Julian Assange

terça-feira, 7 de dezembro de 2010


Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
09ALGIERS948 2009-10-25 09:09 2010-12-06 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Algiers
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000948 


EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2029 

ALGIERS 00000948 001.2 OF 004

Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Guenaizia told visiting
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston October
19 that the Algerian, Mauritanian, Nigerien and Malian chiefs of staff had agreed

2. (C/NF) Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki
Huddleston met October 19 with Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Abdelmalik
Guenaizia and other senior generals, including Defense Ministry (MND) SG Major
General Ahmed Senhadji, MND Director of External Relations and Cooperation General
Mekri, MND Director of the Directorate of Documentation and External Security 
(DDSE) Major General Lallali and Colonel Mohamed Benmousset, Project Manager for
Major General Senhadji. She told Guenaizia that the United States recognized 
Algeria’s leadership in Africa, including Algeria’s history of support to 
Africa’s independence movements, promotion of economic and social development,
and on security matters. Huddleston acknowledged Algeria’s own experience in
combating terrorism and underscored USG appreciation for Algeria’s lead on 
efforts to secure the Sahel region and prevent terrorism from taking root in 
neighboring countries. She recalled her cooperation with Algeria when she was 
ambassador in Mali to confront the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),
forerunner of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after the GSPC captured
European tourists and brought them to northern Mali from Algeria in 2003.
Algeria’s commitment to combat GSPC in the region was clear, she said, and
its engagement with Mali was impressive. The U.S. played its part through 
training to increase Mali’s military planning capacity. In the end, Huddleston
concluded, we were successful. GSPC fled Mali to Niger and then to Chad, where 
GSPC leader “al-Para” was captured and returned to Algeria. Huddleston noted the
regional military chiefs of staff meeting held in Tamanrasset in July and the
planned regional heads of state summit in Bamako demonstrated that Algeria 
understood once more the importance of a coordinated regional response to combat
terrorism in the Sahel. The U.S. recognized Algeria’s commitment to working 
with the countries of the region, she stressed, and Algeria’s leading role in 
that effort. She explained the goal of her visit was to learn how the U.S. can 
support Algeria’s effort.

3. (C) Guenaizia thanked Huddleston for focusing her discussion on 
counterterrorism. Terrorism, he emphasized, was not a local phenomenon in the
region. It was brought from outside with all its horrors, he said, and it is 
a phenomenon the people of the region reject. When the threat
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first emerged in Algeria, the international community misunderstood the scope 
of the problem and left Algeria alone to fight in the 1990s. Algeria faced an
international embargo in its time of need, he said. Despite this embargo and
the challenge of protecting an area of 2.3 million square kilometers and a 
population of 34 million, he said, Algeria became self-reliant and prevailed 
with the overwhelming support of the Algerian people the security services and 
the army.


4. (C/NF) Guenaizia said today the situation had improved considerably, but 
terrorism remains a serious threat, and Algeria will maintain the same level of 
pressure and dedication to its counterterrorism efforts. He stressed, however, 
that terrorism was not only a threat to Algeria, it threatened the entire region
and beyond. AQIM, he argued, wants to embed itself in the region and, therefore,
Algeria intended to take the fight beyond Algeria’s borders. Like a skilled 
boxer, he said, the key is to keep pressure on your opponent and increase your
room for maneuver. Guenaizia made it clear that Algeria will not tolerate a 
situation in which AQIM or other armed groups are able to establish camps for
logistics and training along Algeria’s frontier in neighboring countries with 
the intent of facilitating the entry of trained insurgents, weapons and explosives
into Algeria.

