Viewing cable 05MADRID1317, DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZAPATERO
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|05MADRID1317||2005-04-06 11:11||2010-12-07 12:12||CONFIDENTIAL||Embassy Madrid|
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001317 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2015 TAGS: PREL CO SP EUN NATO VZ SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZAPATERO Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) XXXXXXXXXXXX ========================= U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS ========================= ¶23. (C) On bilateral relations, Zapatero said he would never ask the USG to do something it could not do and, in turn, did not want to be asked to do something he did not believe in. Zapatero said he understood President Bush was upset with his decision to withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq, but insisted that he had maintained a consistent position on Iraq, made clear this position in the election campaign, and said he had followed his convictions and commitments in carrying out the withdrawal. He said he was not bothered by Washington's reaction; he could understand the President's perspective. ¶24. (C) Zapatero regretted not having engaged with the U.S. prior to winning the 2004 election, but it wasn't because he wasn't available. Zapatero complained that U.S. visitors to Spain did not seek him out during his four years as opposition leader. The lack of contact was ironic since, the State Department had sponsored his 1990 participation in a group of young leaders who traveled to the U.S. as International Visitor grantees. Zapatero said this was a good trip. He learned then and subsequently that the U.S. was a great country with great successes, which sometimes also "created great problems." ¶25. (C) Zapatero said he was aware that there would always be some hesitation on the part of the USG regarding his government, but also said he understood that "nothing is more important than deeds." He pointed to Afghanistan as one demonstration of Spain's commitment to support the United States when our values coincide. Spain would remain in Afghanistan as long as necessary to meet its commitment. MANZANARES