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|10BRASILIA45||2010-02-09 10:10||2010-12-05 05:05||CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN||Embassy Brasilia|
VZCZCXYZ0002 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBR #0045/01 0401047 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 091047Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0441 INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0012 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000045 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR S, D, P, SECC, OES, NEA, AND WHA NSC FOR FROMAN AND RESTREPO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09 TAGS: PREL SENV MASS HA IR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MRE SECRETARY-GENERAL PATRIOTA CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas A. Shannon, Ambassador, State, Embassy Brasilia;
1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. After presenting his credentials to Brazilian
President Lula(septel), Ambassador Shannon met for over an hour February
4 with Secretary-General(Deputy FM) Antonio Patriota, covering the work
ahead in Haiti, the status of Brazil's FX2 fighter purchase, climate
change negotiations, and Brazil's efforts regarding Iran and the Middle East.
End summary. ¶2. (C) Patriota, who had requested the meeting with the Ambassador the
night before and had attended the Ambassador's credentialing ceremony as
acting foreign minister, congratulated the Ambassador on his new post and
was pleased to hear of the upcoming visits of Attorney General Holder,
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Locke, and NSC Deputy Michael Froman.
Patriota reviewed the outstanding bilateral items awaiting high-level
agreement, including the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and gender,
climate, and trilateral cooperation MOUs put forward by the GOB.
He outlined President Lula's active travel
schedule over the next few months, which would include trips to Cancun,
San Salvador, Havana, and Port au Prince the week of February 22; to Israel,
Palestine, and Jordan March 15-18; and to Iran May 16-17. Lula would also
be gathering African agriculture ministers shortly, with the goal of taking
a message to the G20 in May. Haiti: A Great Opportunity ¶3. (C) Following up on President Lula's comments earlier that day (septel),
Patriota described the Haiti reconstruction effort as a "great opportunity"
for Brazil and the United States. Noting that President Lula had spent ten
minutes discussing Haiti during his first Oval Office meeting with President
Obama, he said the phone calls between the two leaders had been helpful to
ensuring good communication and coordination. Patriota called President
Obama's engagement on Haiti "necessary and important," adding that "if the
United States and Brazil lead, others will follow." It goes without saying,
he said, that the United States and Brazil should work closely on Haiti in
the UNSC, adding that Brazil was in agreement that MINUSTAH should work under
its current mandate for now, and that new recommendations should be studied
as they are put forward. ¶4. (C) Patriota stressed that Haiti was receiving an enormous amount of
attention from President Lula and a number of other senior GOB officials,
noting Lula's planned February 25 visit. Patriota said he was pleased former
President Clinton had been chosen by the UN to lead on reconstruction and
thought it would be positive to have Chilean President Bachelet involved once
she leaves office. Picking up on Lula's comment earlier in the day that we had
to find a way around the choice between a corrupt Haitian government and
putting so much money into the hands of non-Haitian NGOs, Patriota said that
Marcio Pochmann, president of the Economic and Management Research Institute
(IPEA), had recently done research on the effect of NGOs on development
that might be useful in finding a new approach to Haiti reconstruction. FX2:
No Decision Made ¶5. (C/NF) Patriota said that Lula had told the French Ambassador (who
also had presented credentials) that no decision on the fighter purchase
had been made, but that Lula would do so "in the next few months," after
convening the National Security Council (a body that includes key ministers
and the presidents of both congressional chambers). The Ambassador stressed
that the decision to release all necessary technology to Brazil reflected
a paradigm shift for the United States; not only did it reflect confidence
in Boeing's product, but also confidence in Brazil. Climate Change: We Have
to Move Forward ¶6. (C) Referring to President Lula's emphasis on the need for close
U.S.-Brazil coordination heading into the UNFCCC COP-16, Patriota said he
hoped SECC Todd Stern would be able to come to Brazil soon. He said Lula
was committed to the following through on the Copenhagen communiquC) and,
unlike other BASIC countries, would not backtrack. "We have to move forward,
" he said, suggesting that NSC Deputy Froman might be able to make time
for talks on climate change during his upcoming visit. Iran and the
Middle East: An Agenda of Peace ¶7. (C) With regard to Brazil's engagement with Iran, Patriota said that,
above all, Brazil wants to "avoid a replay of Iraq." Destabilization
of Iran would be disastrous, he said, and as long as there is a
possibility for diplomatic engagement, the international community
should try it. He said that Iranian FM Mottaki had sought out FM Amorim
in Geneva on January 29, saying that he had noted flexibility on the part
of the French and the United States. The Ambassador said Iran needed to
be the subject of continuing dialogue between the United States and
Brazil to avoid misunderstanding and ensure coordination
of messages. The Ambassador urged the GOB to move very cautiously
regarding Iran. He said recent acts of repression, including the executions of
protesters, are a sign of things to come and raise questions about the
Iranian government's ability to do a deal with the international community.
"The distrust is great," Patriota said, "and we never know how sincere" the
Iranians are, but "we intend to continue to try" to reach a settlement.
Patriota noted that Lula had paid a political price internally for his
engagement with Iran. He said criticism of Lula, especially by leaders of
Brazil's Jewish community, had stung Lula badly. However, Lula's consistent
message regarding the need to acknowledge the Holocaust had won over some of
the harshest critics of the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad,
including Claudio Luiz Lottenberg of the Albert Einstein Hospital in
Sao Paulo, whom Lula had invited to join his trip to Israel in March.
On that trip, the first by a Brazilian president in decades, Patriota
said Lula would have "an agenda of peace." ¶8. (U) Minimize considered. SHANNON