5. (C/NF) Guenaizia said the situation in northern Mali presented the greatest 
obstacle to combating terrorism. The nexus of arms, drug and contraband smuggling
in northern Mali created an enabling environment, Guenaizia argued, and provided
a source of logistical and financial support. Guenaizia added that terrorists
will use any means available to finance their activities, including corruption
and hostage-taking. Thus, he underlined, fighting terrorism requires “implacable”
political will to neutralize all avenues of support terrorists can exploit.
Guenaizia asserted that increased drug trafficking represented a critical problem
in this regard. Thousands of tons of drugs now cross through the region, he said.
Based on clashes with Algerian security forces, Guenaizia assessed that those 
involved in drug trafficking were well organized and had military training. 
Guenaizia said that Morocco was a major smuggling route for cannabis and hashish 
and was not doing enough to interdict traffickers. Huddleston told Guenaizia the
U.S. was equally concerned with drug trafficking in northwest Africa, 
particularly Colombian drugs transiting west Africa and the Sahel en route to
Europe. The drug trade added another source of finance for terrorists, and its
destabilizing effect on local populations could expand the geographic scope of
terrorist recruitment efforts, she said, citing the example of the Boko Haram 
in Nigeria.

6. (C) Guenaizia cautioned that the terrorist network in the Sahel is a 
sophisticated organization. “These are not simple warlords we are facing,” 
he emphasized. They use the best explosives, have honed their bomb-making 
expertise and use sophisticated means to deploy explosives against their
targets, Guenaizia underscored. He added that information to build highly 
sophisticated IEDs is easily obtainable from the Internet. No country is safe,
he went on; “We need to remain vigilant.”


7. (C/NF) Guenaizia noted that regional chiefs of staff met in the southern
Algerian city of Tamanrasset in July to create a mechanism to allow militaries 
in the region to coordinate efforts against terrorist threats while at the same
time respecting each country’s sovereignty. Military leaders of Algeria, Mali,
Mauritania and Niger, he said, agreed to establish a regional command in 
Tamanrasset that will host military representatives from each country and 
coordinate joint operations against AQIM targets. Joint military efforts, 
Guenaizia elaborated, are necessary to prevent AQIM from implanting itself in
the region. He called this the fundamental challenge. Regional military leaders
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now sensitized to the problem, he asserted, and are willing to wage a common CT
campaign. He indicated that the command could eventually be expanded to include
Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria will provide resources to
optimize the command center’s capacity. “What we can’t obtain among ourselves,”
he added, “we will seek from our friends.”

8. (C/NF) Guenaizia cautioned that, although the regional command in Tamanrasset
was an important first step, he didn’t expect immediate results. The meeting in
Tamanrasset, he noted, concerned military coordination, but successful action
hinged on two operational aspects: military readiness and political will.
Guenaizia said regional military leaders had done their job, now it was up to 
the civilian leaders of the region to demonstrate the political will to act.
“We are waiting for the Bamako summit,” Guenaizia stressed.


9. (S/NF) As to how the U.S. and others could support the regional effort,
Guenaizia emphasized (repeating himself three times to make the point) that 
sharing intelligence was fundamental. Guenaizia reminded Huddleston that Algeria 
once agreed to U.S. surveillance overflights years ago, but the experience yielded
few positive results for Algeria even though the intelligence collected related 
directly to Algeria’s national security and used Algeria’s sovereign airspace.
Huddleston replied that the U.S. and Algeria were already sharing a lot of 
intelligence. There would be a willingness to conduct overflights, but she 
underlined that any overflight mission would have to be linked to direct action
on the ground. The cost of one mission, she emphasized, was around USD 50,000,
so we had to be sure of the result. Huddleston suggested Guenaizia could raise 
this matter during AFRICOM Commander General Ward’s expected visit in November.

10. (S/NF) The provision of technical means was also key. Guenaizia complained 
that in many ways Algeria still faced an embargo in regards to the provision of
technical equipment, including counter-IED measures and sensors for intelligence
gathering. He informed Huddleston that a Northrop Grumman delegation will arrive
in Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of an AWACS-type platform based
on a Boeing 737 airframe. Algeria also needed sophisticated IED jammers, he said.
Insurgents use cell phones to detonate IEDs remotely, he stressed, resulting in
huge casualties for Algerian forces. Guenaizia lamented that despite this 
critical need, Algeria’s partners had been slow in responding to Algeria’s request
to purchase jammers. He did not refer directly to U.S. end-use-monitoring rules,
but he shared an anecdote about Algeria’s difficulties purchasing jamming 
technology from Portugal, a request, he continued, that has been pending for more
than a year with no response.

