Viewing cable 08DJIBOUTI380, DJIBOUTI FM REPORTS TALKS UNDERWAY WITH ERITREA TO

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08DJIBOUTI380	2008-04-20 17:05	2010-12-08 16:04	SECRET	Embassy Djibouti

VZCZCXRO2806
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0380/01 1111711
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201711Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9169
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 2282
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

Sunday, 20 April 2008, 17:11
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000380 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER 
EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2032 
TAGS PREL, MOPS, PBTS, DJ, ER, ET 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI FM REPORTS TALKS UNDERWAY WITH ERITREA TO 
DEFUSE BORDER INCIDENT
REF: A. DJIBOUTI 378  B. DJIBOUTI 377
Classified By: ERIC WONG, CHARGE D’AFFAIRES, A.I.
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. On April 20, senior Djiboutian officials--

including Djibouti’s defense minister, intelligence chief,

and deputy CHOD--were involved in talks with Eritrean 

military officials in an attempt to defuse tensions arising

from Eritrea’s establishment of a military outpost on 

disputed territory at Ras Doumeira, along the Bab al Mandab

strait. According to Djibouti’s foreign minister, the

GODJ sought to use “quiet diplomacy” to press Eritrea,

although it believed that Eritrean President Isaias was

unpredictable, as evidenced by Eritrea’s 1994 attack on

a Djiboutian outpost at the same area. Foreign Minister

Youssouf reports that Isaias opposes Djiboutian efforts

to broker discussions between Somalia’s Transitional 

Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the 

Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and that Isaias also

suspects that routine U.S. military exercises in 

Djibouti are aimed at gathering intelligence for 

Ethiopia. Youssouf said Djibouti would welcome 

participating in the International Contact Group on

Somalia, and planned to meet with visiting UN SRSG

for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah later in the week.

END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) On April 20, Charge and GRPO met with Djiboutian

Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf to discuss the 

GODJ’s April 17 complaint that Eritrea had established

a military outpost on Djiboutian territory at Doumeira

(ref A). Charge and GRPO were accompanied by two 

representatives of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn 

of Africa (CJTF-HOA): Embassy Djibouti Country Coordination

Element (CCE) CDR James Dickie, and CJTF-HOA Director

of Intelligence (CJ-2) CAPT Kevin Frank.
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
FRENCH IMAGERY SHOWS STRUCTURE ON DISPUTED TERRITORY
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶3. (S) FM Youssouf presented low-resolution color 

photographs of Ras Doumeira dated the afternoon of 

April 17, which he said had been provided by French 

authorities. The photos show a manned structure and 

several trucks at the base of a mountain; according to

FM Youssouf, the structure is an Eritrean military post

constructed recently on “no man’s land” along the 

easternmost portion of the border between Djibouti and 

Eritrea, along the Bab al Mandab strait.
¶4. (S) While Eritrean forces had “pulled back” on the 

evening of April 19, FM Youssouf expressed concern that 

an estimated 3,000 Eritrean troops were along the Eritrean 

border with Djibouti, concentrated along three axes: from 

Eritrea to the Djiboutian border towns of Daddato, Sidiha

Menguela, and Bissidourou. In addition to the post at Ras

Doumeira, Eritrean forces had also recently built a coastal

road from the port of Assab to Doumeira, and had begun to 

reclaim the waterfront, in an apparent attempt to construct

some sort of port facility, he said.
----------------------------------- 
MIL-MIL TALKS UNDERWAY WITH ERITREA
----------------------------------- 
¶5. (S) In response to this “belligerent act,” Youssouf 

said the GODJ had strengthened its military presence at 

its base at Moulhoule (15 km south of Doumeira). In addition,

the GODJ had dispatched a delegation on the morning of

April 20 to Moulhoule, in order to discuss the incursion

with Eritrean officials. According to FM Youssouf, GODJ 

representatives included Deputy Chief of the Djiboutian

Armed Forces Brigadier General Zakaria Cheick Ibrahim,

National Security Service (NSS) Director Hassan Said

Khaireh, and Defense Minister Ogoureh Kiffleh Ahmed.

