Viewing cable 08MEXICO1487, SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT TO MEXICO OF FBI DEPUTY

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MEXICO1487.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08MEXICO1487	2008-05-16 14:02	2011-01-23 21:09	SECRET	Embassy Mexico

VZCZCXRO6479
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #1487/01 1371454
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 161454Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1886
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 001487

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KCRM SNAR MX
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT TO MEXICO OF FBI DEPUTY
DIRECTOR JOHN S. PISTOLE, MAY 21-23, 2008

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d).

¶1. (U) Welcome to Mexico City. Mexico is key to USG
success in combating a wide array of transnational security
threats which undermine our ability to confront global
terrorism. A stew of widespread criminality, drug
trafficking, corruption and impunity has created an enabling
environment for a variety of ill-intended elements here.
There is much good news, however: the U.S. - Mexico
relationship on security issues, including counter-terrorism
and counter-narcotics, is excellent and we have no evidence
that foreign terrorist organizations have gained a foothold
here. Equally important, a resolute president is taking
aggressive actions to combat organized crime that will make
Mexico an even more valued partner in years to come. Your
visit here will provide an excellent overview of Mexico's
challenging security environment. While your interlocutors
will have well-defined opinions on the nature of the security
challenges facing Mexico -- that do not always reflect our
own thinking -- engaging them will advance our dialogue
greatly.

Mexico's Security Environment and Commitment

¶2. (U) Mexico remains relatively inhospitable to local and
international terrorist groups intending to operate within
the country. In July and September of 2007, the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR), a domestic guerrilla group,
attacked oil and gas pipelines, causing significant economic
damage. Several months ago, this group issue a communiquQ
threatening CISEN, Mexico's civilian intelligence
organization. Attacks, however, are sporadic and it is
doubtful domestic groups have the wherewithal to make an
impact with sustained armed operations. More recently, EPR
and the GOM have been floating possible scenarios under which
they would entertain a dialogue but have yet to reach
agreement.

¶3. (S) Mexican authorities are receptive to concerns raised
by foreign governments regarding potential infiltration by
foreign groups, stepping up security and surveillance when
circumstances warrant, investigating special interest aliens
and taking action against human trafficking and smuggling
operations that might be exploited by terrorists. (A March
2007 procedural change, however, has complicated this
picture. Instead of holding SIAs in one central facility
near the capital, migration authorities now detain and
release such individuals where they are originally found,
complicating our ability to investigate and track them. CBP
has been working with senior migration officials, who are
sympathetic to our concerns. On a positive note, CISEN,
which is our primary interlocutor on counterterrorism, has
allowed USG officers to interview foreign nationals detained
at Mexican immigration detention centers dispersed around the
country for potential CT information of interest.)

¶4. (U) Mexico strengthened its anti-terrorism regime last
year with passage of legislation outlawing terrorist
financing and associated money laundering, significantly
toughening penalties for a variety of terror-related
activities in the process. While the legislation lacked some
important provisions, such as assets forfeiture measures, it
represented a significant step forward in suppressing those
who plan, facilitate, finance or commit terrorist acts. It
is also worth noting, that the judicial reform bill passed in
February includes provisions for asset forfeiture. Money
laundering remains a serious problem and Mexico needs to
dedicate more resources to combat this problem.

¶5. (S) The GOM coordinates well with the USG in a variety of
counter-terror areas. Mexico has begun exploring programs
designed to deter terrorists from using Mexico's seaports as
staging areas for introducing terror-related materials.
Mexico cooperates with USG elements in countering money
laundering activity and its military is actively looking to
gain greater control over its vast maritime zone through
equipment upgrades and counter drug initiatives. CISEN and
DNI's Open Source Center recently negotiated a formal
information sharing arrangement which will permit
subscription to each other's open source products.

¶6. (U) In July 2007, the Mexican Government created the
Specialized High-Level Committee on International
Disarmament, Terrorism, and Security -- otherwise known as
the National Authority -- to "unify, coordinate, design, and
articulate the government of Mexico's public policies to
comply with international obligations on disarmament,
nonproliferation and terrorism." CISEN is the titular head
of the National Authority which is to serve as a coordination

MEXICO 00001487 002 OF 003


entity. The other permanent members include the Foreign
Ministry (SRE), the Finance Ministry, the Defense Ministry
(SEDENA), the Navy (SEMAR), the Attorney General's Office
(PGR), the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), and the
Transportation and Public Communications Ministry. The
National Authority consists of six permanent working groups
including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons,
conventional weapons, terrorism, administrative and legal
harmonization and international security. Tasks undertaken
by the working groups include legislative and administrative
harmonization; export controls consultation; development of a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
(CBRNE) national controls list; the national industry
registrar; industry outreach and awareness; enforcement;
inspection, verification and control; capacity building; and
intelligence sharing.

¶7. (U) Areas of concern remain. Mexico's large territory
and traditionally weak enforcement of the movement of peoples
and goods both at its borders and within Mexico make it a
potential transit point for terrorists intending to launch
attacks against the U.S. Moreover, in recent years,
criminality has taken on a growing presence in Mexico and
engendered concern that the government had lost significant
ground in many locales to narco-cartels. Rampant
lawlessness, widespread corruption and the government's
long-standing inability to confront either had been seen as
troubling threat indicators to those watching our southern
border for signs of potential terrorist infiltration.

Aggressive New Posture on Law Enforcement and Security

¶8. (U) In the past year and a half, however, the GOM has
taken aggressive steps to turn the situation around. Since
taking office, Calderon has launched anti-drug operations in
ten states, raised pay for the military, and replaced
numerous high-ranking federal police officers. He launched
improvements to inter-agency communications and oversaw a
successful effort to pass legislation unifying federal police
forces and reform the judicial system. These enhancements, if
fully implemented, should strengthen the GOM's security
capabilities across the board and make it better able to
confront potential challenges from all manner of ill-intended
non-state actors. For the time being, the government's
aggressive posture has provoked violent struggles within and
among cartels as well as attacks on security personnel
producing record numbers of drug related homicides including
the killing of police and military officials

¶9. (U) Calderon has also placed a high premium on
strengthened law enforcement cooperation with the U.S. which
extends on cases run out of the Attorney General's Office
ranging from child pornography and fugitives to kidnapping
and money laundering. He has significantly expanded the
number of criminal extraditions, instructed key members of
his security team to engage their USG counterparts fully and
worked closely with us to develop a joint approach to
counter-narcotics through such efforts as the Merida
Initiative, a program to provide Mexico with $1.4 billion in
assistance to help it combat organized crime. Post's Office
of the Legal AttachQ has provided Mexico's Public Security
Secretariat (SSP) with training in a variety of fields
including counterterrorism, interview techniques, and
fingerprinting; we also sponsored approximately 60 officials
at FBI Training Academy last year for the LEEDS Course. The
emerging pattern of bilateral cooperation across the board is
highly positive and likely to take on momentum in years to
come.

Old Attitudes Complicate Dialogue on Security Issues

¶10. (U) Despite Mexico's commitment to broaden bilateral
cooperation, there are differences between the U.S. and
Mexican approaches to global affairs to be considered when
seeking dialogue with Mexican interlocutors on security and
foreign policy issues. Mexico is still developing an
"over-the-horizon" view of the world and the potential
security threats it throws up. It does not share our
position on the need for robust, forward-based defense of our
security interests in the Near East or South Asia. It places
less emphasis on the potential threat to the region emanating
from groups such as Al-Qaida. It is less nervous about
Iranian diplomatic, economic and political outreach in the
region than we are.

¶11. (C) Closer to home, Mexico has traditionally sought to
play a regional role that is independent of the U.S. With
the exception of the Fox administration, Mexican governments
-- including Calderon's -- have generally sought to maintain
warm ties with Cuba. Similarly, until recently, the GOM had

MEXICO 00001487 003 OF 003


sought to avoid conflict with the current Venezuelan
government. Mexican officials and citizens alike have viewed
the activities of populist governments, and even certain
armed groups, in the region as relatively benign. One senior
official in Mexico's Foreign Relations Secretariat recently
told us that even the FARC had its "historical context" which
conveyed a certain amount of legitimacy to the organization.
You should remember that Mexicans still view global and
regional security issues through a different prism than we do
when discussing such issues.

¶12. (C) Comment: The Calderon administration has committed
to significantly strengthening the security relationship with
the United States, but remains keen to balance this effort
against its desire to be seen in the region as an influential
-- and independent -- actor. Security cooperation,
particularly in the area of counter terrorism initiatives,
will necessarily be low key for some time to come. That
said, security cooperation in combating organized crime has
never been better. We expect your visit will only reinforce
burgeoning cooperation we are observing across the board when
it comes to law enforcement activities. End Comment.

