S E C R E T ALGIERS 001809
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2027
TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, AG
SUBJECT: AFTER THE LATEST ALGIERS BOMBINGS: THIS WILL BE A
LONG HAUL
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The December 11 bombings in Algiers demonstrate
that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) can adapt its tactics
to discredit the Algerian government even if it cannot destabilize
the state. Its tactics have evolved and it is more frequently
targeting foreigners. AQIM seeks to copy tactics used by Al-Qaida
in Iraq and we expect in the future to see AQIM resort to
operations such as kidnapping, attacks by women suicide bombers
and more suicide vests, for example. The Algerian security forces
appeared to enjoy some success dampening AQIM operations in
October and November, but there is no sign that they can
completely secure the capital. Indeed, they are warning in
public and private that they cannot. Their public line is,
therefore, that the country must soldier on even with the
occasional terrorist atrocity. Behind closed doors, however,
the December 11 bombings have opened a debate about whether
President Bouteflika’s amnesty program is appropriate or not;
some in the security services want to cast it aside and use
an iron fist. According to the Portuguese ambassador, who
joined his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on
December 16, the Algerian president appeared shaken and
unsure of how to respond to the bombings. His advisors
appear glum, and Bouteflika himself has yet to say anything
to the nation in the wake of the bombings. Looking forward,
we see a terror organization able to adapt and shift tactics
and targets facing a government that easily holds military
superiority but is not exactly sure what more it can or should
do. None of our contacts think the security services will be
able to prevent new attacks. They do not know when those attacks
might occur or what form they will take. Thus, the security
situation could stay roughly as it is now, or it might
deteriorate further; we do not expect it to improve. Our
contacts all expect more terror attacks, although none
knows when or what form they will take. Al-Qaida tactics
in Iraq are probably the best guide. The Embassy has already
adopted stricter security measures for staff and dependents
and is urging the non-official American community in forums
like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead,
we will have to reevaluate our posture more frequently in
response to the greater AQIM threat. END SUMMARY.
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AQIM IS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANISM
----------------------------
¶2. (SBU) AQIM is using a variety of tactics to keep the Algerian
government guessing and that are slowly raising concerns among
the foreign community and the broader public in Algiers. The
following list shows the evolution of AQIM tactics:
-- Summer 2006: ambushes with roadside bombs and gunfire against
Algerian army patrols in the mountains east of Algiers;
-- October 2006: first car bombs in years in the Algiers region,
hitting two police stations;
-- December 2006: first attack on foreigners in years, using a
roadside bomb to hit a U.S.-Algerian company bus in Algiers suburb,
killing two (no Amcits);
-- February 2007: multiple, coordinated, powerful car bombs in
towns scattered in the mountains outside Algiers;
-- March 2007: another roadside bomb against a bus full of
foreigners, this time a Russian company bus west of Algiers;
-- April 2007: suicide van and truck bombs simultaneously hit
Prime Minister’s offices in downtown Algiers and destroy a
police station east of the city center near the airport;
there were two suicide vehicles against the police station
in a tactic very similar to that seen in Iraq;
-- July 2007: suicide truck bomb hits Algerian army base at
Lakhdaria, east of Algiers, killing dozens of soldiers;
-- September 2007: another suicide truck bomb, this one driven
by a 15 year old, hits Algerian coast guard base at Dellys,
east of Algiers, again killing dozens; -- September 2007:
first suicide vest attack, this one directly targeting President
Bouteflika in Batna, 200 miles east of Algiers;
-- September 2007: drive-by suicide car bomb attack on a
French/Italian company convoy in the mountains east of Algiers
-- September 2007: suspected planning of a kidnapping of two
French nationals working at the Algiers airport leads to the
sudden departure of the two men;
-- December 2007: roadside bomb attack again targets a Russian
company bus west of Algiers;
-- December 2007: simultaneous suicide truck bombs destroy UN
offices and damage Supreme Court building in central Algiers;
one of the truck drivers was 64 years old, something heretofore
unseen here.
