
Classified By: Jerry Guilbert for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) The Department of Energy,s (DOE) International 
Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), through 
funding provided by the Department of State,s Export Control 
and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program, 
conducted Commodity Identification Training (CIT) for Dubai 
Customs, Jan 10 ) 13, 2010.  CIT teaches customs agents to 
recognize WMD-related dual-use items, and this event marked 
the first time INECP had delivered any type of training in 
the Unite Arab Emirates (UAE). 
 
¶2. (U) The INECP team consisted of Chris Walker (DOE HQ); 
Heidi Mahy and Kevin Whattam (Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory); Basil Picologlou (Argonne National Laboratory); 
and Kirk Walker (Kansas City Plant).  Lisa Meyers (DOS/Office 
of Counterproliferation Initiatives) and Tyler Hoffmann (EXBS 
Advisor for the Middle East) also attended.  The Dubai office 
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided 
organizational support and attended the course. 
 
¶3. (U) The course began with brief overviews of Weapons and 
Mass Destruction and delivery systems (missiles), which 
occupied most of the workshop,s first day.  The remaining 
three days consisted of about three dozen modules covering a 
range of controlled goods, including machine tools, 
gyroscopes, (precursor) chemicals, and many others.  The 
course also featured several practical exercises and 
&games8 to test the participants, grasp of the material. 
Unsurprisingly, the attendees were not particularly lively 
during the overview presentations, but they showed strong 
interest in the commodity presentations and especially the 
exercises.  Dubai Customs brought an x-ray van to the course, 
allowing both instructors and participants to see how some 
controlled goods (that is, the ones INECP brought along as 
teaching aids) look when x-rayed, probably the part of the 
course that generated the most interest and excitement.  This 
was the first time any Customs agency had provided an X-ray 
van at a CIT seminar. 
 
¶4. (U) Attendance on the part of Dubai Customs varied from 
about 15 participants on the first day to around 20 or so for 
most of Days 2 through 4, plus a few individuals from the 
training division responsible for organizing the event.  Most 
of the attendees work in Port Rashid, but there were also 
attendees from the Jebel Ali, Cargo Village, UAE-Oman border 
crossing, and two  representatives from Dubai Customs, WMD 
division.  Mr. Mohammed Foolad, the Dubai Custom,s Manager 
for Non-proliferation of WMD, was the senior-most person in 
attendance and had a good working knowledge about WMD related 
dual-use items from his work.  He leads a special unit of 
five individuals (one of whom attended the course with him). 
He  requested extra copies of the printed course materials 
and electronic versions of all the Arab-language materials, 
which the team provided to him. 
 
¶5. (U) Overall, the level of interest was quite good.  The 
audience was fairly participatory, and showed a great deal of 
energy in particular while x-raying the goods and during a 
wrap-up exercise, in which groups of participants identify 
pictures of goods from the course.  Multiple participants 
stated that cooperation should continue in the future; time 
will tell if the sentiment was genuine. 
 
¶6. (S)  In a side conversation between Mr. Foolad and Ms. 
Meyers, he noted that his job is to coordinate WMD- related 
cases.  He works closely with the Dubai General Directorate 
of State Security on sensitive issues.  When asked about the 
Export Control office, he noted that he works with them, but 
that they are new to this issue, while Dubai Customs has been 
working on this issue for years.  He noted that the UAE was 
developing a computer system that will allow Emirate- level 
customs offices to communicate with each other. 
 
¶7. (S//NF) CONTD: On targeting, Mr. Foolad noted that Dubai 
Customs is stopping WMD related cargo on their own (without 
information from foreign governments) using their targeting 
methods.  They currently use the control lists of the various 
regimes to target controlled goods, as well as information 
provided by the United States, Germany, and others to target 
end users.  They have a handbook created by Dubai Customs to 
help their officers physically identify WMD related dual-use 
goods, but noted they have had difficulty finding pictures of 
certain Wassenaar military- related items.  He described a 
case of glass fiber stopped on its way from the Netherlands 
to Iran, as well as some 7075 aluminum.  He noted that they 
really need more information on who the suspect end users 
are, as they could use this information to help them better 
target WMD end users.  He mentioned that they routinely find 
that the same phone numbers are associated with different 
companies. 
¶8.  (S//NF) CONTD: Mr. Foolad explained the serious problems 
they are facing at their Cargo Village facility, which is 
where they handle air cargo shipments.  He noted that they 
have to look at over 9,000 shipments a month going to one 
country of concern (i.e., Iran).  He noted how difficult this 
is due to the quick time frame, but how necessary given the 
sensitivity.  NOTE:  Mr. Foolad seemed to take the course, 
and moreover his responsibilities leading the WMD unit, very 
seriously. 
¶9. (U) Point of Contact for DOS/EXBS program activities in 
UAE is Vennie Pikoulos-Psaros: ph ) 202-647-4513; email: 
PikoulosBA8at8state.gov.  Point of Contact for DOE/INECP 
program activities in UAE is Chris Walker: ph - 202-586-0052; 
email: chris.walker8at8nnsa.doe.gov. 
CLINTON