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
and the North AmericanPartnership Blog at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

GARZA

Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1994, NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: MINISTER TIMMERMANS REGRETS

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07THEHAGUE1994.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07THEHAGUE1994	2007-11-15 12:12	2011-01-22 17:05	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy The Hague

VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1994/01 3191207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151207Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0693
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0701
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0331
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1756
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2193
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0628
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0583

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001994

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL EU RU KV YI
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: MINISTER TIMMERMANS REGRETS
RUSSIA DEALS

REF: THE HAGUE 1979
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall for reasons 1.5(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 9, Ambassador met with Dutch MFA
Minister for European Affairs Timmermans to discuss Russia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, French President Sarkozy, Timmermans,
upcoming trips to the United States, and plans to commemorate
400 years of American-Dutch relations. Although Timmermans
officially defended the reasons for recent Dutch-Russian
energy deals, he privately confessed disappointment. He also
expressed strong doubt the EU could ever reach consensus on
Kosovo. Timmermans is visiting New York November 16-18, and
will also visit Washington DC November 26-28; he is seeking
high level meetings at State, DOE, NSC, and Capitol Hill (see
para 8). END SUMMARY.

Dutch - Russian Relations
-------------------------

¶2. (C) Timmermans stated he was not without concerns about
the latest Dutch-Russian business agreements. However, he
must defend the government's policy. (Note: Timmermans
served previously as a diplomat in Moscow and is known to
advocate a stronger human rights policy toward Russia. On
November 8, Timmermans' fellow MP and Labor Party member
Martijn van Dam criticized PM Balkenende's purported failure
to publicly discuss human rights during the PM's recent visit
to Russia.) Timmermans noted that the positive news is that
engaging Russia is the only way to influence it. There isn't
a level playing field for energy deals, and the Dutch energy
sector needs the deals with Russia. If the Russians don't
make deals and follow through to develop their energy sector,
they will default on their contracts, and the fallout will
hit Germany and then the Netherlands. Timmermans concluded
that he has great concerns...but Russia is not going away.

Kosovo
------

¶3. (C) Timmermans noted that Russia was creating havoc in
the Balkans, and Kosovo will be a messy affair. The
Russians will react strongly (to a Kosovar declaration of
independence), and the European reaction will be all over
the place, I'm afraid. Timmermans was concerned about the
future implications of the EU's outreach to Kosovo: Kosovo
is run by people who live off crime...(they have) no other
means to support themselves.

Afghanistan
-----------

¶4. (C) Timmermans had just returned from the Dutch cabinet
meeting, where Afghanistan was discussed only on the
margins. In principle, the first round of cabinet
discussions will take place November 16, and everyone wants
to avoid delay that could mean a January, rather than
December, parliamentary decision (reftel). For Timmermans,
setting an 18-24 month time limit on the Uruzgan deployment
is key -- the deadline should be firm to avoid repeating the
Dutch debate in two years. (Note: Timmermans' statement
reflects the view of the Labor Party. Timmermans added that
his brother will soon go to Afghanistan as a battalion
commander, and that he thinks about the parents of the dead
soldiers in Afghanistan.) The Dutch will not disengage from
Afghanistan any time soon, but will disengage from Uruzgan.
The French decision to deploy in Uruzgan is very good news,
though there was an explicit deal between PM Balkenende and
President Sarkozy -- that the Dutch would deploy to Chad in
exchange for the French deployment to Afghanistan.

Sarkozy
-------

¶5. (C) President Sarkozy is creating a wonderful opportunity
for the EU and the United States. However, the risk is that
he may overpromise and underdeliver in France and within the
EU. Sarkozy's steps toward NATO are extraordinary.

Timmermans' Trip to the United States, Dutch-U.S. Relations
--------------------------------------------- --------------

¶6. (C/NF) Timmermans wants to make the 2009 celebration of
American-Dutch relations a success. He is working to
focus organizers during his meetings in New York November
16-18. He spoke earlier to New York Governor Spitzer about
the events, and the governor was committed to the issue.
Queen Beatrix has expressed interest in participating (Note:
Please protect. Timmermans asked that the information about
the Queen not be shared.).

¶7. (C) Timmermans also commented on Dutch-U.S. relations
after the 2008 elections -- he does not expect much change.
There are few differences among the campaigns on foreign
policy. If the Democrats win the White House, they won't
disengage from Iraq. If the Republicans win, they won't put
any less effort into building relations with Europe.

¶8. (SBU) Timmermans thanked the ambassador for agreeing to
help set up meetings for Timmermans' November 26-28 trip to
Washington. He would like to meet with Energy Secretary
Bodman, Under Secretaries Burns and Jeffrey, as well as
senior National Security Council contacts and members of
Congress.

COMMENT:
-------

¶9. (C) Although his official portfolio covers European and
Cultural Affairs, Timmermans is a major behind-the-scenes
player within the Labor Party (PvdA) on foreign and defense
policy issues generally, including the Uruzgan extension.
Timmermans' support, while still in opposition, for sending
Dutch troops to Uruzgan was one of the key factors convincing
PvdA leader Wouter Bos to support the original deployment
decision in 2005. Now that the issue of a new referendum on
the EU reform treaty has been settled in the Balkenende
government's favor, Timmermans appears to be focusing on
European Energy policy as his next big project. His views on
this subject will carry weight not only within the
Netherlands, but also in EU circles where he is widely
respected. End Comment.
Arnall

Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1992, NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: BALKENENDE MIXES BUSINESS

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07THEHAGUE1992.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07THEHAGUE1992	2007-11-15 12:12	2011-01-22 17:05	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy The Hague

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1992/01 3191206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151206Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0689
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1754
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001992

SIPDIS


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON PINR IR RU KO NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: BALKENENDE MIXES BUSINESS
WITH PRESSURE

REF: A. THE HAGUE 1985
¶B. POL/ECON IN THE NL 11/09/07 AND 11/14/07

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND E. ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B/D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During his November 5-8 visit to Moscow,
Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende engaged Russian President
Putin on tough issues such as Kosovo, Iran, and human
rights in addition to announcing a major multi-billion dollar
gas pipeline deal (reported septels). Balkenende believes
that strong economic ties with Russia and demonstrating
respect for Russian pride are the keys to influencing Putin.
Although Balkenende claimed to have delivered a strong and
clear message on the need to respect democratic norms, he was
later criticized in Parliament for appearing to place Dutch
economic interests ahead of human rights concerns. END
SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) In a November 13 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Dutch
Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende expressed satisfaction
regarding his November 5-8 visit to Moscow. Without directly
referring to the substantial new energy cooperation
agreements announced during the visit -- for which Balkenende
has been criticized in Parliament (refs) -- Balkenende argued
that the Netherlands' growing economic ties to Russia make it
possible to engage Russian President Putin directly on the
most difficult issues. Balkenende stressed that he did not
shy away from discussing sensitive issues, such as human
rights, both in public and in his private conversations with
Putin.

¶3. (C) Balkenende proudly noted that he and Putin were able
to conduct nearly all of their conversations in German,
which, he said, allowed for a more open and direct
conversation than working through translators. Putin, he
added, was obviously a clever guy who was well briefed on
every issue discussed. According to Balkenende, Putin
readily acknowledges that there are serious problems in
Russia, such as corruption, and was willing to listen to
constructive criticism. At the same time, however, Putin
remains sensitive to perceived slights to Russia's status as
a great power, and is motivated -- in Balkenende's view -- as
much by national pride as by geopolitical or economic
considerations. Treating Putin, and Russia, with respect,
therefore, is a necessary first step before engaging on tough
issues.

KOSOVO:
-------

¶4. (C) According to Balkenende, Putin showed little concern
over the lack of progress on Kosovo. Asked what would happen
if no agreement satisfactory to both sides can be reached by
December 10, Putin told Balkenende: then we go to December
¶11. Putin also reportedly tried to downplay the potential
for regional instability by noting that other countries in
Europe -- such as Belgium or Ireland -- are also divided
along ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences.
Balkenende dismissed these arguments and stressed that there
is no point in talking and talking without ever reaching a
solution. On the other hand, Balkenende made clear to
Ambassador Arnall that he is deeply worried about divisions
within the EU should Kosovo unilaterally declare
independence, a development that would post the most serious
challenge to the EU in fifteen years.

