Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD256, MUSHARRAF TELLS BOUCHER ABOUT PAKISTAN’S PLANS FOR

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07ISLAMABAD256	2007-01-17 06:06	2010-11-30 21:09	SECRET	Embassy Islamabad

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RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1719
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4879
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3977
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1111
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1882
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6679
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0078
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2438
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4188
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 1107
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 9386
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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Wednesday, 17 January 2007, 06:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000256 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2016 
TAGS EAID, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER 
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS BOUCHER ABOUT PAKISTAN’S PLANS FOR 
BORDER SECURITY
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary and introduction: In his January 12 meeting with 

Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher,

Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf spoke of irritants in

Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tactical 

adjustments to enhance security in the border region. Musharraf described

tougher procedures for border crossing, selective fencing and mining of

the border region, stronger leadership for local police and plans to close

Afghan refugee camps. He also underscored that tribal leaders in North 

Waziristan have been given a month to improve implementation of the 

September 2006 agreement or face possible military action. Boucher and 

Lieutenant General Eikenberry briefed the President on their impression

of Afghanistan’s readiness to face a strong offensive by the Taliban in

the spring, noting that President Karzai is a stronger and more confident

leader than only a year ago. Boucher reaffirmed U.S. support for 

Pakistan’s development plans for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

and offered assistance as the Pakistani and Afghan Jirga Planning 

Commissions begin to coordinate. Following the 45 minute meeting with

the full American delegation reported here, President Musharraf spoke 

privately for another 45-minutes with Boucher and Ambassador Crocker.

End summary.
¶2. (C) Meeting Participants:
U.S.
Assistant Secretary Richard A. Boucher, Bureau of South and Central 

Asian Affairs Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Lieutenant General Karl 

Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan Major 

General Ronald Helmly, Defense Representative to Pakistan Ms. Caitlin

Hayden, Senior Advisor, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs 

Embassy notetaker
Pakistan
President Pervez Musharraf Lieutenant General Hamid Javaid, Chief of

Staff Additional Secretary Shahid Kamal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Major General Shafqaat Ahmed, Deputy Chief of Staff
Afghanistan -- Rhetoric and Bugti
¶3. (C) President Musharraf decried the heated rhetoric emanating from

Afghan officials over the past month. Public accusations that al Qaeda

and Taliban figures are operating in our border regions are perhaps 

understandable, Musharraf said, but it is completely unacceptable for

Afghan officials to accuse the Government of Pakistan and Inter Services

Intelligence of collusion with the enemy. Warming to his topic, Musharraf

described Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s January 4 visit to Kabul as 

a bad meeting, saying that President Karzai bombarded the Pakistani 

delegation with outlandish accusations that Pakistan seeks to enslave

the Afghans to achieve strategic depth. This is nonsense, Musharraf

concluded; to the contrary, Pakistan wants good relations with the 

Afghan government and with all communities in Afghanistan. Pakistani

officials and diplomats are under his personnel instructions not to 

interfere in Afghanistan’s affairs. Boucher advised the President that

U.S. officials have noted the aggravated level of cross-border rhetoric

and have counseled Afghan interlocutors not to air their grievance in 

public. All must appreciate the need to address issues responsibly and,

when appropriate, privately.
¶4. (C) Musharraf told Boucher that militant Baloch nationalist and 

fugitive Brahamdagh Bugti remains at large in Afghanistan, enjoying 

freedom of movement to commute between Kabul and Kandahar, raising money

and planning operations against Pakistani security forces. Boucher 

said that he had raised Bugti’s presence in Afghanistan with President

Karzai, who offered assurances that nobody would be allowed to use 

Afghanistan as a staging ground for terrorist attacks on Pakistan. 

Musharraf had a simple response: “That’s bullshit.”
Afghanistan -- Channels of Communication
¶5. (C) Boucher noted the growth in channels of communication between

Kabul and Islamabad, commending the exchange of information that occurs

within the military Tripartite Commission and in trilateral intelligence

channels. He told his Pakistani hosts that Karzai has agreed to support

exchanges between Pakistani and Afghan parliamentarians and encouraged 

the two countries to seek other opportunities to broaden their relationship.

The President agreed, but noted that he was disappointed that the agenda

for the January 10 Tripartite Commission plenary session did not address 

the most critical common challenges facing the two countries: cross-border

infiltration, repatriating Afghan refugees and closing camps that have

become safe havens for extremists.
Afghanistan -- Better Prepared for Spring Offensive
¶6. (C) Lieutenant General Eikenberry, who was making farewell calls 

in Islamabad before relinquishing his command on January 21, shared 

his impressions of the situation in Afghanistan with Musharraf.

Eikenberry told Musharraf that, although the we expect the insurgents

to launch a strong offensive in the spring, time is not on the Taliban’s

side. Afghanistan’s security forces -- the Afghan National Army and 

Afghan National Police -- are growing in confidence and capacity.

