Viewing cable 08RIYADH1134, SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM MEETING

Viewing cable 08RIYADH1134, SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM MEETING

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08RIYADH1134	2008-07-22 05:05	2010-11-28 18:06	SECRET	Embassy Riyadh

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRH #1134 2040500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220500Z JUL 08 ZDK CTG #00732
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8838
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 9639
RUEHRH/CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0733
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0023
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T RIYADH 001134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/RA RMANGIELLO AND RNEPHEW, AND 
NEA/ARP BMCGRATH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018 
TAGS: MNUC PGOV PREL SA TRGY KNNP IR
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM MEETING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 74879 
     ¶B. RIYADH 43 
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) On July 21, Pol Counselor delivered demarche on the 
upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers meeting 
scheduled for Tehran from July 27-30 (Reftel A) to Saudi MFA 
Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali 
Alwahbi. 
 
¶2. (S) Alwahbi informed us that Saudi Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs (MFA Deputy Secretary equivalent) Dr. Nizar 
bin Obaid Madani would lead the Saudi delegation.  He assured 
us Saudi Arabia did not want the NAM meeting to become an 
Iranian propaganda event, adding he had seen the proposed 
agenda and did not expect it to develop in such a manner. 
Alwahbi agreed Iran's continued nuclear enrichment was a 
grave SAG concern with regional security implications (Reftel 
B). 
 
¶3. (S) Alwahbi strongly advised against taking military 
action to neutralize Iran's program.  Rather, establishing a 
US-Iranian dialogue was the best course of action, asserting 
that the USG opening an Interest Section or re-opening our 
Embassy in Tehran would be positive step.  Alwahbi was 
heartened by the USG's initiative for Under Secretary Burns 
to meet with the Iranians last week in Geneva.  He added 
that, in his view, Iran's position was "shifting" and wanted 
to avoid escalation of tensions.  He noted his belief that 
the Russians had recently been effectively pressuring Iran to 
be less provocative.  Alwahbi concluded that he expected Iran 
to keep tensions relatively low at least until after the US 
presidential election. 
 
¶4. (S) COMMENT.  These comments are typical of Saudi MFA 
bureaucrats who take a pacific stance towards Iran, but 
diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice we have 
gotten from senior Saudi royals.  END COMMENT. 
GFOELLER