IRAN/MISSILE DEFENSE:
---------------------

¶5. (C) On Iran, Balkenende said he had impressed on Putin the
importance of maintaining a united front to ensure Iran does
not succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. He also
underscored the key roles of the IAEA and the UNSC, and the
potential damage to their credibility should Iran continue to
ignore its obligations. Balkenende said Putin had
demonstrated a deep understanding of the situation and
appeared genuinely concerned. He added that the Russians
believed they had detected a new, more positive tone in their
recent dealings with Iran (and with Supreme Leader Khameini
in particular), but did not elaborate. (Note: Per ref A,
MFA Political Director Pieter de Gooijer is in Tehran this
week.)

¶6. (C) On the related issue of missile defense, Balkenende
was pleased that recent talks between senior U.S. and Russian
officials appeared to have taken some of the heat out of
Russian opposition to a U.S.-proposed missile shield in
Eastern Europe. That said, the sides clearly remained far
apart and it will be difficult to find a compromise. Putin,
he added, continued to push for increased dialogue between
Russia and NATO on this issue.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
---------------------------

¶7. (C) Balkenende was adamant that he was not afraid to raise
human rights concerns during his visit. He noted that he met
with NGO's working on civil society and rule of law projects
receiving assistance from the Netherlands. In his private
meetings with Putin, and in his press interviews, he had also
stressed the Dutch commitment to democracy and the rule of
law. (Note: Per ref B, Putin apparently later criticized
Balkenende for some of his public remarks.) Balkenende
stressed, however, that such comments would fall on deaf ears
if not accompanied by appropriate gestures of respect and
understanding for Russia's unique situation. Unlike the U.S.
or the Netherlands, Russia has had at most sixteen years of
democracy. Putin, he added, is admired internally for his
strong leadership -- to the point that most Western leaders
should and do envy his popularity ratings.

COMMENT:
--------

¶8. (C) Balkenende was obviously impressed by Putin and feels
that he is someone he can do business with -- literally, in
fact. The announcement of a multi-billion dollar accord
between Gazprom and the Dutch gas company GasUnie during the
visit opened the Prime Minister to criticism -- including
from some members of his own party -- for appearing to place
Dutch economic interests ahead of human rights' concerns.
The fact that the deal was announced the same week the
Foreign Minister publicly presented the Cabinet's new, more
aggressive international Human Rights Policy to Parliament
only heightened the contrast and further motivated
Balkenende's opponents to attack him; at one point, Foreign
Minister Verhagen found himself calling the Prime Minister in
Moscow directly from Parliament for guidance. Several
contacts have since acknowledged that holding the two events
so close together was a serious miscalculation.
Arnall

Viewing cable 09ALGIERS370, BOUTEFLIKA REELECTED IN HEAVILY MANAGED CONTEST

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ALGIERS370.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09ALGIERS370	2009-04-13 19:07	2011-01-22 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Algiers
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

VZCZCXRO5599
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAS #0370/01 1031912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131912Z APR 09 ZDK CTG RUEHNM#3308
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7347
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6738
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1918
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0956
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0544
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000370

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2024
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA REELECTED IN HEAVILY MANAGED CONTEST

REF: A. ALGIERS 337
¶B. ALGIERS 331
¶C. ALGIERS 147

Algiers 00000370 001.14 of 004


Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: To the surprise of noone, Algerian President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected to a third term on April 9
in a carefully choreographed and heavily controlled election
with official results the main opposition leader called
"Brezhnevian." Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni
announced in a press conference on April 10 that a record
74.54 percent of over 20 million eligible voters participated
in the election, with Bouteflika receiving 90.24 percent of
the votes. Opposition parties and defeated candidates have
placed actual turnout figures at between 18 and 55 percent,
while informal Embassy observations indicated that the vast
majority of polling stations were empty across the capital,
with actual turnout at 25-30 percent at most. A joint
statement by observer teams from the African Union, Arab
League and Organization of the Islamic Conference was quick
to proclaim the election "fair and transparent," but UN
monitors declined to participate in the statement despite
Algerian government pressure to do so. Their concerns, to be
presented in a private report to UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon, illustrate a system in which opposition parties and
civil society have their backs against the wall and citizens
have little to do with a political process increasingly
detached from society. With Bouteflika's hold on power
secure, Algeria now faces an urgent need for dialogue between
the population and the state, a situation that left the UN
monitors deeply worried about what comes next. END SUMMARY.

Bouteflika's "crushing majority"
--------------------------------

¶2. (C) Interior Minister Zerhouni officially pronounced
President Bouteflika the victor in the April 9 election
during a press conference at an Algiers hotel on April 10,
closing the final chapter on the President's bid for a third
term made possible by the November 12 revision of the
constitution that removed presidential term limits. Zerhouni
proclaimed that 74.54 percent of Algeria's 20 million
registered voters had gone to the polls the preceding day,
delivering a landslide victory for the incumbent. After the
final vote tally, Zerhouni said Bouteflika landed 90.24
percent of the vote, followed by Worker's Party (PT)
candidate Louisa Hanoune with a distant 4.22 percent, the
Algerian National Front's (FNA) Moussa Touati with 2.31
percent, El Islah's Djahid Younsi with 1.37 percent, Ali
Fouzi Rebaine of Ahd 54 with 0.93 percent, and Mohamed Said
of the unregistered Party for Liberty and Justice (PLJ) in
last place with 0.92 percent.

¶3. (C) As many observers here predicted before the election
(ref A), the official turnout figure has stirred more
controversy than the election result itself. Two hours after
the polls closed on election day, Zerhouni put turnout at
74.11 percent, revising the number slightly upward the next
day. State-run television (ENTV) and the pages of the regime
newspaper El Moudjahid ran images depicting crowds of voters
queuing outside Algiers polling stations. But anecdotal
reports of voter activity suggested Zerhouni's figure to be
greatly exaggerated. Some of our local staff noted that the
crowds of voters on state media appeared dressed for cold
weather, while April 9 was generally warm and sunny,
suggesting that officials used archive footage from previous
elections. The opposition Rally for Culture and Democracy
(RCD) charged that at several polling stations, the Interior
Ministry bussed in loyal voters such as plainclothes police
to create an optic that matched the desired turnout result.
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us the polling stations
he visited with a French journalist were almost empty. In
one case, he met an unemployed man who said he was voting
because he was told to present his voter card in order to
obtain a passport. A woman at another polling station told
xxxxxxxxxxxx she was there to visit her daughter, who was a polling
official, but she did not intend to vote.

¶4. (C) Opposition parties boycotting the election and the
defeated candidates gave turnout estimates ranging between 18
and 55 percent. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us his
party's observers believed 25 percent was a more accurate
turnout figure for the capital, compared to the Interior
Ministry's claim of 64.76 percent. The foreign ministry had
declined to authorize Embassy officers to observe the voting
process, but Embassy personnel informally observed voting at

Algiers 00000370 002 of 004


more than 30 polling stations throughout the capital and saw
only a handful of voters trickling in and out during peak
voting hours. Some employees were able to get informal
statistics from friends or relatives working in polling
stations. At a voting bureau in the CEM Pasteur neighborhood
of central Algiers, 74 of 214 voters cast ballots, a
participation rate of 34 percent. The vote tally counted 48
votes for Bouteflika, 8 for Lousia Hanoune, 5 for Said and
one each for Rebaine, Touati and Younsi. Voters spoiled 10
of the ballots cast, generally considered a "vote blanche" or
protest vote. At another polling station in the same
neighborhood, 85 out of 281 voted with 21 ballots spoiled.
These anecdotal percentages mirrored what the UN monitoring
team told us on April 11 that they had observed. At a vote
count UN monitors attended, 120 of 345 registered voters
participated (34 percent); 75 percent of the votes, they
said, went to Bouteflika and 20 percent of the ballots were
spoiled.

Resigned objections
-------------------

¶5. (C) Each of the losing candidates expressed public doubts
over official turnout figures, while resigning themselves to
the outcome. Fouzi Rebaine accused the government of
inflating vote figures and said he could easily accept defeat
if the numbers were "real." Rebaine threatened to file a
complaint with the UN instead of Algeria's national election
commission, claiming Algerian institutions connected to the
election lacked credibility. Djahid Younsi described the
election results as nothing short of "miraculous," and
estimated voter turnout was closer to 25 percent. PT
candidate Louisa Hanoune believed she actually won at least
30 percent of the vote, and added that the official turnout
figure made Algeria look like "a banana republic." The
leader of the three-person UN monitoring mission, M.I. Abdool
Rahman, told us April 11 that his mission was "quite certain"
something was not right after receiving many vague
allegations of fraud from opposition parties, but the lack of
detail made it impossible to describe with certainty the type
of fraud and how it occurred. The most detailed example of
vote tampering we received came from an Embassy employee who
observed a phone call in which a polling station worker was
told by an Interior Ministry official to use an inflated
figure for the number of ballots cast during the day. When
the polling station closed, Interior Ministry police
presented the polling station worker with a vote protocol to
sign, featuring a grossly inflated figure and names he simply
had not seen during the day.

