Viewing cable 09CAIRO746, ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

Viewing cable 09CAIRO746, ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09CAIRO746	2009-04-30 15:03	2010-11-28 18:06	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Cairo

VZCZCXRO3480
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0746/01 1201500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301500Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2325
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000746 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2019 
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PARM KPAL IS IR SO EG SU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  Key Points: 
 
- (S/NF) During an April 21 meeting with Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Egyptian 
General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman explained 
that his overarching regional goal was combating radicalism, 
especially in Gaza, Iran, and Sudan. 
 
- (S/NF) On Gaza, Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian 
attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and "stop" arms smuggling 
through Egyptian territory. 
 
- (S/NF) Soliman shared his vision on Palestinian 
reconciliation and bringing the Palestinian Authority back to 
Gaza, saying "a Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be 
calm." 
 
- (S/NF) On Iran, Soliman said Egypt was "succeeding" in 
preventing Iran from funneling financial support to Hamas 
through Egypt.  Soliman hoped that the U.S. could encourage 
Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and stop interfering in 
regional affairs, but cautioned that Iran "must pay a price" 
for its actions. 
 
- (S/NF)  Egypt is "very concerned" with stability in Sudan, 
Soliman said, and was focusing efforts on convincing the 
Chadean and Sudanese presidents to stop supporting each 
others' insurgencies, supporting negotiations between 
factions in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).  "Egypt does not want a divided Sudan," 
Soliman stressed. 
 
---- 
Gaza 
---- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  Soliman said radicalism was the "backbone" of 
regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza 
posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national 
security.  Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian 
attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling 
through Egyptian territory.  "Egypt is circled by 
radicalism," he continued, expressing concern over 
instability in Sudan and Somalia as well.  Egypt's own 
successful campaign against radicalism in the 1990s provided 
a useful lesson in how to counteract extremist groups by 
reducing their ability to operate and raise funds, in 
additional to educating people on the dangers of extremism. 
Soliman noted that only the Muslim Brotherhood remained and 
the Egyptian government continued to "make it difficult" for 
them to operate. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) "We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame 
public anger," Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict 
put "moderate (Arab) regimes" in a corner.  To prevent 
another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on 
Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between 
Hamas and Israel.  On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the 
ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to 
Gaza, as "Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm." 
The problem, however, is that the PA cannot return to Gaza 
without Hamas' acquiescence.  Soliman said the PA must return 
before the January 2010 Palestinian elections, or else Gazans 
would be afraid to vote for moderates. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Stability in Gaza also depends on giving people a 
more "normal" life, Soliman continued, saying Israel must be 
convinced to regularly open the border crossings for 
legitimate commercial activity.  The current system - where 
Egypt informs Israel of a humanitarian shipment and Israel 
waits two days before accepting or rejecting the shipment for 
transfer to Gaza - does not adequately meet people's needs. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman said he 
expected the factions to return to Egypt on April 26 to 
discuss his proposal on establishing a high committee 
comprised of the various factions.  The committee would be 
responsible for preparing for the January 2010 elections, 
monitoring reconstruction, and reforming the security 
services in Gaza.  On reconstruction, the committee would 
issue licenses for companies eligible to participate on 
projects, but the PA would decide who receives the money for 
private and government contracts.  Arab governments would 
assist with reforming the security services and could base 
security assistance out of Egypt.  Soliman doubted that Hamas 
would agree to the high committee, but said it was important 
 
CAIRO 00000746  002 OF 002 
 
 
to keep Hamas and Fatah talking, so they would not resort to 
violence. 
 
----------------------- 
Iran, Counter Smuggling 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Iran is "very active in Egypt," Soliman said. 
Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a 
month, but he said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing 
financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt.  Iran has 
tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam 
Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money 
from reaching Gaza.  Soliman said the Egyptian government had 
arrested a "big Hezbollah cell," which was Hezbollah's first 
attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt.  Iran was also 
trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he 
claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza.  So 
far, he continued, Egypt had successfully stopped Hamas from 
rearming.  Soliman noted that in six months, MOD will have 
completed the construction of a subterranean steel wall along 
the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent smuggling.  He warned, 
however, that people will find an alternative to the tunnels 
to smuggle arms, goods, people, and money.  Admiral Mullen 
expressed appreciation for Egypt's efforts to combat 
smuggling, adding that he hoped Egypt felt comfortable enough 
to ask for additional border security assistance at any time. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Egypt has "started a confrontation with Hezbollah 
and Iran," Soliman stressed, and "we will not allow Iran to 
operate in Egypt."  Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear 
message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will 
interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun 
recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria.  Soliman hoped the U.S. 
would "not walk the same track as the Europeans" in regards 
to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on 
one issue at time, like Iran's nuclear weapons program.  Iran 
must "pay the price" for its actions and not be allowed to 
interfere in regional affairs.  "If you want Egypt to 
cooperate with you on Iran, we will," Soliman added, "it 
would take a big burden off our shoulders." 
 
----- 
Sudan 
----- 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Egypt is very concerned with stability in Sudan, 
Soliman said, but asked for the U.S. to be "patient" with the 
Sudanese government and give Egypt time to help the Sudanese 
government deal with its problems.  He applauded the 
appointment of Special Envoy Gration and recent U.S. 
statements on Sudan.  Soliman said Egypt was focused on three 
areas for promoting stability in Sudan: 1) repairing the 
relationship between Chadean President Deby and Sudanese 
President Bashir and stopping their support for each others' 
insurgencies 2) supporting negotiations between the various 
factions in Darfur, and 3) implementing the CPA.  Soliman 
encouraged a larger role for French President Sarkozy in 
mediating between Chad and Sudan.  He said that Southern 
Sudan "feels no benefits from unity," and Egypt is trying to 
bridge the "physiological gap" between north and south itself 
by providing humanitarian assistance.  "Egypt does not want a 
divided Sudan," he stressed.  Admiral Mullen replied that 
Egypt's leadership on Sudan was critical and looked forward 
to increased cooperation between Egypt and Special Envoy 
Gration. 
 
------------------ 
Piracy and Somalia 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Admiral Mullen stressed that piracy was an 
international crime that needed an international solution, 
especially on support for trying captured pirates.  The U.S. 
did not want Somalia to become the next safe haven for 
al-Qaeda after Pakistan, he stressed.  Soliman replied that 
there were not enough ships in the region to provide adequate 
security against pirate attacks and recommended that the 
international community, through the UN Security Council, 
focus counter piracy efforts on the Somali shore. 
 
¶10.  (U) Admiral Mullen did not have the opportunity to clear 
before his departure. 
SCOBEY