Julian Assange

sexta-feira, 3 de dezembro de 2010

iewing cable 10KABUL693, AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSELF AS

iewing cable 10KABUL693, AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSELF AS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KABUL693 2010-02-25 04:04 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2601
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0693/01 0560405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250405Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5873
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000693 

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM PREL AF
SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSELF AS 
U.S. PARTNER? 

REF: A. (A) KABUL 673 
B. (B) 09 KABUL 3068 

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee 
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 

1. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Begin Summary. Senior Civilian 
Representative (SCR) Frank Ruggiero met one-on-one with Ahmed 
Wali Karzai (AWK) on February 23. SCR informed AWK that 
coalition attention will turn to Kandahar in the next phase 
of Operation Moshtarak (Together) and the United States will 
play a far greater role in Kandahar on the military and 
civilian sides. SCR outlined the coalition governance 
strategy for Kandahar and cautioned ISAF will seek 
non-interference by powerbrokers in police matters. AWK 
discussed the recent capture of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar 
in Kandahar, district and provincial-level politics, Kandahar 
economics and security, the role of Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) in 
Helmand, narcotics, a southern Pashtoon political party, 
competition with Nangarhar Governor Gulaga Sherzai, and AWK's 
life in Chicago from 1983-1992. AWK appeared nervous, but 
eager to engage with a U.S. official. End Summary. 

Focus on Kandahar 
----------------- 

2. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR told AWK the attention of the 
Afghan government, with ISAF support, would turn to Kandahar 
in the months ahead and it was likely this would be 
predominantly a political contest that would require the 
leadership from the highest level of the Afghan government. 
SCR discussed the governance strategy for Kandahar City and 
surrounding districts. AWK understood the next phase of 
operation Moshtarak would be on Kandahar and offered his 
support. SCR responded this would be an Afghan 
Government-led effort and the coalition would be focusing its 
resources on building up that capacity. SCR was clear the 
coalition would not tolerate individuals working at odds to 
ISAF campaign aims. AWK stated "nobody is that stupid." 

Better Security and Economy in Kandahar 
--------------------------------------- 

3. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK told the SCR that security has 
improved in Kandahar over the past year. Freedom of movement 
had increased across the province, he said, citing his 
driving to the meeting at Kandahar Airfield with minimum 
security. AWK said insurgents no longer have the capability 
to launch large scale attacks; for example, AWK does not fear 
an insurgent attack on his home. AWK expressed concern about 
a series of assassinations aimed at Afghan officials and 
Afghan citizens who work for the coalition in the city, 
noting this could only be solved by intelligence assets. AWK 
said economic activity had increased in the Kandahar City 
area, but noted his belief that President Karzai is largely 
unaware of these gains. AWK told the President about 
increased economic activity in Arghandab related to AVIPA 
Plus and the President was very surprised, he said. AWK said 
the President did not understand the changing circumstances 
in the province. 

Kandahar Politics Are Local 
--------------------------- 

4. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK said that it was important to get 
district-level tribal dynamics right to bring stability to 
Kandahar City and its environs. AWK specifically stated the 
need to rely on local, village elders to choose 
representatives to district shuras. This would ensure a 
representative shura for district level officials, said AWK 
and pointed to the succession of Arghandab-based Alikozai 
leader Mullah Naqib. AWK said the Alikozais chose Mullah 
Naqib's son, Karimullah, to lead the Alikozai. SCR pointed 
out coalition conventional wisdom that President Karzai had 
interfered in that process to appoint Karimullah, which led 
to certain Alikozai elements to support the Taliban in 
Arghandab. AWK said, unconvincingly, this was not the case. 
AWK then contradicted himself and said Karimullah, in fact, 
did not lead the Alikozai, but AWK's deputy at the provincial 
council Dastegeeri, was the most influential Alikozai in 
Kandahar. 

