Viewing cable 06ABUDHABI1725, SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06ABUDHABI1725 | 2006-04-29 13:01 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001725
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR
CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE
REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243
¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
¶C. ABU DHABI 409
¶D. ABU DHABI 779
¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
¶G. ABU DHABI 176
¶H. ABU DHABI 605
¶I. USDEL 00007
¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
¶L. ABU DHABI 1520
¶M. ABU DHABI 1716
¶N. ABU DHABI 1422
¶O. ABU DHABI 1724
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
you to the UAE on May 7. U.S. and UAE officials have had a
number of productive meetings on the topic of
counterterrorism, the most recent of which came on April 22,
when Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, met over lunch with Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and his brother,
Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ). Your visit
builds on our ongoing dialogue and efforts to push the UAE on
several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism,
counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological
extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). We have
requested separate meetings with Foreign Minister Sheikh
Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ), whom you met in New York last
September, and State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin
Zayed, whom Deputy Coordinator Urbancic met last October. In
your meetings, you should commend the UAE for its assistance
and cooperation, including its strong condemnation of the
April 24 bomb attack in Dahab. The UAE remains a committed
partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take
an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the
problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
Committee (JTFCC). Treasury U/S Levey is currently in the
UAE to hold a second meeting that will focus on cash couriers
and charities.
¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could provoke their neighbor
and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the
same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of
the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate
between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership, which has
told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization, plans
to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role
in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
process and continues to condemn the sectarian violence that
is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of
growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership
is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to
gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.
Counterterrorism Efforts
------------------------
¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers
homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
and procuring equipment. In your meetings, we recommend that
you inquire about the government's plan, announced by
President Khalifa in December 2005, to place all the security
agencies under a newly established National Security Council.
MbZ, asked by Townsend if the UAE was worried about its oil
infrastructure, responded emphatically, "absolutely." He
told Townsend that there are three international companies
currently conducting risk assessments of the UAE oil
infrastructure and maritime security for the UAEG. Townsend
offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to reduce its
vulnerability (ref O).
¶4. (S) The UAEG reacts quickly when presented with evidence
of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach
the problem from a transnational posture. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem. Townsend
discussed this matter with MbZ and urged the UAE to instead
to fully investigate terror suspects and share the results of
those inquiries with the USG.
Counterterrorism Finance
------------------------
¶5. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal
framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date,
investigation and prosecution have been weak. In an effort
to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing,
the
first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives
from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one
participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an
effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
participate. The April 30 meeting will focus on cash
couriers and charity regulations.
Iran
----
¶6. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating
tensions between Iran and the international community. AbZ
publicly expressed his country's concern, and the entire
region's "vulnerability," at a press conference in Kuwait
April 25, while urging a peaceful resolution (ref M).
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of
those instances has resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State
Security Organization explained during the 11 February
U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
decision not to inspect the containers had been a political
decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
(ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
Abbas. AbZ told U/S Joseph during his April 8 visit to Abu
Dhabi that the USG should approach the UAE on interdiction
requests "only as a last resort" (ref N). Two weeks later,
he assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to take
advantage of the UAE's open trading environment. He said the
UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export control
law and that it would be announced "soon." In an encouraging
development, the UAE on April 15 privately endorsed the
Proliferation Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction
Principles (ref L).
¶7. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, Abu
Dhabi's ruling family has expressed clear support for U.S.
initiatives against Iran. The U.S. and UAE have a "common
desire to succeed," AbZ told U/S Joseph, noting that the
combination of Iran and terrorism is something that cannot be
tolerated. "The threat from al-Qa'ida would be minor if Iran
has nukes," AbZ said (ref N). MbZ told Townsend April 22
that the Iranians think that the U.S. will not do anything
about their recent declaration that they have successfully
enriched uranium. He added that he thought the Iranians were
wrong. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23
about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the
region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified
that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership,
not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28
that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
proceeding with any U.S. plans against Iran (ref E). He told
A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to
USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the
challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM
Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat
with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of
taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather
than later. "I believe this guy is going to take us to war.
... It's a matter of time," MbZ warned, adding that action
against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this
year or next year.
¶8. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that
Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also
expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
was supporting Hamas. During your meetings, you should
explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You
should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
with the USG on interdiction requests. These meetings will
be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with AbZ
April 8, when Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for
Iran. (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S.
initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come
to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." End
Note.)
Palestinian Territories/Hamas
-----------------------------
¶9. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
"going to the right people." In his meeting with Townsend,
MbZ said that the UAE "felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally
behind Hamas" after its electoral victory in the Palestinian
territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to
the West. UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told
Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure,"
SIPDIS
would understand the need to respect the will of the
international community.
¶10. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant
financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically,
the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas
electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
(including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
that was announced last year).
¶11. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative
side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the
fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch
how the USG would react to those countries that did support
the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told
Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
"official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.
Iraq
----
¶12. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues
to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The UAE has also
been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has
publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ told Townsend that he had "no
confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime Minister-designate, Jawad
al-Maliki, and he reiterated his concern about Iran's
meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. He has pledged the
UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida.
Ideological Extremism
---------------------
¶13. (S) The Abu Dhabi ruling family continue to be outspoken
on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to
the region. MbZ told Townsend that if there were an election
in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.
He said the challenge is to find a way to remove the
extremists in a way that they never come back. One way he
and his brothers have been trying to accomplish this is by
reforming the education system, which they say was penetrated
by the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s. (Note: The UAE
has announced that half of the members of the Federal
National Council would be elected while half would continue
to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) UAE
officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and
terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of
government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques.
SISON
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