Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD1157, TALABANI WELCOMES AMBASSADOR, DISCUSSES ARAB
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07BAGHDAD1157 | 2007-04-04 09:09 | 2010-12-10 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO4018 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #1157/01 0940922 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 040922Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0536 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Wednesday, 04 April 2007, 09:22 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001157 SIPDIS SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 04/01/2017 TAGS PGOV, PREL, SA, IR, SY, IZ SUBJECT: TALABANI WELCOMES AMBASSADOR, DISCUSSES ARAB SUMMIT, BAGHDAD SECURITY, DE-BA’ATH Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker per 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari March 31 to present
his credentials. They discussed Talabani’s trip to Riyadh for the Arab
Summit and the side meetings he held with other Arab leaders, including
a discussion on Kirkuk and the PKK with Turkish PM Erdogan. Talabani
claimed that the Baghdad security initiative was going well and had
successfully brought in the Sunnis. He also expressed his willingness
to meet with resistance leaders. He said that the Presidency, PM, and
SCIRI leader Hakim had approved the compromise draft de-Ba’athification
law which he said had been forwarded to the Council of Representatives.
Talabani has written a letter to Iran asking for the release of the
British sailors but received no response. The President was mentally
sharp and growing in strength, although by the end of the meeting he
was showing signs of fatigue. END SUMMARY. ------- Welcome ------- ¶2. (C) Talabani welcomed the Ambassador and expressed his conviction
that he and Iraq and are real friends of the U.S. He said Iraq and the
U.S. were partners in the fight for democracy and against dictatorship.
He made apologies for not meeting the Ambassador the day before, blaming
his staff of overprotecting him and failing to tell him of the request for
a meeting. He said he is prepared to meet with the Ambassador at any time
and invited him to a meal in the near future. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Talabani he was glad to be back in Iraq and
praised Talabani’s efforts to build a relationship with the U.S. He said
he would do everything in his power to support democracy and prosperity
in Iraq. He thanked Talabani for his help on a number of important
issues, including de-Ba’athification and hydrocarbons. He said the U.S.
is here to support Iraqi policy. The FM Zebari echoed this sentiment,
saying that the Iraqi people need to understand that these are Iraqi goals. ----------- Arab Summit ----------- ¶4. (C) Talabani said he “explained everything” in his speech to the Arab
League. He spoke of the liberation of Iraq and how Coalition troops were
welcomed by the Iraqi people in 2003, but lamented the passage of UN
Resolution 1483. In response to King Abdullah’s negative comments about
the US’s “illegal occupation” of Iraq, he thanked coalition forces and
called for a resolution condemning terrorist activities. He told the
League they cannot be divided, they must all be working for reconciliation.
He said Iraq was proud to be independent and did not follow the dictates
of countries to the east and north (alluding to Iran and Turkey).
He claimed that the Iraqi Shia were independent from Iran and explained
to the League that oil is a national asset shared by all Iraqis and
difficulties in this area will be worked out. ¶5. (C) Talabani said in his side meeting with Amr Mousa, Secretary
General of the Arab League, he criticized the SIPDIS exclusion of crimes and terrorism taking place in Iraq in the
Secretary General’s report, to which Mousa responded that he SIPDIS would add it. He said he also had private meetings with the kings
of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and with Turkish PM Erdogan, whom he invited
to send a delegation to Kirkuk to examine the situation and prove that
Turkomen are not being treated poorly. He told Erdogan that Kirkuk is
a cultural issue that cannot be decided by strong words from both sides.
He expressed bemusement that Erdgoan still thought of him and KRG
President Massoud Barzani as tribal chiefs. He told Erdogan that he
and the KRG condemn any terrorist activity against Turkey, to which
Erdogan responded positively. On the PKK issue he told Erdogan tat
currently Iraq had to devote all its resources to securing Baghdad,
but he said PKK activity is against the interests of the Kurdish people. ¶6. (C) He also spoke with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Riyadh and
asked him why they had seen no results from their agreement to cooperate
on security matters made when Talabani visited in January. He said Assad
promised to begin cooperating. --------------------------- BSP and Sunni Participation --------------------------- ¶7. (C) According to Talabani, the Baghdad security initiative has been
successfully implemented in a way that BAGHDAD 00001157 002 OF 002 targets not just Sunni areas, but all parts of the city. He said even
Iran was cooperating in some ways by directing the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) militia to cease targeting Sunnis. This will reduce sectarian tensions,
he said. Iran had also stopped helping Thar-Allah, a Shia militia group in
the south, according to Talabani. ¶8. (C) He said the situation was much better than a few months ago,
referencing the PM’s involvement of the Sunnis in the security plan.
Talabani said he hoped that the Ambassador’s arrival was another step
forward in this regard. ¶9. (C) He said before his illness he had a discussion with the PM on
steps to reach out to Sunni parties within the GOI. They agreed on the
need for regular meetings between the Presidency and the PM, as well
as regular PCNS meetings. He said the Presidency must also hold regular
meetings to coordinate on the issues. He said it was vital for them to
be on the same page in the fight against terrorism or at least to use
the same language so that they do not send confusing messages to the
press and public. --------------------------------- Reconciliation/De-Ba’athification --------------------------------- ¶10. (C) Talabani said they are continuing their efforts for national
reconciliation and told the Ambassador that the people are forming groups
to fight terrorism and cooperating with government forces against the
terrorists. He said he has been contacted by members of the national
resistance movement and reported that before traveling to Riyadh he
met with the UK Ambassador to Iraq and the ranking UK General in Iraq
and discussed meeting with members of the resistance. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Talabani for his critical role in
reconciliation efforts and inquired on the status of the draft
de-Ba’athification law. Talabani told him that it had been sent to
the Council of Representatives (CoR) for debate and approval
(Note: according to Embassy contacts at the CoR they have not
yet received it and it is with the Council of Ministers. End Note).
Talabani said that the PM had signed the draft law for the government
and he had signed in the name of the Presidency because the two
Vice-Presidents were out of the country but had given him their
approval. He said he announced the law at the Arab Summit where it
was received with approval. He also discussed the draft law with
SCIRI leader Abdelaziz al-Hakim and Hummam Hammudi, SCIRI CoR member
and Foreign Relations Committee Chair, who were with him at the Summit
as “houseguests” and who he claimed both approved it. ----------------- British Detainees ----------------- ¶12. (C) Talabani said he wrote a letter to the president of Iran which
called for the release of the British sailors. In it, he told the
Iranians that the Shat al-Arab is important and the Brits were trying
to prevent smuggling. He dispatched an envoy to deliver the letter but
the envoy returned empty-handed - the Iranians want an apology from
the United Kingdom. Talabani added that the Iranians were concerned
about his health, joking that the one thing that the US and Iran have
in common is concern for “the health of Talabani.” ¶13. (C) Comment: Talabani appeared tired and seemed to have more
difficulty than usual speaking English. His staff, probably concerned
for his health, had refused to schedule any meetings for March 30.
CROCKER
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