FM Youssouf said he had also been in direct contact 

personally with the Eritrean Navy Commander, Major

General Karikare Ahmed Mohammed, whom he believed 

had some influence on Eritrean President Isaias.

FM Youssouf also planned to engage the secretary-general

of Eritrea’s foreign ministry, who was expected to 

transit Djibouti airport (from Dubai) on the evening 

of April 20.
¶6. (S) To satisfy the GODJ’s concerns, Eritrean forces

needed to withdraw at least 1 km away from the demarcated

border at
DJIBOUTI 00000380 002 OF 002
Mt. Doumeira, Youssouf said; adding that international

law required pulling back to 5 km from the border.
¶7. (S) FM Youssouf noted that the GODJ sought to utilize

“quiet diplomacy” to defuse the situation, and had not

yet issued any public statements on the recent Eritrean

incursion. However, he noted that the 1994 incident,

which had involved an exchange of gunfire between Eritrean 

and Djiboutian forces at Ras Doumeira, reached a denouement

only when Djibouti protested to the United Nations, the 

Arab League, and the African Union. Djibouti subsequently

demarcated the border, while Eritrea issued a map with 

altered boundaries for propaganda purposes.
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
ISAIAS “A LUNATIC”; SUSPICIOUS OF ETHIOPIA AND THE U.S.
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶8. (S) The Eritrean government (GSE) was “very unpredictable,

” Youssouf said. He underscored that Eritrean troops had 

previously attacked a Djiboutian outpost at Ras Doumeira 

in 1994, at the same time that the Eritrean foreign minister

was visiting the capital of Djibouti. Thus, according to

Youssouf, Isaias had blindsided his own foreign minister.

“This man is a lunatic,” opined Youssouf, adding, “you 

can’t pick your neighbors.” Youssouf noted the scarcity 

of food and consumer goods in Eritrea, caused by its 

“monopolistic, communist” state. As “waves of refugees”

already crossed Djibouti’s porous borders from Somalia,

Djibouti could ill afford additional refugees from conflict

between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
¶9. (S) Youssouf said President Isaias had complained, at

the last EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, that there was “no

terrorism in Djibouti.” Isaias was deeply suspicious of 

Djiboutian cooperation with the United States, claiming 

even to have information on USG renditions involving Djibouti,

Youssouf said. More recently, GSE officials had expressed 

concern about both U.S. military exercises in Djibouti and 

also alleged Ethiopian plans to attack Assab from Bure and

to definitively remove Isaias from power. The GSE had asserted

that recent U.S. military exercises in northern Djibouti 

(ref A) were not intended to combat terror, but rather were

intended to collect information for Ethiopia, Youssouf said.

Youssouf highlighted that the GODJ was “happy” with the U.S.

presence in Djibouti, and would continue to support the 

United States.
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
ERITREA OPPOSED TO DJIBOUTIAN-BROKERED SOMALIA TALKS
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶10. (S) Recent business talks relating to the possible 

construction of a massive bridge linking Yemen to Djibouti

had heightened GSE interest in Doumeira. The GSE opposed 

Djibouti’s ongoing efforts to broker discussions between 

Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 

Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (ref B),

Youssouf said, as the GSE sought to keep Ethiopia preoccupied

in Somalia, and thus to fracture the Ethiopian military into

3-4 fronts. Youssouf said Djibouti would welcome participating

in the International Contact Group on Somalia, and planned

to meet with visiting UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah

later in the week.
¶11. (S) COMMENT. FM Youssouf noted that no public statements

from the USG were needed yet, as Djibouti sought to press 

Eritrea through “quiet diplomacy.” Should these talks fail,

however, the international community will have to weigh 

what actions, if any, would be effective in reversing the

Eritrean incursion. The recent withdrawal of UN peacekeeping

forces from the Temporary Security Zone, following more 

than two years of increasing restrictions on the UN Mission

in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), highlight the GSE’s 

intransigence in the face of international pressure. 

END COMMENT. WONG