Viewing cable 09AMMAN813, WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09AMMAN813 | 2009-04-02 05:05 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Amman |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAM #0813/01 0920549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020549Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4793
S E C R E T AMMAN 000813
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2029
TAGS: PREL PINR IR JO
SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
OF CAUTION
REF: A. STATE 25892
¶B. 08 AMMAN 3329
¶C. AMMAN 668
¶D. 08 AMMAN 3189
¶E. 08 AMMAN 2660
¶F. 08 AMMAN 3372
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for
evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S.
engagement with Iran. Jordan's leaders believe such
engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining
Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support
for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic
aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to
counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its
radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a
"two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes,
and making sure that Iraq's political and security
institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when
the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does
proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in
advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End
Summary.
Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian
officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose
tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and
undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional
moderates. Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and
Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian
territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant
to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region. While
Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will
convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they
can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that
make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its
championing of the Palestinian cause.
¶3. (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence
derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver"
while moderates are not. The main failure of moderates as
cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and
dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a
viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next
to Israel. The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle
East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way:
"Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking
advantage of helpless people." From Jordan's perspective,
the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to
final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to
deal with shared security concerns about Iran.
¶4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has
been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its
political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections.
The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having
benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street
enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the
Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008
described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won
last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that
put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the
Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the
only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by
extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand
over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah
lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for
continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison
d'etre and probably domestic support.
¶5. (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political
stability over the past year in particular have served
somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference.
The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national
rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader. During
the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM
Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to
appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni
Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential
bulwark against Iran (Ref B). Positive trends
notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress
that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense,"
and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could
be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).
Prepare for Iran to Disappoint
------------------------------
¶6. (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as
dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a
powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows
how to deal effectively with Iran. Foreign Minister Nasser
Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks
with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them
forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived
acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.
¶7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that
dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the
U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no
circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear
weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran,
or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives
won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David
Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would
have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless
thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would
pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).
¶8. (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director
of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted
that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in
inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels. He urged
the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after
the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest. They know where
they are going and what they are doing." He doubted there
would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June
elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be
practical due to religious and ideological considerations.
He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners,
many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.
Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out
---------------------------------------
¶9. (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian
leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab
interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.
Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a
stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and
reach their own separate peace with Tehran. King Abdullah
counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that
direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just
deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a
backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp. The Prime
Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform
the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict"
and that this strategy was already working with Syria and
Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in
September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that
the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a
hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange
for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).
¶10. (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging
Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the
King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake
both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be
done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F).
International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar
Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as
follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the
region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal
to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy
review. He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work
together to determine what deliverables are required from
Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also
to set clear redlines. (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying
to work with its friends in the region to develop a
joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize.
End Note.)
¶11. (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward
engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided
forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain
anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their
expense. Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional
ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing
benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited
and short-lived. Re-engagement could trigger a review of
Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like
Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last
year. When asked periodically whether by engaging with
Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,
official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets
with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively
engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged.
End Comment.
Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft
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