¶6. (C) There were other signs of government efforts to manage
the optics of the process and keep voices of dissent out of
public view. An Embassy officer watched as a soldier in
uniform made a young Algerian scrape boycott posters off the
exterior wall of the FFS party headquarters in Algiers on the
morning of April 10 even before the official announcement of
the results. Taking aim at the RCD's campaign to make April
9 "a day of national mourning," Zerhouni said during his
April 10 press conference that RCD activists would face
justice, particularly for replacing the Algerian flag over
their headquarters with a black flag of mourning. His
statement apparently cleared the path for a commando raid on
RCD headquarters in El Biar, organized by Algiers Mayor Tayeb
Zitouni, who led a small group of young men in throwing rocks
and attempting to scale the RCD walls to seize the black
flag. RCD leader Said Sadi told us on April 11 that the
election result was "Brezhnevian" and that RCD members
succeeded in thwarting the April 10 attack.

Security incidents
------------------

¶7. (C) There were no major security incidents in the capital
(where an exceptionally heavy security presence was visible)
but there were reports of isolated violence in other regions
across the country. The most serious was a report that a
suicide bomber in the town of Boumerdes (30 miles east of
Algiers) detonated a bomb in a polling station, killing two
police officers. Notably, no voters were harmed in the
attack. In Tamait, in the eastern region of Bejaia, two
opposing political groups created a scuffle near a polling
station that caused an interruption in voting. In Tizi
Ouzou, a group of young Algerians boycotting the election
rushed into a polling station and destroyed three ballot
boxes. When police intervened, one officer was injured by a
Molotov cocktail used by one of the youths during the
confrontation. In Bouira, a group of young men set fire to a

Algiers 00000370 003 of 004


polling station. The local press also reported explosions of
small bombs in Skikda, Tipaza, Tebessa, Tizi Ouzou and Larbaa
Nath Irrathen in the Kabylie region.

A heavily managed affair
------------------------

¶8. (C) The government's management of pre-election and
election-day activities demonstrated a carefully orchestrated
strategy to control the process by using complicated
procedural rules to maintain the outward appearance of
transparency (ref A). The UN's Abdool Rahman told us on
April 11 that Algeria's legal framework itself provided room
for fraud: "For every concern we raised, the government could
point to a rule in the elecTnQ;g1fEQUxwQ[action,"
he said, adding, "We didn't have many good conversations."
Abdool Rahman and his colleagues said the primary weakness of
the process was the government's credibility as an impartial
actor. He noted there was no role for civil society, or
consultation with stakeholders outside the government or
Bouteflika's administration. Even the institution charged
with hearing complaints from candidates and voters, the
National Commission for the Surveillance of the Presidential
Election (CNES), was formed by the government and its
chairman was appointed by President Bouteflika. "Civil
society should have been in the lead." Abdool Rahman said he
raised these concerns in a conversation with the vice
president of the Constitutional Council, who agreed that
opposition parties should have had more representation in
electoral institutions. Another concern the UN team raised
was that candidates, with the exception of Bouteflika, only
had access to the media during the official campaign period
of March 19 - April 7. Abdool Rahman added that throughout
the election boycotting parties were prohibited from speaking
up. AU observer Calixte Mbari shared the UN concern with
media access: "It's too bad we couldn't be here to see the
pre-campaign media environment," he told us, "that would have
been interesting."

¶9. (C) Abdool Rahman said his mission was hindered by the
government's effort to control its meetings and use the
mission's presence to convey the official election story. He
noted that outside of his election-related meetings, he met
only with the U.S. and European Union foreign missions during
his visits to Algiers, something he said the government
actively tried to prevent. Abdool Rahman said Algerian
officials forced schedule changes to prevent a meeting at the
Embassy during the team's mid-March visit. He remarked that
an MFA official even attempted to attend an internal UNDP
country team meeting, as well as a private meeting at the
French embassy. "We had to politely tell him no," he said.
At meetings arranged by the government, team member
Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte said, it was hard to talk to "real"
people. He complained that the team was forced to sit
through a staged civil society meeting in Tizi Ouzou and
listen to canned statements on the election's fairness. We
experienced a similar situation when the Ambassador attempted
to sat meet on April 10 with AU Observer Mission leader
Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique. After
originally agreeing to a 9:15 meeting, the AU team informed
us the meeting was moved to 10:00, the same time Zerhouni was
expected to deliver the election results. We waited for 15
minutes to see Chissano, only to have an MFA official
interrupt the meeting after roughly five minutes to inform
Chissano that he was being summoned to attend Zerhouni's
press event, which ultimately took place at 1130.

Recommendations for the future
------------------------------

¶10. (C) Abdool Rahman said that his mission would not comment
publicly on the election. He noted that the Department's
April 10 statement expressing "concern" over the election was
"very strong" but added that his team agreed with it. He
said that the UN mission's decision to say nothing clearly
annoyed the MFA. "They put a lot of pressure on us to make a
joint statement with the AU, AL and OIC." Abdool Rahman told
us his team would draft a report for UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon that
would highlight the problems he discussed as well as positive
aspects of the election. Abdool Rahman believed no decision
had been made as to how much of the report might be made
public, or in what form its recommendations would be
transmitted to the Algerians. We advised the UN team that
public criticism was generally counterproductive; however, we
believed that the government would seriously consider
critical comments made in private, even if the criticism was
not welcome. Abdool Rahman suggested that USUN New York

Algiers 00000370 004.2 of 004


might obtain a copy of the mission's report by contacting the
SYG's office directly at some point in the coming weeks.

¶11. (C) Abdool Rahman predicted their recommendations would
underscore the need to make progress on freedom of expression
and create a more inclusive dialogue between citizens, civil
society and the government. "There has to be some separation
between the government and the administration," he stressed.
He added that a larger domestic observer presence could have
improved the process. Drawing from his experience elsewhere
in Africa, UNDP resrep Mamadou Mbaye commented, "If leaders
can be elected without this essential element, then we would
be worried about the future here." Ali-Diabacte reiterated
his colleagues' remarks, saying "Five years is not a lot of
time; there is a need for dialogue now. I don't see any
alternative."

Procedural bright spots
-----------------------

¶12. (C) There were good practices to highlight, according to
the UN monitors. Algeria's computerized voter registry was
user-friendly and easily accessible in polling stations. If
they had not done so before the election, Algerians could
present a valid form of identification and obtain a voter
card on the spot. Ali-Diabacte added that polling station
officials were well trained and quick to address voters'
questions. The balloting method itself was simple,
inexpensive and effective. Another important election
dynamic, Abdool Rahman underscored, was the sense of security
and general absence of violence.

Comment
-------

¶13. (C) The disparity between the official turnout figures
and what the average person saw on April 9 has caused many
people here to scratch their heads at how the government
expected to legitimize such an exaggerated turnout figure.
In an April 12 editorial, the French-language daily Liberte
question whether the inflated turnout wouldn't ultimately
delegitimize the electoral process the government worked so
hard to craft. Rather than showing that Algeria is on a path
toward greater democracy, the commentator feared that April 9
was more reminiscent of a return to Algeria's one-party
system. Meanwhile, while Bouteflika based his third-term
platform on continuity, we have heard hints that he is
unhappy with the status quo and acknowledges a political
system sagging under its own weight (ref C). With civil
society and opposition now on the ropes, Bouteflika's control
over the system appears secure, albeit with no discernible
vision for a progressive political future. Without unveiling
such a vision through dialogue between citizens, civil
society, opposition parties and government, the fate of the
disillusioned 72 percent of Algeria's population under the
age of 30 remains in doubt, and with it, the long-term
stability of the country. As the UN's Mbaye put it, Algeria
is "sitting on a volcano." We will continue to sift for
opportunities to support reform, and should be prepared to
offer our frank but private opinion of Algeria's progress
along the way.
Pearce

Viewing cable 09ABUJA259, C) NIGERIA: SHELL BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON OIL GAS ISSUES,

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ABUJA259.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09ABUJA259	2009-02-10 16:04	2011-01-22 21:09	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Abuja
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

VZCZCXRO7442
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0259/01 0411610
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101610Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5253
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0802
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000259