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EXPECT MORE ATTACK METHOD VARIATION A LA IRAQ
---------------------------------------------
¶3. (S) The Al-Qaida in Iraq network, which already has ties
to jihadi groups in Algeria, has strong influence on AQIM
elements. The suicide bomber in July 2007 was nicknamed
“Abu Musaab” because he was so enamored with Zarqawi in Iraq.
The AQIM videos strongly resemble videos from Iraq in terms
of the music, Quranic citations and filming of hits on
enemy targets they show. They strongly pitch the alleged
American wrongdoings in Iraq and Palestine to recruit men
to join AQIM. AQIM is also copying tactics we have seen
in Iraq, including use of suicide vehicle bombs and vests.
(Comment: Notably, during the 1990s violence in Algeria,
there was only one suicide attack. We have now seen nine
since April 2007. End Comment.) Water Resources Minister
Abdelmalek Sellal, who previously held top jobs in the
Interior Ministry, warned Ambassador on December 16 that
it would be easy to imagine AQIM resorting to SVBIEDs driven
by women or women attacking a target wearing a suicide bomb
vest. Security officers at other embassies have pointed to
the use of kidnappings in Iraq and worry that AQIM could
actively start such a campaign in Algeria. Historically,
AQIM has paused between vehicle bomb attacks, although we
do not know if that is due to resource constraints or tactical
decisions. History suggests we may have a pause lasting as
long as months before the next car bomb attack, although it
could be much sooner. In any case, our intelligence is
incomplete and we may not see the next attack, in whatever
form it takes, coming.
-----------------------------------
IRAQ AND PALESTINE HELP RECRUITMENT
-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) A prominent conservative Islamist political leader,
Abdallah Djaballah, told the Ambassador on December 17
that the suicide attacks demonstrated the influence of
the Iraqi jihadis whose appeal to religious sensitivities
finds a ready audience here. In addition, he noted,
Islamist extremists released under the government’s
amnesty program are hugely frustrated because they can
find no jobs and lack any means to support themselves.
They are easy to recruit, he claimed. AQIM’s choice to
put a video of Ayman Zawahari ranting about Palestine last
week is likely to further boost recruitment. The website
has had over 35,000 hits in a week. Djaballah warned that
many young Algerians react strongly to any suggestion that
foreign forces are attacking Islam itself, and Palestine,
along with Iraq, is the perfect symbol. Jaghloul Abdelghafar,
a counselor at the Presidency working on extremism issues,
echoed the point about Algeria suffering because of Palestine
and Iraq to the Ambassador December 18. He stated that there
is a “hard-core five percent” that will always plague Algeria.
Political scientist Lyes Boukraa, who has written two books
about the terrorism phenomenon in Algeria, told DCM December
18 that he thought the terror groups have more potential
recruits than they need.
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ALGERIAN SECURITY FORCES: FRUSTRATED
-------------------------------------
¶5. (S) The Algerian government is trying to figure out how
best to contain and eliminate the extremist problem.
Algerian military forces conducted major sweeping operations
in the troublesome mountains east of Algiers as well as along
the eastern border region near Tebessa in November. They also
continued to try wrapping up AQIM support networks and, until
the December 11 bombings, they appeared to be having some
successes. The number of security force casualties reported
in the press dropped steadily in October and November 2007
from the spike seen in September 2007 due to the AQIM suicide
attack in Dellys. In contrast to 1994-1996, the Algerian army
and gendarmerie can deploy to any location in the country and
immediately establish control. AQIM in its December 12 communique
felt obliged to tell the government very directly that it had
not disappeared.
¶6. (C) The government now is warning the public that it cannot
completely contain the terrorist threat. Interior Minister
Zerhouni told the press after the December 11 bombings that
there was no such thing as perfect security posture since
bomb attacks were so easy. Other terror attacks are possible
even though the terror groups are weakening, Zerhouni told the
press December 12. He also commented that the security forces
had relaxed somewhat after their successful security measures
for the November 29 local elections, and the suicide bombers
had exploited that opening. Head of the Defense Ministry’s
External Relations Director General Sefendji told DATT on
December 17 that the Algerian military had enjoyed successes
in combined air-ground operations against terrorist groups
in mountainous areas, but they could not stop suicide attacks
in Algiers. National police chief (DGSN director) Ali Tounsi
told the press on December 15 that the security services had
put in place special measures to protect the Constitutional
Council in view of the threat information the GOA had. However,
he commented, there was no way to protect against such an
“exceptional” attack. Tounsi pledged that the GOA would stand
up new, stronger security measures in Algiers in the wake of
the December 11 bombings. Pressed by Ambassador for details
about the measures on December 18, Tounsi would only say that
police reinforcements would surge into the capital in the
coming days. He declined to give more details but said he
would consider the Ambassador’s strong suggestion that the
DGSN brief the key ambassadors about the new security plan.