11. (S/NF) He said the U.S. and others could perhaps assist most before the 
Bamako heads of state summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political
will among Sahel governments needed to make the summit a success and facilitate
effective military action. DDSE Major General Lallali said the key to securing
commitment for effective cooperation rested with top-level leaders in Bamako.
Lallali said Mali’s political leadership was the biggest problem. “We need a
signal from Bamako that shows their commitment,” Lallali stated. Malians are 
suffering from terrorism, he said, yet when local populations try to fight back,
the authorities crack down on those populations.

12. (S/NF) Lallali complained that Malian officials have alerted insurgents that 
their cell phone calls were being monitored and leaked sensitive intelligence. 
Lallali also accused Mali of facilitating ransom payments for hostages. He called
Mali a favorable business environment for terrorists and believed many wealthy
and powerful families in Mali benefited from illegal trafficking. He termed 
the XXXXXXXXXXXX the “Terrorist Bank” and said, “we need to suppress that bank,”
noting the connection between drug trafficking and support for terrorist finance
and logistics. Lallali commented that Algeria’s effort in the UN to criminalize
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ransom payments aimed to curb corruption’s role in facilitating terrorism. 
He implored DASD Huddleston to “please do something with them.”

13. (S/NF) Guenaizia agreed that trust was an issue with Mali. Although Algeria 
has provided materiel and training support to Mali to help resolve the Tuareg
issue, it was not inclined to give Mali weapons and communications gear because
of concerns that such equipment might be trafficked to Ivory Coast or Guinea. 
Guenaizia said there was a “double language” in Mali-- its political leadership 
did not share the commitment Mali’s military leaders demonstrated. In order to
succeed in the fight, Guenaizia affirmed, Mali had to cooperate fully. The Bamako
summit has to deliver a clear political commitment. The U.S. could help by 
talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level 
of political will was there. Huddleston agreed that complicity in Mali regarding
the desire to share in the spoils of illegal trafficking seemed to have become 
worse since her tenure as ambassador. She concurred that Mali’s cooperation was 
essential but said that engaging Mali was a task for the entire region, not only 
Algeria. Huddleston cited the potential role of other partners in the region with
influence in Mali, like Libya and Burkina Faso. She also suggested involving the
AU to press for a general statement on fighting terrorism in the Sahel that 
would not single out Mali but rather deliver a broad message that countries in 
the region should act in concert and not allow terrorists to operate with 
impunity. The U.S., she said, will engage Mali and others in the region to play a
constructive role in the region’s fight against terrorism.


14. (S/NF) Huddleston told Guenaizia that U.S. military assistance in the region
aimed to improve the capacity of militaries in Mali, Mauritania and Chad through
training and equipment. President Tandja’s bid for a third term in office, she 
regretted, probably meant the U.S. will not be able to assist Niger, but we will
extend our assistance to Burkina Faso soon. It was important, she stressed, that 
U.S. efforts were in step with regional efforts already underway. In this regard,
Huddleston emphasized that communication among regional governments and other 
partners, like the U.S., was essential. Huddleston referred to recent talks 
between the U.S. and European allies on security in the Sahel, during which the 
European Commission and France mentioned plans for assistance. Guenaizia noted 
Europe’s interest in getting involved and said that some European governments had
tried to insert themselves into the Tamanrasset meeting. He bluntly stated that
Africa had already endured a period of colonialism. Lallali interjected that 
European participation could complicate matters.

15. (S/NF) Huddleston clarified that outside partners did not have to be involved
directly but needed to be apprised of future steps and planning in order to 
provide support. Huddleston suggested regular meetings by the MOD with the 
Ambassador and DATT in Algiers. Guenaizia said he had no objection, both with 
the U.S. and others. The threat concerns all. But cooperation had to advance 
gradually. We should review progress in stages, he added. Immediate efforts, 
he reiterated, should focus on pressuring Mali and achieving a successful summit
in Bamako. The next step was to allow time for standing up the regional command
in Tamanrasset and determining equipment needs. He suggested in two to three 
months we might be able meet and take stock of that effort. In this regard,
Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in

16. (U) DASD Huddleston did not clear this cable.

17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEARCE

DE RUEHAS #0948/01 2980928
O 250928Z OCT 09

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