Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL440, TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09ISTANBUL440 | 2009-12-04 12:12 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Istanbul |
VZCZCXRO7673 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHIT #0440/01 3381236 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041236Z DEC 09 FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9361 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000440 SIPDIS LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAGHDAD FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2024 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON ETRD KNNP TU IR SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS REF: (A) ANKARA 1516 (EXDIS) (B) ISTANBUL 421 (C) ISTANBUL 290 (D) 2008 ISTANBUL 85 (E) 2008 ISTANBUL 146 (F) ISTANBUL 425 (G) ANKARA 1704 Classified By: ConGen Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Rea son 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) Recent discussions with Turkish and Iranian think-tank, business, and political activist contacts on the issue of Turkey-Iran relations reveal a broad consensus that: (1) Turkey pursues closer relations with Iran out of desires for regional stability and conflict avoidance, recognition of Turkey as an indispensable East-West bridge; strengthening a long-term energy and commercial relationship; and hope that Turkey's approach will moderate Iranian regime behavior. (2) Iran reciprocates because it sees Turkey as a hedge against its diplomatic isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a safety valve for its population. However, (3) Turkey's influence over Iranian decision-making it limited; Turkey has never persuaded Iran to change course on an issue of strategic concern to the regime. To quote one contact: "Iran knows Turkey is not going to walk away." On the other hand, our contacts also concluded that Iranian decision-making responds at least tactically to multilateral pressure, which argues that Turkey can and should play a key role to play in supporting tougher approaches on Iran at the UNSC and IAEA. End Summary. Views from Contacts on Turkey-Iran Relations --------------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Over the past several weeks, in conversations before and after President Ahmadinejad's November 8-9 visit to Istanbul (ref B), ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher has solicited views from a wide range of Turkish and Iranian contacts on the issue of warming Turkey-Iran relations, what motivates each side, and whether Turkey's approach has led to a moderation of Iranian regime behavior. Contacts with whom we spoke included Turkish academic experts, Turkish businessmen who deal with Iran, Istanbul-based journalists who cover Iran, several Iranian political activists now seeking refugee status in Turkey for fear of persecution in Iran, and several Tehran-based Iranian contacts who follow Iran's foreign policy. Our conversations revealed an unusual confluence of views. Turkey's Motivations -------------------- ¶3. (C) According to a number of Turkish academic and think-tank contacts, Turkey is pursuing closer relations with Iran for several mutually-reinforcing reasons. First, the underlying principle: According to a Turkish university professor who informally advises FM Davutoglu on Middle East issues (ref C), Turkey's pursuit of close relations with Iran is a direct reflection of Davutoglu's academic philosophy and influential 2000 book, "Strategic Depth," in which he first articulated a policy of "zero problems" with Turkey's neighbors. Another Istanbul-based professor told us that Turkey's Iran policy represents "a triumph of real-politik," with Turkey's national and regional interests trumping any discomfort that Turkey, as a multi-ethnic, pluralistic democracy, might feel about the Iranian regime's harsh domestic authoritarianism. This contact described Davutoglu as "Turkey's Kissinger." ¶4. (C) Regional Stability and Conflict Avoidance: Turkish contacts, and indeed even MFA interlocutors, have acknowledged in the recent past that Turkey sees a military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities as the worst possible outcome on the Iran issue. Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would only be the second worst outcome. This hints at the depth of Turkey's anxiety about the dangers to regional stability, including Turkey's, of the unintended consequences of any further military action in the region, and explains Turkey's commitment at almost any cost to continued western diplomatic engagement with Iran. As one contact explained, "After the traumatic violence in Iraq, and fearful that some countries still think military action is an option with Iran, Turkey will do anything to prevent armed conflict." The GoT's approach on this score enjoys some public support: Turkish public opinion also considers an attack against Iran as more dangerous to Turkey than Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, almost a third of Turks polled do not consider a nuclear-armed Iran to be a threat, believing that Iran would never attack a fellow Muslim country. ¶5. (C) Recognition of Turkey as Moderate Regional Leader and Indispensable East-West Bridge: According to an Ankara-based ISTANBUL 00000440 002 OF 004 international relations professor with ties to PM Erdogan's office, Turkey is also deepening ties to Iran because the region otherwise faces a "power vacuum." No other regional state (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) has the military and economic power to