Viewing cable 09WARSAW467, POLAND - CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE,

Viewing cable 09WARSAW467, POLAND - CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE,

 

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09WARSAW467	2009-05-07 05:05	2010-12-06 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Warsaw

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000467 

SIPDIS 

EUR, PM, H 

EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2019 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, OREP, RS, PL 

SUBJECT: POLAND - CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE, 
PATRIOTS

REF: WARSAW 375

Classified By: Ambassador Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with CODEL Levin, the Polish Prime Minister’s 

chief of staff, the President’s deputy national security advisor, and the 

speaker of the Polish parliament expressed unanimous support for a large U.S.

military footprint in Poland to bolster Article 5 guarantees.  PM chief of 

staff Slawomir Nowak told CODEL that, regardless of the U.S. decision on Missile

Defense, Poland expects the U.S. to “honor its commitments” to bring a Patriot

battery to Poland. All three Polish officials requested that the U.S. keep

Poland updated on the status of dialogue with Russia, suggesting that Russia,

not Iran, poses the greater threat to Poland. CODEL’s meeting with FM Sikorski

is reported septel.  END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), and Senator Susan

Collins (R-ME), visited Warsaw April 15-16 to discuss Missile Defense and Polish

interest in a U.S. Patriot battery rotation with Polish officials, including

Prime Minister Tusk’s chief of staff Slawomir Nowak, Deputy Chief of President

Kaczynski’s National Security Bureau Witold Waszczykowski, and Parliamentary 

Speaker Bronislaw Komorowski (Civic Platform, PO). The Senators’ meetings with 

Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw 

Komorowski are reported septel.

U.S. “ROCK SOLID” ON ARTICLE FIVE

¶3. (C) Senator Levin began all three meetings by conveying the President’s

message that the U.S. commitment to the NATO Article 5 guarantee is “rock 

solid.” While U.S. support for Poland may differ in form under the Obama 

administration, U.S. support for Poland will be strong. When asked whether 

Warsaw felt assured that NATO would honor its Article 5 commitments to Poland,

Waszczykowski said “we still have our doubts,” adding that some European 

members -- particularly France -- prefer talk to action, he wryly added “that’s

why we bought F-16s and not French Mirages, and why we went through with the

Missile Defense deal.”

PATRIOTS AND AMERICAN BOOTS

¶4. (C) Senator Levin warned all three interlocutors that if the Czechs reject 

the proposed MD radar site, the Polish component of MD would be put in jeopardy 

under current U.S. legislation. Nowak expressed confidence that the Czechs would

ratify the agreement with the U.S., suggesting they are simply waiting for a U.S.

decision on MD. Speaker Komorowski acknowledged the provisions of U.S. law, but

stated Poland does not want to be responsible for Czech problems. Senator Collins 

acknowledged the political cost to Poland of supporting MD, and asked for 

Komorowski,s views on how to maintain support for the United States if it pursues

a different course.

¶5. (C) Asked whether Poland would be reassured by the presence of Patriot 

batteries in lieu of MD, Nowak told CODEL Levin that, regardless of MD’s fate,

the GOP expects the USG to “honor its commitments” on Patriots. Poland intends 

to build a comprehensive air-defense system and has identified Patriots as “the

most important element” of its defense modernization efforts. Nowak said Poland 

“will not suffer” if the U.S. withdraws from MD, but repeatedly asserted that the

GOP is “counting on Patriots.” (NB: At one point, Nowak even intervened when his

interpreter mistakenly said the Poles “would like Patriots.” “No, we are counting

on them,” Nowak emphasized in English.)

¶6. (C) Waszczykowski was less adamant about Patriots, stating that Poland and the

U.S. had a binding political agreement on security matters, which he hoped the

United States would respect. He added that Poland “wants U.S. boots on the

ground” -- not necessarily as a tripwire, but as a deterrent.  Nowak similarly 

stressed Poland’s strong interest in “deepening” military cooperation, ideally 

to include a large U.S. footprint in Poland. He mused that one Patriot battery 

and ten MD interceptors do not constitute the “impressive presence” that Poland 

is hoping for.