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE PASS USTR FOR AGAMA
USDOE FOR GEORGE PERSON AND CHAYLOCK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2028
TAGS: EPET ENRG ELAB PINR ECON SENV PGOV NI
SUBJECT: (C) NIGERIA: SHELL BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON OIL GAS ISSUES,
COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION

REF: ABUJA 203 

Classified By: Ambassador Robin R. Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Shell's regional executive vice president for
Africa Ann Pickard and government relations representative Peter
Francis met with the Ambassador on January 27 in Abuja and provided
an update on problems in the oil and gas sector. Pickard said that
things were going from bad to worse, especially the security
situation. She said that Nigeria now had one of the highest negative
ratings for maritime operations, creating problems for Shell in
hiring oil tankers to load, as tanker operators will work only under
highly selective conditions. Last year there were about 80 piracy
attacks on land and water combined. This year already 15 have been
tallied, which includes 3 for Shell and 3 for Exxon. On corruption,
Pickard said that Nigerian entities control the lifting of many oil
cargoes and there are some "very interesting" people lifting oil.
Oil buyers would pay NNPC GMD Yar'Adua, Chief Economic Advisor Yakubu
and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua large bribes to lift oil. Pickard
also reported an instance of the Attorney General Aondoakaa allegedly
soliciting a $20 million bribe to sign a document. The International
Oil Companies (IOC) are quite concerned about the "very flawed" new
petroleum sector energy bill. The IOCs will be asking U.S., Dutch,
and U.K. COMs to convey points on the bill to GON policymakers.
Pickard agreed that the President's health is a guessing game. She
said that in her recent meetings with Yar'Auda he seems alert, though
very drawn in the face, thin, and frail. Her information is that the
President was not in danger of dying soon, but also was unlikely to
ever fully recover from his ailments. (Note: see septel on oil/energy
sector issues for the Ambassador's meeting with the new Minister of
Petroleum Resources. End Note). END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Shell's regional executive vice president for Africa Ann
Pickard and government relations representative Peter Francis met
with the Ambassador on January 27, 2009 in Abuja and provided an
update on problems in the oil and gas sector. Pickard reported that
Shell's meeting with Minister of Petroleum Resources Dr. Rilwanu
Lukman scheduled for earlier that day had been cancelled; the third
week in a row where key appointments had fallen through, with the
excuse of being summoned to the Presidential Villa. (Note: Emboffs
have observed that meetings with ministers and senior staff are
indeed often cancelled with the explanation that they have been
summoned to the Presidential Villa, even when the President is out of
town. End note). Econ Counselor and Econoff (notetaker) also
attended the discussion.

- - - - - - - - -
from bad to worse
- - - - - - - - -

¶3. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to share with Pickard that
the Mission was in the midst of completing its Strategic Plan and
asked Pickard where she thought Nigeria was headed. Pickard said that
things were going from bad to worse, especially in terms of security.
She said that Nigeria now had the highest negative rating for
maritime security, creating problems for Shell in hiring oil tankers
to load; tankers will work only under highly selective conditions.
She also noted that late on the evening of Saturday January 17,
Nigerian militants attacked and boarded two vessels at a Shell crude
oil loading platform in Bonny and took eight crew members hostage.
Standard procedure on the tanker was followed: the ship went into
immediate lock down; there were no injuries or fatalities from the
boarding. The eight Nigerian crew members who were taken hostage were
later released. The pirates who went through the sections of the
boat to which they were able to gain access, smashing and stealing
computers, electronics, and personal items of the crew members. The
second vessel was a tug boat towing a supply vessel from Bonny to
Calabar. Last year there were about 80 incidents of piracy; this
year already 15 had been tallied, which includes 3 for Shell and 3
for Exxon. GON officials have told Shell to "hire more security."
The price of doing business in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria
continues to climb she concluded. [Note: The International Maritime
Bureau (IMB), a division of the International Chamber of Commerce -
www icc-ccs org - reports that the waters off the Gulf of Guinea
(Nigeria) remain the second worst, with 40 incidents in 2008 to the
Horn of Africa (Somalia) with 42 recorded incidents. The IMB notes
that in 2009 the Horn of Africa will be more intense as Spring comes
due to the large number of foreign warships in the region on active
patrol to ensure the safety and security of vessels. The same
increased security is not expected for Nigeria in 2009. End Note]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
shell believes coup unlikely; corruption worsening
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


Abuja 00000259 002 of 003


¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked what Shell's thoughts were on any
potential for a coup. Pickard answered that there is little
intellectual capital to plan and execute a coup and Shell sees little
potential for one. Pickard then went on to say that corruption in
the oil sector was worsening by the day. The Ambassador asked for a
few examples. Pickard said that Nigerian entities control the
lifting of many oil cargoes and there are some "very interesting"
people lifting oil (People, she said that were not even in the
industry). As an example she said that oil buyers would pay Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) General Managing Director
Yar'Adua, (Note: not related to President Yar'Adua. End Note) Chief
Economic Advisor Yakubu, and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua large
bribes, millions of dollars per tanker, to lift oil. The IOCs
control the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cargos, so GON actors do
not have the same opportunity for illicit gain. Pickard also said xxxxxxxxxxxx
Attorney General Aondoakaa had told a visitor that he would sign
a document only if the visitor paid $2 million immediately and
another $18 million the next day.

- - - - - - -
very bad bill
- - - - - - -

¶5. (C) Pickard reported that Shell, Exxon-Mobil and Chevron all have
big license review disputes with the GON. Shell has taken its
dispute to court and the court is supporting Shell's position.
According to her, Shell is stepping back for the moment, however, to
see how the other two majors negotiation fair, but is not taking its
case out of court yet. The IOCs are quite concerned about the "very
flawed" new petroleum sector energy bill. The bill is silent on what
fiscal regimes would be applied. Shell says that the bill could
reduce the corporation's overall value in Nigeria. GON discussions
around the bill have mentioned the possibility of moving to five-year
licenses and prohibiting exploring both oil and gas from the same
source, which would contradict how oil and gas extraction works in
practice. The bill is silent on joint ventures; it just states that
NNPC will be incorporated. Pickard said the bill was "likely to sail
through." The IOCs will be asking U.S., Dutch and U.K. COMs to
convey points on the bill to GON policymakers. (Note: Pickard
mentioned that the IOCs will not share company information directly;
they will hire consultants, like McKinsey, to produce common themes
so the messages from the IOCs to be shared with the relevant
Ambassadors are clear and consistent. End note). Pickard lamented
that the expected cycle of petroleum is at least five years for the
first oil to flow, another 10 years of production to begin to break
even. These numbers change when oil is $40 per barrel instead of $100
per barrel. Hence, a five year license would not be an incentive for
investment and development.

- - - - - -
gas issues
- - - - - -

¶6. (C) The Ambassador said that the Mission was looking at
performance measures for the economy, i.e. the linkage between the
country's electricity output and gross domestic product (GDP). The
Ambassador shared that the Mission feels strongly that gas for
feedstock is the key to Nigeria's power production, which is only
about 2,800 average megawatts for a country of 140 million people.
Pickard agreed and added that the U.S. got it wrong on its domestic
natural gas policies, which it took over 20 years to sort out. So it
is not surprising that Nigeria has it wrong at this point. She said
there is not adequate infrastructure for gas. Gathering plants and
pipelines to carry the product to the power plants still have to be
financed and built. The Nigeria Independent Power Projects (NIPP)
were located where there is no gas and no infrastructure. In
addition, the international oil companies were coerced into building
a power plant each, something they have no expertise in, and they are
scrambling to deliver gas to these plants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
yar'auda vacation is perhaps something else
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶7. (S/NF) Pickard agreed that the President's health is a guessing
game. She said that in her recent meetings with Yar'Auda he seems
alert but drawn in the face and frail. She reported that a xxxxxxxxxxxx
contact says that the President was not in danger of
dying soon but has serious ailments from which he will never fully
recover. Pickard shared that Berger provides transportation
including planes for the President and has reportedly flown in
doctors and technicians to attend the President (reftel). She said,
for instance, that xxxxxxxxxxxx confided that they flew the
President from Germany to Saudi in September 2008. Additionally, the
Berger contact thought the President would not return to the Villa

Abuja 00000259 003 of 003


offices, as they were moving the President's personal things out of
the Villa. (Note: What we think this means is that Yar'Adua is
spending most of his time in the presidential residence and not in
the Villa offices. End Note).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
hopes that oil nationalism can be tempered
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked how comfortable Shell was with the new
appointment of Dr. Rilwanu Lukman as Minister of Petroleum Resources,
and the appointment of Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo as the new NNPC GMD.
Pickard sees the nationalism card cooling with the removal of former
NNPC GMD Yar'Adua, given that new Minister of Petroleum Lukman is
more "pragmatic" and will hold sway over deputy Minister Ajumogobia.
(Note: Ajumogobia's technical assistant told EconOff in a meeting on
January 14, 2009 that the State Minister was focusing on Gas, since
before the mass cabinet change he was State Minster of Petroleum,
with a separate State Minster for Gas.) End Note. She said she was
also okay with NNPC chief Barkindo. She has worked with Barkindo
several times over the past few decades, especially when they were
both working climate change. She said Barkindo led Nigeria's
technical delegation to climate change negotiations that produced the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)and the
Kyoto protocol to UNFCCC during while he served on its Bureau at
various times. She indicated that although his undergraduate studies
were in political science, he obtained his MBA from Southeastern
University in Washington DC and did postgraduate work in petroleum
economics and management at Oxford University. Although she also said
terms like nationalistic and Chavez she however said that she thought
he could be steered in the right direction on the petroleum sector.