serve as an effective counterweight to Iran. Turkey fills this role with the support of regional states who otherwise fear a dominant Iran, including the Gulf States and to some degree Iran's own client, Syria. Moreover, he described Turkey's engagement with Iran as part of a wider effort to stake out a regional leadership position that puts Turkey "at the fulcrum" and makes it an indispensable partner for the west -- whether or not Turkey eventually joins the EU -- in dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia. This contact acknowledged that this sometimes requires Turkey to tactically distance itself from the USG on several key issues, including Iran's "right" to enrichment and the regime's dismal human rights record. But our contact underscored that "this is classic triangulation." Turkey's intention, he claims, is not a strategic distancing from the US. ¶6. (C) Strengthening a long-term energy and commercial relationship: Turkey does not hide the fact that its own growing energy security needs compel it to look to all available sources, including Iran, for energy. In response, we have underscored that the USG supports the diversification of Turkish gas supplies, while cautioning that Iran has proven to be an unreliable partner in the past and reaffirming USG concern over new energy deals with Iran. Turkey is also actively seeking to expand trade ties with Iran: Both Turkish and Iranian officials have publicly called for bilateral trade volume, which was $10 billion in 2008, to reach $20 billion by 2012 -- a goal most trade experts say is wildly unrealistic. Furthermore, Turkey is taking steps to protect and expand financial ties with Iran, for example by continuing to allow Iran's Bank Mellat (sanctioned by the USG under E.O. 13382) to operate branches in Istanbul and Ankara, and agreeing to conduct bilateral trade in Turkish Lira or Iranian Rials rather than dollars and Euros to avoid having to clear the payments through US or European banks. ¶7. (C) Tying Iran into regional organizations: As long as Davutoglu controls Turkish foreign policy, our Turkish contacts predict that Ankara will seek multiple avenues for bilateral and multilateral engagement with Iran, deepening bilateral cultural and economic ties, and working with regional organizations like the D-8 (ref D), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ref E) and the OIC to maximize engagement. Indeed, Davutoglu's MFA sees regional IOs like these as much more useful tools for engaging Iran, and thus committing Iran incrementally to pursue regionally cooperative policies, than previous FMs did, according to contacts. Iran's Motivations ------------------ ¶8. (C) According to our Turkish and Iranian contacts, Iran is happy to reciprocate Turkey's interest in closer ties because it sees Turkey as a hedge against its diplomatic isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a safety valve for its population. Turkey's value to Iran is felt most strongly in these six areas: --Economic: Iran recognizes Turkey's emergence as a regional economic powerhouse, wants to deepen Turkey's dependence on its natural gas, and sees Turkish markets and bilateral commerce as a hedge against isolation and sanctions; -- Diplomatic: Iran knows that Turkey's seats on the UNSC and IAEA Board give it outsized influence, and Iran benefits from the occasional inclination of Turkish leaders to give Iran's nuclear intentions, at least in public, the benefit of the doubt; -- Political: Turkey's refusal to publicly criticize the regime over the conduct of June elections or its crackdown on peaceful protesters, as well as PM Edogan's quick recognition of Ahmadinejad's contested election victory, helped bolster Iranian regime legitimacy at a critical period when the regime needed it most; -- Cultural: A quarter of Iran's population is ethnically Azeri and Turkish-speaking; Turkish TV programs and are among the most popular in Iran; and one million Iranians flock annually visa-free to Turkey as a touristic "safety valve"; -- Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S: Iran closely watched the spring 2009 visits to Turkey by Secretary Clinton and then President Obama. One direct result of those visits, according to an Iranian journalist based in Istanbul, was a decision by the regime to try to use Turkey's enhanced influence with the USG to "soften" Washington's approach to Iran. ISTANBUL 00000440 003 OF 004 The Limits of Turkish Influence On Iran --------------------------- ¶9. (C) Turkey's influence with Iran runs broadly, but does not appear to run deep. None of our contacts had seen concrete evidence that Turkey has swayed Iranian leaders to change course on any issue of strategic interest to the regime where Iran had not already calculated it was in its interests to do so. ¶10. (C) An Istanbul-based professor who informally advises Davutoglu, and joined him in his September and October bilats (in Tehran and Kuala Lumpur) with Iranian FM Mottaki, claimed that Davutoglu's interventions helped persuade the regime to agree to participate in the October 1 Geneva meeting with the P5 1. However, all other contacts dismissed that claim, noting that Iranian regime statements and press reports prior to Davutoglu's bilats already indicated that Iran would go to Geneva. ¶11. (C) Several weeks of intense, personal diplomacy by FM Davutoglu, supported by interventions form President Gul and PM Erdogan, have been unable to persuade Iranian decision-makers to agree to a compromise deal with Turkey that would keep alive the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel swap proposal, a