¶7. (C) Speaker Komorowski and Nowak both pointed out that, by agreeing to host 

the MD site, Poland had paid a “high price” -- especially in its relations with 

other EU members and with Russia. Komorowski expressed concern that Poland had 

again become a Russian target after a dozen years of improving relations -- senior

Russian officials have threatened to target Poland with nuclear missiles, are 

stirring up
WARSAW 00000467 002 OF 002
anti-Polish sentiment among Russians, and are acting against Poland’s interests 

in Ukraine.

¶8. (C) Komorowski argued that the U.S. needs to fulfill its symbolic agreement 

to show involvement in defense of Polish territory. If the new administration is

changing U.S. political priorities, it also needs to engage in dialogue with 

Poland, not just Russia. Most important for Poland is U.S. involvement in Polish 

security, through physical presence of American forces in Poland, NATO facilities 

in Poland, fulfilling the commitment to provide Patriot missiles, and greater U.S.

-Polish cooperation.

DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

¶9. (C) Komorowski, Nowak, and Waszczykowski stressed the importance of keeping

Poland updated on the status of U.S.-Russia talks. Nowak stressed the GOP’s 

strong interest in a positive outcome, but reminded the CODEL that U.S.

negotiators had promised the USG would overcome Russian objections to MD.

“The MD site is an American base. The burden of achieving Russian agreement 

is on the U.S. side,” he said. Even so, Nowak said, Poland had agreed to accept

confidence-building measures with the Russians and was also working to convince

Moscow that MD is not a threat to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Regardless, Russia 

will find it difficult to accept any “tangible manifestation” of a NATO presence 

in Poland or the Czech Republic.

¶10. (C) Nowak said Poland had not discussed Patriots with the Russians. Russia 

should not have a say in Poland’s defense modernization planning. Noting that 

Poland’s armed forces are “defensive in nature,” Nowak reiterated that Poland’s 

primary goal is to increase interoperability with allies.

¶11. (C) Presidential Advisor Waszczykowski reacted more emotionally. While 

Washington is entitled to talk to Russia, to work toward a solution to the 

Iranian threat, and to make its own decision about the MD initiative, the U.S.

should take care not to undermine Poland’s security. He then wondered aloud, 

“How long will it take you to realize that nothing will change with Iran and 

Russia?” Waszczykowski asserted that Moscow is trying to regain its sphere of 

influence and stressed the critical importance of an increased U.S. or NATO 

presence for Poland’s security. He added that Russia continues to deny its 

historical wrong-doings against Poland, imposes economic sanctions against Poland 

at will, and frequently disrupts the flow of oil and gas.

THREAT FROM IRAN?

¶12. (C) In all three meetings, Senator Nelson expressed doubt that Iran would 

abandon its nuclear weapons or missile programs, but noted that the Iranian threat

to Europe could be met for the foreseeable future with the AEGIS and THAAD 

systems. Waszczykowski, who served as Poland’s Ambassador to Tehran (1999-2002),

agreed that Iran poses an increasing threat to the United States and Europe.

He said that the Iranian regime has no incentive to warm relations with

Washington because the regime has built its own legitimacy on the cornerstone 

of anti-Americanism.

¶13. (C) Nowak and Komorowski told the CODEL that Poland does not perceive a 

direct threat from Iran. Nowak stated that, as an active and loyal ally, Poland 

had agreed to host the MD site because of the threat Iran poses to the U.S. and

others in NATO. He noted that Poland’s desire to be a strong ally was also the 

basis for its activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nowak said Poland perceives a 

greater threat from non-state actors, but conceded that Iran’s support for 

terrorist organizations was troubling. He added that Poland’s decision to host

MD had moved it “closer to the top of Iran’s list,” and, as a result, made 

Patriots more important to Poland’s security.

¶14. (U) CODEL Levin has cleared this message.
ASHE

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