(Comment: Tounsi appeared not entirely on top of the brief
and probably couldn’t have provided many details even if he
had wanted to. The Interior Ministry is avoiding repeated
requests from embassies for information on Interior Ministry
plans and operations. End Comment.)
-----------------------
HARD LINE OR SOFT TOUCH ?
-----------------------
¶7. (S) Water Resources Minister Sellal, who is often rumored
to be on a short list to be the next prime minister, told
Ambassador December 16 that the GOA ought to strike much
harder against the terrorists than it is doing. He was entirely
in favor of the iron fist, he stated flatly. However, he noted,
current political reality (“la conjuncture politique”) does not
allow for such a tough policy. Indeed, Prime Minister Belkhadem
had reiterated on December 12 that Bouteflika’s signature
national reconciliation program would continue. Ahmed Fattani,
publisher of L’Expression newspaper who has good contacts in
the security services, told Ambassador December 17 that many
in the security forces want to launch a broad campaign of
arrests. For this reason, he said, they leaked to him
information that some 250 of the Islamist extremists
previously released under President Bouteflika’s amnesty
program had rejoined the AQIM fight against the government.
Fattani claimed that some in the security services said the
number was even higher, but L’Expression used the 250 number
so as not to anger Bouteflika further.
¶8. (S) Bouteflika himself has made no public remarks in
the wake of the December 11 bombings. The Portuguese ambassador,
who accompanied his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika
on December 16, told the Ambassador on December 18 that
Bouteflika appeared very distressed by the Algiers bombings
and unsure of what to do. According to the Portuguese,
Bouteflika urged Portuguese Prime Minister Socrates to
convince European states to help the Algerian security services.
Bouteflika reportedly asked for advice on how to secure fixed
sites and sought help from the Europeans to tap cell phones
whose SIM cards are changed. One of Bouteflika’s aides,
Rachid Aissat, who was the Algerian DATT in Damascus and
Moscow in the 1960s, earnestly asked the Ambassador on
December 16 for help in countering car bombs. The GOA, he
conceded, had no good sense of how to respond. (Comment:
Many of our contacts interpret Bouteflika’s silence since
December 11 to his embarrassment that both suicide bombers
were previously known to the security services and had
benefited from the provisions of the national reconciliation
program. End Comment.)
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COMMENT
-------
¶9. (S) AQIM is very far from being able to bring down
the Algerian government but it can certainly make it look
weak and foolish. From a narrow security perspective, the
December 11 attacks represent not so much the result of
diminished Algerian security capabilities as a successful
change in AQIM targeting to hit the UN and the Constitutional
Council. Security and military contacts have been asking us
for a technological fix for the car bomb threat for months.
They do not seem to fully appreciate the fact that they are
now fight an al-Qaida group, and not just the old Algerian
terrorist group GSPC of the late 1990s. AQIM subscribes to
international jihadist goals as well as attacking the Algerian
government. The more success the GOA has killing the senior
terrorist leaders from the GSPC, the more quickly the newer
amirs recruited under the al-Qaida banner will rise to the
forefront.
¶10. (S) Looking forward, we can imagine that the security
situation could stay roughly as it is now or deteriorate;
we do not expect it to improve. None of our contacts think
the security services will be able to prevent more terrorist
attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or
what form they will take. AQIZ tactics in Iraq are probably
the best guide. Meanwhile, the GOA is slow at best to share
information with us. As a result, the Embassy has taken
stricter security measures for staff and dependents, and
upgraded security of our chancellery and main staff residence.
We are telling the non-official community in forums like the
OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will
need to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to
the greater AQIM threat. FORD
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