key test of the P5 1's efforts to engage Iran. ¶12. (C) Our contact who advises Davutoglu also asserted that Turkey played a key role in persuading Iran to release several detainees including Greek-British journalist Iason Athanasiadis (jailed in Iran on June 17 and released on July 6). But Athanasiadis (please protect) told us that while Turkey offered to intervene with Iran on his case, to his knowledge it never did, and indeed Athanasiadis told us he believed it was the Ecumenical Patriarch's personal request to Khamenei (via letter) that probably convinced Iran to release him. ¶13. (C) Even on issues of lesser strategic importance to Iran, high-level Turkish intervention does not reveal a record of successfully moderating Iranian policies. According to a Turkish businessman who deals with Iran (Ref F), several interventions from Turkey's Trade and Foreign Ministers, and even a plea from PM Erdogan in Tehran on October 27, have been unable to persuade Iran to lower its customs duties on Turkish imports, currently 45% for finished products. As our business contact explained, even though Iran depends on Turkish diplomatic support and benefits from Turkish gas purchases and other trade, Iran realizes it does not have to sacrifice any critical policy priorities in return, including its customs income, because "Iran knows Turkey is not going to walk away." Does Turkey Really Understand Iran Better? --------------------------------------- ¶14. (C) Underlying Turkey's pursuit of warmer relations with Iran is an assumption on the part of Turkish decision-makers and diplomats that Turkey has correctly judged that the current Iranian regime will be its long-term interlocutor. But Turkey's belief that it understands Iranian political developments better than most western countries is an assumption strongly challenged by our Iranian contacts. These contacts suggest that Turkey draws its assessment of Iran's internal dynamics through a subjective filter, which values regime stability foremost, and thus Turkey's assessments artificially inflate evidence suggestive of regime stability. ¶15. (C) According to two separate "Green Movement" activists now seeking refugee status in Turkey -- one a Mousavi campaign official, one the communications director of a reformist party that supported Mousavi -- Turkey missed an historic opportunity by quickly recognizing Ahmadinejad's victory and dismissing the Green Movement's political significance, either as a meaningful opposition movement or as the possible vanguard of a more democratic Iranian government. Most Green Movement activists now see Turkey as fully committed to the Iranian regime's survival in the name of regional stability, and predict that Turkey will be "on the wrong side of history" if and when Iran's fractured regime faces systemic change at the hands of Iran's population. "When the system falls and a more democratic, moderate, outward-looking government comes to power, we will all remember where Turkey stood on 22 Khordad (June 12) and after." ¶16. (C) Turkey, like the USG, almost certainly recognizes that within the Iranian regime there are at least several factions and key players jockeying intensely for influence. ISTANBUL 00000440 004 OF 004 The fact that Turkish President Gul agreed to meet former Iranian presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai, a Rafsanjani ally, in Ankara in October (despite the INTERPOL Red Notice issued against Rezai), and the relative frequency with which Turkish officials including PM Erdogan have met influential Majles speaker Larijani, an Ahmadinejad rival, in the past six months, suggest that Turkey -- like others in the west -- wants to hedge its bets on who will emerge as the strongest of Iran's decision-makers, especially if Supreme Leader Khamenei faces future leadership challenges. (In a telling anecdote related to us indirectly, when Erdogan met Khamenei in Tehran on October 28, Khamenei seemed to be "in a time capsule", asking uninformed or unrealistic questions about Turkish foreign policy, and passively uninterested in discussing the nuclear issue.) Despite its belief that it knows its neighbor Iran better than most other countries do, according to our contacts, Turkey is just as uncertain as the USG and other western countries as to what exactly is happening behind the regime's closed doors. Implications ---------- ¶17. (C) If the consensus views of our contacts are accurate, it suggests our efforts to persuade PM Erdogan to adopt a tougher public stance against Iran will be a tough sell. Even if Erdogan were to hew closer to P5-plus-one criticism of Iran, Tehran would likely pay him little heed. On the other hand, our contacts point out that Iran's regime has a clear recent history of making tactical concessions in the face of concerted international pressure, especially pressure from the UNSC and IAEA. If this holds true, we can and should encourage Turkey to play a supportive role at the UNSC and IAEA as the USG and partners consider raising pressure on Iran in those fora. As noted Ref G, however, any USG effort to try press Turkey to sign up to tougher international measures on Iran, especially on issues that might impact the Turkish economy, will have costly domestic political consequences for the GoT. The key to securing Turkish acquiescence at the UNSC and IAEA, a Turkish professor explained, is to keep the engagement track on the table and even further sweetened (especially with trade incentives from which Turkey might also benefit), even as tougher measures are being pursued. WIENER
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