- - - -
comment
- - - -

¶9. (C) Although Pickard clearly seems frustrated with the way things
are going in the maritime security, oil sector legislation, and
corruption which affects Shell's bottom line, it was useful to hear
that she has hopes for the new Petroleum Minister and NNPC chief.
Septel on the Ambassador's meeting with new Petroleum Minister Lukman
will address many of these same issues.

¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.

Sanders

Viewing cable 09ABUJA203, NIGERIA: UPDATED HEALTH INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ABUJA203.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09ABUJA203	2009-02-04 16:04	2011-01-22 21:09	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Abuja
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

VZCZCXRO2938
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0203/01 0351633
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041633Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5177
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1640
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 0614
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0750
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 000203

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2034
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UPDATED HEALTH INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT
YAR'ADUA (C-AL8-02520)

REF: A. STATE 6401
¶B. 08 ABUJA 2525
¶C. 08 ABUJA 2517
¶D. 08 ABUJA 2222
¶E. 08 ABUJA 2165
¶F. 08 ABUJA 2147
¶G. 08 ABUJA 2141
¶H. 08 ABUJA 2123
¶I. 08 ABUJA 2104
¶J. 08 ABUJA 2065
¶K. 08 ABUJA 1822
¶L. 08 ABUJA 1016
¶M. 08 ABUJA 962

Classified By: Ambassador Robin Renee Sanders for reasons 1.4. (b & d).

¶1. (S/NF) INTRODUCTION. Ref A requested updated information
about the health of Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.
We note that our GON and private contacts continue to state
that President Yar'Adua is managing his known health issues
-- chronic kidney problems -- and is not suffering from
something more serious. The Villa also continues to keep a
tight hold on any information concerning his health and has
been cautious about any indications on travel outside of
Nigeria, to avoid additional concerns. As a result, attempts
to gain specific and/or verifiable information on his
condition, prognoses, medication, treatment options are
limited. The Ambassador's last personal dialogue with him
(Ref. C), in which she observed him up close, noted that he
was extremely frail, more soft spoken than usual, his skin
was extremely drawn, teeth were extremely tarred and his
involuntary cough had increased. He was, however alert and
could carry on a sophisticated conversation. We have also
reported, ref. B, recent extensive critical comments by a
Villa staff member on the impact of the President's health on
the country's governance. What is clear is that the
President's health is a matter of growing concern,
particularly on the minds of the northern Nigerian elite. We
have noted a considerable up-tick in what appears to be
behind-the-scenes machinations and backroom dealing, most
notably the recent reconciliation meeting between former
President Obasanjo and former VP Atiku and Atiku's pending
official return in March to the ruling PDP, former President
Babangida's sudden return to the political scene with a
string of public pronouncements, and Kwara Governor Saraki's
machinations to possibly be a PDP candidate in 2011.

¶2. (S/NF) If Yar'Adua were closer to "death's door," we would
expect more of a political power struggle publicly to break
out drawing in these traditional "Godfathers" of Nigerian
politics, as well as newer groupings including Kwara State
Governor Saraki (and Governors' Forum chairman), some of the
other Governors (e.g. Niger and Kaduna), and some members of
the "Katsina clique" who have gathered around Yar'Adua. All
these groups have a shared interest either in maneuvering VP
Goodluck Jonathan out of assuming the presidency, or in
assuring that his power as President was strictly
circumscribed and that he appointed a strong Northerner as
his VP. (We note there has been a speculation of a Yar'Adua
demise in February 2009. Thus, this has not happened and he
may either not be suffering from a terminal disease or could
-- as other leaders have done in the past -- hang on longer
than we anticipate.)

¶3. (S/NF) Yar'Adua began a two-week vacation on January 26
(to date he still remains in Abuja and his vacation is
scheduled to end on Monday, February 9). However, official
statements from the Presidential Spokesman indicated that he
would pass the two weeks in Lagos, Cross River State (at the
Obudu Cattle Ranch) and at his home state of Katsina. There
is widespread speculation, however, that the Villa may be
using the guise of a "vacation" to hide medical treatment.
On January 27, Kwara State Governor Saraki insisted to
Ambassador that Yar'Adua will not/not leave Nigeria during
his vacation; however, we believe that he is most likely
receiving clandestine medical treatment in Nigeria during
this period. Ambassador was told by two key contacts, Shell

Abuja 00000203 002 of 006


VP for Africa on January 27 and Information Minister Akunyili
on February 2, that experts from Germany have been brought in
to oversee the President's treatment. END INTRODUCTION.

¶4. (S/NF) Information below on the health of President
Yar'Adua is keyed to Ref. A questions:

¶A. (c) overall health

A 1. (S/NF) DIAGNOSES: Despite continued statements by the
Villa spokesperson that the President is not in poor health,
several individuals xxxxxxxxxxxx and First Lady Turai Yar'Adua) have
admitted privately to the Ambassador that he suffers from
acute kidney disease (Refs. C, G, H and others). We continue
to hear press and blog reports that Yar'Adua suffers from
lung cancer, although this is generally from sources further
removed from the Presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx is the only credible source who confirmed
that he heard reports of lung cancer. xxxxxxxxxxxx is
not close to the President and has access to tertiary
information at best.) On October 27, First Lady Turai
Yar'Adua told Ambassador that Yar'Adua did not have lung
cancer, but admitted that he suffered from long-term kidney
disease and from asthma (Ref. G). On January 27, Kwara State
Governor Saraki, a medical doctor by training, told
Ambassador that Yar'Adua is "not at death's door" and that he
is learning to cope and manage his energy levels better,
leading to an improvement in his energy and breathing since
the September 2008 timeframe. xxxxxxxxxxxx a contact xxxxxxxxxxxx at
the German Julius Berger company said that Yar'Adua is
steadily weakening and going downhill, noting that although
he is "not in danger of dying soon," his ailments were
serious and chronic. Other media outlets, such as the online
news site "Sahara Reporters" have reported several
conditions: Churg Strauss Syndrome and/or lung cancer along
with kidney disease.

In a follow-up meeting with Information Minister Akunyili on
February 2, xxxxxxxxxxxx told the Ambassador that Yar'Adua remained
extremely weak. xxxxxxxxxxxxx noted that when xxxxxxxxxxxx last met with him it
was at the residence and not the office as he has
substantially reduced his office hours to conserve his
energy. xxxxxxxxxxxx said Yar'Adua told xxxxxxxxxxxx that he really
wanted to go out of Nigeria for "a rest" but given the uproar
over his September 2008 trip to Saudi, he was compelled to
stay in Nigeria to avoid more speculation on his health. xxxxxxxxxxxx
added that Yar'Adua's current strategy is to have meetings
planned well in advance so he can rest up in order to be able
to have enough energy to complete the session.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

A 2. (C) PAIN: Most of Post's information concerns his lack
of energy and fatigue; however, information exists in other
channels regarding pain management.

A 3. (s/nf) health improved/worsened, changes in appearance:
We believe that Yar'Adua still remains weak and as physically
fragile as he was in November-December 2008. Ref. C contains
Ambassador's observations during her meeting with Yar'Adua on
the margins of the December 19, 2008 ECOWAS meetings.
Ambassador noted: he coughed more extensively as he delivered
his speech on becoming ECOWAS Chair, he appeared to weigh no
more than 130-140 pounds, his skin was very taunt, his
handshake was weak, voice was fainter than on previous

Abuja 00000203 003 of 006


meetings, his eyes were deep set with dark circles
underneath, and his teeth were also very badly tarred. Over
the past several weeks, Yar'Adua has made few public
appearances. Despite this, he was able to carry on a
sophisticated conversation. His most recent appearance was
at his daughter's marriage on January 25, 2008, to Bauchi
State Governor Yuguda. Although we believe these appearances
were meant to calm public anxiety, they actually tended to
renew suspicions about his health. Based on pictures and TV
coverage of these events he appears pale and weak. He
continues to lose weight and he coughs and appears at times
to have difficulty breathing when he talks. U.K. diplomats
told us January 28 that they have seen reports that Yar'Adua
wears make-up for public appearances and padding to hide his
weight loss.

A 4. (S/NF) RESTRICTIONS TO ACTIVITY/SCHEDULE: Yar'Adua's
schedule, since assuming office in May 2007, has never
included long days or late night appointments (Ref. M);
however, it has clearly been severely restricted since late
Summer and appears to be more so since late December 2008.
President Yar'Adua has made few international trips since
assuming office, including missing the September 2008 UN
General Assembly meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx
contact of the Mission shared his risk-analysis paper with us
in late 2008 (Ref. B, q.v.), in which he complained that
Yar'Adua's restricted office hours are "taking a heavy toll
on governance." He also noted then that the President "works
for limited hours, often can't keep scheduled appointments,
and cannot undertake rigorous national tours." On xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolCouns that Yar'Adua's
health has improved "a bit" since last fall; however, there
has been no positive impact on his ability to meet the
demands of the presidency. (This comment dove tails with
Saraki's, who also indicated that Yar'Adua has had a slight
improvement.)

A 5. (s/nf) yar'adua aware of his diagnoses/prognoses:
Although the spokesman for the Villa continues to maintain
that Yar'Adua has no serious health problems that hinder his
ability to carry out his executive functions, the President's
wife admitted his serious kidney ailment to the Ambassador.
We do believe that those around him may be jeopardizing his
well-being for their own political gain. We note that, in
conversations with other foreign diplomats, the First Lady
has indicated she is looking forward to Yar'Adua running for
a second term in 2011.

A 6. (C) NAMES AND SPECIALTIES OF PHYSICIANS: Adamu Banye
Barau serves as Chief Physician to the President. Barau
applied for a U.S. visa in April 2008. xxxxxxxxxxxx Barau planned to travel to the U.S. to
purchase medical equipment. In addition, we know Hussaini
Yakasai Munir serves as a Villa medical officer. (NOTE:
Munir applied for a visa in mid-January to attend medical
training in North Carolina from February 2-14. Specifically,
he will attend Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Cardiac Stress
Testing, Overview of Cardiac Catheterization, Non-Invasive
Management of Myocardial Infarction, and Advances of
Echocardiography at Ladan Medical Center, North Carolina
under Dr. Mohammad Lawal Garba.) We also know from several
sources that German specialists do come in and out of Nigeria
as they are, xxxxxxxxxxxx, transported by the
German Julius Berger company.

A 7-8. (c) who provides yar'adua with reports on health and
IS HE FOLLOWING DOCTOR'S ADVICE: We have no specific
information, but we believe that his wife and other members
of the "Katsina clique," such as Agriculture Minister Ruma,
and possibly Kwara Governor Saraki (who is a medical doctor),
are managing Yar'Adua's health strictly for political
reasons, which seems to overshadow any advice he may be
receiving from medical experts.

¶B. Procedures and treatments

B 1. (C) MEDICATIONS AND CHANGES IN MEDICATION: Information

Abuja 00000203 004 of 006


exists in other channels that provides suggestions on what
Yar'Adua may be taking.

B 2. (s/nf) medical procedures/surgeries in the past year:
Yar'Adua had a range of medical tests in Saudi Arabia in late
August 2008, about which there is reporting in other
channels. According to Leadership newspaper, between August
20 and August 31, 2008 he was at the King Abdulaziz Hospital
in Jeddah. We understand that, in 2001 or 2002, while he was
Governor of Katsina State, Yar'Adua had a kidney transplant.
The Ambassador was told on November 1, 2008 that Minister of
Agriculture Ruma was the donor for Yar'Adua's transplant, but
that the kidney now appeared to be failing. The individuals
(lunch attendees at a Central Bank luncheon) maintained that
Ruma's brother had traveled to Germany to determine if he was
a potential match for a second transplant (Ref. E).

B 3. (C) ADVISED TO SEEK TREATMENT IN LAST MONTH: We
understand that travel to Germany was being heavily
considered by the Villa in December 2008, but given that it
sparked renewed public concern about Yar'Adua's ability to
govern, the President remained in Nigeria. This has been
confirmed by xxxxxxxxxxxx

B 4. (S/NF) CANCELED OR POSTPONED ANY PLANNED TREATMENT:xxxxxxxxxxxx told Ambassador on
December 22 that First Lady Turai Yar'Adua confided xxxxxxxxxxxx
that Yar'Adua would travel to Germany for a second renal
transplant between December 16 and January 1 (Ref. C).
Yar'Adua did not take this planned trip given public reaction
to rumors about travel and concerns about his ability to
govern. We have no information on whether this trip may be
rescheduled.

¶C. Medical equipment

C 1. (C) EQUIPMENT ACCESSIBLE IN ABUJA: We understand that
the Villa maintains a dialysis machine for the President's
use in Abuja and from a credible source at Shell Oil Company
that some additional medical equipment for the President
arrived in December-January 2009. xxxxxxxxxxxx
 was more specific in a xxxxxxxxxxxx meeting with
Ambassador, saying that Yar'Adua is on dialysis three times a
week in the afternoons.

C 2. (s/nf) access to equipment to treat lung cancer: u.s.
medical personnel operating in Nigeria believe it may be
possible to bring chemotherapy drugs into Nigeria to receive
chemotherapy; however, the only hospital which may/may have
radiation equipment is Lagos Teaching Hospital. In all,
however, the American physician with whom we spoke on January
29 noted that both chemo and radiation therapy require a
large cadre of trained specialists (from oncologists, to
nurses and equipment technicians). However, Nigeria has
little to no specialists in these areas. Due to the lack of
local specialists, our medical source believed it would not
be possible to receive reasonably adequate treatment in
Nigeria.

C 3. (s/nf) access to equipment for surgery related to renal
FAILURE OR LUNG CANCER: St. Nicholas Hospital in Lagos
recently began performing minimally invasive transplants
(including both removal -- important as all donors in Nigeria
are "living donors" -- and transplantation) using equipment
from South Africa.

C 4. (S/NF) NEW MEDICAL EQUIPMENT BROUGHT TO ABUJA: Press
reports have circulated periodically that new equipment was
being purchased (dialysis machines mainly) and online news
site Sahara Reporters reported on January 22 that a contract
had been awarded previously to one of Yar'Adua's brothers to
build a 10 billion Naira ($64 million) "State House Clinic"
at the Villa (advertised in the SUN newspaper on July 5,
2008). Sahara Reporters maintained that the clinic was never
completed, but that dialysis equipment and equipment for a
complete Intensive Care Unit (ICU) was purchased. As noted
in A6 above, Chief Physician to the President Amadu Barau is

Abuja 00000203 005 of 006


believed to have traveled to the U.S. in May 2008 to purchase
medical equipment. The specific type of equipment is unknown.

C 5. (s/nf) surgical equipment and specialists in nigeria to
PERFORM KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS: The St. Nicholas Hospital in
Lagos has a full transplant team. St. Nicholas has been
performing renal transplants for approximately ten years,
performing more than 80 of the 100 or so transplants that
have been done in Nigeria. To date, there remains no
capacity in Nigeria to do HLA (human leukocyte antigen)
tissue matching, although samples can be taken in Nigeria and
sent abroad for testing.

¶D. Mental health

D 1. (s/nf) does yar'adua seem sad, detached, distracted,
IRRITABLE OR CONFUSED: xxxxxxxxxxxx both reported to
Ambassador in December that the President was exhausted, but
still very intellectually competent, and that the political
haggling and pressure of putting together a new cabinet drove
him to push for a vacation outside of Nigeria. The political
pressures of the cabinet reshuffle reportedly took a further
toll on his physical wellness. At Ambassador's last meeting
with him, he did not seem sad, detached, irritable or
confused.

D 2. (s/nf) does yar'adua conduct meetings/ is he alert and
FOCUSED: Yar'Adua has delivered remarks recently at the
January 12 Armed Forces Remembrance Day and the January 16
presentation of the 2006 Census to the National Assembly, as
well as attended the highly visible wedding of his daughter
to Bauchi Governor Yuguda on January 24. In these public
appearances, he appeared physically fragile. Ambassador
noted in her December 19 discussions with Yar'Adua and
observations of him at ECOWAS that he "remained focused and
still showed intelligence, understanding and awareness in his
dialogue." Others, from the Foreign, Petroleum and
Information Ministers to the Central Bank Governor, have
confirmed the same.

D 3. (s/nf) does yar'adua use prepared notes/ do aides prompt
HIM OR ANSWER FOR HIM: Yar'Adua spoke at the January 12
Remembrance Day events in Abuja without notes. In his
December 19 interactions with Ambassador, he spoke without
notes and without prompting from aides. We believe that he
is still intellectually fit, even if we don't agree with his
style of governance. However, his physical weakness adds to
the inability of his administration to do more on top of his
slow leadership style. We judge that even if his health were
not an issue, his governance and leadership style would
likely remain slow and largely ineffective as a result of his
personality, his lack of a political network of his own, and
the fact that he chooses not to dictate decisions to his
Ministers, even when necessary and/or expected. Although he
may not be up for days beforehand, he still chairs his weekly
Cabinet meetings, which we still understand can run 3-4
hours.

¶E. Spread of health information

E 1. (s/nf) why are yar'adua/family/advisors reluctant to
DISCLOSE HEALTH INFORMATION: While we have heard the
argument that Yar'Adua's quiet personality and his northern
Nigerian culture are the reasons for his unwillingness to
discuss health information, we believe that those close to
him are motivated more by a desire to retain power. His wife
and several special advisors, such as Economic Advisor Tanimu
Yakubu, we would put high on this list as they only have
influence so long as he is President.

E 2.xxxxxxxxxxxx

Abuja 00000203 006 of 006


stage is missed. (This is a point the Mission raises
regularly with GON interlocutors.)

E 3. (c) reasons or motivations for those close to yar'adua
TO LIE ABOUT HIS HEALTH: We would characterize the behavior
of those close to Yar'Adua more as avoidance, secrecy and
disregard for what is ultimately medically best for the
Nigerian President. We would add that the closed-mouth
nature of both Yar'Adua and his wife, plus the influence of
their religion are also factors. In Yar'Adua's May 15, 2008
interview with the Financial Times, he admitted he is "a
normal human being, who can fall sick," hinting at his
medical condition. His wife admitted his kidney and asthma
ailments to the Ambassador on October 27, 2008 without
hesitation. So, his handlers do not directly lie, but just
go to great lengths to avoid talking about it.

#. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
SANDERS

Viewing cable 09ABUJA202, NIGERIA: SARAKI ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, NEED FOR

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

• The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
• The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
• The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ABUJA202.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09ABUJA202	2009-02-04 14:02	2011-01-22 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Abuja
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

VZCZCXRO2813
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0202/01 0351455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041455Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5175
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1638
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 0612
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0748
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000202

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN KCOR TBIO NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SARAKI ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, NEED FOR
ACTION ON PRIORITIES IN 2009, APPOINTMENT OF FORMER NFIU CHIEF TO GOVERNOR'S FORUM

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador met with Kwara State Governor and
President of the Governor's Forum (GF) Bukola Saraki on
January 28. Saraki was his usual self, discussing President
Yar'Adua's health situation and his own attempt to resolve
some of the EFCC's issues by appointing the former NFIU Chief
as Director General of the GF. He also noted that he had
followed through on the framework for stemming polio
outbreaks tha tthe Ambassador had given to him in December
2008 to share with the 36 governors. (NOTE: The Ambassador
had provided the interagency points on what states needed to
do better to address polio in Nigeria.) Saraki continues to
maintain that Yar'Adua does not have lung cancer and noted
that he is less fatigued and breathing better than in
September 2008. Saraki told me Yar'Adua recognizes the need
to take visible action on his seven point agenda in 2009, as
January 2010 will see the beginning of political maneuvering
for the 2011 elections. Saraki put the recent reconciliation
between former President Obasanjo and former VP Atiku in the
context of preparations for the 2011 elections. He again
thanked Ambassador for a presentation on polio sent by the
Mission and noted that the governors agreed to work to
eradicate polio in their respective states under the umbrella
of the "Make Your State Polio Free" campaign. END SUMMARY.

Saraki comments on yar'adua's health
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) On the President, Saraki began by saying Yar'Adua will
remain in Abuja the week of January 26 and plans to travel to
Katsina and other areas of Nigeria the next week. He holds
to his view (as a medical doctor) that Yar'Adua is
chronically ill, suffering from kidney disease, but maintains
that he knows of no plans to go to Germany for treatment and
does not believe he has lung cancer or is in need of a kidney
transplant at this time. Saraki said Yar'Adua wanted to go
out of Nigeria with his family for vacation, but was
concerned that international travel would be perceived as
another medical trip, so decided to stay in Nigeria to allay
any fears. Regarding Yar'Adua's health in general, Saraki
said that Yar'Adua suffers from less fatigue and shortness of
breath than he had in September 2008, and has not had a major
episode since returning to Nigeria from his September trip to
Saudi Arabia, implying that his medical regime has given him
some relief.

¶3. (C) NOTE: In a January 27 meeting, Shell Petroleum Vice
President for Africa Anne Pickard noted to Ambassador that xxxxxxxxxxxx
the German construction and transport company
Julius Berger xxxxxxxxxxxx provide transportation to and
from Germany for doctors looking after Yar'Adua, as well as
helps ship medical equipment to Abuja.

Yar'adua realizes need to act in 2009
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
¶4. (C) Saraki asked the Ambassador (given her recent trip
back) how Nigeria is being viewed in the U.S. these days.
Ambassador noted that there was still concern that there was
not more movement on Yar'Adua's 7-point agenda, nor concrete
steps to improve the Niger Delta situation and the lack of
movement on the anti-corruption fight remains at the top of
the list. Saraki said he discussed this with Yar'Adua and
that Yar'Adua realized he needs to move faster and no longer
has the liberty to be as deliberative as his nature might
dictate. Saraki said that he and Yar'Adua are of like minds
in seeing 2009 as a "make or break" year. In January 2010,
political camps within the PDP will already be formulating
their positions on candidates for the 2011 election and it
would be harder for Ministers and others to take any bold
actions as they seek their godfathers for 2011. Ambassador
asked Saraki if he thought the PDP would support Yar'Adua for
another term, if he so desired. Saraki said he did not know,
noting there are already others interested (i.e., Atiku) who
will also be working the party members. Saraki said he did
not know and has not received any signal from Yar'Adua
regarding his plans for 2011.

Abuja 00000202 002 of 002



Saraki on obasanjo-atiku meeting
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Saraki maintained that former President Obasanjo and
former VP Atiku were having a "lovefest" in order to prepare
for the 2011 elections. Asked about internal machinations
within the PDP lately, which clearly have the governors on
one side and politicos like Obasanjo and Atiku on the other,
Saraki said this was the case and he expected things to
continue in this vein as people begin to decide who they are
going to back for the 2011 election. Saraki said Atiku would
officially be coming back into the PDP in March 2009.

Gov's forum to put efcc back on track
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) Saraki said he is trying to work behind the scenes
getting the issues surrounding the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission "back on track." He maintained this was
the motivation behind hiring former Nigerian Financial
Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Director Ashishano Bayo Okauru as
Director General of the Governor's Forum (announced publicly
on January 27). Saraki said Okauru is not/not being pursued
on corruption nor national security grounds and neither is
there an arrest pending on him. According to Saraki, Okauru
has worked out his "resignation issues." (COMMENT: Given
previous EFCC focus on the Saraki family, we are skeptical of
the Governor's comments as he has a vested in terest in the
EFCC taking its spotlight off his family. END COMMENT.)

State-level polio eradication campaigns
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Saraki said the governors were appreciative of the
polio presentation the Ambassador sent to the Governors'
Forum in December, noting the attendance of Ministry of
Health officials at the forum. The governors agreed to a
campaign to make their states polio-free and report on polio
issues at each GF meeting. Further developments will be
reported septel.

¶8. (C) COMMENT: Although Saraki is very plugged in with
President Yar'Adua and holds a lot of political sway with
many governors, particuarly in the north, we always need to
weigh his motives with the information he provides in
one-on-one meetings. He certainly sees himself as a
potential political candidate at sometime and sees Yar'Adua
as one of his best vehicles to get there. On the other hand,
he clearly has fears about the Obasanjo-Atiku reunion as they
would be a more difficult faction of the PDP to control.

¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
SANDERS