Julian Assange

quarta-feira, 8 de dezembro de 2010

Viewing cable 09STATE83026, UN 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN) SANCTIONS: USG

Viewing cable 09STATE83026, UN 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN) SANCTIONS: USG
Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
09STATE83026 2009-08-10 23:11 2010-12-05 21:09 SECRET Secretary of State
Appears in these articles:


DE RUEHC #3026 2230014
O R 102356Z AUG 09

S E C R E T STATE 083026 


EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019 
REF: STATE 65044
Classified By: IO Assistant Secretary Esther Brimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

 1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-6.
2. (SBU) In May 2009, legal representatives for 1267-listed entity 
Jamaat-ud-Dawah (identified by the UN 1267 Committee as an alias for
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, permanent reference number QE.L.118.05) and its
leader, Muhammad Saeed (permanent reference number QI.S.263.08)
petitioned on their clients behalf for delisting via the UN focal point.
The focal point, which was established in the UN Secretariat pursuant
to UNSCR 1730 to allow listed individuals/entities (or their
representatives) to petition directly for de-listing, forwarded
the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Saeed for review to 
the USG (designating state) and to the Government of Pakistan (state
of citizenship/residence/incorporation). The USG and GOP have had 
three months to review the de-listing petition. We have completed 
our review and plan to notify the UN focal point on August 25 of 
our opposition to de-listing. Before doing so, we would like to take
this opportunity to: -- share the results of our review of the 
de-listing petition for JUD and Muhammad Saeed with Pakistani officials;
-- seek GOP views on the request; -- underscore our ongoing concern 
over the threat posed by LeT/JUD and Saeed; -- ask Pakistani officials
to update us on actions taken to impose UN 1267 sanctions on LeT/JUD
and Saeed.
3. (S) On December 10, 2008, the UN 1267 Committee took several actions
related to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayibba (LeT), including its
listing of Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD) as an alias for LeT, as well as the 
listing of JUD’s leader, Muhammad Saeed. The Committee in 2005 added 
LeT to its Consolidated List citing its affiliation with al-Qaida. The 
addition of the JUD alias, as well as the listing of Saeed, followed 
closely on the heels of the LeT-perpetrated attacks in Mumbai, India, 
in November 2008. Prior to the attacks, our request to list JUD and Saeed
were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan. In spite of 
Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December 2008, we continue to
see reporting indicating that JUD is still operating in multiple 
locations in Pakistan, and that the group continues to openly raise 
funds. It is unclear what, if any, steps the GOP has taken to freeze 
JUD’s assets or otherwise implement UN 1267 sanctions, which include an 
asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.
4. (SBU) USUN is requested to inform the focal point on August 25, 
after both USUN and Islamabad have had a chance to inform Pakistani
officials of our views, of our opposition to the de-listing request
on behalf of JUD and Muhammad Saeed. In its communication to the focal
point, USUN should refute the assertion in Saeed’s and his legal
representatives claim in the focal point de-listing petition that
“there are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated 
List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless” and note
that we stand by the information included in the statements of case
we submitted (co-sponsored by the UK and France) to the UN 1267 
Committee to add JUD and Saeed to the Consolidated List. USUN should 
further state that we have seen no evidence of a change in circumstance 
warranting de-listing of JUD or Saeed.

