Viewing cable 10STATE17894, DEMARCHE: CONTINUED CONCERN OVER SYRIAN SUPPORT
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10STATE17894 | 2010-02-26 00:12 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
S E C R E T STATE 017894
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: CONTINUED CONCERN OVER SYRIAN SUPPORT
TO HIZBALLAH
REF: A) 2009 STATE 129636
Classified By: NEA A/S Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph four.
Summary
-------
¶2. (S) We previously demarched Britain, France, and Turkey on
our increasing concerns over Syria’s continued provision of
advanced weapons to Hizballah (Ref A). In London, Paris and
Ankara the demarches were taken seriously and all governments
pledged to raise their concern with Syrian officials. French
diplomats noted that they routinely deliver the same message
to the Syrians, but that Damascus denies involvement. This
issue now needs to be reinforced with these governments and
brought to the attention of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar.
Under Secretary Burns visited Damascus on February 17 and
stressed U.S. concerns about weapons transfers to Hizballah
directly with Syrian President Bashar Asad, who bluntly
stated that he knew of no new weapons systems going to
Hizballah. In light of disturbing and weighty evidence to
the contrary -- that Syria currently provides Hizballah with
advanced ballistic missiles and other weaponry -- we want
France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar
to make a renewed push to echo our concerns with Syria,
given that Syria continues to ignore warnings that its
transfers of advanced surface-to-surface and surface-to-air
weapons to Hizballah could jeopardize prospects for an
agreement with Israel or spark a conflict significantly
more destructive than the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Syria’s
actions clearly jeopardize regional stability and could
risk drawing Damascus into any future war between Israel
and Hizballah.
¶3. (S) The Syrian leadership views military support to
Hizballah as integral to Syria’s security and as a
bargaining chip in its negotiations with Israel over
the return of the Golan Heights, as well as a possible
stick to bring the Israelis back to the table. While our
commitment to principled engagement with Syria -- as
demonstrated by Under Secretary Burns’ recent visit --
remains strong, we must enlist additional French, British,
Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and Qatari support to help
dissuade Syria from expanding its ties to Hizballah any
further, especially via the transfer of additional
sophisticated weaponry.
Objectives
----------
¶4. (S/REL FRANCE, BRITAIN, TURKEY, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN,
AND QATAR) Drawing on paragraphs 2 and 3 for context, we
request that Embassies in Paris, London, Ankara, Riyadh,
Amman, and Doha pursue the following objectives with senior
French, British, Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and Qatari
officials at the highest appropriate levels.
-- Highlight that Under Secretary Burns visited Damascus
on February 17 as part of our ongoing engagement with
Syria. Reiterate our commitment to sustained, principled
engagement with Syria. We plan to continue our dialogue
with Syria and look forward to the arrival of our new ambassador
in Damascus once the confirmation process is complete.
-- Stress that in addition to discussing bilateral issues of
mutual interest, Under Secretary Burns conveyed to President
Asad a number of our priority concerns with Syria,
specifically cross-border weapons smuggling into Lebanon
destined for Hizballah.
-- Note that in response, Asad claimed that Syria could
not be Israel’s policeman and that he knew of no new weapons
systems being smuggled from Syria to Hizballah.
-- Underscore that, contrary to President Asad’s statements,
we are aware of current Syrian efforts to supply ballistic
missiles to Hizballah.
-- We also note President Asad’s recent comments -- during
a February 25 joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart
-- that support for Hizballah was a “moral and legal duty.”
-- Express deep concern that Syria’s expanding military ties
to Hizballah, including the supply of ballistic missiles to
Hizballah, jeopardize regional prospects for peace and
stability. Specifically, Syrian transfers of increasingly
sophisticated weaponry risk renewed conflict between Israel
and Hizballah that may expand, unlike in 2006, into Syria.
-- Convey that arms shipments to Hizballah -- especially
ballistic missiles -- increasingly undermine Israel’s
confidence in Syria’s willingness and ability to deliver
peace and diminish the value of an eventual Syrian-Israeli
accord, as Hizballah will not return the weapons it has
already received.
-- Underscore that the next report on Security Council
resolution 1701 will be discussed on March 12. Full
implementation of Security Council resolution 1701,
including the arms embargo and weapons-free zone, remains
a priority for the United States. In light of the upcoming
report, it is especially important to stress that Syria’s
actions constitute serious violations of Security Council
resolution 1701 -- which will be taken seriously by the
international community -- and belie its claims to respect
Lebanon’s sovereignty.
-- Express our appreciation for your host government’s
support on the critical issue of Syrian weapons transfers
to Hizballah and note that we hope to continue our cooperation
to prevent serious miscalculations by the Syrian government.
-- Share the following S/REL FRANCE, BRITAIN, TURKEY, SAUDI
ARABIA, JORDAN, QATAR text verbatim:
(Begin releasable text.)
We would like to convey to you that we have information
indicating that Syria is providing increasingly sophisticated
weapons to Hizballah, including from its own military stocks.
For example, we assess that Syria has provided or will provided
guided short range ballistic missiles to Hizballah that could
target two-thirds of Israel, including Tel Aviv, from launch
sites north of the Litani.
Our information also indicates that Syria has made advanced
surface to air missile systems available to Hizballah and
has probably provided training on these systems to Hizballah
personnel.
(End releasable text.)
-- Urge France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Qatar to raise these concerns once again in their dialogue
with senior Syrian officials. We do not want to undermine
our collective outreach to Syria. However, we are increasingly
concerned that the Syrian government is making a strategic
miscalculation by incorrectly assuming that increasing
Hizballah’s military capability concomitantly bolsters Syria’s
security and strength at the negotiating table with Israel,
when the opposite is more likely to be true.
-- Syria’s desire for a deterrent against Israeli military
action -- presumably a motivation for the transfer of
ballistic missiles to Hizballah -- is not producing a
stable deterrent because there are no mechanisms to prevent
unanticipated escalation. Not having control over
Hizballah’s missiles increases the risk of this danger.
-- Emphasize that Syria’s actions risk derailing our
common efforts to bring peace to the region.
-- Note that we are raising our concerns with Syrian
officials in Damascus and with the Syrian Ambassador
here in Washington.
-- Also note our continuing strong commitment and support
to the full implementation of resolutions 1747 and 1701,
encouraging France, Britain, and Turkey to stress their
continuing support for the full implementation of
resolution 1701 -- in its entirety (including the arms
embargo and weapons free zone) -- with senior Syrian
officials.
-- These are U.S. concerns. We are not carrying somebody
else’s “water” on this issue.
-- (For Turkey) Express that we greatly appreciate
Turkey’s continued efforts to combat weapons smuggling.
As conveyed by Under Secretary Burns when he was in
Ankara on February 18, we urge Turkey to use its close
ties with Damascus to underscore the repercussions that
Syria’s continued provision of weapons to Hizballah has
for regional stability and the broader goal of Middle
East peace. We hope that Turkey will leverage its influence
with Syria on this crucial issue.
Reporting Deadline
------------------
¶5. (SBU) Embassies are requested to report the results
of this demarche to Syria desk officer Andrew Abell and
Lebanon desk officer John Duchak by March 3, 2010. CLINTON
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