Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD290, ALLAWI CRITICIZES PM MALIKI'S AUTHORITARIAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
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10BAGHDAD290 | 2010-02-04 13:01 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGB #0290/01 0351317 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041317Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6448 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2// PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000290 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM LE IR IZ SUBJECT: ALLAWI CRITICIZES PM MALIKI'S AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES AND DENOUNCES IRANIAN INTERFERENCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 278 ¶B. BAGHDAD 285 ¶C. BAGHDAD 153 Classified By: MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Iraqiyya coalition leader Ayad Allawi told A/DCM on February 2 that the Accountability and Justice Commission's (AJC) effort to eliminate candidates on de-Ba'athification grounds was symptomatic of a broader problem of intimidation in the Iraqi political system. He attributed this intimidation to PM Maliki's "centralizing, authoritarian" tendencies, citing as proof the PM's recent intervention in the Salah ad-Din provincial dispute and widespread arrests of political rivals over the last year. Allawi shared details of his recent meeting with Iran's ambassador to Baghdad and worried about the impact of an Iranian-sponsored "resistance" conference in Lebanon in late January on Iraqi and broader regional stability. In light of recent polls that show Allawi and Maliki as top contenders for the premiership, we anticipate that they will use the upcoming campaign to attack each other's track records. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. DE-BA'ATH PART OF A BROADER INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶2. (C) Former PM and Iraqiyya coalition head Ayad Allawi told A/DCM on February 2 that the de-Ba'athification process was destabilizing Iraq. He claimed this was part and parcel of PM Maliki's "campaign of intimidation" to alter the political atmosphere in his favor, including by targeting political rivals in widespread arrest operations. Allawi underscored the "irrationality" of the Accountability and Justice Commission's (AJC) list of disqualified candidates, pointing to the inclusion of Iskander Witwit, deputy governor of Babil and one of Iraqiyya's candidates, as a particularly egregious example. Allawi's ally, MP Maysoon al-Damlougi, explained that Witwit was a leader of the Shi'a Shaabaniya uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991 and had lost several brothers who opposed the previous regime. (NOTE: A complete readout on the de-Ba'athification discussion from this meeting was provided in ref A. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Allawi thanked the USG for staying engaged on the de-Ba'athification issue, and encouraged the Embassy and Washington to underscore the repercussions of an illegitimate election. Although the United States was "losing muscle" with the drawdown of military forces, he commented, it should still act firmly to uphold democratic principles so as not to allow Iran to capitalize on its diminished presence. A/DCM emphasized that the United States would push the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to ensure that the ballot printed on February 6 did not exclude candidates who had not had their legal appeals finalized by the Cassation Chamber. (NOTE: Per ref B, the Cassation Chamber issued a legal decision February 3 ordering IHEC to allow all candidates who had appealed their de-Ba'athification disqualifications to run in the elections. Details septel. END NOTE.) MALIKI AS "AUTHORITARIAN CENTRALIZER" ------------------------------------ ¶4. (C) Allawi faulted PM Maliki for his tendency to "overly centralize" power in Baghdad, either in his own hands or those of his allies, comparing it to Saddam's heavy-handed tactics. He told A/DCM that the PM's direct intervention in the conflict between the Provincial Council and the ousted Qthe conflict between the Provincial Council and the ousted governor of Salah ad-Din was tied to his deal with Parliament Speaker Sammarrai'e to attain the Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP) support in government formation. (NOTE: Details septel. END NOTE.) Allawi asserted that Maliki's efforts to concentrate power would have wide-reaching implications for national security, due to the PM's patronage appointments in the intelligence services. (NOTE: This subject will be addressed septel. END NOTE.) PRESSURE ENGULFS IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS ---------------------------------------- ¶5. (C) Allawi shared that, at President Talabani's behest, Iraqiyya's leaders, including Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (IFND) head Saleh al-Mutlaq, met with Iranian Ambassador Qomi in late January to discuss the de-Ba'athification situation. Allawi reportedly challenged Qomi to prove Iran's good intentions in Iraq by making a public statement calling for fair, transparent elections in Iraq and by telling his "friends" in Iraq, including senior officials in Shi'a-dominated Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and State of Law coalitions, to respect the democratic process and not violate the Iraqi Constitution in order to promote their own electoral chances. He said that the Iranian Ambassador did not respond to these suggestions. Allawi noted that he stressed the danger of disproportionate Iranian interference and influence in Iraq during his recent meetings with Egyptian, Saudi and Emirati leaders, and asked those Arab states to engage more closely with Iraq. President Mubarak reportedly promised Allawi that he would raise this issue with a high-level UK and U.S. delegation visiting Egypt. ¶6. (C) Expressing his concern about a late January "resistance conference" organized by Iran in Lebanon, Allawi told A/DCM that it brought together Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, other terrorist organizations with a number of legitimate political actors like Ammar al-Hakim (ISCI chairman) from across the region. Characterizing Hakim as "stupid" for attending the conference, Allawi said that Hakim was pressured at the meeting to drop the political solution he and INA partner Badr chief Hadi al-Amiri had developed to resolve the de-Ba'ath crisis (ref B). Allawi confided that Nabih Berri, Lebanon's speaker of parliament, asked him to make a brief trip to Lebanon in late January to discuss the conference. Berri's representative reportedly told Allawi that Iran had spent USD 70 million on the conference and used the event to direct proxy groups in Lebanon to "cause trouble" between the Israelis and Egyptians by provoking actions on the Sinai or along the Gaza border. HILL
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