5. (SBU) USUN and Embassy Islamabad should inform Pakistani officials
in New York and Islamabad, respectively, of our opposition to the 
de-listing petition for JUD and Saeed. Action addressees may wish to
draw upon the following points:
-- We have reviewed the de-listing petition from attorneys on behalf 
of Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed and will soon inform
the UN 1267 Committee, via the UN focal point, of our opposition to
-- We first wanted to share our views with Pakistani officials, and 
to seek Pakistan’s view on the de-listing petition.
-- As you are no doubt aware, we are deeply concerned about the threat
posed by LeT/JUD, and reject Saeed’s and his legal representatives 
claim in the focal point de-listing petition that “there are no grounds
for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated List and the material 
relied upon is incorrect and baseless.”
-- In fact, LeT and JUD stem from the same original organization, 
Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI). When LeT was declared a terrorist 
organization in Pakistan in 2002, MDI publicly divested itself of LeT
at that time and renamed itself JUD. LeT transferred most of its assets
and personnel to the newly formed JUD, ensuring its survival.
-- We believe that LeT uses JUD facilities as a public front for its 
activities and shares offices, phone numbers, personnel and bank 
accounts. LeT’s old offices merely changed the name on the door.
-- JUD’s budget, using funds from both witting and unwitting donors,
is dedicated to social services and/or humanitarian relief but some
is used to finance LeT operations.
-- We are also aware that LeT and JUD share many senior leaders, 
including Hafiz Saeed, who according to information available to the
USG, as of 2009 continued to control LeT and issue guidance to LeT
-- We would like here your views on the status of LeT/JUD and Saeed,
and would particularly appreciate an update on steps Pakistan has 
taken or will take to implement UN 1267 sanctions on them.

6. (S/REL to Pakistan) Embassy Islamabad is also requested to share
a non-paper, included below in paragraph 7, prepared by our
intelligence community in February 2009 assessing JUD’s links to LeT.
This non-paper, which was previously passed by former S/CT Coordinator
Dell Daily to Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani,
provides more detailed information on our concerns about LeT/JUD 
and Saeed that underpin our view that their listing by the UN 1267 
Committee was and remains appropriate.

