Viewing cable 05ANKARA1730, TURKEY ADRIFT
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
¶B. ANKARA 1231
¶C. ANKARA 1275
¶D. ANKARA 1511
¶E. ANKARA 1342
¶F. ANKARA 944
¶G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy drift stemming
from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy
debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with
the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a vacuum that resurgent
nationalism is seeking to fill. This period of drift could be extended, making EU
reforms and bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue
until the next crisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning.
End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
-----------------------
¶2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU harmonization,
it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economic reform.
Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient
(refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the
military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state bureaucracy. It is failing
to control corruption in the AK party. It has been slow to introduce the banking,
tax administration and social security legislation required by the IMF as a
pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU.
Erdogan has delayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations;
both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officials
and politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet
reshuffle.
¶3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift and we
see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to
get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and
single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government will be able to refocus
or move our bilateral relationship – which remains strong in some areas – back
to a more strategic level.
¶4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet and
parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close to
Erdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obliged to
kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations, strong
advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear.
Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual advisors in the Iskender
Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up, as we have heard directly from
xxxxx.
¶5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan reads minimally,
mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others with broad and deep
contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of
the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence Organization have cut him off
from their reports. He never had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is
a fear of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by “Hoca” Erbakan's Saadet
Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of
advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman
Islamist fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet
Davutoglu.
¶6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continues
behind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreign junkets.
Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more party control.
He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced to cede to
Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With his relatively good English,
Gul works to project an image of being “moderate”, or “modern”. In fact, Gul's
peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul,
reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some constructive statements on bilateral
relations and on Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we
understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see
fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being
moved by emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
¶7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from those who
support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK. xxxxx
that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policy or on
rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamist sentiment,
has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resign in disgust at
the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's closest business and
brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees no future for this
government and thinks it is time for a more flexible and open leader. Leading
member xxxxx has expressed to us the Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it.
Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some to question
the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to accelerate its
transition. We are encouraged by the determination of some to open a long-overdue,
healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey's relations with the U.S.
Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped
ignite the debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26 press
briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly
emphasized that one cannot reduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations
to a single issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan – albeit without
conviction in his voice – expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of
the importance of bilateral relations.
¶9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of AKP's
domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstream commentators.
However, mainstream commentators are seen as too “pro-American” to be persuasive
among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have been the decisions of
some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP
government must pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition
has continued its anti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way
to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
¶10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness: resurgent
nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey are “Metal Storm”, a
conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S.
invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike with the help of
the Russians; and “Mein Kampf” (ref C). Under instructions from the Directorate
of Religious Affairs, imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against
Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to “steal the beliefs of our
young people and children.” We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian
activity in different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor
told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF
(ref F). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin
has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum, including a
statement from the General Staff that “the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed
forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their
flag.” The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus, the killing by British
forces of several Ottoman soldiers during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul
also bespeaks the national mood.
¶11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears to be a
growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angry at
limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal
code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul Ozkok, managing
editor of Turkey's leading newspaper “Hurriyet” and one of the most authoritative
press voices of the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply
disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and order. Ozkok, in what
would appear to be an overstatement, closed with a warning to Erdogan that,
when democratic forces cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the
public and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4 column,
Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of the right-wing nationalist
MHP, cited increased crime as one reason for the current popularity of
“Mein Kampf.”
¶12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in the press
and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the
government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about
the police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and the press
feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
¶13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals – a date to begin EU accession
negotiations – Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas and energy. For now,
EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized
nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay difficult decisions in
any realm, and resistance to change will be the default mode. Bilateral
cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as
unreasonable U.S. “demands” that infringe upon Turkish “sovereignty.”
¶14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary
majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappiness inside
AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risks to anyone
who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a “nuclear” option in hand –
early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and the settling out of the
political system will be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will
either energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives. Waiting bears a
real cost, since Turkey needs to be more nimble in pursuing the political,
economic, social and foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S.,
have been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário