Viewing cable 09PARIS762, EUR A/S GORDON’S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH FRENCH NSA

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09PARIS762	2009-06-08 16:04	2010-11-30 23:11	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Paris

VZCZCXRO3385
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0762/01 1591642
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081642Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6409
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000762 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2024 
TAGS PGOV, PREL, FR 
SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON’S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH FRENCH NSA 
LEVITTE

Classified By: Charg d’Affaires Mark A. Pekala, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a June 3 meeting with A/S Gordon, French NSA-equivalent

Jean-David Levitte previewed the agenda for the POTUS-President Sarkozy 

bilat at Normandy. He noted that Sarkozy hoped to use the occasion to 

announce the appointments of two French general officers to high-level NATO

positions. On Russia, Levitte expressed concern that Moscow was trying to

whittle away at the commitments it made during the Georgia crisis, 

especially the presence of international monitors. He noted that Russia

was “testing” the Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g., the natural

gas crisis) as it tried to reassert control over its traditional sphere of

influence. “We need to tell them to be careful, because your behavior risks

changing the relationship (between Russia and the West),” said Levitte.

Gordon observed that while it was comparatively easy for the U.S. and France

to maintain a united front in dealing with Russia, the same was not true for

all of our European partners. Levitte agreed, adding that the Germans were 

somewhat divided over how to respond to President Medvedev’s proposals.

He emphasized that Russia should pay a political price if it refuses to 

allow international observers to remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Turning to Nagorno-Karabakh, Levitte said there was an opportunity to 

improve the situation, which in turn might facilitate improvement in 

Turkish-Armenian relations. On Iran, Levitte noted that the French would 

pass two messages to Iranian FM Mottaki, who was due in Paris later that 

same day: First, that things “will end badly” if Iran presses forward with

its nuclear program; second, that Iran faces “a historic opportunity” with

the U.S. that it must not miss. End summary.

Participants
------------ 

¶2. (S/NF) Jean-David Levitte was accompanied by Damien Loras, French 

Presidency Adviser for the Americas. EUR A/S Gordon was accompanied by

CDA Pekala and Poloff (notetaker).

POTUS-Sarkozy Bilat
------------------- 

¶3. (S/NF) Levitte began by explaining the French decision not to invite

the Germans to the June 6 D-Day commemoration. “It’s my fault,” said

Levitte, who said that President Sarkozy had initially been keen to invite

German Chancellor Merkel to participate. “I pointed out to the President

that if Merkel came, then Sarkozy would be obligated to invite the heads

of state of Italy, Poland, and the Czech Republic as well.” Moreover, all

of those leaders would have to be given an opportunity to speak as well,

which would lengthen an already long ceremony. The cases of the UK and 

Canada were exceptional, he added, because both Gordon Brown and Stephen

Harper were in such political trouble at home that the survival of their

governments was at stake.

¶4. (S/NF) As for the substance of the POTUS-Sarkozy bilat, Levitte

previewed the proposed agenda: Iran, the Middle East peace process,

Afghanistan/Pakistan, Russia and its neighbors, and finally a broad 

discussion of economic issues under the rubric of the G-20 (e.g., the 

economic crisis, regulation, preparation for the next G-8 meeting, the

price of gasoline, and climate issues). Levitte stressed that Sarkozy 

hoped to announce (preferably in person to the press, but possibly through

a written bulletin) on June 3 the names of the two French general officers

-- the chiefs of staff of the French Air Force and Navy -- receiving high 

level NATO commands in Norfolk and Lisbon.

Russia/Georgia
-------------- 

¶5. (S/NF) Turning to relations with Russia, Levitte suggested that Moscow 

misconstrued U.S. policy on Georgia. Russian officials seemed to interpret

U.S. efforts at improving the atmosphere for talks as a license to walk away

from commitments that Sarkozy had extracted from Russia at the height of the

Georgia crisis. In specific, Russian obstructionism indicates Moscow’s

opposition to the presence of international monitors in Georgia and the 

breakaway territories. While Levitte conceded that Western relations with 

Russia should not hinge solely on the Georgian question, he nevertheless

pointed to the continued need for a firm, united Western front. He noted

that Russia was “testing” the Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g.,

the natural gas crisis) as it tried to reassert control over its traditional

sphere of influence. “We need to tell them to be careful,
PARIS 00000762 002 OF 003
because your behavior risks changing the relationship (between Russia and

the West),” said Levitte. Gordon agreed that U.S./EU could not afford to be

naive in engaging with Russia, and stressed the need for the U.S. and Europe

to draw the same red lines in dealing with Moscow. He observed that while 

it was comparatively easy for the U.S. and France to maintain a united front,

the same was not true for all of our European partners. Levitte concurred.

He added that the Germans were somewhat divided over how to respond to 

President Medvedev’s proposals. Alluding to the differences between FM 

Steinmeier and Chancellor Merkel, Levitte said: “It’s as if they have two

foreign policies.” He emphasized that Russia should pay a political price 

if it refuses to allow international observers (e.g., UNOMIG and OSCE) to 

remain present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: namely, increased Western 

assistance to Georgia.

¶6. (S/NF) Levitte returned to the question of international observers, 

saying that the West should push Russia hard in New York and Geneva to

let the observers stay. “They (the Russians) will accept it if we stay

strong,” Levitte noted, adding that the Russians must understand that 

they will pay a price for changing the status quo.

¶7. (S/NF) On NATO expansion, Levitte and Gordon discussed the relative 

merits of giving Membership Action Plans (MAP) to other Balkan countries 

but not to Georgia and Ukraine. Levitte suggested that the Russians would

see such a policy as “a gift,” yet he agreed that NATO needed to decide

whether to continue with MAP for Ukraine and Georgia or find an alternative

mechanism. Levitte proposed eliminating the MAP program altogether, as

“each country arrives at membership through its own unique path anyway.”

Nagorno-Karabakh
---------------- 

¶8. (S/NF) Levitte said he saw a historic opportunity to make progress on

Nagorno-Karabakh and -- although the two are not formally linked -- 

relations between Turkey and Armenia. Gordon agreed that progress between

the latter two was unlikely without movement on Nagorno-Karabakh, a reality

the Armenians understood but had difficulty accepting. Levitte suggested

that the U.S. and France remain in contact on this issue, with an eye 

toward a possible meeting on the margins of the informal ministerial at

Corfu. On the question of Turkey’s admission to the EU, Levitte said that

the Turks themselves had signaled that the important thing was for the 

process to continue. Levitte said the French fully agreed, since the EU

membership criteria served as an engine for modernizing Turkey.

Iran
---- 

¶9. (S/NF) As for the June 3 visit of Iranian FM Mottaki to Paris,

Levitte said that Mottaki would be received at the Elysee later that

same afternoon. Levitte portrayed Mottaki’s visit as the result of

Iranian in-fighting after Iranian President Ahmadinejad took umbrage 

that Ali Akbar Velayati, Supreme Leader Khamenei’s diplomatic advisor,

had been received in the past by Sarkozy. He noted that the French had 

already postponed Mottaki’s visit once as a result of Ahmadinejad’s 

anti-Semitic rant at the Durban II conference in Geneva, which had 

prompted the French Ambassador and other EU representatives to walk out 

of the session in protest. Levitte predicted that Mottaki would have 

nothing meaningful to say, whereas the French would deliver two messages 

to the Iranians: First, that things “will end badly” if Iran presses 

forward with its nuclear program; second, that Iran faces “a historic 

opportunity” with the U.S. that it must not miss. Levitte pledged that

France would “remain the toughest” U.S. ally when it came to imposing

sanctions on Iran, adding that the French had no illusions about how 

difficult it would be to get the Russians and Chinese to support tougher

measures. He suggested that October would be the time to begin drumming

up international support for new sanctions, and acknowledged that the 

Russians would likely try to extract concessions from the West on Georgia

and missile defense in exchange.

Cuba/GTMO
--------- 

¶10. (S/NF) Levitte said that the new Administration’s policy on Cuba was 

great. “How can we help?” asked Levitte, who noted that Sarkozy would travel

to the Caribbean in late June. He added that former French Culture Minister

Jack Lang was serving as Sarkozy’s point man on Cuba, and met with Raul 

Castro during a recent visit to Havana. “Your open-handed
PARIS 00000762 003 OF 003
policy is producing some interesting movement inside (the regime),” Levitte

summarized.

¶11. (S/NF) Turning to the fate of the Guantanamo (GTMO) detainees, Levitte

said that France’s acceptance of a first GTMO returnee was not intended

to be a one time gesture. To the contrary, the French saw it as the

beginning of a process, and they were currently evaluating other candidates

as well. However, France would not accept any detainees who posed a 

threat to French security and would only consider taking those with a 

legitimate tie to France. Levitte noted that Congressional opposition to

the President’s plan to close GTMO had given French authorities less

room for maneuver on this subject, as the French public wondered why 

France should accept detainees who were too dangerous to be transferred

to the United States.

¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon.
PEKALA