Viewing cable 09MOSCOW3010, MOSCOW'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION WITH TEHRAN
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09MOSCOW3010 | 2009-12-14 15:03 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO5471 PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHMO #3010/01 3481520 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 141520Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5655 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0540
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003010 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP IAEA RS IR SUBJECT: MOSCOW'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION WITH TEHRAN Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Official GOR reports and media have pronounced the Russian-Iranian relationship healthy and Minister of Energy's Shmatko's recent visit to Tehran as a success. Privately, GOR officials and Russian analysts agree that there are serious tensions in the bilateral relationship such as the S-300s issue, the Bushehr project and the possibility of Russia's support of sanctions. They downplay Moscow's ability to influence Iran, noting competing interests within Russia that complicate Russian policy decisions. Iran policy remains a sensitive domestic question. End Summary --------------------------- Signaling Iran on Sanctions --------------------------- ¶2. (C) Italian Embassy interlocutors in Moscow reported that, during his recent visit to Rome, President Medvedev confided to PM Berlusconi that dealing with Iran lately had been "frustrating." Medvedev said he was bothered by Iran's refusal to accept the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal and that Iran's reaction showed a lack of trust for Russia. While Russia did not necessarily agree that sanctions would be effective, he said, the threat of sanctions could signal Iran that it was time to change course. Medvedev admitted that he did not know who was making decisions in Tehran now, but he was nevertheless optimistic that there was still some room for negotiation on the TRR proposal. ¶3. (C) Ali Mustafabeily, Deputy for Iran and Afghanistan in the MFA's Second Asia Department who accompanied Shmatko to Iran, told us that it was time to pressure Iran. The TRR proposal was a fair offer, but there was also a deadline that Iran had missed. Commenting that the Iranians were "sly" and knew how to negotiate, he said that just last week Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, had informed the Russian Ambassador in Tehran of Iran's new thinking on the TRR proposal. If the West, including Russia, did not agree to a plan in which the IAEA would take "possession" of the low enriched uranium (LEU) while it remained on Iranian soil, it meant the West did not trust the IAEA. Mustafabeily seemed exasperated by this thinking. He also reported that Iran had conferred with (unnamed) other countries and determined that the enrichment proposed in the TRR proposal could be completed in five months rather than one year. Mustafabeily said that Russia could not accomplish this process in five months, but said it was possible that others could. ¶4. (C) Mustafabeily also remarked that he had met many members of the Iranian diaspora living in France. Most were involved in business and kept one foot in France and the other in Iran. While uniformly critical of the current Iranian regime, they also unanimously opposed sanctions as a way to influence Iran. They believed sanctions would only harm average Iranians, not the elites. Mustafabeily reported his own private conversations with businessmen in Tehran that confirmed this opinion. --------------------------------------- S-300s: Still Yellow Light on Transfer --------------------------------------- ¶5. (C) On the issue of the S-300s, Mustafabeily reported that the Iranians had strongly criticized delays in the sale. Specifically, the Iranian Ministers of Trade and Economic Development summoned Shmatko to discuss the S-300s and threatened legal action against the GOR to resolve the issue. According to Mustafabeily, the Iranians reminded Shmatko that they had already paid a considerable amount towards delivery of the system and they expected fulfillment of the contract. While Moscow was not considering a refund, GOR officials recognized the gravity of the issue and that Tehran was likely waiting for Russia's decision on sanctions before carrying out its threat of legal action. Baranov said the decision on the Russian side would be made at the Presidential level, implying that the MFA was not involved in the discussions. He did note that some in the GOR believed transferring the S-300s to Iran would increase stability in the region because Iran would feel more secure without developing nuclear weapons. ----------------------- Anti-Russian Mood Grows ----------------------- MOSCOW 00003010 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Interestingly, Mustafabeily noticed an anti-Russian feeling in Iran, even to include unorchestrated demonstrations in front of their embassy in Tehran. He commented that Russia was being criticized by the government and the elites for being too close to the West and for voting with Western countries in the IAEA. Simultaneously, the Iranian opposition was also condemning Russia for working with the Iranian government. Mustafabeily complained that the propaganda machine was working at full-speed in Iran. ¶7. (C) Maxim Baranov, Director of the MFA's Iran Desk, said that Minister of Energy Shmatko's visit to Tehran was a chance to calm Iran's concerns about delays at the Bushehr facility and reduce rising tensions in the relationship. He said that Russia planned to open the Bushehr reactor as soon as technical tests were completed and that confusion over dates had led to misstatements in the press. Baranov claimed that Russia was continuing with technical testing and did not truly have an expected opening date. Baranov acknowledged that Shmatko's visit came at a difficult time in the bilateral relationship, given Russia's recent vote at the IAEA. He noted that, although Iran was upset about Russia's decision, Iranians would not directly "criticize a guest in