Police in the South and Abdul Rahman Jan 
---------------------------------------- 

5. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR told AWK the coalition would not 
accept powerbroker interference with the police and used the 
example of citizens in Marjah telling Marines they would not 

KABUL 00000693 002 OF 003 


support GIRoA due to past Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) abuses when 
he was the Helmand police chief between 2003 and 2006. AWK 
concurred ARJ was problematic. SCR reiterated coalition 
would seek to make certain ARJ did not re-establish links to 
police officials in Marjah (Note: SCR brought this discussion 
up so that AWK would report it to Kabul. End Note.). AWK 
said the Noorzais in Marjah would support ARJ, but other 
tribes would resist. Kandahar does not have similar issues 
of interference with the police, he said, but SCR pressed 
saying we are aware of a recent incident when the Kandahar 
governor sought to remove the Panjwa'i chief of police, but 
someone had intervened to halt that removal. AWK, who is 
believed to have prevented Governor Weesa from firing the 
police chief, said the governor had the power to remove 
police officials and should exercise that authority in 
Panjwa'i. AWK characterized Governor Weesa as honest and a 
powerful figure in Kandahar, but he needed to be more 
aggressive. In the same breath, AWK said he was the most 
powerful official in Kandahar and could deliver whatever is 
needed. 

Capture of Mullah Baradar 
------------------------- 

6. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR asked AWK his views on the recent 
capture in Pakistan of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar. AWK 
said Pakistan detained Baradar and other Taliban leaders 
because they were prepared to discuss reintegration with the 
Karzai government. Senior Taliban fighters in Pakistan may 
be prepared to reintegrate, he said, but are forced by the 
Pakistan Government to continue to fight. AWK said some 
Afghan Taliban commanders cannot return to Afghanistan 
because they are on the Joint Priority Effects List (JPEL) 
and are told by the Pakistanis they must continue to fight or 
will be turned over to the coalition. It is important to 
remove such fighters from the JPEL for reintegration to work, 
he argued, adding that he has been working on the 
reconciliation issue with the Saudis for two-three years. 
AWK offered a meeting with SCR and his older brother and 
former Member of Parliament for Kandahar Kayyum Karzai in the 
next few weeks to discuss ongoing reintegration discussions 
with the Saudis. 

Drug Trafficker: Where is the Polygraph? 
---------------------------------------- 

7. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Unprompted, AWK raised allegations of 
his involvement in narcotics, telling the SCR that he is 
willing to take a polygraph anytime, anywhere to prove his 
innocence and that he has hired an attorney in New York to 
clear his name. He suggested that the coalition pay mullahs 
to preach against heroin, which would reduce demand for poppy 
cultivation. AWK dismissed the narcotics allegations as part 
of a campaign to discredit him, particularly by the media, 
saying the allegations are "like a spice added to a dish to 
make it more enticing to eat." 

A Political Party for Southern Pashtuns? 
----------------------------------------- 

8. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR asked AWK if there are discussions 
to create a Pashtun-oriented political party in the South. 
AWK said such a party would be announced shortly and it would 
encompass southern Pashtuns from Herat to Kandahar; Tajiks 
also would be represented. AWK said Afghans are reluctant to 
join political parties because they are associated with the 
communist party and Islamic fundamentalist movements, like 
the Taliban. He added that he could not be part of another 
election because he had to personally manage promises to 
hundreds of thousands of voters in the last election. 

Gulaga Sherzai: Competitor 
-------------------------- 

9. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR raised the recent 1,500 person 
shura co-hosted by AWK and Sherzai in Kandahar City (Reftel 
B). AWK said Sherzai was not to be trusted, but he was 
willing to work with him on a peace jirga to deliver peace to 
the south. AWK passionately presented his history of working 
with the United States since 2001 and told the SCR that he 
could deliver anything needed. 

Missing Wrigley 
--------------- 

10. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Further emphasizing his links to 
the United States, AWK fondly recalled his days in Chicago as 
a restaurant owner close to Chicago's Wrigley Field. His 

KABUL 00000693 003 OF 003 


restaurant was a hub for American in the Midwest who had 
worked or lived in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion, 
he said. 

Comment 
------- 

11. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK was eager to engage and rarely 
stopped talking in the two hour meeting. While he presented 
himself as a partner to the United States and is eager to be 
seen as helping the coalition, he also demonstrated that he 
will dissemble when it suits his needs. He appears not to 
understand the level of our knowledge of his activities, and 
that the coalition views many of his activities as malign, 
particularly relating to his influence over the police. We 
will need to monitor his activity closely, and deliver a 
recurring, transparent message to him of where are redlines 
are and what we expect of him in the months ahead. 
RICCIARDONE

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