Viewing cable 04ANKARA348, turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m.
Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic
reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will
press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation
by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions
against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While
the
Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy,
Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as concrete
results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the
paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges
which,if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in government,
Turkey's democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck
as heprepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to
demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S.
interestin Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to
hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate
unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones
(he rejects the term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to
open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a
higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions
to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political
stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove
the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the
GOT's newCyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S.
stands behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory
for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country,
Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the
radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his
(radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him
to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of
Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as
someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the
hearts ofhis more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an
abilityto communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common
citizen.He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on
corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his
AK Party won atwo-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections.
Owing to AK'simage as the party of change at the national level, good record in
providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable political
alternatives, AKcould gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local
elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give AK control of
65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul
and Ankara and perhapseven Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most
of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try to
diminish him – whetherby blocking legislation or attacking his motives –
cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian
heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various loci of the State
apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond
AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully
implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His
government's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters
– land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course
reform – has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain
wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is
counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and
interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging
market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, Erdogan has reaped
the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy
through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by
EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission
President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks
forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself
at this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.
Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey's
economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks's ambivalence
toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American.
From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several
supportive steps, whilebeing careful not to be too closely associated with us
since opening Turkishairspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line
of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization
for a Turkish deploymentin support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop
rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he
took a bold step in Nov. 2002to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution
stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open
than any previous Prime Ministerto a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most
fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto
independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against
the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK
parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the
margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues
to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to
advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations
with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice
Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his survival,
and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic
challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe
strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to
maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
–Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable
to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and
vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First,
overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has
anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and
his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on
Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK
Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission).
Third, an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong
and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development
of effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and
parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned.
Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image,
renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swift
and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not
only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give
women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s
constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter
appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent
Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused
problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear
headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions
involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of
learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or
lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control
or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only from
those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from
contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial levels,
are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet Ministers
to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that the party's
choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March local
elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or
inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local
and national level.
–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks
advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his
advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government
has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public
opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy
steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK
creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an
anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading
to Establishment (dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion against corruption.
Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul
have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that close
advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd
Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he
benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery)
privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct
acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has become
a public controversy.
–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry
Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the
relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in
the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic
order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio
and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar,
have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and
Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the
question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups
(including the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence
of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the
Southeast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy
contacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious
effect of a “closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs,
as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he
can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider
prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth
for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his
ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the
only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful,
democratic Turkey integrated into Europe.
Edelman
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