(U//FOUO) Assessing Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s Links to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT, a Pakistan-based terrorist 
group, uses the JUD name as an alias. JUD is a religious, educational,
and humanitarian organization that the Community assesses provides 
cover and protection for LT’s militant activities in Pakistan. LT and
JUD share many senior leaders; LT falls under the authority of JUD 
leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed; and JUD supports and facilitates LT’s 
violent activities.  - LT and JUD stem from the same original 
organization*Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI)*that was founded around
1986 and for which LT served as its armed, militant wing. MDI was
renamed JUD in December 2001.  - LT was declared a terrorist 
organization in January 2002, and MDI publicly divested itself of
the LT at that time. LT transferred most of its assets and personnel
under the newly formed JUD.
(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD relies heavily on private 
donations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and
businesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Some of the money to finance LT operations is obtained by fraudulently
redirecting donations intended for humanitarian work.
(S//REL) JUD and LT have branch offices with different names and have
adopted a number of aliases as a denial and deception tactic.
(C//REL) Various Names and Aliases
(S//REL) The Intelligence Community assesses that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
(LT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are part of the same organization, 
originally called Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI), that was founded 
by Hafiz Muhammed Saeed and other faculty at the University of 
Engineering and Technology in Lahore in 1986. MDI was established 
with funding from donors in the Middle East and set up camps to 
prepare its personnel to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.
MDI reorganized after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989,
creating LT as its paramilitary wing to fight in the Indian-controlled
districts of Jammu and Kashmir while MDI focused on religious and
humanitarian activity. Saeed led both MDI and LT during the 1990s.
When the US declared LT a terrorist organization in December 2001,
MDI reorganized*changing its name to JUD to draw a distinction 
between its charitable and educational work and LT’s militant 
activities*in an effort by MDI leaders to shield their fundraising 
and other activities from sanctions. Saeed publicly resigned from LT,
telling the media that he had assumed the leadership of JUD. In 
mid-January 2002, LT was banned.
Islamabad “watchlisted” JUD in 2003, but the government has resisted
pressure to take action against the group, particularly after JUD,s 
popular earthquake relief efforts in 2005 and 2006 in response to 
the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.
LT has used JUD facilities as a public front for its activities and,
shared offices, phone numbers, leaders, and bank accounts. LT 
members identified themselves as JUD when in Pakistan and as LT 
when in Kashmir.
LT/JUD purportedly raises funds for the Palestinian people in 
response to Israel’s attacks on Gaza. The Community judges that 
as of January, JUD also may be operating under the alias 
Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool. LT’s political affairs coordinator 
Khalid Waleed identified himself in late December as the chief 
organizer for a conference for Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool,
according to intelligence reporting. - On 6 February, the 
JUD held a Kashmir Solidarity Conference at which JUD renamed
itself Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir (TAK). At JUD,s first public 
protest since December, supporters used old JUD banners and 
chanted JUD slogans, but rallied under the name TAK to avoid arrest.
(U//FOUO) UN Links Jamaat-ud-Dawa to Terrorism
(S//REL) The United Nations (UN) banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), 
and on 10 December, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the 1267 Committee)
approved the addition of JUD as a new LT alias for targeted 
sanctions. This UN designation required all UN member states to
freeze any assets this entity may have under the member states’ 
jurisdiction, impose a travel ban, and implement an arms embargo 
against them as set out in paragraph 1 of UNSC Resolution 1822 of 2008.
(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT/JUD, in an attempt to evade
restrictions, has established branch offices with different names 
and adopted a number of aliases. One branch, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq,
is a publicly acknowledged charitable arm of JUD and has its own 
web page with photos of hospitals and ambulances. Other aliases 
include Paasbaan-e-Ahle-Hadith, Paasban-e-Kashmir, Al-Mansoorian,
and Al-Nasaryeen. We assess that LT and LT-associated militants 
will continue to use aliases in order to circumvent restrictions 
on their movement and operations.
(U//FOUO) Financial Support
(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD fundraising has relied 
heavily on private donations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
madrassas, and businesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle
East, and Europe. Some of JUD’s budget, using funds raised both from
witting donors and by fraud, is dedicated to social services or 
humanitarian relief projects, while some is used to finance LT operations.
- In December 2005, an official of Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq forwarded 
JUD donation receipts to a probable LT front company in Saudi Arabia 
where an LT finance official may have been closely associated with 
the general manager*possibly acting as a front for moving LT funds, 
according to intelligence reporting.  - Makki in 2002 frequently 
visited the Middle East and viewed it as a main source of funding.
To demonstrate results to donors, JUD would finance the cost of
building a new school or upgrading facilities at a madrassa, but
would inflate the cost to siphon money to LT.
(S//REL) The Community lacks sufficient intelligence to determine 
if or how the November Mumbai attacks have affected donations to JUD.
Some donors may be dissuaded from supporting JUD if they become aware
that their funds may be used for additional terrorist attacks, 
whereas other donors may support LT’s attacks. As public and government
scrutiny increases in the wake of the attacks and subsequent designation
of JUD as an alias of LT by the UN, we assess that JUD will rely more
on covert fundraising efforts.
(U//FOUO) Leadership
(S//REL) The Community assesses that Saeed is the leader of LT and Lakvi
is LT’s operations commander*and they continue to run the organization
despite being detained for their role in the November Mumbai attacks.
We also judge that they have planned, directed, and executed LT attacks
throughout South Asia and likely have used some funds collected in 
the name of JUD’s charitable activities to support multiple LT terrorist
operations, including the November Mumbai attacks. The Community 
assesses that Saeed continues to lead both organizations. However, the
Community is unable to assess to what extent senior JUD leaders such
as Saeed are involved in specific terrorist operations or the level
of detail to which they are knowledgeable about specific past and
pending attacks.  - As of mid-July Lakvi was responsible for the 
LT’s military operations budget of PKR 365 million (approximately US
$5.2 million) per year. He reportedly used the money to purchase all
materials required for LT operations other than weapons and ammunition,
according to a source claiming direct and ongoing access to LT leaders.
8. (U) Action addressees should report as soon as possible but no 
later than August 19 results of their demarche to Pakistani officials .

9. (U) Questions may be directed to IO/PSC (Erin Crowe, 202-736-7847).

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