President Karzai is a more confident commander-in-chief and chief executive,

replacing corrupt and poor-performing officials. Reconstruction assistance

is taking root in districts throughout the country. U.S. forces  -- which

will reach the highest level of strength in Afghanistan in 2007, despite

the inactivation of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan -- stand ready 

to give NATO all necessary support to achieve it mission. The current winter

lull is the time, Eikenberry continued, to move forcefully to disrupt 

Taliban command-and-control. A strike to the Haqqani network -- which 

controls some Taliban action from Pakistan -- would deal a serious blow 

to both Taliban operational planning and recruitment. Responding to

Musharraf’s concern that the mil-mil Tripartite Commission is not 

addressing issues such as refugee repatriation, Eikenberry offered the

opinion that the Tripartite Commission operates best when its participants

can deal with each other soldier-to-soldier; cross-border issues 

carrying significant political baggage are better addressed through other

channels.
¶7. (C) President Musharraf suggested that NATO forces could enhance the

effort against the Taliban in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan by 

actively enlisting the support of local populations, even to the extent of

arming village-level militias against Taliban insurgents. Boucher described

an invigorated effort to boost support for Afghan National Army and Afghan

National Police through auxiliary police units of local residents serving

under the Ministry of Interior. President Karzai is also responding to 

public frustration with poor governance and corruption by cleaning out 

corrupt and dishonest local officials. The international community is using

the winter months to inject new flows of development and economic assistance

out to the provinces. Musharraf applauded this effort, saying that the 

Taliban will eventually lose popularity the more it is seen obstructing 

the country’s reconstruction.
Time to Close Refugee Camps
¶8. (C) President Musharraf advised Boucher that he and his senior advisors

have taken several decisions in recent weeks to improve security along

Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, including closing at least one of the

large camps inhabited by Afghan refugees. These camps have become safe

havens for militant elements, Musharraf explained. As extensive collateral

casualties would inevitably follow any military operation to separate the

militants from the civilian residents, the only solution is to begin closing

the camps altogether. Musharraf has tasked his advisors with devising a 

camp closure plan that incorporates recommendations on where the refugees 

could be relocated if they choose not to return to Afghanistan. These measure

will then be discussed with Afghan and UN officials under the auspices of

the refugee Tripartite Commission. We agree with you that the camps should

close, Boucher replied, underscoring the urgency of devising a plan and 

coordinating with Afghanistan and the UN before spring.
Stronger Border Security Measures
¶9. (C) Stressing that Pakistan understands that it must take firm measure 

to gain control over its western border, Musharraf reviewed a range of actions

already under way. New senior police officials appointed to posts in 

Balochistan and North West Frontier Province have been personally instructed

by the President to crack down on undocumented Afghans and other militant

targets. The Ministry of Interior is also in the process of lowering the

number of official border crossings in Balochistan from 33 to 6. Enhanced

immigrations procedures, including biometric crossing cards, have been

introduced at the Chaman border crossing, where 30,000 individuals transit

daily. The Army has been ordered to design a plan for selective fencing 

and mining along the border. Musharraf assured Boucher that Pakistan has

long and successful experience with mining along its eastern border, and 

that extraordinary measures would be implemented to prevent accidental 

civilian casualties or misappropriation of mines by terrorists. Of course,

minefields will not stop terrorism, Musharraf said, but they can help us 

control the insurgents’ movements across the border. Boucher noted that 

deployment of land mines is a complicated issue that the U.S. and other 

Coalition partners will want to discuss with Pakistani military planners.

President Musharraf acknowledged that, but said that these are “unusual 

circumstances” and Pakistan will take “unilateral measures” if needed.
Attack on Insurgents Infiltrating from North Waziristan
¶10. (S) The American delegation briefed the President on the Coalition

assault on a massive infiltration of Taliban fighters from North 

Waziristan on January 10-11. The fighters massed on the Pakistani side

of the border before crossing into Afghanistan, where U.S. forces 

attacked, killing up to 150. Musharraf shared American concern that

the enemy could mobilize such a large force during the winter lull,

and expressed some frustration that so large a force had been able to

collect on Pakistani territory and then cross the border unimpeded.

He suggested that this reflected a need for greater aerial surveillance

of the area or night-capable helicopter gunships to attack the enemy,

indicating his willingness to coordinate with U.S. forces on deploying 

whatever air assets are necessary to identify and destroy these enemy 

movements. (Note: The President was specific in calling for reliance on

air assets, saying point blank that ground forces are not an option.

End note.)
Re-Assessing the North Waziristan Accord
¶11. (S) Musharraf briefed Boucher on the government’s recent review of

the September 2006 North Waziristan agreement. Governor Orakzai convened

the jirga that negotiated the agreement in December, dispatching the

members to Miran Shah to make clear to North Waziristan’s tribal leaders

that they must take action to prevent cross-border infiltration in support

of the Taliban, eliminate foreign fighters from the Agency and stop any

effort to establish a parallel political administration. Tribal leaders

were given one month to gain control of the situation or the government

would consider taking military action. Musharraf refused to be disheartened,

saying that it will take time for the accord to take hold. In the interim,

the government has stepped up recruitment and training for tribal levies

and has assigned a Frontier Corps wing to the Political Agent. This will

give the Political Agent the muscle he needs to enforce the writ of state,

while the Army will be at hand to take on Taliban and al Qaeda targets.
Pak-Afghan Jirgas
¶12. (C) Boucher commended Musharraf for naming strong leaders to Pakistan’s

Jirga Planning Commission, encouraging the Commission to meet soonest with

its Afghan counterpart to discuss each country’s vision for the process.

Noting that he would discuss the jirgas with Interior Minister and Jirga

Commission Chair Sherpao later in the day, Boucher told the President 

that the U.S. stands ready to support the process once Pakistan and 

Afghanistan determine what assistance will be required.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Assistance
¶13. (C) Musharraf also spoke plans for the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas Secretariat and Development Authority to funnel near-term 

development assistance through tribal maliks, to strengthen their stature

within their tribes. Asking maliks to identify development needs and

direct resources will reinforce his authority with the local population,

said Musharraf. Boucher replied that the U.S. hopes to offer 

substantial financial support for the Pakistani’s Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas Sustainable Development Plan.
¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by SCA Senior Advisor 

Caitlin Hayden.
CROCKER