their home." As could be expected, Iranian officials instead expressed their disappointment through the media. Baranov explained Russia's IAEA vote as an effort to signal Iran that Russia would no longer remain its unconditional supporter. He indicated that Moscow felt deceived by the Qom site. Baranov also took the opportunity to call for the U.S. to consult more closely with Russia on Iran and not limit discussions to like-minded countries. ¶8. (C) Baranov claimed there was no clear signal coming from Tehran about if or when Iran would negotiate and who was in charge. According to Baranov, Russia wanted Iran to understand that, while IAEA Director El Baradei had always tried to remain objective, there was no guarantee that the incoming director would follow this path. El Baradei's proposal was a favorable deal that might not be available after he leaves his position. Therefore, Russia was urging Iran to begin cooperation with the IAEA now on the TRR proposal. When asked about Prime Minister Putin's recent statement that Russia had no information about a military dimension to Iran's nuclear program, Baranov seemed caught off guard. He confided that backing up such a comment would be "complicated work." -------------------------------------- Iran's Goal--Capability or Production? -------------------------------------- ¶9. (C) Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Yevseyev claimed that Russia's red line with Iran would be if/when Iran withdrew from the IAEA because this would demonstrate that Iran's intention was to build a nuclear weapon. He believed that, because Iran was hoping to keep the LEU on its territory and needed an excuse to back away from the IAEA, its reaction to the vote was calculated and exaggerated. Nina Mamedova of the Oriental Studies Institute and Zhigun Yefim of the Middle East Institute agreed that Iran's reaction was overly emotional. Mamedova claimed that Iran's reaction and subsequent announcement of plans to build 10 enrichment sites was meant to leave room for bargaining in the world community. Iran was well known, according to Mamedova, for adopting harsh positions so there would be room for retreat. She recalled that six years ago Iran reacted in the same way to an unfavorable IAEA resolution and threatened to build 20 nuclear power plants. Then, when Iran realized that the isolation this decision produced was not helpful, it renewed cooperation. She predicted that Iran would likely return to negotiations by early next year but did not know when exactly. ¶10. (C) Vladimir Sazhin of the Oriental Studies Institute and commentator for the Voice of Russia claimed that Tehran's overall goal was completion of the fuel cycle and infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon when they needed it. He did not believe Tehran intended to assemble a weapon. Merely having the capacity would be enough to satisfy its need for security and self-aggrandizement. Conversely, both Mamedova and Yefim believed Iran's goal was to build a nuclear weapon rather than just develop the capability. They believed Iran would not feel secure until it had a small number of nuclear weapons to defend itself against the "threat" from Israel. ----------------- Influencing Iran ----------------- MOSCOW 00003010 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Although Russia had long considered Iran as a key element of regional stability, most Russian officials and analysts agreed that its ability to influence Iran was minimal and quickly decreasing. Yevseyev pointed out that Italy and Germany had far greater trade turnover with Iran than Russia did. Similarly, Mamedova lamented that the bilateral economic relationship was small, even speculating that rumors circulating about Iran's readiness to start joint new exploration efforts with Gazprom of possible gas fields were more likely empty promises meant to convince Russia to defend Iran's position in the international community. ¶12. (C) A carrot/stick approach was recommended by some observers. Vladimir Sazhin said that any use of military force against Iran would cause catastrophe in the region or even globally. He advocated balanced measures which included financial support to the oil and gas sector, a treaty between the P5 1 and Iran on security guarantees, and recognition of Iran's prominent role in the region. If these failed to produce positive results, he believed sanctions against the banking and oil and gas sectors might be effective. Yevseyev said the international community should remain flexible and strive for Iran's integration in to the global economic and political system when Iran demonstrates behaviors that are more positive. Mamedova said it was critical that sanctions avoid inflicting suffering on average Iranians because this would only increase support for Iran's current behavior. ¶13. (C) Comment: The varying perspectives within the Russian foreign policy establishment reflect competing interests. From a purely mercantilist standpoint, sanctions against Iran, particularly its energy sector, would likely translate into a bump in world oil prices, which would boost annual revenues for Russia's state-connected energy companies and the state budget by billions of dollars annually. If sanctions harm Iran's burgeoning economic relationship with China, some in Russia might also regard that as a plus. On the other hand, sanctions could damage Russia's own trade with Iran, which is modest (Russia currently has a bilateral trade surplus of about USD 3 billion) but concentrated in the politically-influential defense and atomic-energy sectors. Since many high-ranking officials in these agencies also favor a more adversarial policy towards the West, an anti-sanctions posture serves them both economically and ideologically. The status quo is preferable for Russia and as the decision point approaches Moscow will probably search for an outcome that changes as little as possible. Given the stakes for Russia's economy and its relations with the U.S., Israel and the EU, this decision will be made by both Medvedev and Putin, with implications for the domestic and foreign influence each exerts. End Comment. Beyrle
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