Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI187, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH

Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI187, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07ABUDHABI187	2007-02-07 06:06	2010-11-28 18:06	SECRET	Embassy Abu Dhabi

VZCZCXRO0118
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0187/01 0380621
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 070621Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8204
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH 
GENERAL MOSELEY 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 97 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 145 
 
Classified By: Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
(MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted Chief of Staff USAF General T. Michael 
Moseley on February 1, 2007.  MbZ warned Moseley of the 
growing threat from Iran, stating that they (Iran) "can't be 
allowed to have a nuclear program."  MbZ further emphasized 
that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped "by all means 
available."  As expected, MbZ inquired about Predator B. 
Moseley informed MbZ that the question of Predator B would 
require further discussion within the interagency and with 
our MTCR partners, while Ambassador noted that the USG looked 
forward to discussion of UAE defense requirements and our 
shared security objectives in the context of the Gulf 
Security Dialogue.  MbZ expressed a desire to have a missile 
defense system in place by Summer 2009, and was looking to 
add ship-based launch platforms as a part of that system.  He 
also noted that the UAE had identified a location on the 
northern border at an elevation of 6,000 feet that may be 
suitable for installation of an early warning radar system. 
End Summary. 
 
Iran 
---- 
¶2. (S) Stating that "we are living in a dangerous 
neighborhood," MbZ stressed the importance of curtailing 
Iran's nuclear program to the overall stability of the Gulf, 
the Middle East as a region, and to the world's energy 
markets.  Pointing out that a nuclear weapon with even a 
short-range delivery system puts all the critical 
infrastructure in the Gulf at risk -- as well as the oil 
shipping lanes -- MbZ asserted: "If Iran can increase oil 
production to more than 15 million barrels of oil per day, 
let them have nuclear power, but until they can replace (the 
Gulf's) oil production they can't be allowed to have a 
nuclear program." 
 
¶3. (S) MbZ told Moseley that the US should not focus too much 
on Ahmadinejad as the problem, but should focus instead on 
"the greater Iranian threat."  Calling Ahmadinejad  "merely 
the driver" of a bus (nuclear program) that has been running 
for a long time in Iran, MbZ described Iran's nuclear program 
as one that is no longer driven by personalities -- but which 
has become part of the Iranian identity.  Noting that even if 
Ahmadinejad or other leaders were to change, the nuclear 
program would still continue, MbZ stated: "Even a siege at 
this point will not change anything."   In answer to 
Moseley's question what should be done, MbZ responded: "Delay 
their program -- by all means available."  He added: "I am 
saying this knowing that I am putting my country at risk and 
placing myself in a dangerous spot." 
 
¶4. (S) Speaking about his fears of Iran's growing hegemonic 
aspirations, MbZ warned the US not to underestimate the 
Iranians characterizing them as "extremely smart."  "It 
amazes me," MbZ continued, "that the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which controls Hamas, has at its core an opposition to all 
things Shi'a, and yet they (Hamas) cooperate with Iran.  That 
shows you how smart they are."  MbZ then pointed to what he 
called successful Iranian actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Palestine to illustrate how Iran has managed to 
manipulate Muslim extremism in order to advance Shi'a and 
Iranian goals. 
 
UAV/Predator B 
-------------- 
¶5. (S) MbZ again asked about the status of the UAE request to 
acquire Predator B.  GeneralMoseley informed MbZ that the 
question of Predatr B acquisition would require further 
discussionwithin the interagency and with our MTCR partners. 
 MbZ nodded in understanding: "We are patient." He then 
added: "I hope the Iranians give us time; they are aggressive 
and are moving fast."  MbZ also mentioned that there were 
several other countries offering UAVs to the UAE.  Ambassador 
added that the U.S. and the other 33 MTCR members would be 
meeting in March to review the MTCR control list.  Growing 
demand worldwide for unmanned aerial vehicles had led to the 
need for a general discussion of how the MTCR controls UAVs 
and cruise missiles, and the USG looked forward to further 
discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared 
security objectives in the context of the ongoing Gulf 
Security Dialogue (GSD). 
 
Strategic Interests 
------------------- 
 
ABU DHABI 00000187  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (S) Moseley's meeting with MbZ immediately followed a 
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing of MbZ on the ongoing 
development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems. 
Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ said he 
wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009.  MbZ 
expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting 
PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).  Learning that PAC-3 
cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased 
to note that SLAMRAAM has already tested successfully on a 
wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh 
(Major) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on 
critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of 
this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing 
Hawk/AMRAAM assets.  When briefers noted the 32km limit of 
unelevated radar, MbZ stated that he has a location 
identified on the UAE's northern border at an elevation of 
6000 feet that he would like contractors to come back and 
look at as a possible location for an early warning radar 
system.  Also present was International Affairs Advisor to 
the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba, who is a UAE 
representative to the GSD. 
 
¶7. (S) Comment: Although MbZ is increasingly talking tough on 
Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with 
Iran sooner rather than later" (ref A), his comments should 
also be taken in the context of strong UAE interest in 
acquiring advanced military technology and, specifically, 
MbZ's repeated requests for Predator B (ref B).  The UAEG is 
clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their 
much larger and militarily superior neighbor. The UAE's 
significant trade relationship with Iran--approximately $4 
billion--is another complicating factor in the relationship. 
On more than one occasion, the UAE leadership has expressed 
trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle 
between the US and Iran.  End Comment. 
 
¶8.  (U) POLAD, Chief of Staff USAF, Ambassador Marcelle M. 
Wahba has approved this message. 
SISON